What’s forgotten about <em>The Structure of Scientific Revolutions</em>?

Abstract

<div lang="en" class="abs"><p class="abs_header">Abstract</p><p>Thomas Kuhn’s <em>The Structure of Scientific Revolutions</em> is a classic, and it is certainly not forgotten. However, an essential aspect about it has been neglected. That is, Kuhn’s <em>Structure</em> is a book in philosophy of history in the sense that <em>Structure</em> attempts gives an account of historical events, focuses on the whole of the history of science and stipulates a structure of the history of science to explain historical events. Kuhn’s book and its contribution to the debates about the progress of science and the contingency and inevitability of the history of science shows why and how philosophy of history is relevant for the history and philosophy of science. Its successful integration of historical and philosophical aspects in one account makes it worthwhile reading also for philosophers of history in the twentieth-first century. In particular, it raises the question whether the historical record can justify philosophical views and comprehensive syntheses of the past.</p></div>