Unobserved preferences and dynamic platform pricing under positive network externality
Huuki, Hannu; Svento, Rauli (2020-12-29)
Huuki, H., Svento, R. Unobserved preferences and dynamic platform pricing under positive network externality. Netnomics 21, 37–58 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11066-020-09140-w
© The Author(s) 2020. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi-fe202102023545
Tiivistelmä
Abstract
We study the dynamic optimization of platform pricing in industries with positive direct network externalities. The utility of the network for the consumer is modeled as a function of three components. Platform price and participation rate affect the consumer’s decision to join the platform. The platform operator is assumed to know the consumer’s sensitivities with respect to these components. In addition, the consumer’s utility is a function of other attributes, such as network privacy policies and environmental effects of the service. We assume that the distribution of these unobserved preferences in the potential customer base is known to the platform operator. We show analytically how the unobserved preferences affect the dynamic platform price design. Both static and rational expectations with respect to the platform participation are presented. We simulate an electricity market demand side management service application and show that the platform operator sets low prices in the launch phase. The platform operator can set higher launching prices if it can affect customers’ preferences, expectations or adjustment friction.
Kokoelmat
- Avoin saatavuus [36502]
