

Establishing intergovernmental organizations:  
how founding treaty discourse creates collectivity among the  
member states

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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

AU	African Union
CAAU	Constitutive Act of the African Union
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
DA	Discourse Analysis
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
NAT	North Atlantic Treaty
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPECS	OPEC Statute
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UN	United Nations
UNC	Charter of the United Nations

# 1. Introduction

Globalisation has become an increasingly affluent phenomenon in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century due to the deepening of the world-wide interconnectedness when it comes to social, economic and political activity. The policies and political phenomena that previously affected solely sovereign nations have come to affect multiple nations, entire continents or potentially the entire world. It has been argued that since this phenomenon has occurred remarkably rapidly and broadly across the world, this shift could eventually undermine the sovereign nation states as the main governing force (McGrew, 2005, pp. 20-14). While this might be an exaggeration, intergovernmental cooperation has become increasingly important when it comes to policy making, economic development and security issues, as nations have come to acknowledge the necessity for international cooperation in controlling the adverse effects of the globalisation and in gaining the maximum benefits from it. Consequently, the contemporary challenges have developed into neo-tribal politics which are conducted in imagined communities in which the members share values, beliefs and attitudes and draw from the shared social codes to construct a common identity (Dürschmidt & Taylor, 2007). This is especially apparent in the contemporary myriad of intergovernmental organization (IGOs), which are groupings of two or more nations that cooperate on a variety of issues towards common goals in order to protect the group and individual interests in the modern global world. Intergovernmental organizations enjoy increased legitimacy in comparison to other less formal forms of international cooperation, as they are founded on a treaty, agreement or other such document that officialises the cooperation. Such IGOs are subject to international law and have some enforcing capacities towards their member states (Harvard Law School, 2016). All IGO members who sign the IGO founding treaty receive the same rights and responsibilities within the organization and commit to the common goals, principles and practices as they are outlined in the treaty in question.

Intergovernmental organizations tend to be either international or regional in nature. For example, IGOs such as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) can be considered to represent the internationalization of politics, as their member states represent a variety of nations from across the globe and are mainly united either by common political, economic or security goals. In comparison to this, there also exists IGOs that can be considered regional, because their main focus is to work on issues that concern a particular geographical region. The European Union (EU) and the African

Union (AU) can be considered such regional IGOs, because their member states are situated within a relative geographical proximity from each other and they are working to improve the position and stability of their respective continents in particular. (McGrew, 2005, p. 25) Nevertheless, whether an intergovernmental organization aims for international or regional improvement and cooperation, they play an increasingly important role on the global political stage, as a grouping of nations has more resources, influence and political power than individual nations.

In this study the focus will be on the five aforementioned and globally significant intergovernmental organizations: the supranational UN, the military and defence organization NATO, the trade-specific OPEC and finally the regionals EU and AU. These organizations were chosen based on their relatively significant impact on the global politics, economy and security and due to the fact that they have firmly established their status in their respective fields. The UN was chosen due to its significant global influence and its uniquely extensive scope in the current world. The regional unions of EU and AU were chosen to emphasise the geographical influence in the globalization of politics and also to offer comparison between the possible different implementations of a relatively similar concept of a continental intergovernmental union. The military organization NATO and the trade-focused OPEC were taken into consideration due to their similarly intergovernmental nature, but also because their member states are united by shared security and economic agendas, rather than by geographical proximity. Overall, these five organizations should be similar enough in their intergovernmental nature to be comparable, but at the same time their different agendas, structures and constitutions should offer enough variation to form a versatile research basis.

However, this study is not concerned with these IGOs as mainly political organizations, but the focus is on the social aspect of the organizational structures. Consequently, intergovernmental organizations can be viewed as independent social entities that, instead of individuals, consist of sovereign states who act as independent social agents within their social group, the IGO. Generally, in this social group the policy making occurs on democratic principles through discourse and negotiations between the member states, in a similar manner to nations states' civil societies. However, because an IGO consists of multiple sovereign nations that do not necessarily have similar strong unifying factors as social agents in civil societies do, such as common language, similar cultural background, nationality or even shared political ideologies, the IGO collective identity and sense of unity must be artificially created. Even though the benefits that an IGO can provide for individual member states, whether it be political, economic, or security benefits, can operate as the first motivator for joining an IGO, these motivators alone are not enough to explain the longevity and stability of the most successful IGOs. Thus, some level of shared beliefs and

practices as well as a sense of collectivity must exist for the intergovernmental organizations to remain stable and to ensure the success of their collective action. Therefore, this study assumes that even though the initial reasons for a nation to join an IGO may be fundamentally self-interested, the collective mentality within an IGO and the we-attitudes among its members are crucial for the long-term success of the organization.

Based on this approach, this study will treat the founding treaties and agreements of intergovernmental organizations as the basis of the collective identity within intergovernmental organizations. While disagreement and political disaccord may occur within an intergovernmental organization in other organizational discourse, every member state within the organization has originally agreed to the founding treaty articles. Therefore, it can be assumed that the shared collective beliefs, intentionality and practices are outlined in these treaties in a way that each of the sovereign states finds agreeable. This collective acceptance can be viewed as the foundation of the IGO collective identity upon which the we-attitudes that enables collective action is built. Thus, in this study these treaties will be approached as a discourse that takes place between the collective of the IGO and a singular member state: the treaty introduces the collective principles and practices and by signing the treaty the member state consents to both the rights and responsibilities as presented. By focusing on the founding treaties of the five major IGOs mentioned earlier, the UN, NATO, OPEC, EU and AU, this study will examine the treaty discourses and their typical characteristics. The main objective is to determine the quintessential discourse methods and repetitive thematic choices that are used to establish the notion of collectivity and to strengthen the we-attitudes among the signing parties of these treaties. Furthermore, the study will look at how the beliefs and principles of the IGOs are presented in order to appeal universally to the member states who are naturally divided by multinationalism and lingual and cultural differences. Some attention will also be paid to the power relations in the social structures in question, as they inevitably affect the collectives and their members' subject positions. Power imbalances could affect negatively the collective mentality within an IGO, if the member states viewed that their sovereignty was under threat, so it is necessary to examine how the founding treaties implement superficial egalitarianism to avoid this type of disaccord.

Fundamentally, some level of collective identity is crucial for the success of the collective action of an intergovernmental organization and therefore negating the effect of the dividing factors and emphasising the unity and similarities is essential. The preliminary hypothesis is that, due to their similar multinational nature, all IGOs struggle with these challenges and therefore some discourse choices utilized to resolve them must appear in all of the five treaties selected for this study. Even if

some variation in the discourse inevitably exists as a result of the different focus areas of the organizations, the shared discourse choices that reoccur in the IGO treaties can be considered the quintessential format for the creation of collectivity within a multinational organization. As the organizations selected for this study are undeniably different in their purpose, but overall quite successful, it can be assumed that their founding treaties are a prolific example of successful discourse between the IGO collective and the individual member state in creating the sense of unity and collectivity.

Theoretically, determining the effective discourse instruments used in creation of artificial collectivity in multinational setting could present valuable tools for the future of global politics, since it is likely that the intergovernmental cooperation will only increase in significance in the future as a response to the increasing global threats and opportunities. If this study succeeds in determining the typical features of unifying discourse, similar format and methods could be utilized in future treaties of intergovernmental organizations and potentially in other settings where multinational cooperation requires artificial collectivity in order to succeed. Furthermore, even though this study does not take into account other discourse that takes place within an IGO or between the IGO collective and its member states, the discourse methods that encourage collectivity in the founding treaties could be beneficial for the IGO in other circumstances as well. While the treaty documents that the member states sign upon joining an IGO establish the foundation beliefs and principles and the basis for the IGO collectivity, maintaining and developing the collective identity and we-attitude among the member states in the recurrent IGO discourse could further the ideological and political integration, which in turn could improve the effectivity of the collective action taken by the IGO. If the results yielded by this study could also be applicable in this type of everyday IGO discourse, it could potentially improve the operational readiness and effectivity of intergovernmental cooperation.

## 2. Research material

The research material selected for this study consists of official international treaties, agreements, statutes and charters that potential IGO member states must sign in order to join any of the organizations. As presented in the introduction, this study will focus on the Charter of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty, the Statute of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the Treaty on the European Union, and the Constitutive Act of the African Union. Even though the official names and compositions of these documents slightly differ, they will all be hereon referred to as founding treaties throughout this study, since common to all these documents is that their original signing by the founding member states is generally viewed as the creation point of the IGOs in question. This section shortly introduces the five treaties examined in this study in chronological order from the oldest to the newest.

### 2.1. The Charter of the United Nations

The first of the documents used as research material in this study is the Charter of the United Nations which was first introduced in San Francisco at the United Nations Conference on International Organization in 1945. At the time the delegations of fifty nations finalised the contents of the United Nations Charter which was then signed by the founding members on 26<sup>th</sup> of June 1945. When the Charter came to force on 24<sup>th</sup> of October 1945, it marked the official creation point of the United Nations and the first supranational intergovernmental organization (UN.org, 2016). In 2017 the UN has 193 member states who have all signed the Charter. In this number are included every recognized sovereign state in the world, while contested areas such as Taiwan, Kosovo or Palestine, or city states like Vatican City are excluded. This makes the UN the globally largest IGO, which gives its founding treaty a special status among all international treaties. The text of the Charter of the United Nations consist of 19 distinct chapters and a total of 111 articles that introduce the principles and the different organs of the organization and emphasise the four main purposes of the organization: international peace and security, cooperation in resolving international problems, promotion of human rights, and harmonisation of the actions of nations (Curtis & Taylor, 2005, p. 406). The second half of the Charter is the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and

while this section is generally presented as an integral part of the UN Charter, this study will exclude the Statute from research material. This study is focused on the founding treaties and their discourse, and while the Statute has an important role for the UN judicial system, its contents are not particularly relevant in regards to the research focus. Excluding the Statute of the International Court of Justice also brings the composition, length and included issues of the UN Charter more in line with the other treaties examined in this study.

## 2.2. The North Atlantic Treaty

The second document included as research material is the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) that saw the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949, four years after the creation of the UN. These two treaties can be viewed somewhat interconnected, because they were both drafted after the Second World War as a response to the prevailing global political situation. While the UN Charter promotes the principles of peace, the North Atlantic Treaty is concerned with the armed defence and military security in case the UN approach fails. However, the North Atlantic Treaty specifies that any practices and principles adopted by the organization will operate in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. The main purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is to promote military cooperation among the member states in protection of the North Atlantic area, especially focusing on the principle that an attack on one of the member states of NATO is an attack against all of them, which operates in accordance with the UN Charter that promotes collective self-defence in its Article 51 (Scott, 2005, p. 99). The North Atlantic Treaty was originally signed in Washington D.C. on 4<sup>th</sup> of April 1949 by 12 founding members. By 2017 the number of NATO member states has increased to 28 sovereign states mainly from North America and Europe. All of the member states of NATO have signed the original treaty that consists of 14 articles and for new member states that have joined after the original signing date in 1949, the treaty has been expanded with Accession Protocols that include country specific articles for the new member states. Due to the fact that the original treaty text is common to all member states of NATO, this section of the North Atlantic Treaty will be used in the analysis section, while the Accession Protocols will be excluded.

### 2.3. OPEC Statute

The third founding treaty examined in this study is the Statute of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, commonly known as the OPEC Statute, which created the cooperation principles for petroleum exporting countries in January 1961 in Caracas, Venezuela, when it was signed by five founding members. In practice the organization itself was created a year earlier in September 1960 when the founding members signed an agreement concerning the creation of the organization in Baghdad, Iraq. However, this study will approach the Statute as the foundation treaty for the OPEC cooperation, as it is the official document that outlines the principles and main organs of the organization in a manner similar to the other documents examined in this study. The Statute has been applied from May 1<sup>st</sup> 1965 onwards and its 6 chapters and 41 articles aim to coordinate and unify the petroleum trade policies and practices of the member states and to otherwise protect the stability of the global oil trade. According to the Statute, the main goals of OPEC are cooperation in stabilising oil prices, safeguarding the interests of the producing countries and the industry investors, and to ensure a steady supply of petroleum to consumers (OPEC.org, 2017). In 2017 the organization has 13 member states from Middle East, Africa and South America.

### 2.4. The Treaty on European Union

The Treaty on European Union (TEU), also known as the Maastricht Treaty, was signed in Maastricht, Netherlands, on 7<sup>th</sup> of February 1992 by the 12 member states of the preceding European Community. While intergovernmental cooperation had been present in the European politics since the end of the the Second World War, this study will focus on the Maastricht Treaty on European Union in particular, because it is the foundation for the European political integration and the European Union as it is known today. The Treaty on European Union introduces the three pillars of the EU: the European Communities, common foreign and security policy, and police and judicial cooperation on criminal matters. In addition, it presents the concept of European citizenship and the economic and monetary union (EMU), as well as reinforces the powers of the European Parliament (Eur-Lex, 2010). In 2017 the number of the member states of the EU has increased to 28, which means that most European nations belong to this particular IGO and its sphere of influence. In this study the consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union will be used, while the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union that is attached to the TEU is excluded

from the analysis. This decision was made due to the fact that, with its 55 articles and the included content, the TEU structure and composition are better comparable with the other founding treaties examined in the study.

## 2.5. The Constitutive Act of the African Union

The last, and consequently the newest, of the founding treaties examined is the Constitutive Act of the African Union that was adopted in Lomé, Togo, on 11<sup>th</sup> of July 2000. This treaty when it entered to force in 2001 created the African Union as it exists today, but the principles of the African unity and cooperation were much older as the organization was preceded by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The OAU was founded already in 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, by 32 independent African states who sought to establish the basis for African unity and solidarity, to safeguard the sovereignty of African states, improve the lives of the African peoples, and to rid the continent of colonisation and apartheid. The IGO was also meant to cooperate in harmonizing the policies of the member states and to promote international cooperation within the framework of the United Nations (AU.int, n.d.). The African Union was found on the same principles, but as a response to the changing world. By the time of the creation of the AU, the OAU already had 53 member states, which means that those 53 states were the founding members of the African Union. After South Sudan joined the IGO in 2011, the number of the member states became officially 54, which means that the influence of the 33 Articles of its Constitutive Act covers every sovereign state on the African continent. Therefore, the African Union is the second largest IGO examined in this study.

## 2.6. Conclusion to Research Material

Overall, these five treaties are quite similar in regards to their layout, contents and the type of discourse they employ, even though the purposes and goals of the organizations vary somewhat. They all outline the organizational aims and principles, introduce the organs and structure of the organization, and offer insight into the status of the member states in relation to the organization, each other and the rest of the world. Partially this similarity in contents and layout of the treaties can be assumed to result from the fact that, despite the different focus areas, the organizations are

still comparable in nature as they all operate as a mediator of intergovernmental cooperation in the field of international politics. However, there is also diffusion to consider, which in political science refers to the process in which the situation and events in one country begin to influence other countries: In cross-national research testing for its effects is called the Galton's problem, which suggests that there might be a seemingly strong causal connection between variables, where none really exist, due to several samples being jointly affected by another country (Manheim & Rich, 1986, p. 231). This problem is relevant to this study, since even though the research subjects are not nations, but organizations, the same effect could easily surface in the material. In essence, the UN Charter, which is the oldest and most influential of the IGO treaties, could have influenced the contents and discourse of the other IGO treaties. As all countries who are members of any of the other four IGOs examined in the study are also members of the United Nations, the IGOs that were established later were all founded within the framework of the United Nations. Therefore, the UN Charter can be viewed as the most significant treaty of intergovernmental politics, as it does not only influence its member states, but also the IGOs that were established after the UN treaty took effect. It is possible that the influence of the Charter of the United Nations can be recognised within the discourse of the other treaties and therefore this UN effect will be taken into consideration in the analysis should it appear blatant.

The treaties have been amended to some extent over the course of their history and accession protocols have been added when new member states have joined. However, the amendments and additions to the treaty contents have been in line with the treaty texts that all the member states have consented to, so they have not significantly affected the original treaty texts. The treaty texts used in this study are from the official websites and online document databases of the organizations in question, where they are freely available to the public. Since the source of the research material is directly from the organizations themselves, it should be safe to assume that the treaty texts are the original ones with the correct and updated content.

## 2.7. Reference system

In order to better organise the practical presentation of the analysis, a simplified and standardised in-text reference system has been created for the IGO treaties. The composition of the analysed treaties is for most parts identical, but some differences in the structure systems exist within the material, as the treaty articles can be divided into numbered or alphabetised paragraphs or

subsections or in some cases to both, depending on the treaty. For example, a treaty article could be divided into a few numbered paragraphs, which in turn could include alphabetised subsections. The simplest method of organizing this in-text in the analysis is (X:Yn), in which (X) represents the number of the treaty article, (Y) the paragraph number or character, and finally (n) the possible subsection of the (Y) paragraph. Likewise, using acronyms to refer to treaties simplifies this system further (table 1).

Table 1: Acronyms for the examined treaties

<b>ACR</b>	<b>Treaty</b>
UNC	Charter of United Nations
NAT	North Atlantic Treaty
OPECS	OPEC Statute
TEU	Treaty on European Union
CAAU	Constitutive Act of African Union

As a result, the articles and paragraphs of a specific treaty will be referred to in-text as (ACR X:Yn). For example, the subsection (i) of paragraph (1) in Article 9 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union would be referred to as (CAAU 9:1i) in-text. This system is in use because it is applicable to each of research material treaties and because its abbreviated format significantly simplifies the referencing to specific treaty clauses in the analysis.

### 3. Theoretical framework

Even though this study mainly examines intergovernmental organizations as autonomous social groups, it is important to acknowledge that these organizations do not exist in a political void, but are linked to national and international political networks. While the member states also participate in the intergovernmental organizations, most of the political action and policy making are still conducted on the national level and by national actors. Furthermore, sovereign nations can be members of multiple international organizations simultaneously, which means that the intergovernmental cooperation that takes place within and through these organizations is unavoidably interconnected through their members. Therefore, politically IGOs are not truly independent actors, but rather merely a medium in the international political network. However, this study will treat these organizations largely as autonomous social groups, because the main focus is on the group dynamics and group specific discourse. Therefore, the main theoretical framework of this study can be found in sociology, rather than political science. This chapter will introduce the theoretical principles of collective commitment and group ethos that precede the construction of social groups, including the IGOs, and will then discuss how the emergence of collective identity among the group members can support the functionality and longevity of the group. Afterwards, some attention will be paid to issues that can challenge group harmony and reciprocity between the group members, such as stark power imbalances and obvious inequality. Because these elements are crucial for the formation of functional social groups, it can be assumed that these features are also present and acknowledged in the IGO treaties.

#### 3.1. An intergovernmental organization as a social institution

Fundamentally, a social institution is based on a convention; such a convention surfaces when social agents have a common interest in establishing norms to ensure coordination of action, none of the agents has conflicting interests, and all are unwilling to deviate from the collectively approved norms in case the collective coordination of action is lost (Lewis, 1968). This study will approach IGOs as social institutions, which are legitimized by their founding treaties. Such

approach assumes that sovereign states are capable of participating in mutually and individually beneficial cooperation even without the pre-existing presence of group mentality and collective commitments. This type of joint action is ultimately egocentric as the decision to participate in the joint action is based on the national estimation of costs and benefits. In group action, however, the action taken is not only based on individual motivations, but also on group motivations (Tuomela, 2007, p. 3). Therefore, the further treatment of an IGO as a social institution assumes two things: firstly, that the member states of the organization can be viewed as independent social and political agents who consciously participate in the social group, and secondly, that these state agents are collectively committed to the group goals and to fulfilling their role in the group. This distinction is important because it differentiates between the informal international cooperation and the official international commitments that a state agent faces when participating in intergovernmental organizations. Therefore, the first issues to be examined here are what exactly makes nation states autonomous agents when it comes to international collectives and what the participation in such a group actually implies.

Modern nation states are often characterised by their inner diversity. The population consists of multiple different social and ethnic groups who represent varieties of interests and value systems, which reflects in the versatile national political scenery. However, as a whole even a nation state can be treated as an autonomous social agent, if it is viewed as a group capable of acting as a unit that can formulate views and intentions and to act on them responsibly (Tuomela, 2007, p. 3). While there can be nearly irrefutable political, societal and ethnic conflicts on the national level, as a nation participating in the politics on the international political stage, most nation states are capable of presenting a unified front. Based on the dominant cultural and societal values and the central national policies, a nation can form stances and intentions to represent in the international politics and act accordingly in multinational collectives. Together multiple state agents can create intergovernmental organizations if all agents participating are committed to the group and its goals.

However, in order to become a political and social agent within a collective, a potential agent must first be aware of the structure of the collective in question, the distribution of power, the status, rights and duties of the members and how all these are discursively legitimised (Preston, 1997, p. 65). Genuine commitment to a social group is based on knowledge, rather than a belief of commitment. A group member must know what they are committing to and must also be certain that the other group members are committed to the same collective goals and group ethos as themselves. Voluntary membership assumes that the agent in the collective knows what group goals

and beliefs it is endorsing by joining the organization and that the agent decides on membership free of inner coercion (Tuomela, 2007, p. 15), as a conflict of individual and collective interests and value systems would affect negatively the relationship of the agent and the collective. In the case of intergovernmental organizations the collective goals, values and intentions are presented to the potential member states in the founding treaties, which means that all the signing members are aware of the organizational purpose and can also be certain that all the other signing members are committed to the organizational goals. This gives the IGOs as a collective transparency and credibility, which supports the relationship between the individual member states and the collective. However, at the same time the presentation of the group ethos in the discourse of the founding treaties is of particular interest in regards to the IGO collectivity, as the organizational goals, values and beliefs must be presented in a universally appealing manner in order to appeal to a variety of potential member states with varying national backgrounds.

Furthermore, because the IGO treaties are absolute in their construction of organizational principles and norms, this gives the IGO collective a status as a social institution, rather than merely a social group. Social institutions are typically characterised as recurrent, norm-based collective activity, or more strictly, as collective activity taking place by normatively structured hierarchical system with specific subject positions and power relations (Tuomela, 2007, p. 191). This means that the social institution and its collective action is guided on one hand by predetermined rule-norms that some sort of authority imposes on the group and on the other hand by collective expectations and self-regulation. Thus, social institutions have a few incentives that must be fulfilled collectively by the social group, as they can be only constructed through collective acceptance: these are the requirements of generality, which means that whatever is created on the group level applies equally to each member, present or future, and interchangeability, which involves a necessary level of disregard for individuality and potential for depersonalization and anonymity (Tuomela, 2007, p. 185). In the case of an IGO this means that the decisions and policies created on the intergovernmental level are equally binding to all members and that the social practices are universally accepted by the state agents participating in the organizations. Furthermore, the requirement of interchangeability implies that the group members, the sovereign states, are at least to some extent capable and willing to cast aside their national interests for the benefit of the social group. In essence, as a social institution the IGO binds its members to specific organizational norms and hierarchies, which the members must accept in order to participate in the institution. Conceptually, a social institution depends on this collective acceptance of social practices of the group, which are essentially repeated collective social actions based on collective intentionality and

shared we-attitudes (Tuomela, 2002, p. 7). In the case of intergovernmental organizations, this collective acceptance is solidified by the IGO founding treaties, since the group norms and practices, as well as the organizational hierarchy are introduced to the member states in the treaty texts, so that each of the potential members is aware of the social control imposed upon them upon joining.

To summarise, a nation state can act as an agent in a social institution such as an IGO only if it can act as a unit that represents beliefs, values and goals and if it is capable of acting consistently upon these principles. If these are in line with the values and goals of an IGO, the two can agree to participate in cooperation in achieving those goals and supporting those values. In doing so, the state agent commits itself to the organizational operations and collective goals, while surrendering some of its independence and sovereignty to the group authority. In essence, a social group is characterised by its constitutive goals, values, beliefs and norms that the acting members of the group have collectively approved (Tuomela, 2007, p. 44). Collectively satisfying and maintaining this group ethos can be viewed as the basis of group action and the foundation of its collective identity.

### 3.2. Collective identity

In relation to this study the concept of collective identity is of particular significance. The decision to join an IGO is generally formed based on national estimations regarding the costs and benefits of participation in such an organization and its action. However, collective identity creates a sense of fundamental union between individual agents which in turn decreases the significance of their individual calculations concerning the costs and benefits (Eder, Giesen, Schmidtke, & Tambini, 2002, p. 19). In essence, a collective identity and an increased sense of union among the member states of an IGO can encourage the state agents to move onwards from national motivations towards more group-focused motivations of action. This can be assumed to significantly support the group collectivity and thus the longevity and functionality of an IGO.

However, generally the state agents already have a secure form of national identity, which is a quintessential feature of modern nation states. However, collective identities are not given or certain, but have to be learned and relearned in relation to the changing social world (Preston, 1997, p. 65). A collective identity of an IGO does not replace the national identity of a nation, but it can

be adopted as a part of the existing identity. In essence, the membership of international organizations can become a part of national identity and amend the already existing value systems and commitments. This process of creating, replacing and transforming collective identities is called identicization, which can occur via primordial, traditional or universalist means (Eder, Giesen, Schmidtke, & Tambini, 2002, p. 18). This study will focus on identicization, rather than identification, because sovereign states already tend to have a firmly established national identity, which can be adapted and transformed to also include the sense of collectivity that stems from the IGOs that a state belongs to. In essence, this study views that the national collective identity is transformed, rather than a new identity formed, when a state begins to identify with the collective of an IGO. Because this type of identicization can be particularly beneficial to IGOs in promoting a sense of collectivity, it can be assumed that the process is encouraged by the organizations and their discourse, which should surface in the research material of this study. However, because the formation of collective identity can happen in multiple ways, a short introduction of these different types of collective identities is necessary.

As stated above, Eder et al. (2002) differentiate between three different types of socially constructed collective identities. The first of these, the primordial collective identity, is based mainly on an idea that certain structures of the social world are given and cannot be changed by voluntary action. A primordial type of collective identity refers to the 'natural' world, to the seeming objectivity of the social order and to unmovable social boundaries, which are regulated and difficult to cross. This creates a sense of kinship and a stark division between the collective and the rest of the world, which means that these type of collectives are often particularly homogenous. A traditional type of collective identity is based on the collective familiarity with social rules, traditions and routines. Therefore, the institutional and constitutive practices and principles are of particular significance to this type of collective identity, as a sense of historical continuum of the communal traditions is important. The outsiders are not viewed in a positive or negative light, but a certain inner hierarchy within a traditional collective exists, as those who have participated in the collective traditions longer are viewed bearers of tradition, while new members must slowly learn and adopt the collective system of conduct. Lastly, a universalist collective identity is founded on the universalistic belief system of the collective. The constitutive boundary is created between the collective and the sacred, as the collective is related to something unchanging and eternal. Those outside the collective are viewed inferior, but this type of collective identity is also often marked by a missionary attitude towards others. In essence, while the collective identity is fundamentally exclusive, the outsiders can overcome their inferiority by adopting the universalistic belief system

of the collective. (21-28)

This study will utilize this theory of construction of collective identities in the analysis of the research material. It will be assumed that a collective identity among state agents can be socially constructed through similar means that were introduced above or through a combination of multiple of these methods. Because the founding treaties are the foundation of intergovernmental organizations, it is likely that the construction of collective identities begins in their discourse and some primordial, traditional or universalist features of collectiveness can be detected in this discourse. Consequently, another important sociological question to take into consideration here is how the collective identities actually present themselves on an operational level and what a shared collective identity actually means to a social collective. In essence, how does the socially constructed shared identity actually appear in the structures and activity of the collective?

According to Preston (1997), a collective political-cultural identity can operate on multiple levels: Firstly, it can be person-centred and focus on the individual's relationship with the community. Secondly, it can be group-centred and mainly concerned with group hierarchies and the relationships between group members. And lastly, it can be collectivity-centred and focus on how the group and the collectivity relates to other groups and the rest of the surrounding world. (54) In relation to this study, this type of threefold approach means that the collective identity of the IGO can be detected in the individual agent states' relationship with the collective, in the IGO inner hierarchy and the relations between the member states, and ultimately in how the IGO relates to other international political operatives and the rest of the world. Essentially this means that the collective identities and their primordial, traditional or universal approaches should be detectable in how these aforementioned relationships are determined and controlled by the IGO founding treaty discourse.

Predetermining organizational relationships and hierarchies in a multinational social structure where all involved agents are accustomed to unconditional sovereignty is imperative to organizational functionality. Furthermore, a multilingual and multicultural environment of political conduct creates its own challenges as the likelihood of misinterpretations and cultural affronts is higher than, for example, within a culturally homogenous national environment. The presence of shared collective identity can compensate for the social cleavages, differences and inequalities that could otherwise disrupt the communication process, as ultimately all participants have been accepted as members of the same collectivity which implies some similarities and shared values (Eder, Giesen, Schmidtke, & Tambini, 2002, p. 111). However, therein can also be found some of the most significant

challenges presented to the IGO collectivity. On one hand, social institutions require clear demonstrations of institutional hierarchy that all the members are aware of from the point of joining the institution. On the other hand, stark differences and inequalities within the collective can interrupt the communication process, threaten the cooperation and ultimately even lead to the breakdown of the collective. This is especially likely if the institutional discursive situations are mainly controlled by the dominant agents of the collective, which could lead to social exclusion of less dominant agents and decrease the potential for mutually acceptable compromise or consensus (Eder, Giesen, Schmidtke, & Tambini, 2002, p. 140). Therefore, while examining collectivity within a social institution, it is also important to examine the ways how these types of challenges are controlled and negated by the institutional discourse.

### 3.3. Societal power structures and discourse

What ultimately creates inequality between social agents or, alternatively, between different social groups in any society is the uneven distribution of power. In broad terms power can be defined as the probability that one social actor is in such a position in a social relationship that the actor in question can carry out his will, regardless what this probability is based on (Weber, 1978, p. 53). Therefore, social agents are bound to certain social subject positions in their collective and generally the participants of the collective abide to these roles either consciously or unconsciously. In this study the supposition is that because an intergovernmental organization can be treated as a social institution and a social collective, similar subject positions also exist within its structures. This in turn would imply that not all state agents within an IGO framework are equal in power. In fact, while the sovereign equality of the IGO members is meant to mandate open membership, equality in voting power, and unanimity in binding constitutional decisions and reservations to conflicting multilateral treaties, each phase of institutional design involves unavoidable compromises between sovereign equality, great power primacy and institutional efficacy (Kingsbury, 1999, p. 71). The treaties of IGOs aim to protect multiple, sometimes conflicting interests, which means that the organizational power relations ultimately determine whose interests come first in the institutional discourse. Therefore, this section will examine power relations within a social structure and how the discourse of the social institution on one hand supports these power relations and on the other hand attempts to normalize and hide the obvious markers of power.

### 3.3.1. Societal power

Within a social context, power is mainly used for social control to maintain a specific social order. The first and perhaps the most studied feature that affects the power relations within a society is the social class struggle that can generally be detected in any society. The uneven distribution of wealth within a society means that the ruling social class is dominant because it controls the production and wealth and by extension the state (Fairclough N. , 1989, pp. 32-33). Consequently, because the social practices within a society are produced by the dominant social class, these practices themselves support the continuity of the current social order. In essence, the dominant social practices have become the social norms: the ideology they represent has become institutionalised and the norms are viewed as universal, even necessary. This type of institutional normative power can be viewed as the second factor that significantly influences the power relations and social order of a society. Furthermore, because multiple social groups generally exist within a society and not all of them are equally powerful, some level of social struggle is present between these groups; between different ethnic groups, men and women, the young and the old, et cetera. This struggle between social groups vary in intensity and in its forms, but generally any exercise of power happens in their framework (Fairclough N. , 1989, p. 34). Lastly, individual agents within a society can be held to higher authority than others, due to their status, skills, knowledge or other such traits in particular areas. These figures of authority are a quintessential characteristic of social structures, and more often than not, at least in the modern capitalist societies, they are a by-product of the dominant societal order. To summarise this briefly, there are four ways in which inequality of power surfaces in a social collective. Firstly, there is the dominant social class that possesses the most resources. Secondly, the institutional normative power that is based on the dominant ideologies has come to be viewed as common-sensical and universal, thus superseding other competing ideologies. Thirdly, different social groups of the collective, at least to some extent, compete against each other for exceeding social dominance. And lastly, due to the dominant social order some social agents have come to hold special positions of power within a society.

Hypothetically, all these features should be detectable within the social setting of an intergovernmental organization as well. If the member states are viewed as independent social agents, the social class structure among them can be detected in the uneven distribution of wealth. The traditional tool for measuring the wealth of a sovereign nation is the gross domestic product (GDP) which is the total value of goods and services produced nationally over the period of one year. GDP is used as an indicator of a nation's economic health and as an estimate of the standard

of living. A high GDP translates for a wealthier nation, while a low GDP means that the country's economy is struggling. In accordance to the regular societal setting, it can be assumed that the nations that control the majority of global production and wealth hold the majority of global power as well, because they can afford status rising commodities such as a strong military or institutions that raise national well-being such as advanced health care or education. This creates similar class division among the state agents of an IGO that exists within civil societies. As a result, it can be assumed that the ideological normative practices that an IGO adopts as institutional norms are produced mainly by these socially dominant state agents. Essentially this would mean that, for example, the political or economic practices that prevail in the socially dominant countries become the ideological practices of the IGOs as well, because the power the dominant agents wield makes the practices seem common-sensical and even necessary.

Furthermore, a variation of the struggle between different social groups within a society should also be detectable in an IGO structure. Naturally factors such as age or gender do not hold significance when the social actors in question are sovereign states, but all the same, the member states share uniting and dividing features that can create similar power struggles. For example, geographical proximity may unite some member states in a global intergovernmental organization, as can cultural similarity, common language, religion or even the preferred system of government. Essentially, this creates groupings of sovereign states that can be gathered under hypernyms and contrasted with other groups; Anglophone world versus Francophone world, Muslim versus Christian world, European versus Asian world, et cetera. As such, even if two nations have little in common on a national level of politics, they might find themselves more united within an IGO due to such bonding features. This means that the similar conditions of the struggle between social groups could also exist within the social structures of IGOs, as it does in the standard interpersonal social structures.

Finally, it can also be assumed that at least to some extent a state agent of an IGO can raise to special social status within its collective, much like an individual actor can in a civil society. Within the society of an intergovernmental organization the member states are usually given equal responsibilities and rights by the founding treaty and therefore, in essence, they are created as equal social agents within the social institution. However, the collective can and does give certain members extended responsibilities or status, as the positions of high responsibility often circulate from member state to member state within politically inclined IGOs. For example, in the EU, the presidency of Council of the European Union is a position that is every six months given to a

member state in turn. Similarly, the United States has somewhat special status in NATO, given by the Articles 10 and 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty, that give the US a special role in the processes of joining and leaving the IGO. These are merely examples of how special status power can manifest within an IGO, but in the analysis section of the study some attention will be paid to this type of hierarchical inequalities between the member states that might be highlighted in the founding treaties.

### 3.3.2. Power in treaty discourse

As suggested earlier in this chapter, inequality and imbalanced power relations are approached in this study as the main threats to the stability of an IGO collective. However, as the societal imbalances of power are fundamentally unavoidable, it must be taken into consideration how an intergovernmental organization seeks to control the potential issues that could rise from the power imbalances. Because this study is not focused on the general institutional discourse of an IGO, but very specifically on the discourse of the founding treaties, at first it must be acknowledged that these treaties themselves exercise power in relation to the collective. Furthermore, any further exercise of power among and between the member states happens in the framework that the founding treaties outline. Because the power imbalances and resulting social inequality can be challenging to IGO collective, the relations in question are not often blatantly obvious, but hidden. For example, whose voice can be heard in the treaty discourse and what the power relations that influenced its production were is not necessarily directly announced. Furthermore, treaty discourse is characterised by its one-sidedness: usually in interaction participants alternate between contributions from producers and interpreters, but in written discourse this is not the case (Fairclough N. , 1989, p. 49). This is especially true in the case of the IGO founding treaties in which the text producers have outlined the rights and responsibilities of an IGO member state throughout and the text interpreter, the signing party, can only choose either to unanimously agree to everything by signing the treaty or to disregard the treaty and therefore the organization membership by not signing it. In essence, this type of discourse demands absolute consent from its interpreter.

Consequently, if power is viewed as control one holds over others, in discourse it can be exercised either via consent or coercion (Fairclough N. , 1989, p. 36). Essentially, a piece of discourse can either persuade the interpreter into agreement with the producer or it can coerce the interpreter into

obedience, depending on which route the text producer chooses and how much power over the interpreter they hold. Since a founding treaty of an IGO demands absolute consent from its interpreter, the treaty can be seen to hold the highest power in the organization. However, the treaty itself represents specific social ideologies and promotes selected values and goals, which implies that it reflects the world view of its producers. Therefore, there are hidden power relations working behind the treaty discourse. Blatant exercise of power over such subjects as state agents who are characterised by their independence and sovereignty would most likely discourage potential member states from joining or eventually from developing a collective identity among themselves. Therefore, like in most modern societies, power is increasingly exercised through consent, because it is generally viewed less uncertain and more sustainable. Often this is done either by appealing to common ideological factors or by integrating the social agents into apparatuses of control, so they come to regard themselves as a part of the power structure (Fairclough N. , 1989, p. 36). These quintessential features are likely to surface in the analysis of the IGO founding treaties, as they both promote identification towards a shared collective identity and control the adverse effects of power imbalances. Firstly, the treaty discourses promote universality of the organizational values in order to encourage consensus. Secondly, establishing the member states as parts of the organizational organs of control diffuses the sense of inequality among the member states. Furthermore, the study will take into account how contemporary discourse of social control aims towards the removal of surface markers of authority and power, and thus, aims to create artificial egalitarianism (Fairclough N. , 1989, p. 37). This should also be detectable within the founding treaties, as they generally seek to create a democratic and egalitarian environment for the conduction of international politics within the framework of the organization. By signing the same treaty, each member state signs for the same rights and responsibilities and participates in the organization in the predetermined manner the treaty outlines, but due to the potential power imbalances among the state agents the extent of this egalitarianism remains debateable.

Fairclough (1989) also notes that in a usual face-to-face situation discourse can be adapted by the producers for the particular interpreters, based on the interaction and feedback they receive from their audience. As a written text a treaty is rather unyielding and unadaptable, as its producers and interpreters are typically separated by time and space. However, all discourse must be produced with some interpreter in mind, which means that the text producers have created their piece of discourse with an ideal subject in mind (49). This implies that in the background of an IGO founding treaty there exists an image of an ideal member state that is considered as a target interpreter when drafting the treaty in question. It can be assumed that the narrower the focus of an

IGO, the more specific its ideal subject audience can be. For example, OPEC has narrowed its ideal subjects to countries with interests in oil trade, which means that relatively few countries have the potential to join the organization. Instead, an IGO with a wider target audience, like the UN, for example, has to predefine their ideal subject in much vaguer terms, if they wish to reach and unite a variety of sovereign nations in a common cause. Therefore, when examining the research material used in this study, some thought has to be also given to the intended ideal target subject of the treaty, because this could work in both uniting and dividing the actual member states, depending on how well they fit into the mould of the ideal subject and how well the treaty specific discourse appeals to them.

In conclusion, there are several factors that need to be taken into particular consideration when examining how the founding treaties of intergovernmental organizations typically control the challenges and issues that could be prompted by the power imbalances and inequality among the member states. First of all, because in the discourse between the treaty and the signing member state there exists a stark asymmetry of power, it is necessary to look into to what extent the social control exercised is based on consent and to what extent on coercion. Secondly, the treaties most likely promote certain ideological views as universal among its members, which means that those features must be examined as a uniting factor within the social structure, but at the same time it is necessary to remember that even the seemingly universal values generally represent the ideology of the dominant social power holders. Thirdly, another quintessential trait of discourse of power is to create a sense of egalitarianism and to integrate the targets into the apparatuses of control. This in particular should be evident in the IGO treaties, as creating the member states as equals is the basis of the democratic process within these organizations. Lastly, some attention must be paid to the ideal subject of an IGO, because depending on how well a potential member state equals the image of an ideal target audience for the treaty discourse, the better it can be assumed to adapt to the treaty control.

## 4. Methodological framework

Primarily the purpose of this study is to determine the quintessential discourse methods that are used in the founding treaties of major intergovernmental organizations to establish collectivity between the state agents that participate in the collective action. The main hypotheses is that the founding treaties seek to establish collective identity among the state agents to ensure the operational functionality of the organization, while also attempting to normalize and conceal the power structures and any potential inequalities that could impair this process of identicization. This research aim in mind, this study will be conducted through comparative content analysis of the five IGO founding treaties introduced in chapter two. While the research material and the research questions of this study somewhat venture in the fields of political science and sociology, the analytical approach of the study will be mainly in linguistics and language analysis. Therefore, while the treaties are available in multiple languages due to the lingual diversity among the IGO member states, this study will only take into account the English versions of the treaties. This is done for the sake of the approachability of the treaty texts and for the comparability of their discourse, while minimizing the potential lingual equivocality that might surface in multilingual research material. Furthermore, English is generally considered *lingua franca* of modern international politics, which will make the potential results of the study more universally applicable in the field of international politics. This chapter will introduce the chosen methodological approaches of the analysis and will explain their importance in relation to the main research objective of discovering the quintessential discourse choices in the treaty texts that promote collectivity.

### 4.1. Content analysis and thematic approach

With content analysis choosing the most beneficial unit of analysis is of particular significance, as losing the wider implications of the overall communication among its component parts can be an easy mistake to make (Manheim & Rich, 1986, p. 155). For this study the main focus unit of analysis will be themes, rather than exact words or entire items of communication. However, in the

beginning of the analysis some consideration towards the chosen terminology and the pronouns that are utilised in the treaties in reference to treaty signees is necessary, as the chosen vocabulary could have implications towards the collectivity of the IGOs. For this goal the unit of analysis will be word-focused, but after that the focus will shift on a selection of themes that were chosen due to their recurrent appearance in each of the treaties. The thematic approach to analysis appears to be the most relevant in answering the research question of how the IGO treaties aim to establish collectivity within the organization. A narrower, morphological approach could risk losing the contextual implications that are produced by the political nature of the research material, while using the entire items as the units of analysis would lose the relevant analytical focus in the technical sections of the treaties that mainly introduce organizational structures and hierarchies.

Furthermore, thematic analysis aims to determine the recurrent topics in the text, as these repetitive motifs can be assumed to be of special interest or significance to the text producer (Kedar, 1987, p. 113). Therefore, should the selected themes surface in all of the relevant research texts in a relatively comparable fashion, it would suggest that those particular themes are of special significance to all of the IGOs. As the overall research objective of this study is to find the universally applicable discourse choices that are used to create IGO collectivity, discovering these types of recurrent, shared themes in the research material items and analysing the way they are presented is crucial. However, with these types of comparisons it is important to acknowledge the underlying concepts in the discourse, as the selected analysed variables in each examined item can either be identical or source specific (Manheim & Rich, 1986, p. 228). This, in practice, means that due to the similar international nature of the IGOs the compared themes should be somewhat identical in each studied text, but at the same time the varying purposes of the IGOs could influence the underlying concepts or implications of specific discourse choices. For example, the implications of “co-operation” for the United Nations and the African Union are very different, the first more global and the second more region-specific, but at the same time “co-operation” as a concept and as a basic value and organizational goal is identical in both IGO treaties, even if the practical effects are different. Therefore, the analysis in this study will take the source specific differences into account when necessary, but mainly the focus will be on determining the identical variables in the select themes.

Consequently, the study will focus on three major themes which are mainly based on the Preston (1997) suggestion of three different operational levels that political-cultural identity can surface on: 1) agent-centred approach, 2) group-centred approach, and 3) collectivity-centred approach. These particular themes were selected for the analytic focus area, because it is likely that some

encouragement to identification occurs on each of these levels in the founding treaty discourse. As the previous chapter suggested, this study approaches collective identity believing that it is founded on shared goals, beliefs and values that all group members find agreeable and beneficial, while its stability could be challenged by obvious inequality and power imbalance within the group collective. Three different means of creating collective identity were also introduced by Eder et al. (2002), the primordial, traditional and universalist collective identities, and when looking at the selected central themes, the analysis will try to determine which approach is selected for the treaty discourse on which level of collective identity. Special attention will also be paid to the removal of markers of power and to the integration of state agents into the organizational institutions, because these features can be assumed to be of particular interest in negating the effects of the institutional controversies of power division in creating collective identities.

The first major theme examined in this study, the agent-centred approach to collective identity, focuses on the relationship between individual state agents and the collective. In essence, the main concern is why a sovereign state chooses to join a multinational collective and then remains committed to the collective goals and collective action. It will be assumed that similarities between national and organizational values, interests and goals encourage a nation state to join. In order to appeal to a variety of member states the IGO has to universalise its values and value hierarchy in a manner that all the potential member states find agreeable, despite their different viewpoints. Therefore, the presentation of these in the founding treaties is of particular interest in this section. How does the founding treaty discourse introduce the organizational goals and values in a manner that the ideal target states find them appealing and agreeable? In doing this, some attention has to be paid to the image of ideal member state, since the treaty discourse was produced with this type of target audience in mind. Depending on how narrow the ideal is, it could contribute to the homogeneity of the member states and thus encourage collectivity and the creation of collective identity. Another focus area of the agent-centred theme is how the treaties aim to protect on one hand the supranational interests of the IGO and on the other hand promise to respect national sovereignty. How this conflict of interests is presented in the treaties in a manner that appeals to the potential member states could greatly diffuse the potential for inner conflicts within the organization that could in time endanger the collectivity within the organization.

The second examined theme, the group-centred approach to collective identity, focuses on the in-group relationships between state agents. This is done mainly by examining those sections of the treaty discourse that explain the organizational hierarchies and promote egalitarianism among the member states. As all members of the organizations are sovereign states and all the organizations

operate accordingly on democratic principles, the equality of these member states is a fundamental part of the functionality of the IGOs and of crucial significance to the national and organizational value systems. A failure in establishing this sense of equality among the members could lead to schisms within the organization, challenge the organizational collectivity and in turn destabilize the organization as a whole. The analysis in this section will look into the manner in which the egalitarianism is established and will then examine the hierarchical structures to determine how the equality of state agents presents itself. Because some imbalance in the power relations and resulting inequality are unavoidable in any community, it is also necessary to examine how these controversies are controlled in the treaty discourse to negate their adverse effects within the intergovernmental organizations. The normalisation of these types of unavoidable inequalities is also a fundamental function of the founding treaty discourse.

The third and final theme is the collectivity-centred approach to collective identity which is mainly interested in how the collective as a whole relates to the rest of the world and other collectives. In the case of IGOs this translates to closer examination of how the treaty discourse situates them into the global context. One of the main research goals of this theme is to look at how the collective views the outsiders and other collectives; is the approach positive, negative, or indifferent? The creation of an outside enemy or an adversary is a typical method of creating collective identity among any community, so examining whether this method appears in the founding treaty discourse is necessary. Furthermore, the founding treaties could reveal significant details concerning the global status of the collective. It can be assumed that any intergovernmental organization becomes increasingly appealing to potential member states when it holds more global power and significance. All in all, the analysis of this collectivity-centred theme is focused on how the founding treaty discourse creates a sense of “us” and “them” between the collective and the outside world. How this mentality is presented and manipulated in the selected IGO treaties could hold significant implications to the sense of collectivity among the treaty participants.

Overall, these three major themes should create a comprehensive research basis for the analysis of the treaty discourse in answering the main research question on how these treaties create collectivity among IGO member states. The thematic focus is on the three operational levels that collective identity operates on, but in analysing these levels it is also necessary to keep in mind the different methods of creating collectivity; whether the organizational collectivity is established on primordial, traditional or universalist codes and social boundaries could have implications for the nature of the organization and therefore for the selected treaty discourse. Furthermore, in regards to each major theme, some attention has to be given to how the treaty addresses the signing members

and how they are referred to throughout the treaty. The selected system of address can be assumed to reveal something concerning the nature of the organization behind the treaty, as it is the first significant conscious discourse choice in each treaty that approaches the IGO members as participants to the treaty and also as a collective. How the treaty discourse addresses the member states and the collective they form can be assumed to be essential for the collectivity within the organization, as it defines the way the organization views its relationship with its members and how the members relate to one another within the organizational framework.

## 4.2. Discourse-analytic approach

Since the research material of this study is without exception in textual format, this makes the comparisons drawn between the items and their content more reliable and unconditional. The fact that the treaties serve similar purposes in establishing intergovernmental organizations and due to their multinational political nature, the word choices, sentence structures and the language used in these treaties are quite similar. Furthermore, because the researched text items have remained unaltered for most parts since their original drafting and all treaty members have signed the same treaty text, the relatively permanent nature of the research texts also implies longevity and long-term applicability of the results. However, the written nature of the research material has further implications that must be taken into consideration before the analysis in order to avoid drawing overtly simplistic conclusions based solely on the similar nature of the selected treaty texts. For example, written words are always definite and committed (Kedar, 1987, p. 5). Thus, the discourse they offer for analysis remains unchanged in its morphological and syntactic appearances. However, while this should in theory create clarity in analysing these texts, it has to be remembered that sentential meaning and contextual meaning are not always identical (Kedar, 1987, p. 19). In essence, while the treaty texts may be similar in wording and sentence structures, the meaning and especially the practical implications of the treaty contents can be altered by their varying contexts, such as the organization in question, the signing party or the location or time of the signing.

Discourse analysis (DA) takes these types of contextual implications into consideration, as it views that language and how it is used in a specific cultural environment creates social realities. DA takes an interpretative and constructive approach to linguistic material, as it first identifies recurrent linguistic features within the discourse item and then employs these repetitive patterns as a basis for speculation concerning the underlying influences, such as the surrounding political or social

environments (Baxter, 2010, p. 125). Consequently, this will be the main analytical approach of this study. As an intergovernmental organization does not exist until a founding treaty has established its status and the potential organization member have signed the treaty, the language of the IGO treaties is fundamental in determining the nature and structure of the organization. In essence, the treaty discourse creates a new social reality and a social context in which the international politics of the IGO are conducted. Likewise, the IGO treaty discourse constructs the social reality in which the member states of the IGO begin to experience a sense of collectivity where it did not necessarily exist before. Thus, DA of the treaty texts should be able to identify the distinctive features that are used to support this. Furthermore, because DA takes into consideration the contextual influences that can affect the discourse, analysing the five diverse research items separately but also comparatively should yield results that are fundamentally applicable to IGO treaties regardless of the socio-political context or the time and place of the drafting, signing or application of the treaty.

However, discourse analysis alone is a rather narrow view to take on the complex realities that exist in the field of international politics. In practice, DA is microanalysis of language that is combined with the macrolevel discussion about the social realities that the analysed language constructs and interprets (Baxter, 2010, p. 126). As such, DA is interested in language and its component parts, but it does not offer any particular insight into how the discourse itself is a social, political or ideological practice. Consequently, this type of macroanalytic view of discourse is typical of critical discourse analysis (CDA), which is interested in the social implications discourse in institutional or political setting can have and how discourse can have specific forms depending on where it is used and by whom (Baxter, 2010, p. 126). Therefore, CDA approach in this study is also necessary, as IGO discourse can be viewed as political discourse that takes place within its own, independent institution, i.e. the intergovernmental organization. While DA could adequately answer the research question concerning the creation of collectivity within an IGO, exploring the power relations within the organization requires a more critical method of analysis. As it was established in the theoretical framework, power relations and power imbalances within any group are essentially unavoidable and the IGO treaty itself holds significant power over its signees. CDA can be used to analyse written or spoken discourse when trying to answer these types of questions about who holds the institutional power and over whom, as such features are systematically present and often normalised especially in institutionalised discourse. Furthermore, discourse can be operationalised or put into practice, if it encourages participants or recipients to act a certain way or alter their identity accordingly (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 84). This is especially true in the case of official treaties such as are studied here, since they significantly affect the way the signing parties conduct their

international politics and also alters their identity as they become members to the treaty. CDA is concerned with these types of effects discourse can have on social realities, as this type of alteration in behaviour and identity suggest that the recipients of the discourse have been influenced either by persuasion, argumentation or rationalisation. The producer of the discourse is creating a specific reality and exerting power over those influenced. Therefore, for this study CDA approach means that after analysing the treaty texts for their constructed social reality, it is necessary to determine what kind of hierarchy and social structures the treaty discourse introduces and displays as the organizational norm. The normalisation of institutional power relations within an IGO enables organizational hierarchy and inequality, without challenging the superficial egalitarianism that is crucial for the sense of collectivity. Likewise, taking into consideration who has produced the IGO founding treaty discourses and who the interpreters are falls into the field of CDA, as the treaty discourse exerts power over its signees.

## 5. Establishing collective identity in IGO founding treaty discourse

In this chapter the five founding treaties will be examined for the quintessential discourses that surface in the texts to create, promote and protect the collective identity and identification with the collective among the member states of the IGOs. This will be done by examining the three levels of relationships that the collective identity is formed on, as the chapter is thematically divided into three sections that explore the agent-centred, group-centred, and collectivity-centred formation of collective identity. The goal is to determine how the treaties seek to promote collectivity, while also balancing the protection of national and organizational interests from conflicts that could threaten the national sovereignty or equality between the member states that could harm the sense of collectivity or hinder the identification process. Social identity is not necessarily something an agent can individually determine: it is also dependent on how others view the individual and how the individual relates to others within the social group (Thomas & Wareing, 1999, p. 143). Therefore, this chapter examines how the treaty discourse encourages individual state agents to identify with the collective, as well as how the agents relate to each other and ultimately how the collective relates to the rest of the world. The preliminary hypotheses is that, due to the multilateral nature of collective identity, the founding treaty discourse of IGOs in some way determines and encourages identification of the members on each of these levels.

### 5.1. Agent-centred approach to collective identity

The agent-centred approach to collective identity within an intergovernmental organization is focused on the relationship between an individual state agent and the organization collective. In this chapter the research aim is to determine how the founding treaty discourses encourage ideal member states into joining the organization. Therefore, the first goal is to determine what types of state agents the treaty discourse targets and then to examine how the organizational goals, values and beliefs are introduced in the treaties in order to present the organization as an appealing collective for these ideal state agents. Furthermore, the second examined issue is how the treaties promise to on one hand safeguard national rights and sovereignty of the state agents and on the other hand how protecting the organizational interests is introduced in a manner that does not

discourage membership. These features are of crucial interest to the IGO sense of collectivity, as a transparent and fair relationship between state agents and the organization supports the longevity of the organization as a whole. If the membership of any of the intergovernmental organizations notably endangered the rights or sovereignty of its individual member states, it would undoubtedly have negative effects on the relationship between the two. Therefore, the founding treaties should introduce an abundance of discourse that is dedicated to resolving these conflicts of interests and to cap the ideological cleavage that could appear in the political, cultural or economic belief systems between the national and organizational levels.

### 5.1.1. Ideal member state

When examining the relationship between any intergovernmental organization and its individual members, it is first necessary to determine what kind of ideal member states the founding treaty discourse targets. This could reveal two things: Firstly, what kind of member states does the organization aim to reach with the founding treaty discourse? And secondly, how similar are the member states likely to be in their political, cultural or economic practices? How exclusive or inclusive the introduced vision of an ideal member state is could have implications towards the identification of the collective. While it has been suggested that over time the interests of IGO members tend to converge due to the influence of the organizational discourse (Taninchev, 2015), the fact remains that the narrower the organizational scope in regards to member states, the less national interests and variety in national practices there exists within the organizational framework that the founding treaties have to acknowledge, while a more inclusive intergovernmental organization must cater to a variety of needs and practices in its discourse. Furthermore, a more versatile and inclusive image of an ideal member state means that there will be greater variety among the member states in ideological and cultural sense. In essence, while an IGO might find a larger member base an attractive goal to work towards, the problems that such a goal could raise are something that the founding treaties must counter. This section will therefore examine what kind of ideal member states the examined IGOs are looking for and how wide a scope the organizations are aiming for.

Only two of the examined treaties, the Charter of the United Nations and the OPEC Statute, make a direct reference to the original treaty members who were the first to sign the treaty and participated in its drafting:

- (1) *“The original members of the United Nations shall be the states which, having participated in the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, or having previously signed the Declaration by United Nations of January 1, 1942, sign the present Charter and ratify it in accordance with Article 110.” (UNC 3)*
- (2) *“Founder Members of the Organization are those countries which were represented at the First Conference, held in Baghdad, and which signed the original agreement of the establishment of the Organization.” (OPECS 7:A)*

However, while the other founding treaties do not make this clear distinction, the significance of the founding parties is undeniable in all of the treaties, because the value systems and world views that are represented in the treaties originate from these founding states. The original member states are the archetypes of ideal members and the composition of the group of founding states also influences the eligibility of further members for the organization. However, because the influence of the original member states is not always blatant, but hidden into the treaty discourses in the form of emphasised values and beliefs, all of the treaties make some reference to the eligibility of potential member states. There are also articles that determine what kind of sovereign states can be considered for the membership:

- (3) *“Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and --- are able and willing to carry out these obligations.” (UNC 4:1)*
- (4) *“The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.” (NAT 10)*
- (5) *“Any other country with substantial net export of crude petroleum, which has fundamentally similar interests to those of Member Countries, may become a Full Member of the Organization ---“ (OPECS 7:C)*
- (6) *“Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union.” (TEU 49)*
- (7) *“Any African State may, at any time after the entry into force of this Act, notify the Chairman of the Commission of its intention to accede to this Act and to be admitted as a member of the Union.” (CAAU 29:1)*

The first feature that should be noted in regards to these particular articles of the treaties is who exactly prompts the process of joining, because that could reveal something in regards to the relationship between the member states and the organization. For example, the United Nations appears unquestionably the most welcoming to new member states. As long as a country is

committed to organizational goals and able to carry them out, they are welcomed to the organization. The treaty discourse presents the membership as open and the organization welcoming, which is understandable when taking into consideration the UN goal of global peace. In a similar manner, the membership of the AU is presented as quite welcoming in the CAAU; a notification to the relevant organization organs is enough to initiate the joining process. The welcoming and open treaty discourse in this regard reflects upon the organizations quite clearly, as these two IGOs, the UN and the AU, are the two largest organizations examined in this study when it comes to the number of member states. Similarly, OPEC is open to its ideal members quite easily, according to the treaty discourse, as any state with relevant interests may become a member. However, this organization has such a specific focus area in the crude oil trade that this limits the number of potential members greatly. A more exclusive type of discourse in regards to the membership can be found in the North Atlantic Treaty and the Treaty on the European Union. The TEU states that any European state may apply to become a member. While this can be viewed as a quite welcoming approach to membership, it is implied in this article that while the application may be approved of, it also may not be. Consequently, the membership of the European Union requires that the applicant fulfils the Copenhagen criteria and even then, the membership requires negotiations between the member state and the EU organs (Europa.eu, 2017). This less inclusive approach to new members can be also seen in the structure of the EU; while it is a continental IGO, not all of the European states belong to it. Lastly, the most exclusive view on new members can be found in the North Atlantic Treaty, as it states that the present treaty parties can decide to invite a new member to join the organization. In essence, this is entirely different from the other IGO treaties, which expect the potential members to apply for the membership, while NATO views the membership of potential new members to be the responsibility of the existing parties. This can be somewhat explained by the security and defence agenda of the organization: by exclusivity and invitation-based membership, NATO can more easily monitor and control its members and member base.

These varying approaches to new members can be used in construction of the group collective identity, because they reveal something concerning the collectives' attitudes towards the Other, those outside the group. For example, the UN and the AU have a missionary approach to membership: they want to include as many of their ideal member states as possible into the organizational framework and therefore spread the organizational agenda. This type of missionary approach that views those outside the organization on some level inferior to those in the group is typical of the Universalist collective identity. The EU and OPEC, however, view the Other with

indifference, unless they can be incorporated into the organization and its traditions and practices, in which case they become potential members to the collective. This view of the Other is quintessential of the traditional collective identity. Lastly, the NATO approach to new members, which is strictly exclusive and views those outside the group as a potential threat to the collective, is typically a primordial code of collective identity (Eder, Giesen, Schmidtke, & Tambini, 2002, p. 28).

Whatever approach to the Other the treaties have, whether it be inclusive or exclusive, all of the aforementioned articles concerning the membership of the organization for new members also reveals a few crucial details concerning what kind of ideal member states the treaty is targeting. Generally in all of these articles concerning the eligibility of future member states three distinct requirements can be detected to some extent: firstly, the geographical scope of the organization, secondly, the commitment to the values and principles of the organization, and, lastly, the ability to participate in the collective action and further the organizational agenda. If a state agent seeks to join any of the organizations in question, it must fulfil these parameters before it will be considered by the collective as an eligible member. Therefore, the rest of this chapter will focus on these three features that determine the relationship between a state agent and the collective: the implications of the geographical boundaries of an IGO, the collaboration of the national and organizational value systems, and lastly, the balance between national and organizational commitments and interests.

Out of the examined five founding treaties, two appear to be global in their scope, as neither the UN nor the OPEC specifies any geographic limits to their member states. NATO and the EU, however, specify that they admit European members, while the AU accepts only African states in the organization. The selected geographical scope of the organization depends on its areas of interest. For example, the United Nations is interested in promoting peace and stability on a global level, which means that if all sovereign nations participated in the effort, it would further the UN cause better than an exclusive membership or geographic scope. Similarly, crude oil has been found on multiple sites across the planet, and because OPEC interests are tied to this resource, limiting potential members due to predetermined geographic boundaries would be counterproductive. In the case of NATO the focus of the organization is in the safety and defence of the North Atlantic area. Consequently, because the North American countries, the United States and Canada, have been members since the drafting of the treaty, only other states that could have direct interests in the safety of the specified area are European states. The continental geographic focus areas of the EU and the AU are self-explanatory: both organizations are interested mainly in promoting unity and cooperation in their respective continents, so limiting the potential member states to only those that

are geographically located within the specified area serves this purpose. Furthermore, this type of geographic exclusivity also promotes the sense of kinship among the European and African states in the organizational framework. By belonging to the regional intergovernmental organization the sense of continental citizenship is highlighted in the countries that participate in the organization. Overall, it is quite apparent that the intergovernmental organizations use geographical boundaries in specifying their eligible member states in a manner that best serves the organizational interests and the interests of the member states. In essence, the ideological and practical focus areas of the organization determine its physical boundaries. These boundaries are introduced in the founding treaties, which gives them certain permanency, even though the number and composition of the member states may change.

The geographic scope of an IGO undoubtedly has effects on the nature of its collective identity. If the member states are located within relatively close proximity of each other, the states are more likely to have mutual interests the organizational cooperation can pursue. Furthermore, the geographic proximity implies increased historical collaboration, which in turn translates to greater similarities in political and cultural practices. For example, the European states have more in common with each other than with the rest of the world due to their long intervened history. However, the African Union, while similar in nature to the EU, has more significant variety among its member states due to the notable size of the African continent. In the case of the United Nations, which is attempting to include the entire world into its peace-promoting agenda, the variety of member states' political, cultural and economic interests is not only vastly different from each other, but also often conflicting and competing. In essence, this means that the IGOs that desire wider geographic reach must first of all offer benefits that can interest a wider variety of state agents in order to attract potential member states into joining the IGO. Secondly, such an IGO must presents its values and practices in such a manner that all the potential member states find them appealing, despite the variation in their national value systems and practices. The next section of this chapter will examine these features of the treaties: how the treaties present and universalise the organizational values, beliefs and practices and how they cooperate with the national value systems to create cohesiveness within the collective.

### 5.1.2. Collaboration of national and organizational ethos

What ultimately forms the basis for the relationship between the state agent and the organization is the similarity of their ethos. In this study ethos refers to the combination of values, beliefs,

principles and practices that exists either on the national or organizational level. The more similar the national ethos is to that of the organization, the easier the transition from a sovereign state in to a member of a multinational collective is. The membership in an IGO means that a sovereign state must surrender some of its self-determination rights over to the collective and in order for this to realistically happen the organization must support similar values and goals as the state agent does on a national level. However, an IGO consists of multiple state agents that can have even greatly varying value systems. In order to appeal to all potential member states the organization must therefore presents its values in such a manner that all of the potential members can consent to. Therefore, this section examines how the examined founding treaties introduce and support the values and practices of the IGOs in question.

Because the organizational ethos is fundamentally important to an IGO, its functionality, and the collective identity that is formed within its framework, the components of the ethos are always introduced at the beginning of the treaties. The Charter of the United Nations, the Treaty on the European Union and the Constitutive Act of the African Union all include a preamble which sole purpose is to accentuate and assert the IGO goals, values and beliefs. These preambles stand separate from the actual treaty articles and while the treaty texts themselves tend to maintain a mostly objective and informative narrative in their contents, the subjective attitudes and views of the organization are clearly represented in the preamble discourse. In fact, the purpose of these preambles appears to be the promotion of the organizational values in a manner that will win the sympathy and approval of the potential member states. This is particularly apparent in the way that all the preambles being with a reference to the shared past and common history of the members:

(8) *“---to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life-time has brought untold sorrow to mankind, ---“ (UNC Preamble)*

(9) *“---Recalling the historic importance of the ending of the divisions of the European continent, ---“ (TEU Preamble)*

(10) *“---Recalling the heroic struggles waged by our peoples and our countries for the political independence, human dignity and economic emancipation; ---“ (CAAU Preamble)*

Both the UN Charter and TEU make a direct reference to the World Wars and use this as a common history to unite the member states. In the case of the African Union the colonized past of the continent and its consequences are used for the same end. The creation of this common history and shared struggles serves a purpose in justifying and emphasising the importance of the organizational values and goals that are to follow. When all members of the IGOs share the past experiences the

preambles describe, accepting and approving of the values, principles and practices that the treaties introduce as the main means of avoiding such events from ever occurring again becomes easier, even common-sensical. National history and experiences are therefore successfully transferred over into the organizational ethos to promote organizational collective identity as well.

While similar approach could be used to some extent in the North Atlantic Treaty, that is not the route the treaty discourse takes. Instead of referring to the uniting past, the foreword of the NAT makes instead a reference to the Charter of the United Nations:

*(11) “The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.” (NAT)*

All of the NATO members are also member states of the UN and therefore committed to the UN ethos as well, and, by directly referring to the Charter of the United Nations, the NAT uses the UN as the common ground of the member states. By signing the Charter the parties of the NAT have already committed themselves to the goals and principles that are of the interest to NATO as well, so the NAT does not have to accentuate these values in a manner similar to the UNC, but the same principles are still present in the background of the organizational ethos.

While this type of creation of common ground is beneficial to group ethos, it is not strictly necessary either. In the previous four treaties the discourse is used to create and highlight the similarities produced by the common experience, whether it be historical events or the membership of the United Nations, but the OPEC Statute has a more practical approach. As a trade organization, the common ground that the members have is the petroleum exporting business and the experience in the trade. Accordingly, the only relevant values are, in the end, the trade practices and goals the organization supports:

*(12) “The principal aim of the Organization shall be the coordination and unification of the petroleum policies of the Member Countries and the determination of the best means for safeguarding their interests, individually and collectively.” (OPECS 2:A)*

Therefore, the OPEC approach to organizational collective identity is practical, rather than ideological. While the other IGOs examined here naturally have their own practical agendas, they still do exhibit certain ideological leanings that justify the existence of the collective. In the case of OPEC the only dominant ideologies are the capitalist market laws that control the petroleum trade and therefore the organizational unity is established upon this foundation. The universal value that unites the national and organizational ethos is the value of crude oil.

Establishing this type of universal values that all the members of an IGO can support can be more challenging in IGOs with larger and more varied member base and less clear focus. Therefore, the pre-established historical background is used to put the organizational values that are then presented into the universal context. The universalization of the values is necessary to appease all members. This can be done either by presenting the values in vague terms that can therefore include any national variation there could be, or by outright stating that the introduced value is universal or fundamental. The first uses consent as a method of control, as it assumes agreement from the signing members, while the latter relies on subtle coercion, since such discourse is essentially saying that a state agent can either agree with the values presented as universal or it will be wrong and therefore, ultimately, a potential adversary. In essence, the best way to introduce values in an IGO founding treaty is to do it in a manner that the potential member states cannot disagree with.

(13) *“Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law.” (TEU Preamble)*

For example, this paragraph in the TEU Preamble not only introduces the organizational values as universal, but also uses them to create common ground and common history, so disagreeing with this set of the particular values would not only be violating and alienating, but also un-European. This type of discourse relies on both consent and coercion: on one hand, the values introduced are very vague, as it is not specified what type of human rights the treaty refers to or what kind of democracy is acceptable, and on the other hand, it is impossible to disagree with them due to the aforementioned negative connotations this would have. Similar discourse is present in the Constitutive Act of the African Union:

(14) *“Determined to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and to ensure good governance and the rule of law;” (CAAU Preamble)*

And in less concise manner in the UN Charter that makes mentions of similar values of human rights, justice, international peace and security and economic and social advancement of all peoples. Moreover, in the Charter the presence of subtle coercion is quite blatantly present:

(15) *“---to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors---“ (UNC Preamble)*

(16) *“---armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, ---“*

The first clause states that either a state can live by the UN organizational values or it will be

considered a bad neighbour, and therefore a potential adversary, while the second example suggests a military retaliation in case the UN values and principles are violated. As presented earlier, NATO operates mainly on the same values as the UN, so this approach to the UN values as a universal and fundamentally mandatory value system can be assumed to also affect NATO.

Therefore, since the agreement to organizational values, beliefs and principles is a fundamental requirement for the potential member state, the IGO treaties purposefully introduce their value systems in such vague terms that they are easy for the state agents to support regardless of their inner variation in the implementation of the values in question. At the same time the treaty discourse creates an environment in which not agreeing or consenting to the IGO organizational values is alienating and even accusatory. In this type of setting, it is first of all easy for a member state to accustom to organizational values, and secondly, this can be also used to create division between the collective and the Other. If the organizational values are fundamental and universal, then those who support them are superior to those who do not. This division between the collective and the Other will be examined more in depth in later chapters.

### 5.1.3. National and organizational commitments and interest

The third requirement that the IGO founding treaties present to their potential members alongside with the geographic boundaries and respect to organizational values, is the commitment to organizational goals and obligations of the state agents. However, in order to understand why a state agent may commit themselves to organizational goals, it is also necessary to examine what kind of obligations and commitments the organization has towards its member states. This naturally has to do with the organizational goals and intentions: if the state agents fulfil their obligations to the IGO, it advances the organizational goals which in turn are something the member states can benefit from. How this mutually beneficial arrangement is presented in the IGO founding treaties is of special interest in regards to the collective identity. The more benefits the member states can gain from the membership, the more logical it is for them to commit fully to the organization and its goals. This in turn supports the identicization within the IGO towards a collective identity. Furthermore, as the sovereign states and the organization can also have conflicting interests, it is also necessary to look at how the founding treaties balance these national and organizational interests. While it can be assumed that in the organizational discourse, the organization always come first, the interests of the state agents must also be protected by the founding treaty discourse or otherwise this conflict would discourage the potential members from joining the organization or

from adopting the collective identity.

As suggested earlier, generally the articles that are concerned with the membership of potential new members to the IGO present the idea of the eligible members being committed to the organizational goals and capable of carrying out their obligations. However, also specific articles can be used to highlight this:

(17) *“All Members in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.” (UNC 2:2)*

(18) *“Member Countries shall fulfil, in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Statute.” (OPECS 3)*

(19) *“The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union.” (TEU 4:3)*

What exactly these obligations are naturally depends on the organization and its focus areas and their scope, but nevertheless, the commitment of the member states to these obligations is of crucial importance to the organization. The obligations introduced in the examined treaties vary from financial to political to military obligations towards the organization and common good. For example, NATO expects its members to “maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack” (NAT 3), which in practice means that the member states are obligated to maintain their military capabilities and strength, whereas the EU obligates its members to remove internal frontiers to enable free movement of persons and services in the EU area (TEU 3:2). While these are entirely different requirements in nature, both are obligations that the IGO sets on their member states and expects to be fulfilled accordingly. Similar obligations can be found throughout all of the five treaties, as the founding treaties introduce the most important practices of the organizations and explains how the member states are supposed to commit to those practices. However, not all of the obligations are necessarily introduced in the founding treaties to full extent. As the IGOs politics and goals are ultimately a process the organization aims to work towards, which means that the obligations of the member states can change and adapt to suit these ends over time. Therefore, the founding treaties mainly introduce only the principles and goals the organizations are working towards, thus giving the organization leeway to adapt its practices and the obligations of the member states according to the changing global political situation. The aims of the organization are usually introduced in the very beginning of the treaty; generally, this is done within the first articles. These organizational aims are the ultimate obligations of both the member states and the collectives themselves.

However, what the treaties do outline quite definitely are the organizational organs and the member states' status within them. Most of the examined organizations have multiple political institutions within their framework, but each IGO has at least one political organ which sole purpose is to include all of the member states' representatives into the political process of the IGO.

(20) *“The General Assembly shall consists of all the Members of the United Nations.” (UNC 9:1)*

(21) *“The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty.” (NAT 9)*

(22) *“The Conference shall be the supreme authority of the Organization. The Conference shall consists of delegations representing the Member Countries.” (OPECS 10 & 11:A)*

(23) *“Member States are represented in the European Council by their Heads of State of Government and in the Council by their government, ---“ (TEU 9:2)*

(24) *“The Assembly shall be composed of Heads of States and Government and their duly accredited representatives. The Assembly shall be the supreme organ of the Union.” (CAAU 6:1 & 6:2)*

In essence, the participation in the political processes of the IGOs is one of the most important obligations of the member states. The member states are integrated into the organizational structure and are a part of the organization and its politics, as they actively participate in the IGO policy making. This is done for two purposes: on one hand, to protect sovereign rights of the member states, and on the other hand, to promote commitment to the collective goals by integrating the member states into the organizational apparatuses of control. These both reasons work towards promoting the collective identity. The protection of sovereign rights appeases the member states in regards to the loss of control they experience due to organizational control. Surrendering some independence to the organization is viewed less nationally threatening, when the member states can directly participate in the IGO politics. Such security promotes trust between the member states and the collective. Moreover, the AU and OPEC further specify that these organs that member states directly participate in are the “supreme authority” of the organizations in question, which only serves to increase the sense of responsibility of the member states when participating in these organs. Furthermore, when the member states directly participate in the policy making of the organization, it increases the national investment in the success of these policies. The organizational goals and commitment become also national goals and commitments, when the national government has participated in their drafting. Such multi-layered sense of commitment increases

the sense of collective identity within an IGO, when all of the member states experience similar investment and commitment. The policies on the organizational level can therefore cap the cleavages of different political ideas and agendas between national levels.

However, while the founding treaties generally stress the importance of these organs that the member states can participate in to protect the national sovereignty, ultimately the organizational interests come before national interests. IGOs are fundamentally supranational in their nature and this reflects in the relationship between the state agents and the collective. Any IGO seeks to promote common good that benefits as many of the member states as possible and therefore national interests can and have to be sacrificed if they conflict with the collective interests. Some organizations have taken this conflict into account by creating supranational political organs, which purpose is to protect the organizational interests, whereas some have included specific articles in their founding treaties that exist to protect the supranational interests above national ones. For example, the United Nations Secretariat is a supranational organ, which purpose is to protect common interests:

(25) *“In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instruction from any government or from any authority external to the Organization.” (UNC 100:1)*

Similarly, the Treaty on the European Union established the European Commission as such a supranational organ:

(26) *“In carrying out its responsibilities, the Commission shall be completely independent. --- the Commission shall neither seek nor take instruction from any Government or other institutions, body, office or entity.” (TEU 17:3)*

The purpose of these types of supranational organs is to ensure that the IGO politics and policy making follows the principles introduced in the founding treaties. As the IGO politics are conducted through democratic processes and voting by the member states, without such organs to protect the organizational interests over time the organization politics could divert from their original goals. Furthermore, the benefit of such organs is that, while they do conduct politics that essentially control and limit the sovereignty of the member states, they are introduced in the founding treaties as merely political organs and part of the IGO political machinery, rather than actual limitations or orders. Instead of the founding treaties including articles of restriction or obligation, they simply introduce organs that can politically act as restrictive or obligating. For signing member states this is undoubtedly more appealing than specific clauses limiting sovereignty, as it normalizes and justifies the power imbalance that naturally exists between a state agent and a collective. The

member states are not directly controlled, but instead they are integrated into the organizational system of political control. This normalization of power relations within the organizational framework is meant to make the limitations of power more appealing to the member states, which in turn supports the identicization with the collective, if the member state feels the collective is not directly trying to limit its sovereignty.

However, as mentioned earlier, the treaties do also include specific clauses that protect collective interests over national interests. This tends to be necessary for more loosely institutionalized collectives with less complex political systems.

(27) *“If, as a result of the application of any decision of the Organization, sanctions are employed, directly or indirectly, by any interested company or companies against one or more Member Countries, no other member shall accept any offer of a beneficial treatment, whether in the form of an increase in oil exports or in an improvement in prices, ---“ (OPECS 4)*

This is an example of such a restrictive article from the OPEC Statute. While the main organization purpose of OPEC is to maximize the benefits of the oil trade for the producing nations, this article exercises organizational control to ensure that the collective interest comes before national interests. While the founding treaty does promote financial benefits to the member states, this article prevents such benefits at the cost of the other member states. The article control on member states is blatant in this case, but instead of dissuading from the collective identification, it can support it as it directly promotes solidarity and unity of the member states. Therefore, this is a good example of how the founding treaty discourse can exercise direct control over member states without discouraging the formation of collective identity. The sovereign right to self-determination is limited by the article, but at the same time the promotion of solidarity encourages to identicization to counter the adverse effects of direct treaty control.

However, the founding treaties can also include articles which only purpose is to protect the organizational interests and treaty credibility. For example, the Article 8 of the North Atlantic Treaty includes provisions that:

(28) *“Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to entire into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.” (NAT 8)*

This article exercises direct organizational control over the member states and similar articles can be found in other IGO founding treaties. This type of direct exercise of control in the founding treaties is necessary to protect the organizational interests and therefore unavoidable. However,

their open introduction in the treaty discourse ensures that the member states are aware of what they are committing to. This is what caps the cleavage in the power balances between a state agent and the collective in relation to such articles of control; since the member states are made aware of the control the treaty exercises, they can choose either to sign or not to sign the treaty. Thus, the treaty control relies on consent, rather than coercion, which decreases the dissociation produced by limited sovereignty within the organization framework.

Consequently, despite the multitude of commitments and obligations that the IGOs can set on their members, the membership itself is always voluntary. The state agents are aware of the expectations set on them by the organization before making the decision to commit to the organization, and therefore, the decision to join an IGO is based on national calculations on costs and benefits of joining an IGO. The voluntary nature of the membership also means that the founding treaties offer a possibility to terminate the membership of the IGOs:

(29) *“After the treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, ---“ (NAT 13)*

(30) *“No Member of the Organization may withdraw from membership without giving notice of its intention to do so to the Conference.” (OPECS 8:A)*

(31) *“Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.” (TEU 50:1)*

These are three different examples of how the IGO founding treaties introduce the possibility of cessation of membership. Out of these the EU clause can be viewed as the most objective, as it merely informs the treaty audience of the possibility, while the rest of the Article 50 continues on to describe the process of withdrawing from the Union. The NAT includes a timeframe during which the cessation of the membership is impossible, but since the treaty entered into force in 1949, the set due date for the mandatory membership period has since passed, and therefore, the nature of this clause in the North Atlantic Treaty is quite similar to the Treaty on the European Union. However, the clause that has the same implications is quite different in the OPEC Statute. While the two other treaties introduce the option of the cessation of membership quite objectively and informatively, the OPEC Statute introduces the same via a negative, more alienating discourse choice. While the content of the clause is exactly the same in all three, only the OPEC clause has negative tone due to the fact that it approaches the topic via an address of “no member” rather than “any member” that the two other treaties have elected to use. This can be assumed to be a conscious choice which purpose is to discourage the member states from leaving the organization, as this type of negative and

alienating clause stands quite clearly out among the otherwise inclusive treaty discourse.

However, the cessation of membership can also be used for control and coercion:

*(32) "A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization ---" (UNC 6)*

The organization membership is treated by the founding treaties as both voluntary and as a privilege. The voluntary nature of the membership protects the national rights from the organization control: if a state agent ceases to be satisfied with the organization and its ethos, it can leave the IGO to protect national interests. However, the treatment of the membership as a privilege protects in turn the interest of the organization. If a member state fails to conform to the organizational norms, its membership can be revoked and therefore the state agent loses the benefits that come with the membership.

## 5.2. Group-centred approach to collective identity

In this chapter the approach to the collective identity within an intergovernmental organization expands from the two dimensional relationship of a member state and the organization to multidimensional relationships between the member states themselves. This group-centred approach to collective identity is interested in the in-group structures and hierarchies and how the independent state agents relate to each other in the organizational framework. While the approach to collective identity that was examined in the previous chapter focused on how the founding treaty discourse encourages individual member states to identify with the organization and its ethos, the approach in this chapter in turn is interested in how the treaty discourse encourages the member states to identicization among themselves. Due to the sovereign nature of the state agents, the most crucial purpose of the founding treaty discourse in regards to this in-group identicization is the promotion of equality and solidarity between the member states. Any inequalities within the organization could lead to division between the members and thus damage the organizational collective identity. Therefore, this chapter will firstly examine how the member states are made equal by the treaties and will then examine how any potential inequalities that could surface within the organization are pre-emptively normalized and institutionalised.

### 5.2.2. Egalitarianism within the organizations

As suggested in the previous chapter, in order to incorporate sovereign states successfully into collective polities such as IGOs, it is crucial that the states do not view their sovereignty threatened by the collectivity. While the relationship between the agent and the collective is the most important level on which this threat to collective identicization is resolved, the group level equality also greatly influences this aspect of any collective. If the members of the collective are unequal either in their rights, obligations or power within the organization framework, it could lead to oppression of the less powerful members which in turn could negatively influence the identicization process within the collective. Therefore, organizational egalitarianism is one of the fundamental principles that guide the operational politics of any IGO. This section will examine how the five founding treaties of this study introduce the principles of equality and how they are integrated into the organizational institutions and practices. The basis hypothesis is that the treaties offer theoretical equality to all of its member states, but the organizational egalitarianism can be viewed successful only if the organizational practices exercise this equality in a fair and open manner.

The examined intergovernmental organizations all operate on democratic principles, as their key organs consists of national representatives of the state agents. The political systems within the organizations are based without exception on representation and voting, and this operates as the foundation for the organizational egalitarianism. However, some treaties include specific clauses which purpose is to protect and promote the equality of the members:

(33) *“The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.” (UNC 2:1)*

(34) *“The Organization shall be guided by the principle of the sovereign equality of its Member Countries.” (OPECS 3)*

(35) *“The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties ---“ (TEU 4:2)*

(36) *“[The Union shall function in accordance with the following principles:] sovereign equality and interdependence among Member States of the Union;” (CAAU 4:a)*

The presence of these clauses in the founding treaties appears self-explanatory: they protect the equality of the member states within the organizational framework from the potential inequalities that could rise from the national political, economic or ethnic conflicts and disparities. The equality of the organizations' member states is an unquestionable right protected by the founding treaty

discourse. In the international legal system, the sovereign equality of nations is a fundamental principle, as very small states are procedurally on equal standing with the superpowers of the world (Kingsbury, 1999, p. 66), and the importance of this also reflects in the IGO value systems. It should be noted here, however, that not all of the examined founding treaties include this separate clause promoting the equality of the members, since such clause is not present in the North Atlantic Treaty. However, this difference can somewhat be explained by the selected system of address in the NAT. The other examined IGOs generally refer either to members, member states or member countries in relation to the state agents within the organization, whereas NATO refers to “Parties to the Treaty” or simply to the Parties. This suggests that NATO is fundamentally different in its view of the organizational structure: while other IGO founding treaty discourses endorse membership of the organization, the selected NATO discourse implies partnership between the treaty signees. Partnership in itself implies equality of the participants and therefore the selected system of address in the North Atlantic Treaty supports the sovereign equality of NATO members.

However, a treaty promise of sovereign equality does not necessarily mean that the members are equal. The organizational egalitarianism must also reflect in its practical politics and operations, which essentially means that the members must be bound by the same obligations to the same level of control, while also gaining equal rights and benefits from the organization. This feature of organizational egalitarianism is detectable especially within the political organs of the IGOs, as equal representation and voting rights in the political systems of the IGO define the level of equality of member states within the organization. Generally, it can be confirmed that the most important political organs of the IGOs operate on democratic principles and all of the member states are represented in the political organs.

The most direct democracy from national politics to organizational level can be found in the regional IGOs, the European Union and the African Union, as both of these organizations have a political organ which sole purpose is to engage the state leaders in the organizational politics:

(37) *“Member States are represented in the European Council by their Heads of State or Government and in the Council by their governments, ---“ (TEU 10:2)*

(38) *“The Assembly shall be composed of Heads of States and Government or their duly accredited representatives.” (CAAU 6:1)*

This type of direct political representation from the highest national political authorities ensures that the member states all enjoy equal representation and thus legislative powers in the organization. In the case of the African Union it is specified that the Assembly operates as the supreme organ of the

Union (CAAU 6:2), which means that the highest organizational authority is divided evenly among the state leaders of the member states. Due to the consensus focused approach present in democratic politics, this gives the member states of the AU principally equal powers in the organizational political stage. In the case of the EU, however, the legislative powers are divided between the European Council and the European Parliament, which means that the state leaders are not the highest authority in the EU. Meanwhile, in the African Union the other organs, the Executive Council in particular, are responsible to the Assembly and thus the state leaders. Why this difference is significant to the organizational equality and power relations is that in the African Union the highest power belongs evenly to all member states as the supreme political organ consists of state representatives, which gives the member states the equal standing in the organizational politics. In the European Union, however, the division of legislative powers between the Council and the Parliament means that while the state leaders enjoy equal powers in the Council, the Parliament is a supranational organ that has unevenly distributed number of representatives per member state, as the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) do not represent their respective countries, but the European citizens. However, the number of representatives is proportionally determined according to the population of the EU member states, which means that some member states have more MEPs than others. While the organ is supranational in nature, this political setting still offers the citizens of some member states more political power than others, which can be viewed to create some inequality between the member states and their political interests. Nevertheless, the more complex structures of the European Union can also benefit the integration and sense of collectivity. Taninchev (2015) argues that the more substructures an IGO has, the more extensive and in-depth the state agent interaction is, which in turn will lead to increased interest convergence. In essence, while the complexity of the EU structures means that the singular state agents may have less influence and political power, the extent to which the EU structures force them to interact could in turn benefit the development of collective identity, thus negating the adverse effects of unbalanced power relations.

Since these two IGOs, the AU and the EU, are directly political and seek to further integration between member states, the involvement of national political representatives is quite necessary on the organizational level. However, such involvement of national political authorities is not required to same extent in the other examined IGOs due to their lesser degree of integration. Although, because all IGOs significantly influence national level politics of the member countries in their fields of focus, similar representative systems are to be found in the political organs of the UN, NATO and OPEC as well:

(39) *“The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations.” (UNC 9:1)*

(40) *“The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty.” (NAT 9)*

(41) *“The Conference shall be the supreme authority of the Organization. The Conference shall consist of delegations representing the Member Countries.” (OPECS 11)*

All these articles protect organizational egalitarianism on the group level between the state agents by integrating them equally into the systems of political conduct. As all these organs operate democratically via voting, all of the members have equal opportunity to participate and influence the policies generated on the organizational level. However, as suggested in the theoretical framework, the mere existence of a democratic political system does not irrefutably make the member states equal, but this promotion of theoretical and practical equality in the organizational framework serves to diffuse the global power imbalances created by national inequalities in wealth, standard of living, or military prowess. Despite the fact that the member states can have significant variation in their global status, within the IGOs these types of articles and organs ensure that the power imbalances do not reflect on the organizational politics. This is fundamentally important for the promotion of collective identity on the group level: by utilizing discourse that superficially diffuses the cleavages between the state agents, the founding treaties seek to create equivalence and equality that eases the identification to the collective identity.

### 5.2.3. Normalization of inequality

Nevertheless, despite the purposeful promotion of equality between the state agents, naturally there also exists unavoidable inequality within the IGOs, as it does in any social collective. Therefore, a social institution needs a stabilizing principle, which usually means the naturalization of social classifications; the selected discourse must establish the foundation of the social relations in the surrounding world and structures, so that they are no longer seen as social constructions. The formality of the structures becomes recognizable and a self-validating truth (Douglas, 1986, p. 48). In the founding treaties the most blatant inequalities within the systems of the organizations are generally addressed outright and directly, because open discourse can be used to systematically normalize and justify these types of inequalities. From discourse-analytic viewpoint discourse can be used to create realities and by utilizing objectively informative way of addressing special statuses

of certain group members or group elites, the founding treaties create a sense of reality in which the existence of these group elites is objectively acceptable and even necessary. This section will observe selected instances in which this type of approach has been used in the examined IGO founding treaties.

However, at first it should be acknowledged that the existence of group elites in itself does not necessarily dissuade the members of a collective from identicization towards a collective identity. In fact, for the traditional collective identity the existence of group elites is a natural state of progression, since the formation of traditional collective identity is based on the integration of the group members into the practices and rituals of the collective. Consequently, there exists a natural hierarchical structure in such collectives in which the founding members of the collective can be viewed as the bearers of tradition, while new members are slowly integrated into the collective, sometimes even to the point of ascending into the group elite (Eder, Giesen, Schmidtke, & Tambini, 2002, p. 25). This type of view can be detected in the founding treaties of the UN and OPEC, as they are the only founding treaties that clearly differentiate the original or founding members from the members who were approved for membership after the original signing. Thus, it can be argued that the existence of hierarchical structures in self-proclaimed egalitarian systems of intergovernmental organizations do not necessarily directly jeopardise the collective identicization, but can be a part of the process.

However, this approach can also be utilized to normalize inequality between member states in the founding treaties of IGOs. A good example of this can be found in the Security Council of the United Nations, which is a significant organ of the organization. The Security Council can be viewed as the second most important exerciser of organizational control, immediately after the Charter itself as the Charter defines:

(42) *“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”*  
(UNC 25)

The Security Council, like the General Assembly, operates on the democratic principle of each member of the organ having one vote, but unlike the General Assembly, the membership of the Security Council is strictly limited. While the General Assembly consists of 192 representatives who each represent their respective member states, the Charter introduces the Security Council as follows:

(43) *“The Security Council shall consist of eleven Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist*

*Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council.” (UNC 23:1)*

In essence, the organizational power that the Security Council holds over its 192 member countries is distributed to only eleven member states. Furthermore, five of those members are the permanent members, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, also known as the P5. Due to its exclusive nature the Security Council can be viewed as an organizational group elite, and the P5 countries even more so, considering their permanent status as organizational power holders. The elite status of this in-group of five members is consistent in the UN narrative, as the countries in question are also the only nuclear-weapon states that are recognized by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1969). Therefore, the special national military status that is granted to these countries by their nuclear weapons programs can be viewed to directly translate to further organizational power within the UN as well. However, it is also widely believed that four other nations, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel, also possess some nuclear capabilities, yet these countries are excluded from the permanent membership of the Security Council. This means that the Security Council presents quite a stark display of inequality within an otherwise at least superficially egalitarian organization. This, however, has been quite successfully compensated for by utilizing the aforementioned possibility of ascension into the group elite:

*(44) “The General Assembly shall elect six other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being paid, --- to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization and to equitable geographic distribution.” (UNC 23:1)*

Hence, any UN member state that proves itself to be useful and necessary to the organizational agenda and practices may ascend to the group elite. This artificially creates the same setting as exists in traditional collective identity; through adaptation to organizational norms a standard member may ascend to the group elite. As the non-permanent members of the Security Council participate in the organ from one to two years at a time and a retiring member cannot be immediately re-elected, the rotation is quite efficient. Therefore, instead of the true group elite, the P5, becoming a caricature of organizational inequality, they now represent the in-group status that any member state may ascend to. Consequently, while the group elite P5 has risen to their status mainly because of their superior national powers, their status in the organizational power structures is normalized by creating an organizational hierarchical group elite around the naturally existing in-group already in the founding treaty. The existence of group elite is arguably more acceptable and less detrimental for the relationships between the members of a collective if all members at least

theoretically have an equal opportunity of rising into the elite ingroup.

Another quite significant power imbalance exists also in the system of the European Union, as the European Parliament (EP) utilizes proportional representation and determines the number of the members of parliament according to the population of the respective member states. This means that the number of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) per member state varies from the minimum of 6 up to 96 (Europarl, n.d.). Such a setting significantly marginalizes the smaller member states in the EP, while the five most populous states, Germany, France, Italy, the UK and Spain between themselves hold nearly half of the seats of the Parliament. While the EP operates on supranational principles, as the MEPs represent the European political parties, rather than their home countries, it is to be expected that the policies the MEPs favour ultimately also favour their home countries, which gives the more populous EU members a clear advantage on the European political level. Because this represents a noteworthy aspect of the European Union that could create inequality between the member states and thus damage the European identification towards a collective identity, this has been notified by the Treaty on the European Union.

(45) *“Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament.” (TEU 10:2)*

(46) *“The European Parliament shall be composed of representatives of the Union’s citizens.” (TEU 14:1)*

Thus, the treaty and the political system of the EU itself takes advantage of the democratic nature of the European politics. By explicitly introducing the idea that the European Parliament and MEPs represent the European citizens, rather than the member states, the treaty aims to first justify the great disparity in the number of MEPs to the Union member states and secondly to export the identification from the European political level also to the European citizens. Therefore, while the number of MEPs might create some inequality between the member states in relation to organizational political power, it serves a greater purpose in expanding the European collective identity from the state agents onwards to the micro level of the European citizens.

Lastly, as specific figures of authority tend to rise in any social group due to their skills, knowledge or other attributes, it is necessary to acknowledge that a somewhat similar phenomenon can be noted in the IGO founding treaties. While the members of IGOs are generally promised the same rights and are bound by the same obligations and commitments, it can be specified in the founding treaty if an individual state agent has obligations beyond those of a standard member. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty four times mentions organizational roles specific for the US:

In relation to the accession of potential new members the NAT states:

(47) *“Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of United States of America.” (NAT 10)*

Three further mentions are included before the end of the treaty:

(48) *“The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America.” (NAT 11)*

(49) *“---any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America,---“ (NAT 13)*

(50) *“This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America.” (NAT 14)*

While these roles are administrative and largely due to the lack of elaborate administrative systems within the IGO, it is still significant that one specific member is given four responsibilities different from the other members. No matter how menial the obligations are, they still give the particular state agent a special role and status in the organization. Furthermore, the special status of the US is even more evident as the UN Charter makes a separate mention as well, although in a lesser scale:

(51) *“The present Charter, of which the Chinese, French, Russian, English and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America.” (UNC 111)*

It could be argued that this special mention in the UN Charter is what ultimately justifies the US role as the NATO administrator. The UN framework and respect to UN principles is emphasised multiple times throughout the North Atlantic Treaty. Therefore, the organizational reverence that the NATO directs at the Charter of the United Nations, means that a mention of the administrative role of the US in the UN Charter could translate in the NATO narrative into national capability and organizational tradition of the United States assuming such special roles. This type of status rising feature could easily justify and normalize the ascension of one member of the collective into a special status within a social group.

### 5.3. Collectivity-centred approach to collective identity

The last examined way the collective identity can be formed and presented is the collectivity-

centred approach. The two previous approaches, the agent-centred and the group-centred, mainly operated within the IGO framework, whereas collectivity-centred approach to collective identity is concerned with how the IGO operates in relation to the rest of the world and other collectives. The globalist nature of the IGOs examined in this study means that the general global political influences also affect these organizations. They operate within a premade political context and in a network of various operatives with varying agendas. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to determine what kind of attitudes and views the examined IGOs form in relation to the outside world and other IGOs. This relationship between the IGO and the rest of the world can be of great importance in forming a sense of “us” and “them” in the organizational narrative. Whether an IGO views the rest of the world as a potential ally or as a potential adversary, is a crucial component of the collective identity. Furthermore, if the rest of the world is not the main adversary of the organization, this chapter will attempt to determine what kind of opposing forces or threats the founding treaties do treat as their adversaries that the collective aims to work against. This type of common enemy can be an important factor in building group unity and solidarity, which in turn aids the development of collective identity within the organization.

### 5.3.1. The IGO collective in relation to other collectives

The organizational attitudes towards the Other were briefly touched upon in the section concerning the ideal member states of an IGO. However, the main topic of discussion in that chapter was how the IGO views potential new member states and whether their approach to membership is more exclusive or inclusive. In this some variation existed between the examined IGOs as, for example, the UN and the AU were more inclusive in their membership, while NATO and the EU could be more exclusive. However, in this chapter the analysis approach is somewhat different. While the membership question dealt with the agent-collective relationships, this chapter aims to determine what kind of attitudes and views the IGOs adopt towards other collectives and the rest of the world. The focus is not on the individual agents, rather than on the global political networks and operatives that exist within those networks. Whether the approach to other collectives is positive, negative or indifferent could affect the nature of the IGO collective identity in a similar manner the attitude to the Other could affect it in relation to the agent-centred approach.

To being with, the special status of the United Nations should be acknowledged when examining the IGOs relationships with each other. The eighth chapter of the Charter of the United Nations deals specifically with regional arrangements.

(52) *“Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.” (UNC 52:1)*

(53) *“The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.” (UNC 54)*

In essence, these two clauses suggest that the United Nation allows such independent collective action which could further the UN cause as long as the cooperation is conducted in accordance with the UN principles and the UN supreme security organ, the Security Council, is kept informed of any action taken or considered. Therefore, based on the Charter articles 52-54, the United Nation can be viewed to present itself as the highest authority on any global security matters and because the UN members include every sovereign state in the world, it means that every regional arrangement has to respect the above clauses and thus surrender to the UN control. Consequently, the North Atlantic Treaty, the Treaty on the European Union and the Constitutive Act of the African Union all include an article which refers to this article in the Charter and affirms that the IGOs in question operate on UN principles:

(54) *“The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means ---“ (NAT I)*

(55) *” [It [the Union] shall contribute] --- to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.” (TEU 3:5)*

(56) *“[The objectives of the Union shall be to:] encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” (CAAU 3:e)*

These articles in the founding treaties of the “regional agencies”, as the UN referred to the intergovernmental cooperation taking place within its framework, give credibility and justification for the UN claims of its status as the highest global authority on the matters relevant to its scope. The acknowledgement of the UN principles is fundamentally also an acknowledgement of the authority the United Nations holds over these regional agencies. However, this only applies to the operatives that are concerned with similar issues as the United Nations itself. The UN control does not extend to OPEC for example, because the organization in question operates outside of the UN scope. The petroleum trade or the market value of oil is not a concern of the UN, so the OPEC, as

well as other similar IGOs, can operate free of the UN supervision. Nevertheless, the global status of the UN as the highest authority on matters of international peace and justice reflects to its relationship with the world. Due to the scope of the organization, the number of its members and ultimately the focus of its principles and purposes the UN enjoys a unique position in the world where sovereign states and any collectives they form fall equally under the UN sphere of control. Consequently, this significantly affects the collective identity that can be formed within the UN collective. Since the UN reaches essentially the entire world with its agenda, being part of the UN organizational structures can be fundamentally the same as being a part of the global political world. Therefore, falling outside the UN structures would not be alienating and isolating to an individual state agent, but could also destroy any credibility a state could have as a political operative on the global political stage. This can be considered one of the fundamental reasons why all sovereign states seek to maintain their membership in the UN, despite their potential differences of opinion. This can be viewed as a crucial part of the UN collective identity: in order to a state agent to successfully participate in the world, it also has to participate in the UN. The UN membership has come to mean the membership of the world as a sovereign state.

Furthermore, the UN inclusivity extends even to those peoples and areas that have yet to gain independence and cannot therefore become full members of the UN. While the Charter emphasises a nation's right to self-rule and sovereignty, the treaty makes quite a clear exception in the case of territories that lack self-governing:

*(57) "Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interest of the inhabitants of these territories is paramount ---" (UNC 73)*

The Charter continues by listing the obligations such member states have towards these territories. Therefore, the treaty control does not only include just its members and their regional arrangements, but also such peoples and territories that are excluded from the Charter due to their lack of sovereignty. This means that the United Nations considers the entire world as its concern, which makes its attitude towards the rest of the world emphatically inclusive and it has quite a missionary drive behind its purposes and principles. This is typical of the universalist collective identity.

However, as stated earlier, the United Nations is a unique case in the world and among the intergovernmental organization. The relationship the UN has with the rest of the world is exceptional due to the inclusive nature of the organization and therefore the construction of the IGO collective identity through its relationship with the rest of the world is quite different than in the

other examined IGOs. Although, some similarities can be detected and perhaps credited to the UN effect on the other IGOs that exist within its framework. For example, the EU has some missionary aspirations according to its founding treaty:

(58) *“In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights ---”* (TEU 3:5)

In this article the treaty outlines the EU attitude towards the rest of the world, while also listing the European universal values. As suggested in the earlier chapters, the EU views the European values as universal and in this particular article the founding treaty proposes that the EU relations with the wider world is concerned with exporting these values and principles. This is quintessential of the universalist collective identity: the identity is founded on the universalist belief system, in this case the European value system, and the Other are viewed as somewhat inferior, which validates the export of these superior values to the wider world. However, the EU is not inclusive in a similar manner to the UN, which means its missionary aspirations are based on informal cooperation with the wider world, rather than institutionalized obligations to cooperate as it is in the UN framework. Furthermore, unlike the UN, the European Union is limited by its geographic boundaries. The Union's main concern is not the world, but the European continent, which means that the treaty focuses more concretely on the relationship between EU and the rest of the European states:

(59) *“The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.”* (TEU 8:1)

Therefore, while the EU has some missionary aspirations towards the rest of the world, its main concern is ultimately Europe. In practice this translates to further cooperation with such countries that can assist in promoting the prosperity and peace on the continent, not to cooperation with the whole world as it does in the United Nations.

Similarly, due to their regional natures, the African Union defines its relationship with the world on terms that best promote African interests. The Constitutive Act encourages international cooperation with relevant parties in areas that are main concerns to African well-being and prosperity. The Article 3 of the Act introduces the Union's objectives and makes three specific references to international cooperation: *“encourage international cooperation”* (3:e), *“establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and*

*in international negotiations” (3:i), and “work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases”.* In essence, the African Union views the rest of the world and different operatives as potential collaborators as long as they can assist in promoting the African interests. However, according to the founding treaty, the African Union does not have missionary aspirations towards its values or principles, like the EU or the UN. The Union’s sole concern is the protection of African interests and that defines the organization’s relationship with the rest of the world. However, this sort of careful attitude towards the Other can be attributed to the continent’s history. As introduced earlier, the Constitutive Act makes direct references to the African colonialisised history and emphasises the uniting past of “struggles for political independence, human dignity and economic emancipation” (CAAU Preamble). This could mean that the AU attitude towards the Other operates in accordance with the primordial collective identity: while the member states share kinship, the Other is viewed as threatening and superior at the same time, which translates to sharp frontiers and exclusive practice (Eder, Giesen, Schmidtke, & Tambini, 2002, p. 28). This in turn could limit the extent of the cooperation the collective is willing to participate in with the wider world.

Consequently, quite similar attitude can be detected in the OPEC Statute. The IGO is willing to cooperate with outsiders, but only as long as they share similar interests as the member states and the organization itself. For example, the treaty admits Associate Members among countries who have net export in petroleum, but who do not otherwise qualify for the full membership of the organization (OPECS 7:D). However, the same clause specifies that:

*(60) “No country may be admitted to Associate Membership which does not fundamentally have interests and aims similar to those of Member Countries.” (OPECS 7:D)*

This articulates the OPEC exclusivity: the organization is willing to cooperate to significant extent with outside countries, but on very specific conditions. However, the membership question does not fully define the OPEC world view. In the typical OPEC narrative, the organization collective consists of petroleum producers, while the Other consists of consumers and to some extent investors. In essence, the OPEC attitude towards the wider world is tied to its focus area in the specific trade. This is introduced already in the OPEC aims in Article 2 of the Statute:

*(61) “Due regard shall be given at times to the interests of the producing nations and to the necessity of securing a steady income to the producing countries; an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair return on their capital to those investing in the petroleum industry.” (OPECS 2:C)*

This setting defines the relationship between OPEC and the rest of the world. Fundamentally, the OPEC world view is determined by who benefits and from what. The division to producers, consumers and investors creates the focus groups of OPEC action, while the outsiders who do not fall into any of these groups are of no interest to the organization. This is quite typical of the traditional collective identity in which the Other is seen with indifference and is observed in its value-free otherness (Eder, Giesen, Schmidtke, & Tambini, 2002, p. 28), while the IGO is only interested in those that fall under the scope of its traditions and practices in the trade it focuses on.

The last of the examined collectivity-centred relationships is that of NATO. NATO approach to the rest of the world is quite controversial, according to the North Atlantic Treaty. Firstly, it is necessary to acknowledge the UN effect on the treaty, as it is separately specified that the Parties undertake to settle any international dispute they might participate in by peaceful means, as set forth in the Charter (NAT 1). The treaty goes on to further expand on its value systems in Article 2:

(62) *“The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.” (NAT 2)*

This introduction of value system can be regarded as an extension of the UN value system, referenced in the previous article. In fact, NATO appears to be highlighting its commitment to the UN goals and principles in its founding treaty, which is undoubtedly a conscious choice and meant to establish a certain image of the organization. This construction of a peaceful image is necessary, because the treaty continues by introducing the military nature of the IGO by obligating the Parties to “maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack” (NAT 3). This is the fundamental basis of the NATO world view: on one hand, the organization is committed to the UN goals of promoting peace and friendly international relations, while on the other hand, it views the Other as a potential threat to its members. The NATO collective identity is largely founded on this potential threat the Other presents:

(63) *“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against all of them and consequently agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, ---, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked ---” (NAT 5)*

This creates a stark division of “us” and “them” into the NATO narrative. By committing to the North Atlantic Treaty, the treaty parties also commit to each other and the protection of the collective. While the NATO is committed to its UN context and obligations, ultimately, the

collective identity of NATO is established on the collective commitment to the defence of each other. Such commitment is necessary only if the Other is viewed as a potential threat to either the member or the collective, which is the basis of the NATO world view and narrative. This would suggest that the NATO collective identity in this regards is quite unique: on one hand, the Other has the potential to be viewed as a threat, but it is not necessarily treated as threatening or superior. The attitude to Other is quite indifferent on the IGOs part until it becomes a threat. On other hand, the commitment to UN principles means that the NATO and its members are bound to the peaceful missionary attitudes of the United Nations, which means that the peaceful solution to international relations must come first.

### 5.3.3. The adversary of the collective

As suggested above, in the case of NATO the potential adversary of the collective is the Other. An armed attack either on one of the treaty parties or on the collective is introduced in the North Atlantic Treaty as the main adversary the organization is prepared to act against. Naturally, there are underlying, less significant adversaries implied by the organizational aims (NAT 2), such as international instability, unequal distribution of well-being or conflicting economic policies, but the main adversary of the collective according to the NAT narrative is the potential threat the Other represents. While in the case of NATO this adversary to the collective is clearly presented and closely tied to the IGO's relationship with the wider world, the other examined IGOs also propose some sort of adversary or enemy the collective must unite against. The creation of this type of enemy is one of the quintessential ways to construct collective identity as a common enemy unites independent actors effectively. Therefore, the purpose of this section is to examine the treaties in order to discover the adversaries or enemies presented in the discourse.

Consequently, the organizational aims are fundamentally an indicator of what or whom the organization is opposing. The proposed action and introduced goals of an IGO generally either build towards a common goal or attempt to counter something else that could be potentially harmful or threatening to the collective or the members of the collective. Since the member states consent to these organizational aims, it suggests that they view the adversaries of the collective as a threat on the national level as well and are therefore willing to commit to collective action to prevent them. Therefore, this is one of the most important aspects of the collectivity-centred construction of collective identity in IGOs. The member states are, as a collective, uniting against an outside enemy that threatens them all. While in the case of NATO this potential threat is an outside agent or a

collective of Other, in the case of the rest of the examined IGOs the threats appear to be more abstract.

The United Nations was established after the Second World War, which understandably reflects in its purposes. The first article of the Charter introduces the organizational purposes, which highlight the UN aspirations towards world-wide peace and security, the development of friendly relations among nations, and “cooperation in solving international problems of social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all” (UNC 1:3). Therefore, ultimately the adversary of the United Nations is extensive conflict between nations. The importance of international peace and security are emphasised throughout the treaty, while the other purposes of the organization aim to dissuade inequalities between different peoples and social groups, while also harmonizing their actions in pursuing the UN goals. By promoting these types of goals, the UN works towards its main goal of world peace. It is assumed that every nation wants to ultimately live in peace and therefore extensive conflict and war are the main UN adversaries. The lesser adversaries, such as poverty, inequality and injustice, are UN concerns, because they could ultimately lead to open conflict between nations or within nations. To accentuate this common adversary as a uniting feature among the member states of the organization, the Charter begins with a reference to it:

*(64) “We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life-time has brought untold sorrow to mankind, ---“ (UNC Preamble)*

While quite different in its organizational purpose, OPEC has a similarly clear main adversary to introduce to its member states. The Statute states that:

*(65) “The Organization shall devise ways and means of ensuring the stabilization of prices in international oil markets with a view to eliminating harmful and unnecessary fluctuations.” (OPECS 2:B)*

As all of the member states of OPEC are benefiting from the oil trade and the export of petroleum is crucial for their GDP, the aforementioned market fluctuations of crude oil prices is the main adversary of the organization. The collapse of the oil prices influences negatively the benefits the member states can get from their trade and, therefore, the protection of stable markets is the most important purpose of the organization. The peripheral goals of the IGO, such as the unification of the petroleum policies, the efficient and economic supply of petroleum to consumers and a fair return to investors, all ultimately serve the organizational goal of stabilising the market prices and maximizing the benefits the producing nations gain from the trade.

However, the adversary of the collective is not always as straightforward or easy to detect as it is in the case of the three aforementioned IGOs. The organizational goals and purposes of the regional IGOs of the EU and the AU are expansive and include both political, economic and security goals, as well as seek to promote general well-being and equality of the peoples of the continents. Therefore, it can be argued that instead of trying to defend against a specific adversary, these collectives are dedicated to build towards improvement of their respective continents. However, that type of argument would suggest that what these types of regional IGOs are combating is, in fact, continental failure to reach extensive well-being and prosperity. In essence, the purpose of these IGOs is to cooperate to build improved future prospects for all of the member states and their peoples. For these ends, the unity of the members is of crucial importance, so that they all willingly participate in the effort. Both the Treaty on the European Union and the Constitutive Act of the African Union introduce from the very beginning of the treaties their goal of promoting unity and solidarity among the member states:

(66) *“This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe, ---“ (TEU 1)*

(67) *“[The objectives of the Union shall be to:] achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa;” (CAAU 3:a)*

These clauses promote kinship and solidarity among the member states and among the various peoples of the continents. The establishment of such natural frontiers is typical of primordial collective identity, so these clauses are important to the collective identity within these types of regional IGOs. Without the sense of kinship and shared history, the state agents could have little in common. Therefore, it could be argued that the main adversary these collectives have to acknowledge in order to succeed in pursuing their other goals is inner division among its member states. If the sense of kinship and solidarity begins to fail within the organizational framework, it could mean the collapse of the organization itself. For example, the recent decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union could be influenced at least partially by the British disassociation between the UK and the main land Europe.

## 6. Discussion and Conclusion

The final chapter of this study will discuss the findings yielded by the analysis of the research material and will try to determine the role of the founding treaty discourse in the development of the organizational collective identity and the sense of collectivity among the member states. As the main research question was how the founding treaty discourse creates collectivity among the member states, this section will attempt to briefly summarize the results of the analysis and will also try to offer some context on how the established discourses of collectivity influence the development of organizational and national identities. The final section will be the conclusion to the study which will briefly comment on the overall success of this study in achieving its research aim and address the potential research topics excluded from this study.

### 6.1. Conclusions and their implications

Based on the analysis of the research material in the previous chapter, three conclusions can be drawn: Firstly, sovereign states are capable of acting as independent social agents as they can support values and ideas, form intentions, and take action. Secondly, an IGO can be viewed as a social collective and as a social institution, because it consists of social state agents who willingly adapt to the group norms and collective control. And lastly, the founding treaties of the studied IGOs acknowledge these two facts and consciously aim to create collective identity among the social agents within the IGO framework. These three conclusions align with the hypotheses that originally operated as the foundation of this study.

However, because the collective identity in the multinational setting of an IGO differs greatly from that of traditional social collectives or groups, the means of establishing that collective identity are somewhat different as well. While the primordial, traditional and universalist collective identities present themselves mostly uniformly in social collectives defined by nationality, ethnicity, religion, age, gender or social class, the collective identity formed among a variety of nations is more complex in nature. All collective identities are ultimately socially constructed, but in order to accommodate the variety in the cultural, political, economic and ethnic compositions of the member

states, an IGO collective identity must be constructed consciously and with care. Therefore, the collective identities within IGOs tend to be composed of multiple features across the primordial, traditional and universalist formulas of collective identity. Because the collective of the IGO is consciously created, it gives the creating analogy, the founding treaty discourse, an opportunity to also establish the perimeters of the collective identity that is to be founded in the collective framework. This setting makes the collective identity within IGOs quite unique, as its foundation can be directly studied in the founding treaty discourse and any further development of that collective identity that results from the organizational interaction and operational discourse can be contrasted with that defining beginning of the collective identity.

However, fundamentally the collective identity of an IGO largely operates and presents itself similarly as those of other social collectives. It was theorized that a collective identity surfaces on three levels in any social collective: between an agent and the collective, between the agents of the collective, and ultimately between the collective and other collectives or the wider world. All these levels surfaced quite concretely in the treaty discourse. The process of identicization from national identity towards the collective identity of an IGO begins on the level of relationship between the state agent and the collective, as the first determining factor is the ideal member state the collective is looking for. This not only creates organizational homogeneity, but also introduces the fundamental requirements that the member state must accept. Three mandatory requirements surfaced in each of the examined treaties: the state agent must be located within the geographical scope of the organization, the potential member must accept to support the organizational values and principles, and lastly, the state agent must commit itself to the organizational obligations and be able to carry them out in the manner required by the organization. This defines the relationship between the individual agents and the collective and thus prompts the identification towards the collective identity. A limited geographic scope of the organization can be used to create homogeneity as in the case of the regionally focused IGOs like NATO, the EU and the AU, or alternatively open geographic scope can promote and protect the organizational operational focus and spread its influence, like in the case of the world-wide IGOs the UN and OPEC. The acceptance of the organizational values and principles in turn encourages the alignment of national and organizational ethos, which directly supports the identification of state agent towards the collective. The more similar the organizational values, beliefs and practices are, the easier it is for a state agent to assimilate to the collective. Lastly, the commitment to organizational obligations serves two goals; firstly, it ensures that the organizational interests come before national interests, and secondly, it promises to the potential members that all the organizational member states are bound

to the same obligations. Overall, the examined founding treaties seem to define the relationship between the individual state agents and the collective in quite restrictive terms. However, the open presentation of these requirements means that the member states are aware of the commitment they are making and therefore the discourse supports the communal trust. At the same time, because all of the member states are bound by the same restrictions and requirements, the restrictive limits of the agent-collective relationship promotes the organizational egalitarianism as well. Within the IGO framework, the organizational interests always come first and by setting clear boundaries to the power of a state agent within the organization, the founding treaty discourse ensures that in case of any conflict of interests the member states are bound to respect the collective interests first. This unyielding commitment to collective interest in turn serves to promote the convergence of interests within the organizations.

The second level of collective identity that deals with the relationship between the members of the collective is mainly interested in the organizational egalitarianism in the case of the IGOs. The sovereign nature of the state agents means that organizational inequality could endanger the identification, if a state agent views that the collective favours some members over others. The protection of organizational egalitarianism is in the examined founding treaties generally introduced via three different methods. Firstly, all treaties include a theoretical promise of equality of the member states. Secondly, this equality is practically promoted by offering the members equal representation and voting rights in the major political organs of the organization. Thirdly, the treaties seek to normalize the arising inequalities in the founding treaty discourse by naturalizing their presence and creating a sense of self-validating truth around them. The quintessential methods of how this is done is either by introducing the unequal power relations with objectively informative narrative that normalizes their presence or by justifying the existence of these power relations by connecting them to the natural world and its facts, such as the permanent Security Council members being the acknowledged nuclear weapons states or the membership of the European Parliament being tied to the population of the member states. However, it should be acknowledged here that this study is solely concerned with the founding treaty discourse. While the discourse in each examined treaty seems to adamantly support the organizational egalitarianism, how well this translates to the operational and political interaction and discourse of the IGOs does not fall under the scope of this study. Therefore, the promotion of equality introduced in this study is highly theoretical. However, it can be assumed that if the founding treaty egalitarianism and the normalization of inequalities is successfully transferred and adopted in the interactional discourse of the IGOs, it would greatly support the continuous development and maintaining of the IGO

collective identity.

The third, and consequently the last, level of collective identity that is concerned with the collective in relation to the wider world and other collectives is presented in the founding treaty discourse to varying degrees. The Charter of the United Nations unquestionably introduces an organizational attitude to the wider world as the most inclusive out of the examined IGOs. The United Nations seeks to cooperate with all state agents, their dependent territories, as well as other collectives that seek to promote collaboration in similar matters as the UN. Therefore, it can be said that the UN attitude towards the world is quite positive and missionary; by seeking to export its values and principles of international peace and justice, the UN aims to promote its organizational goals globally as extensively as possible. Among the examined IGOs this extent of positive inclusiveness is unique to the UN. This feature can be partially considered to explain the reach and geographical scope of the organization; the membership of the UN has come to mean the membership of the world, which can be considered as the basis of the UN collective identity. Furthermore, the Treaty on the European Union suggested that the EU has some careful missionary ideals towards the world, but the treaty discourse was mainly concerned with the spread of European values that are by the treaty treated as universal. The European Union, while it seeks to cooperate with the world and to spread the European values, does not mean to expand its reach in a manner similar to the UN. Likewise, the African Union and OPEC founding treaties imply attitudes that the IGOs are willing to cooperate with the world and other global agencies, but only if such cooperation works towards satisfying the organizational ethos and to further the organizational agenda. In essence, it could be argued that the founding treaties of these IGOs suggest that the UN seeks to cooperate with the wider world, because it aids in the execution of its organizational agenda, while the EU, the AU and OPEC cooperate with the world, if it aids in the implementation of theirs. Therefore, the UN collective identity appears to be significantly more globalist, while the other three IGOs build their collective identity firmly on the idea of organizational solidarity and on a sense of “us”. However, out of the examined IGOs only NATO seems to adopt a carefully negative attitude towards the wider world. While the UN ideals that operate behind the NATO principles promote peaceful coexistence with the rest of the world, NATO itself is a conscious preparation in case the UN approach fails. NATO is a military and defence organization and this reflects in its attitude towards the rest of the world, as one of its most significant principles is that the member states uniformly cooperate in case of an attack on one or more of the members. The NAT discourse, therefore, creates the starkest division between “us” and “them”, as the organizational solidarity is contrasted with the Other’s potential hostility. However, all of the founding treaties include or at least imply

some sort of an adversary or enemy the collective must work against, even though in the case of the other IGOs it is not quite as clearly outlined, as it is in the case of NATO. For each organization the adversary relates to the organizational goals and potential threats or challenges that would negatively influence all of the member states. The presence of this adversary, whether it be war and international unrest, like in the case of the UN, or market fluctuations, as the OPEC suggests, can be viewed as one of the most uniting and collectivity creating features in the founding treaties.

Overall, the examined IGO founding treaties succeed in establishing a common framework for the organizational collective identity on each of these levels. While the fundamental purpose of the treaty discourse might be first of all to determine these relationships between the agent and the collective, between the various state agents and between the collective and the world, in order to clarify the organizational approach to each and to present the extent of organizational control, these relationships also determine the development of the collective identity within an IGO. The power relations that exist within the organization are closely tied to the sense of collective identity within the IGO, as they can either support the development of the organizational collectivity or challenge it. While the discourse that encourages to collective identification was found consistently throughout all of the five examined treaties, it was also apparent that some of the treaties were more extensive in this regard than others. For example, while NATO and OPEC include discourse that establishes collectivity, both of these treaties are more focused on the introduction of the organizational practices, rather than on emphasising the ideological framework. Meanwhile, the UN, the EU and the AU all include a preamble which sole purpose is to introduce the ideological and historical framework within which the organizations exist. Therefore, it would appear that the wider the scope is or the deeper the integration an organization seeks, the more extensive its discourse of collectivity aims to be. However, despite this slight variation in the extent of the discourse, it is undeniable that the discourse of collectivity does appear in the IGO founding treaties consistently, regardless the organizational focus areas.

However, it should be acknowledged that even though the examined treaties include quite undeniable encouragement towards identifying with the collective and the organization, the IGO collective identity does not seek to replace the national identity of a sovereign state in any manner. Therefore, this study has been more concerned with the phenomenon of identicization, rather than collective identification: The IGO collective identity does not create a new identity for the agents within its framework, but instead the sense of collectivity must be integrated into the national collective identity of a sovereign state. In essence, the national identity is merely adapting to the changing social environment it exists in. This approach to collective identity can be argued to

reflect in the examined treaties as well, since the analysis indicated that the treaties aim to seek a balance between the protection of national and organizational interests and promises to protect sovereign rights and equality. This fundamental respect for the national identity and national ethos of the state agents can be considered one of the reasons why the examined IGOs have been successful in promoting the collectivity among their members. Furthermore, because the identicization primarily takes place on the level of the national identity, a state agent can simultaneously identify with multiple IGOs. For example, European nations like France or Germany, belong simultaneously to the UN, the EU and NATO, whereas African states like Libya and Nigeria belong to the UN, the AU and OPEC. Because the collective identity of these IGOs merely complements the national identity of the member states and does not seek to replace or dominate it, it is possible for the sovereign states to participate in all of the beneficial international cooperation without it challenging the national or organizational identities. This type of flexibility is crucial for the functionality of the IGOs and the collective identity that exists within their framework, as it further enables the global political networking by creating connections between various states and other IGOs through the state agents themselves.

Consequently, this type of adaptability of the collective identity within the IGO requires that the founding treaties are not too rigid and limiting in the creation of collectivity. This necessary ambiguity can be detected in the examined treaties quite easily; while the fundamental components are present on the three operational levels of collective identity and the patterns of discourse that target the creation of collectivity are easily detectable, how these features are further implemented and realized in the organizational context is left undetermined. Therefore, while the founding treaties seek to establish the foundation for the organizational collective identity, the actual formation of this identity takes place in the practical interaction and discourse of the organizational politics. The collective identity of the IGO social collective is realized within the framework of the founding treaties, rather than by the founding treaties. Nevertheless, the founding treaty discourse offers valuable information in regards to what type of a collective identity the IGO wishes to establish, how comprehensive integration of national and organizational identities the organization wishes to achieve and whether the collective identity is an intrinsic value in itself for the organization. Therefore, in order to comprehensively study the collective identities that surface within intergovernmental organizations, it is necessary to incorporate both the theoretical framework for the collective identity that is introduced in the founding treaties and the practical implementation of the collective identity that transpires in the everyday discourse and interaction within the organizational organs and platforms. This type of research may be particularly beneficial

in the near future, as the intergovernmental organizations offer an excellent research basis for further study in the collective identities formed in societies that consists solely of independent state agents. In the era of globalisation, these types of multilateral national collective identities may become increasingly important for international politics.

## 6.2. Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be perceived that this study succeeded in fulfilling its research aim and determined how the discourse in the founding treaties of intergovernmental organizations can be used to create collectivity within the organization. As the previous section outlined, certain quintessential discourses that can create and protect the sense of collectivity within an IGO surface consistently in all of the examined founding treaties. As the sample of IGO founding treaties that was used in this study as research material was relatively versatile and extensive, it should be safe to assume that similar features of discourse could be detectable in the founding treaties of other intergovernmental organizations as well, at least if the IGOs seek to establish a firm sense of collectivity among its member states.

Retrospectively, however, a more concise selection of research material would have enabled a more exhaustive analysis of the discourse itself. Due to the broad comparative approach selected for this study, the results are more focused on the thematically relevant discourse, whereas a study of one or two founding treaties may have enabled a more linguistic analysis of the discourse of collectivity within the treaties. Consequently, while this study introduces what should be included in the discourse of founding treaties to establish collectivity among the member states, further research into what type of discourse would most advance this treaty goal is still needed.

Furthermore, as suggested in the previous section, this study only introduces the theoretical foundation for the IGO collective identity. In order to develop a more comprehensive view of collectivity within IGOs, it would be necessary to contrast the theoretical framework of the collective identity that is introduced in the founding treaties with the practical realization of the collective identity that takes place in the operational discourse and interaction of the organization. How successfully the founding treaty principles and practices of collectivity are realized in the organizational politics determine the extent of the identicization. Therefore, a potential relevant research topic would be to contrast the discourse of operational interaction of IGOs with the founding treaty discourse and to determine how or if the founding treaty discourse points of

collectivity also present themselves in the practical discourse of the organization.

Nevertheless, the founding treaties of IGOs appear to offer valuable information in regards to the durability and longevity of the organizations. The more firmly the collective identity and a sense of collective solidarity is established among the members, the more committed to each other and the organizational goals they can be assumed to be. In this regard, the themes and discourses discussed in this study introduce the foundation of the IGOs, and the conclusions drawn in this study should be useful when examining existing IGO founding treaties, for potential new treaties, or for further research into the collectivity within IGOs. A better understanding of the founding discourse of IGOs could help to predict the future development of the organizations and thus also offer insight into the future of global politics.

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