Incentivizing selected devices to perform cooperative content delivery : a carrier aggregation-based approach
Barua, Bidushi; Khan , Zaheer; Han, Zhu; Abouzeid, Alhussein A.; Latva-aho, Matti (2016-04-07)
Barua, B., khan, Z., Han, Z., Abouzeid, A., Latva-aho, M. (2016) Incentivizing Selected Devices to Perform Cooperative Content Delivery: A Carrier Aggregation based Approach. IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, 15 (7), 5030-5045. doi:10.1109/TWC.2016.2551741
© 2016 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.
In a cooperative content distribution (CCD) using multiple interfaces, a smart wireless device receives content from a base station (BS) on its cellular interface, and it broadcasts the same content through another wireless interface, such as WiFi. However, different users can experience different link qualities, and users with slow wireless links can be a bottleneck in terms of CCD performance. To address this problem, we propose a device selection method, which leverages multiple interfaces of the selected devices to perform CCD. Our proposed method takes into account the link quality of both primary (cellular) and secondary (WiFi/short-range) interfaces of the devices, and selects the devices with the best link quality for CCD. To analyze the stability of the proposed CCD method against selfish deviators, we model the problem as a repeated CCD game. We show that although the proposed method yields significant gains in terms of energy and frequency carrier savings, it is vulnerable to selfish deviating users. To address this challenge, we propose a carrier aggregation-based incentive mechanism. The analytical and simulation results show that the proposed mechanism maximizes individual and network payoffs, and is an equilibrium against unilateral selfish deviations.
- Avoin saatavuus