From strategy to tactics : the United States’ counterterrorism towards al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2004–2011

Abstract

Why has this particular counterterrorism mission led to an international conflict? How come neither of the sides seems to be winning the War on Terror? From the viewpoint of these questions, I examine the counterterrorism policies and practices that the United States has aimed at al-Qaeda since the beginning of the War on Terror. I examine how, why and for what purposes has the war been fought on behalf of the United States and why they have chosen the strategic turns that they have. In addition to this, I assess what are the main differences of the warfare and ideology of al-Qaeda and the United States and whether there is something about this particular enemy that has required an armed conflict and does the US-strategy somehow contribute to the inability to end the War on Terror. Thematically formed chapters examine these questions starting from the rise of terrorism, al-Qaeda ideology and counterterrorism as war, continuing to examine the actual conflict and its possible outcomes.