Instrumental and cordial logics of cross-border cooperation in Europe: toward a game-theoretic approach
Zimmerbauer, Kaj; Durand, Frederic; Decoville, Antoine; Kivelae, Satu (2025-04-29)
Routledge
29.04.2025
Zimmerbauer, K., Durand, F., Decoville, A., & Kivelä, S. (2025). Instrumental and cordial logics of cross-border cooperation in Europe: toward a game-theoretic approach. Territory, Politics, Governance, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2025.2490174
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
© 2025 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
© 2025 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:oulu-202505063114
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:oulu-202505063114
Tiivistelmä
Abstract
This theoretical article discusses different logics in cross-border relations through selected features of game theory. The logics of cooperation are examined by first analytically distinguishing cooperation as either instrumental or cordial. Then, applicable features of game theory are selected and integrated into the analytical distinction. These features are rational choice, information sharing, symmetry and duration, and they become complemented by trust as a cross-cutting feature. The paper concludes that game theory, as applied here, is a profitable tool for analytically identifying and discussing the instrumental and cordial modes of cooperation, and more generally is a helpful way to approach and understand the different logics of cooperation in the context of European sub-national cross-border initiatives. The article also points out that the underlying rationalities of cross-border initiatives are not categorical, and that instrumental and cordial types interact.
This theoretical article discusses different logics in cross-border relations through selected features of game theory. The logics of cooperation are examined by first analytically distinguishing cooperation as either instrumental or cordial. Then, applicable features of game theory are selected and integrated into the analytical distinction. These features are rational choice, information sharing, symmetry and duration, and they become complemented by trust as a cross-cutting feature. The paper concludes that game theory, as applied here, is a profitable tool for analytically identifying and discussing the instrumental and cordial modes of cooperation, and more generally is a helpful way to approach and understand the different logics of cooperation in the context of European sub-national cross-border initiatives. The article also points out that the underlying rationalities of cross-border initiatives are not categorical, and that instrumental and cordial types interact.
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