Mapping the Boundaries of Conscious Life in Margaret Cavendish's Philosophy
Marrama, Oberto
Marrama, Oberto
Peeters
Marrama, O. (2023). Mapping the Boundaries of Conscious Life in Margaret Cavendish's Philosophy. Revue philosophique de Louvain 120(3), 407-434. https://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article&id=3293370&journal_code=RPL
https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
© Peeters
https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
© Peeters
https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:oulu-202411086669
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:oulu-202411086669
Tiivistelmä
Abstract
In this paper I investigate where the boundaries of conscious mental life lie in Cavendish’s theory, and why. Cavendish argues for a wholly material yet wholly thinking universe. She claims that all matter is capable of 'self-knowledge' and 'perception', so that every part of nature 'must have its own knowledge and perception, according to its own particular nature'. It is unclear, however, whether the universal capacity of matter to know and perceive also implies the presence of consciousness. I show that Cavendish’s use of the notions of 'self-knowledge' and 'perception' implies the attribution of consciousness to all bodies. I identify one condition under which the ubiquitous presence of consciousness is intuitively required in Cavendish’s system: namely the presence of intentional agency in every part of nature, which Cavendish conceives as necessary, alongside the capacity of self-motion, to account for the orderly behavior of any body. Dans cet article j’examine si Cavendish établit des limites à la présence de vie mentale consciente dans la nature, et pourquoi. Cavendish défend le concept d’un univers entièrement matériel mais entièrement pensant. Elle prétend que toute matière est capable de «connaissance de soi» et de «perception», de sorte que chaque partie de la nature «doit avoir sa propre connaissance et perception, selon sa propre nature individuelle». Cependant, la question de savoir si la capacité universelle que la matière a de connaître et de percevoir implique aussi la présence d’une conscience, reste dans l’obscurité. Je montre que l’usage par Cavendish des notions de «connaissance de soi» et de «perception» implique l’attribution de conscience à tous les corps. J’identifie une condition qui nécessite intuitivement la présence universelle de la conscience dans le système de Cavendish, à savoir la présence d’une agentivité intentionnelle dans chaque partie de la nature, que Cavendish envisage comme nécessaire, tout comme la capacité de se mouvoir pour rendre compte du comportement harmonieux de tout corps.
In this paper I investigate where the boundaries of conscious mental life lie in Cavendish’s theory, and why. Cavendish argues for a wholly material yet wholly thinking universe. She claims that all matter is capable of 'self-knowledge' and 'perception', so that every part of nature 'must have its own knowledge and perception, according to its own particular nature'. It is unclear, however, whether the universal capacity of matter to know and perceive also implies the presence of consciousness. I show that Cavendish’s use of the notions of 'self-knowledge' and 'perception' implies the attribution of consciousness to all bodies. I identify one condition under which the ubiquitous presence of consciousness is intuitively required in Cavendish’s system: namely the presence of intentional agency in every part of nature, which Cavendish conceives as necessary, alongside the capacity of self-motion, to account for the orderly behavior of any body.
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