Blockchain technology adoption mechanism for semiconductor chip supply chains considering information disclosure under cost-sharing contract

Abstract

To combat substandard semiconductor chips and enhance market control, a blockchain technology adoption mechanism is crucial in managing semiconductor chip quality within supply chains. This paper establishes two-stage Stackelberg game models treating the usage level of blockchain technology as an endogenous variable for semiconductor chip supply chains consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, considering consumer preferences, decision-makers’ risk attitudes, technological enhancement cost, and additional testing cost. This study expands the application of blockchain technology, game models that treat the usage level of blockchain technology as an exogenous variable, and those that only address the design of single-type cost-sharing contracts. This paper further explores the blockchain technology adoption mechanism from the aspects of the optimal usage level of blockchain technology or enhancement level of information disclosure, pricing strategy, and utility profit. The results indicate when the semiconductor chip manufacturer bears the technological enhancement cost alone, the adoption of blockchain technology improves the information disclosure level, increase the market demand, and reduce the downstream testing demand, enhancing overall profitability. The fixed-ratio cost-sharing contract for additional testing does not prove effective. However, when the semiconductor chip retailer falls below a certain threshold, the fixed-ratio cost-sharing contract for technological enhancement further enhances the usage level of blockchain technology and overall profitability, fostering a win-win scenario.