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**NAVIGATING CIMIC: LESSONS FROM MILITARY-LOCAL GOVERNMENT
COOPERATION**

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Abstract			
<p>Military organizations have been involved with crisis management processes in numerous occasions ranging from war to natural disasters and humanitarian aid. Recent crises, like COVID-19 pandemic have increased the military involvement in crisis management. COVID-19 pandemic brought Finnish Border Guard operations at the normally open Schengen border at Tornio, between Finland and Sweden. The cooperation between the local government and the Finnish Border Guard can be considered as a successful Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) as both organizations representatives interviewed for this study reported being satisfied with the outcome. Similarly, the Russo-Ukrainian War has challenged the Ukrainian society on a major scale since the Russian Federation launched a full-scale invasion in 2022. As the war has escalated into a total war involving the entire Ukrainian society, the CIMIC environment is exceptionally demanding.</p> <p>This study focuses on identifying the key elements of successful cooperation between military organizations and local government and attempts to construct a model based on these elements. This study also showcases the difficulties experienced with CIMIC operations in Ukraine, between a Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) and local government of the city of Vyshhorod. The study utilizes semi-structured interviews to provide better understanding of the nature of practical CIMIC applications in the studied cases. The empirical data is complemented with non-systematic literature review to show the key elements of CIMIC identified by prior literature.</p> <p>The research shows that long lasting relationship between the Finnish Border Guard and the municipality of Tornio enabled the organizations to have a joint crisis management operation and effectively coordinate in demanding situations. Representatives of both organizations credit the personal relationships between officials as a key component in successfully cooperating in crisis, but also recognize the importance of organizational partnership. In contrast, the lack of existing relationship and experience in working together caused substantial difficulties in enabling CIMIC in Ukraine by TDF and the city of Vyshhorod. Without proper knowledge on other organizations capabilities and needs, it is proved to be difficult to engage in meaningful cooperation. Also, based on experiences in Ukraine and previous academic literature, inefficient or unsuccessful cooperation between the civil society and the military can risk military overreach in a crisis.</p> <p>Besides continuous collaboration before a crisis, the research shows the need and benefits in upholding responsibilities and positions of each organization and person in a crisis and maintaining a continuous communication among organizations and actors participating in the crisis management. Together these elements form a resilient operational model of CIMIC that can be utilized to improve the cooperation capabilities of military organizations and local governments.</p>			
Keywords CIMIC, crisis management, interorganizational cooperation, local government, military			
Additional information			

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CIMIC – Civil-military cooperation

CMS – Critical Military Studies

FDF – Finnish Defence Forces

IK – Indigenous Knowledge

IOC – Interorganizational Cooperation

LMIC – Low- or Middle-Income Country

MOOTW – Military Operations Other Than War

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO – Non-Governmental Organization

OOTW – Operations Other Than War

PTR – Police, Customs & Border Guard (in Finland)

RVL – Finnish Border Guard (Rajavartiolaitos)

TDF – Territorial Defence Forces of Ukraine

WHO – World Health Organization

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Topic

Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is a key component of resilience and crisis response of modern multi-layered societies. While CIMIC has been substantially studied in the context of peacekeeping (Bollen & Rietjens, 2008; Kurko, 2013; Mockaitis T, 2004) and other foreign problems like humanitarian missions (Gourlay C, 1999), there seems to be a growing recognition of its importance in contexts other than crisis responses in Middle East and other Low- or Middle-Income Countries (LMIC), including western countries like Finland.

Major Kurko M's (2013) study on Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) engagement in CIMIC activities in Afghanistan crisis management operation paved the way in looking into CIMIC capabilities and utilization in Finnish military context. Major Kurko also recognizes the need for examining this topic in domestic context. Due to having been heavily implemented in COVID-19 handling in Finland, CIMIC has only grown in relevance since.

The relationship between the Finnish Border Guard (RVL) and the Municipality of Tornio during the first wave of COVID-19 crisis is a prime example of effective utilization of the CIMIC in Finnish domestic context. The successful management of the epidemic situation that was drifting towards a pandemic required cooperation and coordination of numerous government agencies and non-governmental organizations. RVL as a national defence institution was thrown into a situation in which the Schengen area border between Finland and Sweden needed to be closed in order to control the spread of the virus. The Municipality of Tornio, as a regional authority, was responsible for providing essential services and support to its citizens, but was also thrown into a situation in which the Municipality is suddenly a host to a military operation.

As such, it seems imperative that the RVL and the Municipality of Tornio worked together to ensure a successful response to the challenges brought upon by the COVID-19 pandemic. This successful response does not only encompass the individual

mission of RVL at the border but had wide ranging consequences to the overall well-being and safety of the Finnish people.

In addition to the case of RVL and the municipality of Tornio, this research also includes another empirical case on the cooperation of the Ukrainian Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) of Vyshhorod with their municipal government of the said city. The context of Ukraine, and Russo-Ukrainian War offers valuable insight into the role and utilization of CIMIC in especially demanding environment.

Incorporating these two diverse empirical cases in this study enables broader look into CIMIC processes and facilitates better conclusions on what aspects of CIMIC are effective and what may require improvement. By examining both the RVL cooperation with the municipality of Tornio and the Ukrainian CIMIC experiences in Vyshhorod, the study can determine comprehensive lessons that are applicable to a wide range of crisis situations. Comparative analysis on the tactics, techniques and procedures employed in both cases provides thorough understanding of the key elements that contribute to successful civil-military cooperation.

This study bases itself around two research questions that are designed to first provide clear academic framework for exploring the lessons of the CIMIC in both environments and then to identify the key factors contributing to their success and shortcomings. By addressing these research questions, the study aims to improve the understanding of the interorganizational cooperation in a crisis and military-local government cooperation. For this objective, following research questions are posed:

1. What are the key elements of interorganizational cooperation management during times of crisis?
2. What tactics, techniques or procedures characterize successful military-local government cooperation?

Understanding these topics and these questions answered enables further improvement in the cooperation between local governments and military organizations globally.

1.2 Structure of the study

This study consists of two main parts: a literature review and an empirical study. The literature review covers topics around crisis management, temporary organizing, and interorganizational cooperation, to provide the groundwork for more in-depth analysis on the practical issues and implications of CIMIC in the case of COVID-19 pandemic handling in Tornio. In the literature review, this study attempts to provide a comprehensive understanding of the existing research on crisis management applicable in Finnish domestic issues and further examine municipalities as crisis organizations, extending on previous study by Juntti (2021) on said matter. Literature review will also explore the concept of CIMIC and its relevance in the realm of crisis management.

After the literature review, the empirical research utilizes a constructive method to identify the lessons learned from the experiences of military cooperation with municipalities in crisis management. Base data for this research is acquired with semi-structured interviews from two separate cases of military involvement in crisis management locally. Interviews with a RVL officer and a Tornio Municipality representative provide data eligible about the use of CIMIC processes in Tornio during COVID-19 crisis. In addition, an interview conducted on a Ukrainian Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) unit commander extends the research on use of these CIMIC processes in the context of Ukrainian War. This enables the comparison of the use of these processes in these two contexts and validates the accuracy of the findings.

These interviews with personnel involved with CIMIC and the handling of the COVID-19 crisis in Tornio and the war in Ukraine act as the main source of information for the empirical phase. These interviews provide valuable insights into the experiences and perspectives of those who were directly involved in crisis management of these crises. The theoretical framework formed in the second chapter acts as the theoretical basis for the research and it is complemented with additional studies relevant to the study.

Lastly, the study draws conclusions based on the research questions posed and attempts to construct an understanding of CIMIC utilization in collaboration between

the military and local government and answer the research questions posed. In addition, the study proposes a construct for a resilient operational model of CIMIC. These conclusions connect the lessons learned from the practical application of CIMIC in these empirically studied contexts and the previous academic knowledge explored in the literature review, providing new and more detailed information on CIMIC application and planning in this environment.

2 MILITARY, MUNICIPALITIES AND INTERORGANIZATIONAL COOPERATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

2.1 Structure of the literature review

In this study, the key academical contents are in the fields of Military Studies, Crisis Management, and Interorganizational Cooperation (IOC). Based on this academic literature this study attempts to identify the key elements of interorganizational cooperation in a crisis, in order to answer the first research question. Supporting literature is collected to supplement the understanding on the key players of IOC involving military and civilian organizations in localized crises.

This literature review will provide an overview of the conflicts and crises and key elements of them. The contribution of military studies in understanding CIMIC is explored and the risks and benefits of utilizing military in crisis management is demonstrated. The literature review will also combine the knowledge from studies on crisis management and indigenous knowledge (IK) to better understand crises as a context for cooperation between military organizations and civil authorities.

The main contribution to the literature reviewed is made by temporary organizing and interorganizational cooperation (IOC) that provide the general understanding of collaborating in temporary fashion. The academia of temporary organizing highlights the specific requirements posed by special circumstances lasting for a limited time, like crises, and the IOC studies showcase the important elements for successfully conjoining operations between organizations.

The literature review is divided into chapters, including an overview of conflicts and crises, crisis management, and temporary organizing and interorganizational cooperation. The chapter on crisis management is further divided into sections providing insight on different application contexts relevant to this study. The final section of the literature review will discuss the findings of the review and then forms a conclusive theoretical framework that showcases the findings essential to this study.

2.2 Understanding Conflict and Crisis

Peace and Conflict Studies (PCS) is a multidisciplinary field that was first initiated by Johan Galtung during the Cold War. Since then, it has grown to encompass many topics from the relationships between states, non-state actors, and the international community. PCS explores the nature of conflicts and the strategies of how to navigate them and includes peace building activities as well. PCS also examines peace and conflict in broader view, including the conflicts arising from factors like inequality and considering peace in more detail and fully appreciating the complexity of these concepts in modern society. (Barash & Webel, 2021; Jeong, 2017a; Webel C & Galtung J, 2007.)

The examination of conflicts in their many forms is what sets it apart from other conflict studies and traditional military studies. For example, peacebuilding efforts and conflict study that is usually associated with war have been utilized in the context of Climate Change by Hardt and Scheffran in their (2019) Policy Brief No. 68 titled Environmental Peacebuilding and Climate Change: Peace and Conflict Studies at the Edge of Transformation. PCS studies take a broad approach to conflict and cooperation, by examining the mechanisms and the root causes of conflicts (Bollen & Rietjens, 2008; Jeong, 2017).

The root causes for conflicts proposed in academic literature vary widely depending on the types of conflicts examined. Scholars researching these causes often focus on certain types of conflicts and crisis's, such as Kaldor (2013) who examined wars as old wars and new wars and drew her conclusions from comparisons between these two. Similarly, Collier (2000) examined conflicts in a context of civil wars. General overview of the academic literature in the subject has been outlined in an article by Doucey (2011) but he does not outline the general causes for conflict either.

As for crisis, there isn't a one specific definition in academia, but typically crises are characterized as temporary states of confusion and disorganization that one way or another restrict the use of normal routines within the organization. In this study this definition by Saarelma-Thiel (1994) is utilized as a primary classification.

The uncertainty and the threat the event or situation pose to the organisation are what is often used as a framework to what constitutes a crisis in academic research (Huhtala & Hakala, 2007; Iivari P, 2011). On the other hand, crises can also be studied as a social construct that is created by the actors involved in it, rather than a concrete objective turn of events (Christianson et al., 2011). Overall complexity of the crisis as an academic concept has not restricted thorough research on the matter, but rather facilitates many different points of view and numerous case studies on different occasions and contexts.

Recent development in PCS academia by the researchers like Page is the recognition of the need of military and armed forces to understand peace. The increased involvement of militaries in MOOTW actions has prompted the need for conjoining the PCS with military education (Page, 2007). Page (2007) points out that this best manifests itself with military personnel enrolling to the courses of said subject, highlighting that militaries themselves have noticed PCS studies have a lot to offer in their field of work.

The Peace and Conflict Studies show that the crisis and crisis management environment has grown more complex and along with that, the demand for military involvement in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) operations has increased. Nuciari (2007) concluded in her article *Coping with Diversity: Military and Civilian Actors in MOOTW*, that the demanding nature of such operations challenge militaries in new ways and expose military personnel to uncommon situations and stress factors.

Overall, conflict and crisis are academically multidimensional concepts, but the general outline is established and then further detailed in different contexts. The realization of the need to understand conflicts and crises at their roots has prompted newfound interest in PCS academia from the armed forces.

2.3 Crisis Management

Crisis management refers to the practise and study on how to respond to, and recover from events that threaten the organization, society or individuals (Dayton, 2009).

Seeck (2015) further discusses successful crisis management in different stages of the events, and she recognizes three stages of crisis management. The preparedness, and actions before the crisis. Decisions and capabilities to perform during the crisis, and post crisis recovery.

The first part of crisis management, that determines the success in it, is preparedness and effective risk assessments made before organization threatening events unfold (Carmeli & Schaubroeck, 2008). The understanding of potential threats and their likelihood and impact is used to plan for said incidents. This then in turn helps the management to make informed decisions quickly to respond to the changing needs of the situation. (Hassel & Cedergren, 2021; Michael E. Whitman & Herbert J. Mattord, 2021; Perry & Lindell, 2003.)

A prominent crisis management research point of view focuses on the managers themselves and their role in resolving crises (Demiroz & Kapucu, 2012; Yusko & Goldstein, 1997). This is the second part of Seecks (2015) three-part crisis management. A clear decision making, an effective communication, and the ability to perform under pressure are some of the attributes demanded from a manager in a crisis (Diermeier et al., 2006; Eldridge et al., 2020; Higgins & Freedman, 2013). A good leader can inspire and motivate subordinates to perform at their best and to make sacrifices for the common goal and therefore greatly impact the organizations capability to encounter and survive in crisis (DuBrin, 2013). Also, the efficient and flexible usage of resources is a key element to success (Meier, 2020).

From the crisis preparedness and management in crisis, academia comes to the post crisis recovery. Much of the research on this part of crisis management is focusing on the changes applied after a crisis, to utilize the knowledge gained in the crisis and capitalize on the opportunities after things settle down. (Fardoust S et al., 2010; Williamson, 1994). These studies show that crises are not just obstacles, but they can also enable growth, but on the other hand, the work on crisis does not end when it is no longer a threat to the organization. Post-crisis work might even come full circle to the preparation of the next.

What is criticized of crisis management research, is that, according to Bundy et. al (2016) and Shrivastava (2016), the applied research seems to be lagging behind the theories. Zhao, Ismail, and Carley (2006) make the case for extending the crisis management research to encompass wider variety of organizations to better understand crisis management in all industries and organization types.

2.3.1 Military in Crisis Management

Military and civil authorities can be perceived operating in different domains but military power, especially in democratic countries, performs the task of protecting the civil society. Military as an actor is ambivalent, as it is shown that efficient military is required to protect the society, but similarly an efficient military can threaten the very society it is protecting. (Feaver, 1996; Haltiner, 2000; Huntington S, 1957.)

On the other hand, military professionalism has been characterized by Huntington (1957) involving a separation between the military and civilian spaces, and thus explains the reluctance of militaries to engage in politics and affairs of the civil society. Such virtues uphold the balance of power needed to sustain both military and civil power simultaneously.

Critical Military Studies (CMS) challenges the traditional fixed views on military and militarization and explores the border between what is perceived as military and civilian. Some CMS scholars prioritize studying on how the military powers work and why, and what are its limits. CMS also investigates the practices and processes of the military and approach military power through social aspects of it and the representations associated with it. (Basham et al., 2015; Basham & Bulmer, 2017.)

These studies that critically evaluate the military power and its use are essential in recognizing the threats posed by military involvement in crisis management. This applies to this study's' context of CIMIC in Finnish national and domestic issues. Studying the military powers threats to society fundamentally occupies the same space of integrating military into civil society as CIMIC research. CMS provides the sceptical approach to the entanglement of these two parties and points out the threat factors the military poses to the societal integrity. Therefore, as CMS studies point out

the dangers of military involvement in the society, they provide important perspective on the CIMIC research, making sure these risks are addressed accordingly. (Ichani, 2019; Levy, 2015; Schofield, 2007; Yamazaki T, 2011.)

In Military Studies and CMS academia, commonly mentioned potential threats to civil society in the use of military force are potential human rights violations (Slater & Nardin, 1986) and militarization of society (Ichani, 2019; Yamazaki T, 2011). Previous case studies on these matters heavily emphasize the third world experiences and post-war and war-like situations. These studies investigate cases like conflict in Kashmir region (Mohiluddin L, 1997) and Nigerian military actions (Adeakin, 2016).

2.3.2 Municipalities in Crisis Management

Local governments and authorities around the world are the first tier of governmental hierarchy structures. The municipalities, representing this first tier of local governance in Finland, handle the basic services that citizens use, such as school, local libraries, and day care. Municipalities also play a key role in crisis management and emergency response, both as providers of essential services and as coordinators of resources and assistance. In the context of this study, the concept of municipalities encompasses the municipalities of Finland. (Haveri et al., 2007; Tyry-Salo, 2004.)

According to the law, municipalities in Finland, like other public organizations, must have functional emergency plans that support the implementation of their operational- and security strategies in order to manage their operations as smoothly as possible (Korhonen, 2010). Municipal organizations must also have pre-agreed procedures and management arrangements for various crisis situations (Ström, 2007).

Scholars researching conflict often emphasize the importance of local communities and related institutions in crisis response and solving those root causes for conflict they try to identify (Linnell, 2013). Many crisis management systems rely on community resilience that combines the use of local and government resources (Stark & Taylor, 2014). These studies prompt the need for further examination of the local specialities when examining crisis management procedures.

Indigenous Knowledge (IK) or Local Knowledge, as proposed by DeWalt (1994), refers to community perspectives on resources and environment, especially as to how the communities utilize them through labour (Castro & Ettenger, 2000). According to Kloppenburg (2010) what sets IK apart from most of western science, is its emphasis on distinctive characteristics and limitations of a particular place rather than trying to find universal principles.

The existence of Indigenous Knowledge and its use in science is not without opposition, as scholars like Agrawal (1995) and Castro and Ettenger (2000) point out the criticism of knowledge existing outside the common academic understanding, but the whole notion of IK being about classification of information in one way or another. Castro and Ettenger (2000) themselves align with the views of DeWalt (1994) in that IK and scientific knowledge can coexist and complement each other.

Studies on IK showcase how some communities host a variety of unofficial customs and laws to settle disputes and conflicts (Moore, 1986). These customs affect the crisis responses of these communities, and crisis management systems that rely on local resources and communities, discussed by Stark and Taylor (2014), firmly coexist in the same realm and contribute to the same local resilience.

For these reasons, municipalities and other local government organizations have an important role as authorities that can utilize IK in their responsible areas. These local governments can potentially act as intermediaries between the national government agencies, military officials, global organizations, and the local people. This potential stems from the inherent IK within the local government officials and organizations.

2.4 Temporary Organizing and Interorganizational Cooperation

As in everyday life in organizations, also in crisis situations, the efficient and flexible usage of resources is key element to success (Meier, 2020). The best utilization of resources requires reorganizing to match the changes posed by the environment. Crises are usually seen as temporary occasions, and as such, they require temporary reorganizing of resources and possibly, the organizations themselves.

Organizations that can balance temporality and stability within their organizing, and switch from one to the other, can potentially maintain relevance better in the ever-changing modern environment. (Sydow & Windeler, 2020.) Researchers have taken three basic approaches to temporary organization: process-based temporary organizing, form-based temporary organizing, and perspective-based temporary organizing.

Temporary organizing can be viewed from the process perspective, which places temporality or, more specifically, temporariness, at the centre. The focus of this perspective is on how businesses manage and navigate continual processes of change. The outcomes of this process vary from projects to hiring temporary workers. While temporary organizing as a process aims for reflexive structuring, it incorporates rules, routines, and resources to control the outcomes. (Bakker et al., 2016.)

The second perspective, form-based temporary organizing, focuses on the organizations that are created by the process of temporality and are designed to dissolve after a specific time period. These organizations might not have a predetermined date for disbanding, but the environment and specifications characterizing their existence set these parameters. Disaster relief organizations and film productions are a typical example of such organizations, operating with clear objective but naturally limited lifespan. (Bakker et al., 2016; DeFillippi & Arthur, 1998; Lundin & Söderholm, 1995.)

Third approach, perspective-based temporary organizing proposes that temporary organizing is a completely different way of organizing and focuses on building an understanding of these organizations. This view emphasizes research on how temporary organizations are created and how they differ from other organizations. Research is also done on reproducing and transforming of these temporary organizations in order to better understand their specific characteristics. (Bakker et al., 2016; Powell et al., 1996.)

Interorganizational cooperation (IOC) is the strategic alliances or partnerships between two or more organizations. These partnerships are formed in order to partner organizations to achieve common objectives and enhance their respective capacities.

Just as in the temporary organizing academia, the key perspectives on interorganizational cooperation in literature can be summarized under three main categories: the drivers of cooperation, the management of cooperative relationships, and the outcomes of cooperation. (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994.)

First, the literature has identified numerous drivers for IOC. Factors like environmental uncertainty, scarcity of resources, and the need to access additional skills and knowledge are some of the many factors driving cooperation (Powell, 1998; Sapat et al., 2019). For instance, during crises, organizations often collaborate to pool resources and expertise, allowing them to address the immediate needs of affected populations more effectively (Chi & Holsapple, 2005; Samaddar & Kadiyala, 2006). Institutional factors, such as culture, also play a significant role in shaping cooperations and partnerships (Harrison, 2005; Ward et al., 2018).

Second, the literature offers valuable insights into the management of collaborative relationships. Successfully coordinating IOC requires trust between the partners (Tschannen-Moran, 2001). Organizations can employ various governance mechanisms, including joint decision-making processes, to manage potential conflicts and align their interests (Scholten & Schilder, 2015; Vangen et al., 2015). As shown here, this perspective emphasizes the need for interoperability between the partners involved in IOC.

The Third literature perspective provides focused look into the outcomes of the IOC. According to the literature, there are numerous benefits to IOC, for example enhanced innovation and increased organizational resilience (Medel et al., 2020; Paulus & Bernard A. Nijstad, 2003; Sarkis et al., 2010; Scholten & Schilder, 2015). On the other hand, academia researching the outcomes of cooperation also recognize the negative outcomes of IOC. These negative outcomes are such as increased risk of opportunistic behaviour and the loss of competitive advantage due to knowledge spill overs (Ding & Huang, 2010; Mikami et al., 2022; Yang et al., 2020).

These studies show that organizations have numerous reasons to pursue interorganizational cooperation, but the management of such cooperations requires a lot of effort and structures. The study on temporary organizing complements the IOC

academia well, as many of these structures fall under the category of temporary organizations. Most notable occasions for these temporary IOC structures are the crisis response operations integrating numerous organizations for a single goal for a specific lifespan (Yaziji & Doh, 2009). These temporary NGO IOC structures have been studied in many contexts, like Middle East refugee crises (Adem et al., 2018) and African humanitarian crises (Ndongosieme et al., 2007).

2.5 Theoretical Framework

As the literature showed, the complex nature of the crises and conflicts poses new challenges to the crisis response procedures of organizations, military organizations included. For militaries, the grown involvement in MOOTW has exposed them to previously unknown territory that requires more consideration to the complexity of the environment and cooperations. This includes cooperation with the civil authorities, which might conflict with the traditional view on military professionalism, which values separation of military and civilian spheres. (Huntington S, 1957; Nuciari, 2007; Page, 2007.)

Involving the military in the affairs of civil society is not without issues and many scholars especially in CMS academia problematize it. Academic criticism is often pointing to the possibilities for human rights violations and authority overreach. Even though many of these studies focus on third world countries, there is no indication that changing the context for the use of military power would diminish the risk of these threats have been pointed out here. Therefore, these factors remain relevant when studying the use of military force in CIMIC in Finnish national context and Ukrainian War and should be considered when evaluating the success of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the war, and the RVL involvement in the handling of COVID-19 pandemic. (Adeakin, 2016; Ichani, 2019; Levy, 2015; Mohiluddin L, 1997; Schofield, 2007; Slater & Nardin, 1986; Yamazaki T, 2011.)

Municipalities in Finland are, according to research, prepared for crises, or at least the law and regulations mandate crisis preparedness (Korhonen, 2010; Ström, 2007). As the municipalities are responsible for providing many of the basic services in the area, it is easy to see why their ability to keep functioning in a crisis is essential (Haveri et

al., 2007; Tyry-Salo, 2004). While capable municipal government is important to the citizens, it can also aid other crisis response organizations local resources and knowledge (Stark & Taylor, 2014).

These studies showed that in this complex environment that describes modern crisis situations, there is potential for cooperation. Both military and local government actors can provide resources to benefit the common crisis response, however deeper cooperation can also address the threats the military poses to the civil society. The research on temporary organizing and interorganizational cooperation reviewed in this study complement these views on crisis cooperation and provide a framework on successful cooperation.

Sydow and Windeler (2020) showed that organizations can benefit from balancing temporality in dynamic environments, such as crises. Projects, temporary workers, and limited lifespan of organizations are what characterize these temporary organizations (Bakker et al., 2016; DeFillippi & Arthur, 1998; Lundin & Söderholm, 1995). These were found to be especially linked with crisis management operators, such as disaster relief organizations.

According to Ring and Van de Ven (1994) interorganizational cooperation (IOC) can be examined in three stages of its existence, drivers to it, management of it, and outcomes of it. What Ring and Van de Ven (1994) have shown, is that all these stages of IOC have clear separate benefits and shortfalls. This categorization allows for specific needs of each state of IOC to be addressed.

Overall IOC appears to benefit organizations operating in situations that require quick access to additional resources and increased capabilities (Chi & Holsapple, 2005; Samaddar & Kadiyala, 2006). IOC also has clear implications for the crisis management as it can enhance organizations resilience (Medel et al., 2020; Paulus & Bernard A. Nijstad, 2003; Sarkis et al., 2010; Scholten & Schilder, 2015). In exchange of these benefits, organizations might risk competitive advantage with leaking information and create possibilities for exploitation through opportunism (Ding & Huang, 2010; Mikami et al., 2022; Yang et al., 2020).

3 METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Methodology

The aim of this study is to better understand the benefits and shortcomings of civil-military cooperation in Finnish domestic context. This study will utilize a constructive research method, which aims to develop new understanding, knowledge, models, and methods. A constructive research method is well suited to studying practically relevant issues (Kasanen & Lukka, 1993; Oyegoke, 2011; Piirainen & Gonzalez, 2013). In this study, constructive research method is used to identify the key issues of CIMIC and provide methods and tools to further develop CIMIC capabilities in military-local government cooperation. Findings of this study are mainly applicable to municipal level governance and CIMIC but can also be utilized in other instances through broader understanding of civil-military cooperation in crisis management.

The first part of research data is collected from previous academic literature of the subject in a literature review. The purpose of the literature review is to identify the key elements of CIMIC in previous research and build the foundation for the research on specified research on CIMIC in the Finnish domestic context. The theoretical framework of the study is multi-layered, encompassing a multitude of academic topics ranging from crisis management and temporary organizing to military studies and IOC. The study loosely builds upon previous study on Finnish municipalities as crisis organizations and the case of the city of Tornio in COVID-19 crisis (Juntti, 2021).

In addition to relevant literature, this study uses semi-structured interviews as a primary empirical data collection method, to provide better understanding to the nature of practical CIMIC applications in the case contexts. Semi-structured interviews enable in-depth conversations with the interviewees and allow for information to freely emerge without imposing restrictions with information selection processes (Kasanen & Lukka, 1993). These interviews are conducted on regional authorities and Finnish Border Guard officers that have been involved in handling the COVID-19 crisis in Tornio region. In addition, an interview conducted on Ukrainian Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) unit commander aims to reflect the experiences from extreme crisis, that

is the Russo-Ukrainian War, in relation to utilization of CIMIC in a territorial defence situation.

The interview questions used are semi-structured and cover the topic both generally, and in more detail focusing on each interviewee's personal responsibilities in the CIMIC operation. These interviews were conducted in person with all three interviewees. Similarly, the language in which the interviews were conducted was agreed upon based on the preferences and proficiency of the parties involved.

For a permission to conduct interviews on RVL officials, the official research and information services unit of RVL has issued research permit, and in it given rights to use non classified information in this study and provided contacts for officers to be interviewed. Interviews with the representatives of Tornio Municipality and Ukrainian TDF were agreed upon personally with the interviewees.

3.2 Data Collection: Ukraine

The empirical data was collected through an interview with a company commander of Territorial Defence Forces of Ukraine (TDF) near Kyiv in November of 2022. The interviewee in question will henceforth be referred to as Interviewee U1. Besides being a company commander of a TDF unit, Interviewee U1 holds a political position within his local community budgetary affairs. The focus of the interview was to determine to what extent is CIMIC utilized in Ukraine.

The interview conducted, employed a qualitative research design, and the data was collected in an in-person interview with the interviewee U1, and an interpreter. Interpreter was used to translate between English and Ukrainian. The interview was conducted near Kyiv in November of 2022, during the ongoing conflict with Russia.

The interview was conducted using a semi-structured approach, incorporating framework for qualitative semi-structured interview by Kallio et al. (2016). This allowed for a flexible and exploratory conversation while ensuring that the objectives of the study were met (Magaldi & Berler, 2020). The interview questions were designed to discuss Interviewee U1's opinions and experiences on CIMIC in Ukraine

and the usability of these practices and processes in the Ukrainian War context. The utilization of semi-structured approach allowed follow-up questions and to discuss particular areas of interest in more detail.

Before the interview, the interviewee U1 was provided with a brief overview of the study's objectives and the general outline of the interview questions to ensure understanding of the study's purpose. The interview was recorded using a digital voice recorder with the permission of Interviewee U1, and this enabled accurate transcription and analysis of the interview data.

3.3 Data Collection: Tornio

The empirical data regarding the COVID-19 and RVL operations in Tornio municipality were collected through two interviews, one for each organization. RVL officer, that will henceforth be referred to as Interviewee F1, was interviewed in January of 2023, and Tornio city official was interviewed in February of 2023, and he will be referred to as Interviewee F2. The focus of both of the interviews was to identify the successes and failures of CIMIC practices in this crisis and expose the different experiences of the organizations from the same operation.

F1 was in managerial position in handling of the COVID-19 spurred response at the national border in Tornio. The RVL organization involved in this operation was multi-layered and F1 himself noted that the organizations responsibilities changed during the operation, ultimately changing the roles of the officers involved. Therefore, his experience on the matter is limited to his respective role, which was to manage the operation from the headquarters in Oulu. Similarly, F2 expressed, that his experience in municipality crisis management and CIMIC practices is limited to his role as the Head of Development Services.

The interview employed a qualitative research method and interviews utilized semi-structured approach and incorporated the same framework for qualitative semi-structured interview by Kallio et al. (2016) as incorporated in previous data collection for Ukraine. Utilizing the same data collection methods for both cases enable accurate comparisons between the two.

The interview questions were designed to examine the cooperation from both sides, and to discuss the dynamic of what was given and what was received between the parties. The interview questions were same for both interviewees F1 and F2. Semi-structured approach allowed for organizational and experience-based differences to be expressed through free discussion and follow-up questions.

Even as the study emphasizes the COVID-19 crisis, all references to 2015 immigration crisis made by the interviewees are included in the study data, and the topic is not specifically crossed off. Instead, the interview questions posed steer the conversation to the experiences gained in COVID-19 crisis and the border guard operation relating to it.

To make sure they understood the purpose of the study, the interviewees F1 and F2 were given a short overview of the study's objectives and a general outline of the interview questions prior to the interviews. With the consent of the interview subjects, the conversation was recorded on a digital voice recorder, allowing for accurate transcription and analysis of the interview data.

Both interviews are done well after the COVID-19 restrictions on border crossings were ended in the summer of 2022, and therefore the interview topics are not currently occurring. Interviewing F1 and F2 so much after the CIMIC operation is cause for some issues with remembering all the facts and details on the spot. Interview questions took this into account, and they focus on larger concepts and phenomena, rather than specific details.

4 SYSTEMATIZING CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES

4.1 Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC)

As recognized earlier about interorganizational cooperation, there is a demand for cooperation in crisis situations. Based on Nuciariis (2007) findings, militaries might have especial need for interorganizational cooperation in handling OOTW, as the key competences in encountering these issues, might be found in civil organizations.

Civili-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) refers to the cooperation and coordination between civil organizations and authorities and military organizations, and it originates from NATO peacekeeping doctrine of 2001 (Mazurkiewicz A, 2014). CIMIC, besides as a field of study and approach to it, is also an experienced form of temporary organizing, specific environment of IOC and operation focus within militaries and for example in peacekeeping operations.

CIMIC in academic literature consists of the cooperation and coordination of military organizations and civil authorities. CIMIC has become prominent research topic within NATO in recent decades as western militaries have found themselves in operations working together more closely with civil authorities than normally mandated of military organizations (Rollins, 2001). NATO itself has played a crucial part in defining CIMIC and forming it along the way as the alliance has gained more knowledge and experience on the matter. But CIMIC is not controlled by NATO or clearly defined by it, as the utilization and focus points differ depending on the organizations involved and the environment. (Bollen & Rietjens, 2008.)

The level of cooperation is fluctuating and the intensity of CIMIC in operations is depending on the current situation (Bollen & Rietjens, 2008). Therefore, CIMIC shares close similarities with the academia of temporary organizing. The temporary nature of crisis situations also pushes CIMIC operations and academia in this direction.

The nature of cooperation between military- and civil organizations has been discussed by Gourlay, C. (1999) in his article *Partners apart: Managing civil-military cooperation in humanitarian interventions*. Gourlay points out how the work of these parties is

affected by differences in most aspects of work. Gourlay includes culture, structure, and skillsets to name a few of his findings. In the academic literature regarding CIMIC, it is apparent that this cooperation is not without its own set of problems and special needs. These special needs require specific solutions that take into account the differences in organizational cultures and abilities (Heaslip et al., 2012).

One of the major difficulties in the cooperation and relationship of military and civilians identified in the literature by the likes of Wendling (2010) is the military's inability to take into account the multitude of partakers in civilian side of things. This is due to military's tendency to be used to clear command structures and hierarchic lines. (Wendling, 2010.)

While the general image of military organizations is characterized by the hierarchical mechanism and structure that encompasses these organizations, the military also has its own set of specific cultural and social attributes. These manifests themselves in numerous traditions and customs passed down to the generations of soldiers within these organizations. Therefore, CIMIC has substantial connection to the research of Harrison (2005) and Ward et al. (2018) implying that cultural factors affect cooperation. (Hall, 2011; Soeters et al., 2006; Wilson, 2007.)

4.1.1 Use of the Military in COVID-19 Crisis

As in COVID-19 handling, and other occasions that employ armed forces in MOOTW activities, it is essential that civilian crisis organizations are not overrun, and civilian control and rights are guarded. It is also important to consider the effects of the armed forces involvement. (Kalkman, 2021.)

In a study of the use of Military in France and Europe in the COVID-19 Crisis, Opillard et al. (2020) argue that the utilization of armed forces in domestic crisis management to counter the spread of a virus has changed the role of the military in our society in Europe. Gibson-Fall (2021) identified three separate trends and courses of action regarding the military involvement in handling of COVID-19 pandemic. These identified trends are (1) Minimal technical military support; (2) Blended civil-military responses; and (3) Military-led responses. It is also apparent that military involvement

in humanitarian crises and health emergencies has become an integral part of societal crisis management. (Gibson-Fall, 2021.)

Gibson-Falls (2021) first trend, minimal technical military support, the military is utilized as an extra resource to support the civilian response to the crisis. The leadership remains in the hands of the civilian authorities, even when military assets are utilized. This type of support is identified to be often the case in countries where the military and civilian roles are traditionally separated, like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, New Zealand, Sweden, and Canada. (Gibson-Fall, 2021.)

Second trend, blended civil-military responses, involves more active participation of the military in COVID-19 response. In this trend, the leadership is mixing both military- and civilian leadership, with the military supplementing the leadership of the civilian authorities when they cannot operate. This type of response is more often seen in countries where the military is often viewed as a source of stability and the balance of military and civilian authorities is more delicate. (Gibson-Fall, 2021.)

According to Gibson-Fall (2021) this type of blended response were used in countries like China, United Kingdom, Singapore and Vietnam. Countries also saw vast differences in sub-national experiences with this blended response, as for example military was utilized on a local level in the United States, and in LMIC countries like Nigeria and India, military was used in high population areas. (Gibson-Fall, 2021.)

The third trend Gibson-Fall (2021) identified is the situation in which the military takes the lead in the COVID-19 response, displacing the civilian authorities to a secondary role. This response was seen in countries in which the military has a strong influence on politics and some history in military getting involved in internal affairs. Gibson-Fall identified this response to have been utilized in countries like Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, the Philippines, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, Ecuador, and Peru. (Gibson-Fall, 2021.)

Overall, studies like Khorram-Manesh et al. (2022) show that cooperation between civilian and military organizations in a crisis is a reliable partnership that generally produces good results. Their study showed that in order to military to cooperate

effectively with the civil authorities in crisis management, intensified coordination and communication are required. Experiences from COVID-19 showed that different priorities and conflicting views on the situation might threaten a successful CIMIC. (Khorram-Manesh et al., 2022.)

4.2 Use of CIMIC Processes in Ukrainian War

4.2.1 General Context: Ukrainian War

Following the war in Georgia 2008 and annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24th of 2022. While the conflict in Donbas had been going on for almost eight years, the all-out invasion of 2022 changed the nature of the conflict and full-scale war is still going on, at the time of writing in spring of 2023. (Dijkstra et al., 2022; Trudolyubov et al., 2015.)

Ukraine's success in deterring the Russian invasion was surprising and the conflict has evolved into modern war combining precision-guided missiles, cyber weapons and drones, as well as conventional arms (Dijkstra et al., 2022). The conflict has also had far reaching consequences ranging from immigration crisis, healthcare challenges both in and outside of Ukraine and economic sanctions posed on Russia (Kardas et al., 2022; Yudin, 2022).

Ukraine itself is reported to have done near total mobilization of its society to combat the Russian invasion and entire country is affected by the war in one way or another (Gatopoulos, 2022). In addition to Ukrainian officials and military, dozens of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) are operating in Ukraine to assist in various tasks in the Ukrainian war effort and humanitarian missions (Catoire, 2022).

As of now, the situation in Ukraine remains volatile with ongoing fighting and bombing of infrastructure. The risks associated with operating in the country remains high, including the risk of violence, disruptions to business operations, and the near continuous missile strikes across the country. In the context of this study, Russo-Ukrainian War is limited to consider the period of conflict that started in 24th of February in 2022. The conflict in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea are

purposefully left out of the study, due to these conflicts having widely different nature compared to the now ongoing war. (United States Department of State, 2023)

4.2.2 CIMIC Processes in Ukraine

Before discussing the general use of CIMIC processes in Ukraine, it is necessary to determine Interviewee U1's contribution and involvement in this realm and address the dual role he holds as both military leader and local politician. U1 himself said, that these spheres, civil governance, and military are totally separate, and his two roles are not connected at all. He went on to add that in his opinion, these roles should not be connected, closely representing the Huntington (1957) view on military professionalism.

In addition to separation of U1's own dual role in the society, according to the data provided in the interview with U1, the civil-military cooperation in Ukraine seems to be close to non-existent, even though we need to acknowledge that experiences might differ widely in different regions. U1 admitted that he hasn't even thought about forging a closer tie between the military and civilian authorities.

As a concrete example of civilian and military spheres connecting in U1's work environment, came up a particular case of U1's TDF unit taking control over an abandoned building within their city for training purposes. The lack of CIMIC processes is manifested in the case, as the TDF unit had simply informed the city officials that military was taking control over the building rather than communicating with the civil authorities beforehand.

Evidence of insufficient processes is made even more evident by the fact that U1 reported that his unit has previously answered a support request by the municipal government in offering manual labour for humanitarian missions. This shows that the municipal government and the military unit operating within the area were able to cooperate and at times they did so, but the processes in doing so were lacking behind hindering the development of closer ties.

Even though the TDF unit did not expect help from the municipal government, U1 vocalised a wish that the municipal government would provide them with more material aid to better do their job. Specifically, U1 hoped to receive more ammunition. This type of material aid does not fall under what is commonly mentioned in CIMIC academia, but as the Ukrainian supply chains had grown especially difficult and complex, as shown by Vincent (2022) Gilles (2022) and Cohen (2022), the scope at looking for options for possible equipment providers seems to have become wider.

As earlier stated, U1 did not express any interest in forging closer ties with the municipal government and he went on to say that he did not see benefits in doing so at the time. U1 expressed that even though he agrees that civilian and military authorities should be partners, the partnership and conditions for it are too weak for the time being.

According to U1, the main obstacle in deeper civil-military cooperation within the area of U1's TDF unit was the unproficiency of civilian authorities in cooperating with the military and recognizing the needs and concerns of the military operating within their area. In addition, he said that the city officials should be more aware of the threat of another Russian offensive towards Kyiv from the north, and act accordingly. This meant building defensive structures and block posts.

The imminent threat of occupation of Kyiv ended with victory of Ukrainian defence in that theatre of war, and the responsible sector of U1's TDF unit (Rice, 2022). U1 said *the people that are responsible for civilian administration should think as if there could be one more attack from the north and build this. Borders, trenches and block posts and invest in such people like we. So, we do this work better and we'll be more prepared, but for now they are thinking like the peace is already done for here and doing their own civilian stuff.* In saying so, he brings up the fact that he thinks the civilian authorities and the municipal government of his area too swiftly reverted back to the peace time duties, giving too little attention to maintaining and improving the defensive capabilities in the area in case of another push towards Kyiv from the north.

U1's concerns on civil authorities' priorities and proficiency in war related issues speak out the lack of prior cooperation or training that would boost the confidence of these parties towards each other. With this limited insight into the matter through merely

one interview in multi-layered subject does not definitely prove or disprove any capabilities of the parties involved but brings out the existing paradigm in this particular Territorial Defence Forces unit and the obstacles it has experienced with CIMIC.

The TDF unit and the local government were both not cooperating and simultaneously hoping for more extensive cooperation than CIMIC research commonly proposes. U1 himself saw that the best way to improve the cooperation between his unit and the local municipal government was to improve the proficiency of the city officials, namely the mayor and his team. Given that U1 himself saw the municipal government as a potential partner, but narrows down the necessary aid into material aid, there might be great potential in discourse between the two parties in determining what is needed and what can be given.

The evident lack of cooperation between civilian and military authorities in Ukraine can affect the effectiveness of the Ukrainian War effort. U1 expressed need for material aid from the municipal government but the near non-existent use of CIMIC processes seems to cause lack of information sharing and in turn hinder the access to resources. Given that the military has the ability to take control over the resources, like the building in this case, not listening to military's needs risks the militarization of the society (Ichani, 2019; Levy, 2015; Schofield, 2007; Yamazaki T, 2011) and possible violations of these powers, to secure the resources necessary to the national defence (Ichani, 2019; Yamazaki T, 2011).

4.3 Use of CIMIC Processes in COVID-19 Crisis in Tornio

4.3.1 General Context: COVID-19 in Tornio

The city of Tornio is over 400 years old city at the Bothnian Bay, Finland. Economically, Tornio is industrialized agrarian municipality of about 23 000 people, that has both agriculture and steel industry. Outokumpu stainless steel plant is the single largest employer in the municipality, and vast number of sub-contractors of the stainless steel plant operate within Tornio municipality and the surrounding area. (City of Tornio, 2023; Outokumpu Oyj, 2023.)

Geographically Tornio lies in an interesting spot at the national border between Sweden and Finland forming near seamless border through what is called a dual city. According to Finnish Customs data (2023) border crossing hosts millions of border crossings each year. Additionally, the border within the city area causes the seemingly integrated area to host two different legislations and reside on two different time zones (City of Tornio, 2023).

Due to being a border city, Tornio has been in the centre of two crises with global consequences, and at the forefront of Finnish crisis management measures. Namely the immigration crisis of 2015 that brought tens of thousands of immigrants flooding to the open Schengen border at Tornio, and more recently the COVID-19 pandemic that was met with tightening border security in Tornio to limit the spread of the virus. (Ministry of the Interior, 2021; Prokkola, 2021.)

Responding to these crises required multiorganizational cooperation and the Schengen border at Tornio posed a unique set of issues to consider. The influx of asylum seekers put a significant pressure on institutions around Europe and especially in regions at highly trafficked border crossings. Similarly, the COVID-19 challenged the security environment at the border as countries tried to limit the spread of the virus from one country to another, bringing RVL to Tornio yet again to bolster the border security. (Alaviippola & Rintapukka, 2021; Prokkola, 2021)

This study focuses on COVID-19 crisis in examining the CIMIC practises in Tornio, for the purposes of examining the most recent experiences and therefore the most up to date information. The focus is on crisis time cooperations of Tornio Municipality and RVL but also takes the organizations' experience in working together outside crisis situations into account as a significant factor in considering the cooperation capabilities.

4.3.2 CIMIC in Finnish National Defence and Domestic Issues

Finland has had first-hand experience in CIMIC during recent crises in Europe, in 2015 immigration crisis and COVID-19 pandemic, when these events brought Finnish

Border Guard and Finnish Defence Forces to Tornio (Ministry of the Interior, 2021; Prokkola, 2021).

CIMIC in Finnish context has been researched in Finnish National Defence University in studies like Major Kurko, M. 2013 study reflecting on Finnish Defence Forces experiences in Afghanistan operation, that was deliberately focused on civil-military cooperation. Kurko (2013) also recognizes the need for extending lessons learned from the CIMIC in peacekeeping and crisis management operations to domestic issues and national defence of Finland.

Finnish internal security officials are described by Interviewee F1 by an acronym PTR, which comes from Finnish words for Police, Customs and Border Guard. He describes that these three organizations share many responsibilities regarding internal security and border control. In this study, the focus on Finnish Border Guard was chosen due to its high level of involvement in border security during COVID-19 crisis in Tornio.

The Border Guard Act (578/2005) Section 3 of Finnish law describes the duties of the Finnish Border Guard. These duties include maintaining the border security, police and customs duties, search and rescue operations, military defence, and other emergency response duties like medical services in emergency situations. The reinstatement of internal border control falls under these duties. Therefore, Finnish Border Guard has been the responsible authority to carry out the task in these cases. (Alaviippola & Rintapukka, 2021; Heusala et al., 2008; Kammonen, 2012.)

Finnish Border Guard and the municipal government of Tornio, in responding to these recent crisis's have cooperated to respond to these crisis's (Alaviippola & Rintapukka, 2021; Prokkola, 2021). Here the aim is to examine the processes and organizing practices used in this cooperation in order to identify the strengths and weaknesses of CIMIC in the Finnish environment. Overall, this study contributes to understanding the CIMIC in Finland and provides tools for both civil- and military organizations to better prepare for future crisis situations and to work together in day-to-day situations.

The cooperation with the organizations involved in COVID-19 handling was done in a coordination task force that integrated the healthcare officials, municipal- and

regional officials and PTR. F1 described the decision-making process of RVL in this CIMIC context, being centred around personal relationships the participants have forged and maintained before the crisis.

According to F1, RVL operates with its own mission first mentality, and same is true in the case of COVID-19 handling in Tornio. This requires careful consideration regarding the concerns posed by Kalkman (2021) about the possibility of the civilian crisis organizations being overrun by the military organization involved.

Even though Wendling (2010) noted that military organizations potentially have problems in taking into account the multi-layered and complex nature of civilian bureaucratic decision-making, F1 did not emphasize these problems with RVL experiences in Tornio. In addition, while the cooperation and coordination were intensified, F1 mentioned that all participant organizations maintained their own responsibilities. So RVL managed to navigate the bureaucratic civilian sphere and did not override it in hierarchy by installing its own.

F1 reported that RVL got swift and effective aid from Tornio in building the infrastructure necessary to perform the increased border security duties at the western border in Tornio, when the COVID-19 handling began. RVL and Tornio managed to effectively coordinate with each other and the city subcontractors in building the block posts and other necessary traffic control facilities according to RVL's specifications.

Interviewee F2 from the Tornio municipality also stated that good relations that are maintained over time before and after any crisis situations emerge, is the key element for good crisis management. This includes personal relationships to the people you are supposed to be working with in a crisis, and it extends from the municipality to the military organizations, and vice versa. Therefore, it seems, that the RVL cooperation with the municipality of Tornio is a resilient cooperation and these organizations benefit from the ability to maintain the routine operations through a crisis.

Still, F2 recognizes that working in a crisis situation is not mainly built on these personal relationships, but rather on the stable organizational relationship that longstanding organizations in Finland have developed and maintained overtime.

Personal relationships and good working atmosphere are few key components of this cooperation and building blocks of this organizational relationship.

Both RVL and Tornio confirm that these crisis's even with military organization involved, have been handled with the responsibilities and titles in use in non-crisis situation. In other words, no responsibilities have been transferred from one organisation to another and both organisations have operated using the same mandate they have normally. Both organizations recognize a clear "crisis mode" being on, and it has affected the operations of the organization, but they have been able to do so with same organizational composition and distribution of responsibilities as normally.

It seems both organizations have found this to be very effective way of organizing as the people who possess the skills and knowledge to perform in a certain task, keep on completing that task throughout the crisis. This also eliminates the need to hand back responsibilities from the military organization to the civilian organization at the end of the crisis situation and therefore the possibility for conflict in this situation is mitigated.

Communication was talked about as an important component of good cooperation by both F1 and F2. The continuous communication that involves both the military and the civil authorities is one of the key components of successful crisis management with CIMIC. The complex nature of the organization network working in the crisis management does not only include RVL and Tornio, but multitude of other authorities, including all organizations in PRT and numerous other civil governments in the region. Therefore, F1 and F2 both bring up continuous communication as an important tool in managing the situation.

Communication is not without its issues, and especially F1 reported having struggled with the responsibilities of communication especially to the press. COVID-19 guidelines and restrictions at the border changed frequently enough to cause an ongoing need to communicate with the public about the situation on the ground. The communication in turn was difficult to restrict to the specific official that oversaw each of the COVID-19 restrictions and guidelines. For example, RVL was supposed to communicate about the restrictions at the border while health officials were the official in responsible of communicating about the general COVID-19 situation. Maintaining

these responsibilities while communicating to the public caused difficulties according to F1.

In turn, F2 reported that municipal government suffered from a lack of communication from other parties. F2 especially pointed out the fact that the municipal government was not informed about the latest developments in COVID.19 restrictions and had to communicate to their own stakeholders, mainly the citizens, about the crisis management situation with insufficient information. During the crisis the communication improved, and these problems diminished when the communication became more routinized.

As for the cultural differences and potential conflicts that arise from those, interestingly both F1 and F2 stated that it has not been an issue, even though they both recognise the challenges it poses. F2 further elaborated by referencing to the fact that he, like most Finnish males, has himself served in the military as a conscript. He points out that the possible issues stemming from the military culture and differences of it to the civil organizations should be asked about from those who have not served in the military, women in particular.

Special concern highlighted in CIMIC literature is the ability of the organizations to revert back to the routine operations after the crisis ends, and how well is the military organization able to hand back the responsibilities it has taken, to the civil authorities. Neither F1 nor F2 saw that any responsibilities had been transferred from one official to another. Military and civil authorities have seemingly been able to perform throughout these crises without the need for military to take over the local governance responsibilities. This also means that the military has been able to withhold from overstepping its own responsibilities and let the civil authorities keep their position, and the risks highlighted by Slater and Nardin (1986), Ichani (2019) and Yamazaki (2011) haven't come true.

As both RVL officials and Tornio city officials both work in the same environment in and out of crises, and regularly train cooperation and interoperability capabilities, both organizations and their cooperation can benefit from Indigenous Knowledge based dispute resolution, described by Moore (1986). Both F1 and F2 referenced the fact that

personal relationships and long-lasting experience in cooperating between human actors is a benefit enabling the success of CIMIC in Tornio.

Scenario training and demoing crisis situations was seen as a crucial element in improving the interoperability of the organizations in general. Training enabled successful CIMIC by facilitating the creation of the personal- and organizational relationships, that both F1 and F2 identified as key building blocks of Tornio-RVL cooperation. F2 also emphasized the importance of meeting regularly with the counterparts in the other organization to update the common knowledge on the environment of operation. Training also provides crucial knowledge on other organizations capabilities and resources that can be utilized in a crisis.

Tornio-RVL cooperation appears to be successful and resilient in countering crises. The cooperation and sharing of knowledge and resources in crisis is more prevalent than what U1 described of Ukraine. Especially the ability of both organizations to function through major crisis situations with the responsibilities and duties held in non-crisis situation seems to benefit the crisis management. This also looks to mitigate the problems in returning to normality from crisis, that CIMIC literature has been concerned about.

5 CHALLENGES AND CORNERSTONES OF CASE-SPECIFIC CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Military cooperation with municipalities appears to be characterized by Huntington's (1957) decades-old depiction of military professionalism, despite changes in the operational environment. This natural reluctance of the military to engage in the affairs of civil society more than what is necessary seems to coexist with success in avoiding military overreach in civil society discussed in CMS academia.

Studied cases in Ukraine and Finland have their differences in this regard and clear divergence in the level of conjoined crisis responses, but the separation of military and civilian spheres is present in both. Military organizations in both cases follow the typical military narrative in putting their own mission before anything else and cooperation second. Even so, especially in the case of Tornio-RVL cooperation, the level of interoperability and capability of the military to take civil authorities' needs and concerns into account seems balanced. F2 did not report any misuse of power by the RVL and both F1s and F2s comments reflected happiness about the cooperation with each other and acknowledgement of the benefits of incorporating each other's capabilities in conjoined crisis response.

Differences in approach and in the general view on applicability of CIMIC in military crisis management between U1 and F1 show the value of training and experience. While U1 had completely disregarded the whole notion of forging closer ties with the civil administration, F1 spoke highly of the long-lasting partnership between RVL and the various civilian actors. This leads to the conclusion that CIMIC does not happen in the crisis without intent, and therefore incorporating CIMIC processes into crisis training and planning beforehand is necessary to effectively utilize CIMIC from the start.

The second research question of this study was with which tactics, techniques or procedures military organizations collaborate with municipalities. With this limited look into the CIMIC practices of these two different military organizations in two different crisis situations, it is now possible to identify some of these factors. The focus here is to showcase the tactics, techniques and procedures that positively affect the cooperation of municipalities and military organizations.

The findings show a specialty for CIMIC in Finnish context, because often in CIMIC literature, like the study of Adeakin (2016), the possibility for civil rights violations and military domination over civil society is cause for concern. The case in Finland more closely represents the Gibson-Fall (2021) pattern that recognized that countries that traditionally have a separation of military power and civil authority, managed to maintain that through a crisis in which the military was in a supporting role. What sets the Finnish case apart from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, New Zealand, Sweden, and Canada, which Gibson-Fall (2021) studied, is that in the countries listed by Gibson-Fall, the leadership remained firmly in the hands of the civil authorities, but in Finland, RVL and the municipal government had their own independent leadership and mission.

The research also showed that the positions that people occupy during a normal situation remain occupied by the same people in a crisis. Because of this, the military organization does not take away any power or responsibilities from the civil authorities. Due to this, it appears that the military and municipal government can both focus on their own responsibilities first without risking conflicts of interest. CIMIC coordination is then facilitated by interorganizational- and personal relationships and training.

Based on the information provided, three elements of cooperation that positively impact the CIMIC capabilities of a military organization in cooperating with municipal government can be identified. These elements represent a procedure that is carefully coordinated over a long period of time, a tactic that is employed in a crisis and a technique that bolsters the ability to execute the tactic. Together they form a specific CIMIC approach that enables close coordination with RVL and Tornio municipality.

The procedure is the continuous cooperation and training between the organizations during a noncrisis situation. The data showed that both organizations experienced the existence of long-lasting relationships between the organizations, a positive thing that mitigated the possible conflicts and assured good interoperability during a crisis.

The data showed that the key component for success in this method employed in Tornio is the continuous training for crisis situations that involve both the military and

civilian authorities. This allows for both parties to remain informed on the other organizations' capabilities, competences, and shortcomings. As also identified from the Ukrainian case, the inability to recognize these capabilities of each other can lead to mischaracterization of the possibilities in cooperation and its benefits.

The second element is the tactical decision to uphold the responsibilities and positions each organization and person has in a crisis that they also have in noncrisis situation. This enables the military to utilize the professionalism of the civil authorities rather than taking the responsibilities to itself. Similarly, the civil authorities don't have to take the leadership responsibility over the military assets like in military minimal technical support response to COVID-19 crisis in many western countries. (Gibson-Fall, 2021)

The success of this tactic relies on the first element, training, and continuous cooperation. This is facilitating the necessary trust in each other's professionalism and providing the knowledge on the capabilities of one organization to another. Data from Ukraine showed that without these aspects of the cooperation intact, it is difficult to collaborate without changes in responsibilities.

Continuous communication is the technique that enables the interoperability of the vast network of organizations and actors participating in the crisis management in Tornio. This is the third element that characterized the success of CIMIC capabilities of the RVL in this operation. Data from Ukraine indicated that lack of information sharing leads to military making its own conclusions about the need and benefits of cooperation with the municipal government possibly resulting in military overriding the civilian administration.

Both organizations experienced difficulties in communicating with the public due to unclear communication structure and insufficient information. Communication with other authorities also had its issues and both parties interviewed reported a need for improvement with it, but also recognized the progress made on this front during the crisis. The Coordination Task Force that combined all the organizations involved in the crisis management in the area represents a type of solution that takes into account

the complexity of the organization network and provides tools for improved communication.

These three elements are the crucial parts of the success of the COVID-19 CIMIC response in Tornio by the RVL and the municipal government. According to the data examined in this study, successful military cooperation with municipalities is centred around the procedure of continuous training, tactic of maintaining the normal organization structure and hierarchy through crisis and the continuous communication technique.

6 RESILIENT OPERATIONAL MODEL OF CIMIC

Based on the elements of successful CIMIC operation that have been identified, it is now possible to form a construct for military collaboration with municipalities. The three elements, procedure, tactic, and technique form the base structure for the structure, and together they describe what is identified as the Resilient Operational Model of CIMIC.

The first element of the construct is continuous cooperation and training. The data showed that the long-lasting relationships between military organizations and civil authorities on an organizational- and personal level, based on continuous cooperation and training, were crucial for the success of the cooperation in a crisis. This element ensures that both organizations remain informed of each other's capabilities, competences, and shortcomings. Personal relationships directly contribute to the cooperation capability of the organizations and the officials themselves.

In addition, continuous cooperation and training mitigates possible conflicts, assures good interoperability during a crisis, and facilitates trust in each other's professionalism. The data also showed that it is necessary to incorporate CIMIC processes into crisis training and planning beforehand to utilize CIMIC effectively from the start. Therefore, this element takes the first spot in the construct.

The second element of the construct is the tactical decision to uphold responsibilities and positions. The data showed that for the military, the mission comes before anything else, and cooperation is second, and therefore, it is necessary to ensure that the military utilizes the professionalism of the civil authorities rather than taking the responsibilities to itself. Similarly, the civil authorities should not have to take the leadership responsibility over the military assets.

Equally as important benefit of this tactic that was identified from the data, is that maintaining the status quo reduces the possibility of a military overreach and diminishes the need to hand back the responsibilities and tasks after the crisis, that can cause issues according to prior literature. The success of this tactic relies on the first

element, continuous cooperation, and training, to provide the necessary trust in each other's professionalism and knowledge of each other's capabilities.

The third element is continuous communication. As the data showed, the lack of information sharing might lead to the military making its conclusions about the need and benefits of cooperation, which can result in mischaracterization of possibilities. The continuous communication between the stakeholders was also the part of the CIMIC processes of RVL and Tornio that was reported to have caused issues to both parties involved. Similarly issues in Ukrainian CIMIC process had could be traced back to the lack of continuous communication.

Therefore, continuous communication is crucial in enabling the interoperability of the network of organizations and actors participating in crisis management and CIMIC. This element ensures that all actors have access to relevant and up to date information and enables them to make informed decisions and take necessary actions. In the case of RVL and Tornio, the mentioned Coordination Task Force represents an avenue of continuous communication.

The construct is showcased in a table below. The Table 1. showcases the hierarchical order of the elements utilized in this Resilient Operational Model of CIMIC. It also provides a short example referencing the data utilized in this research to support the brief description of each element. Last column shows what information and data sources is the specific element based on. In this case, RVL-Tornio refers to the case of COVID-19 pandemic, Ukraine refers to the cooperation of TDF and the municipality of Vyshorod, and literature refers to the reviewed literature.

Table 1. Resilient operational model of CIMIC

Element	Description	Example	Based on
Procedure	Continuous cooperation and training between military and municipal government	Long-lasting relationships between RVL and Tornio municipality	RVL-Tornio, Ukraine, Literature
Tactic	Upholding responsibilities and positions of each organization and person in a crisis	Military utilizing the professionalism of civil authorities, and vice versa	RVL-Tornio, Literature
Technique	Continuous communication among organizations and actors participating in crisis management	Information sharing between RVL and Tornio municipality	RVL-Tornio, Literature

The construct ensures that the military and municipal government can both focus on their own responsibilities first without risking conflicts of interest, and CIMIC coordination is facilitated by interorganizational and personal relationships and training. Therefore, military organizations and civil authorities should incorporate this construct into their crisis planning and training to enable effective cooperation in crisis response situations.

7 DISCUSSION

7.1 Conclusions

The organizations studied here portray a widely different experience of IOC and CIMIC. RVL cooperation with the municipality of Tornio worked well, and both parties maintained their responsibilities and duties throughout the COVID-19 crisis. In this environment, both organizations knew their role well and this cooperation fostered a necessary amount of trust to avoid conflicts. In the case of TDF in Vyshorod, the routines and procedures for cooperation between the military and the municipal government were close to non-existent.

People working in RVL, and the municipality of Tornio reported that they personally know each other, which enabled them to better know what and how to communicate. These organizations also supplemented each other's capabilities in this crisis by providing different sets of skills and resources that were effectively utilized through their cooperation to meet the goals of the organizations. This was reportedly enabled by the very same good communication and personal relations.

Even this cooperation had its problems when communicating the crisis response and measures outside of the cooperation, to the press or the citizens. Interviewees indicated that these problems were due to organizations not knowing who is responsible for sharing certain information, and who is responsible for informing the general public of new guidelines and restrictions. Similarly, these stakeholders outside the cooperation were left unaware of who they are supposed to ask about things relating to the crisis and crisis management.

Interestingly in the case of RVL and the municipality of Tornio, cultural differences were not experienced to substantially affect the cooperation. As such the findings of Harrison (2005) and Ward et al. (2018) showing that organizational and institutional cultures significantly affect cooperation between organizations seems to be diminished when organizations regularly work together and maintain good relations over time.

7.2 Key Elements of Interorganizational Cooperation in a Crisis

The information provided by the existing literature in chapter 2 provides the information necessary to determine the key elements of IOC in a crisis. This enables answering the first research question, *what are the key elements of interorganizational cooperation management during times of crisis*. For this research question literature serves as the main source of information supplemented and validated with the findings from the cases of Tornio and Ukraine.

Tschannen-Moran (2001) emphasized the need for trust between the partners. Trust is what allows the organizations to overcome the threats IOC academia points out. More specifically the information leaks discussed by Ding and Guang (2010) and opportunism researched by Mikami et al. (2022), and Yang et al.(2020). Without proper trust between the organizations, these issues can form impassable barriers for cooperation.

Recognizing the drivers of IOC for each participant organization is essential in forming common goals for the cooperation. As Powell(1998), Sapat et al. (2019), Chi and Holsapple (2005) and Samaddar and Kadiyala (2006) showed, the reasons for cooperation vary widely, and therefore without properly recognizing both the own need for cooperation, and partner's needs, partnering might not provide the results hoped for. This was shown in the case of Ukraine, as the U1 didn't have clear understanding of what could be expected of a cooperation with the municipal government.

Proper governance mechanisms need to be in place to manage the cooperation, align interests between the partners and to minimize the potential for conflicts (Scholten & Schilder, 2015; Vangen et al., 2015). These governance mechanisms may vary depending on the organizations involved, the situation the cooperation addresses and might even change during the cooperation. Coordination Task Force in the case of Tornio is a good example of such a mechanism.

Decision making as well as communication needs to be effective, and leaders need to be able to perform under pressure, when managing a crisis (Diermeier et al., 2006;

Eldridge et al., 2020; Higgins & Freedman, 2013). Preparedness and correct risk assessment were shown to substantially help organizations and leaders in reaching these goals (Carmeli & Schaubroeck, 2008; Hassel & Cedergren, 2021; Michael E. Whitman & Herbert J. Mattord, 2021; Perry & Lindell, 2003). Preparedness, and its benefits in forging successful cooperation was also heavily emphasized by both interviewees F1 and F2. These elements enable the leaders to act accordingly in the volatile environment of a crisis.

In conclusion, the key elements of interorganizational cooperation in a crisis are preparedness, trust, recognizing the drivers for cooperation, and proper governance mechanisms. These elements build the base for successful IOC in turbulent environment by establishing the cooperation on mutual respect and common goals. Preparing for the crises enables the leaders to act effectively and setting up proper governance mechanisms allows for the cooperation to stay on track and avoid most risks.

7.3 Characteristics of Successful Military-Local Government Cooperation

The Resilient Operational Model of CIMIC construct put forward in the sixth chapter, based on the findings of the fifth chapter provides the framework and complete description of the tactics, techniques and procedures recommended for military-local government cooperation. This construct takes into account all the literature and empirical data discussed in this study and bases the conclusions around the experiences on successful cooperation between RVL and the municipality of Tornio, while reflecting upon the less developed interaction of TDF and the municipality of Vyshorod.

The construct provides the answer to the second research question of this study, *what tactics, techniques or procedures characterize successful military-local government cooperation*. The research showed that in order to have successful cooperation between these two types of organizations in a crisis, three elements of management need to be employed before and during the crisis. These elements have produced successful CIMIC in RVL-Tornio case, and absence of them limited the ability of TDF to successfully cooperate with the municipality of Vyshorod.

Based on the findings and the construct, successful military-local government cooperation is produced by continuous cooperation and training between military and municipal government, upholding responsibilities and positions of each organization and person in a crisis, and continuous communication among organizations and actors participating in crisis management. These elements represent a procedure, a tactic and a technique, in this order, as portrayed in table The hierarchical order of the elements showcased in the Table 1 runs down from a larger concept to a smaller practical element of IOC between these organization types.

7.4 Theoretical Contribution

Bundy et. al (2016) and Shrivastava (2016) criticized crisis management research by implying that the research itself seems to be lagging behind the theories. This study addresses these concerns by emphasizing the lessons learned in actual crisis management situations and closely tying it together with the existing literature. Similarly, as Zhao, Ismail and Carley (2006) urge that crisis management research should be extended to encompass different types of organizations than usually studied, this study provides insight into very specific and individual cases involving crisis management.

COVID-19 pandemic and restrictions put in place to limit its spread have only just recently ended as WHO (2023) declared it is no longer a global health emergency, fifth of May 2023. Therefore, it is prime time to engage in academic discourse on what can be learned from various aspects of crisis management. This study is deeply involved in this discussion by emphasizing the military involvement in COVID-19 responses globally via both literature review and empirical research.

Russo-Ukrainian War escalated into a full-scale invasion and total war in February of 2022, and it continues at the time of writing. The conflict in Ukraine has been evolving for a long time and it first became an armed conflict in 2014, but after Russia launched its invasion the scale of the conflict changed dramatically. Therefore, it is imperative that research on Ukraine and the conflict there is updated regarding this new situation and lessons from a first major war in Europe since the second World War is studied in crisis management, like this study attempts to do.

7.5 Managerial Implications

The managerial implications of this study revolve around the application of the proposed model in collaborating with partners, crisis planning, and crisis management. This paper urges managers in military and local government organizations responsible for collaborating within this group to engage in these proposed activities before any crises emerge. This study showed that organizations that have collaborated before a crisis fared better in volatile crisis situations.

In addition, this paper recommends managers to pay attention to communication both between the collaborating partners as well as other stakeholders. Proper communication planning includes plans of information distribution within the CIMIC framework and structured approach to communicating with stakeholders outside of the cooperation. Managers should pay attention to structuring and planning the communication responsibilities that were shown to pose problems with RVL and the municipality of Tornio.

The construct formed in this study urges managers, especially in the military organizations, to respect the status quo and the professionalism of the civil authorities during a crisis. Good results produced by upholding the positions and responsibilities of personnel in each organization during a crisis situation set a strong precedent for respecting the existing structure. Military organizations might threaten both societal integrity and own mission success by overriding the civil authorities in their positions.

7.6 Reliability and Validity of the Research

Literature review on the study subjects was conducted with a non-systematic approach, and the thematically relevant literature reviewed was chosen by researchers' judgement and intuition. This method allowed a broad and exploratory look into the research topics. The articles were sourced from multiple databases, like Google Scholar, EBSCO Host and other online databases.

As this method allowed for a wide range of studies to be reviewed, there is a potential for bias and limited spectrum. It should be noted that it is possible some important

studies might have been left out of the study unintentionally. In addition, the relevance, quality, and coverage of the topics may vary, which impacts the overall reliability and validity of the research.

Interviews conducted on RVL and the municipality of Tornio officials, F1 and F2, offer great but limited insight into the cooperation of these organizations. Both interviewees F1 and F2 mentioned numerous times during the interview that some of the information regarding different aspects of the cooperation is in the hands of different people than them, and in order to get full analysis on all of the aspects of the cooperation interviews should be extended to other personnel of these organizations.

Due to difficult working environment in Ukraine due to the war, interviews in that area are only from the POV of the interviewee U1 that represents the military side of things in one specific geographical area. This does not give a comprehensive analysis of the area, leaving the municipal government unheard, and not to talk about possible areal differences with different types and stages of civilian government and military organizations.

The semi-structured interview method employed throughout the study provided tools for exploratory approach to the opinions and experiences of the interviewee in question, but it also exposes the data to biases from both the interviewee and the interviewer. All interviews were conducted by the same interviewer, so it is also possible earlier interviews could have affected the actions and follow-up questions in the later interviews.

The interview data was reviewed through a non-systematic method, which allowed the study to focus on the key findings from each interview. This in turn exposes the data analysis to this same researcher bias and influence of previously gained knowledge. The same threat of bias permeates throughout the study, as the research method is aimed for detailed analysis of the key findings based on researcher judgement.

7.7 Recommendations for Future Research

This study builds the base framework for successful CIMIC, confirming the importance of communication and developing partnership between military and local government organizations. The construct has been formed based on previous experiences and literature reviewed. Further empirical research might evaluate the accessibility of the proposed construct, and further refine and test the model through additional case studies, test projects and simulations.

The resilient operational model of CIMIC formulated in this study showcases the key elements of successful military cooperation with the local government specifically. Through additional research, this model could be adapted for use in other organizations and cases of IOC. As the core principles of the model have been derived from two military-local government cooperation cases, future research needs to validate these findings applicability in other contexts to show its usability in other IOC contexts.

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