


Studia humaniora ouluensia



*Vesa Suominen*

ABOUT AND ON BEHALF OF  
*SCRIPTUM EST*







STUDIA HUMANIORA OULUENSIA 15

VESA SUOMINEN

ABOUT AND ON BEHALF OF  
*SCRIPTUM EST*

The literary, bibliographic, and educational rationality  
*sui generis* of the library and librarianship on the top  
of what literature has produced

UNIVERSITY OF OULU, OULU, FINLAND 2016

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***Abstract***

The thematic dealt with in the treatise is the possible of the library and librarianship. The rationality appears in a philosophical perspective as a normative notion. The treatise particularly investigates the possible intelligibility of a literary rationality of the library and librarianship with a foundation in what literature has produced (*scriptum est*), which divides into the bibliographic rationality of the library about *scriptum est* and the educational rationality or the library on behalf of *scriptum est*. The point of departure is that how we can conceive of the rationality of the library and librarianship depends on what we can conceive of as rational more widely in our cultural, social, and political being. The foundations of intelligibility of the literary, bibliographical, and educational rationality of the library and librarianship consists of (i) the Gadamerian and Ricoeurian hermeneutics (ii) the republicanist and even Hegelian view of the state, as opposed to liberalism within political theory and philosophy, and what is called agnostic republicanism as the result of emphasizing some liberal ideals. Gadamerian hermeneutics and republicanism relate mainly to the educational rationality of the library on behalf of *scriptum est* and for the state while the Ricoeurian hermeneutics and agnostic republicanism relate to the bibliographic rationality of the library about *scriptum est*. Further, the notion of explication should reconcile the tension between the Gadamerian criticism of historical objectivism and the bibliographic rationality about *scriptum est*. and politico-ethical reasoning should indicate actual reasons to mind about past realities or and around *scriptum est*. The overall result of reasoning is as follows. The primary rationality should be the rationality about *scriptum est*, which would be open towards many other specified rationalities among which the educational rationality on behalf of *scriptum est* would be particularly plausible.

*Keywords*: bibliography, hermeneutics, librarianship, library, literature, philosophy, republicanism, userism



*Commemorating my good teachers,  
professors  
Raili Kauppi and Marjatta Okko*





## Preface

The origin of this treatise is the obvious lack of a sufficiently reflected understanding of the foundations of the rationality of the library and librarianship within the professional field. At least partly, this seems to be the result of the lack of interest in the thematic of the library and librarianship within scholarly fields, which have the responsibility for education for the field. Within the Finnish information studies, I have experienced that the questions related to the education for librarianship—a task posed to information studies by the Finnish library legislation in the specification of the competencies required for positions of the public libraries—is nearly a taboo. Surprisingly, even those with particular responsibilities within and of the professional field seem to be somewhat indifferent and interested neither in the serious thought of the social and cultural responsibilities of the library and librarianship nor in the educational and scholarly foundation of the field.

I consider summer 2005 and the Summer School of Document Academy (DOCAM) in Tromsø as the starting point of the work the result of which is this treatise. Professor Elizabeth Davenport especially was most encouraging. As a precursor, however, I should mention *Pieni kirjastofilosofia* (A tiny library philosophy), a monograph published in Finnish (Oulu, Oulun yliopisto, 2001). The period of a little more than ten years of work with the present treatise has been a period of intensive studies and learning and consequently, the present treatise is by no means an English version only of the earlier publication—even if some themes of the earlier book are present here as well.

I wish to express my gratitude to my colleagues, the information scientists at the University of Oulu, with whom I have had some options to discuss my work. They have made admirable efforts to make some sense of my texts and reasoning that have been anything but ready. In the relatively early phase of the work, Professor Reijo Savolainen from the University of Tampere also made the hard job and read through my text. Among other things, his valuable remarks made me emphasize the hypothetical nature of my judgments of the mainstream of the scholarship related to the library and librarianship and particularly of information studies. Even though the writings by Professor Tarmo Malmberg—a Finnish scholar of journalism, media, and culture—are not much present in this treatise, I should mention that his work within his own fields has since 1980's inspired my own work and interest in what semiology first and then also hermeneutics could

mean as regards the library and librarianship. Since 1980's, I have also thought that documentation—rather than the somewhat escaping notion of information—is a plausibly concrete starting point for considering the library and librarianship. In this respect, most fruitful have been the opportunity to bring ideas of this treatise to the discussion in a couple of meetings of DOCAM. Professor Pertti Vakari's investigation in 1990's of the *historia literaria* tradition of the library and librarianship too has given me some particular and important inspiration.

I especially wish to express my gratitude to Ph.D. Markku Mäki—a Finnish philosopher and my good old friend—who has been kind enough to discuss with me frequently during the past years matters related to republicanism and the Hegelian thought. We did not reach agreement in every respect (we seldom do). For this reason already, I have the full responsibility of my argumentation on these matters, including my possible fallacies there, of course. Discussions with Mäki, in any case, have helped me to avoid many misunderstandings and some of the most typical and stupid fallacies on these matters.

After my dear wife Pirjo Tuomi—a lecturer of librarianship at the Oulu University of Applied Sciences—started her study of the public library as a part of the literary institution, our home and summer place has turned into something like a school and a boot camp of literary librarianship and its sociology and philosophy. It may be that the help has been mutual. On my part, in any case, I am grateful—among so many other things—for our discussions that have helped me in connecting my own, somewhat esoteric work to the wider spheres of critically library-related scholarship.

Finally, I wish to thank Jack Jennings who helped me with the English language. The responsibility of my probably still rather awkward expression belongs to me alone, however. The deal was that Jack treats my text with a most gentle hand. Once there was some tension, my conceptual and argumentative frills outstripped the fluency of language.

Koskelankylä of Oulu  
23 April, 2016  
Vesa Suominen

## Abbreviations

CHB	content-historical bibliography
IM/KM	information management and/or knowledge management
IR	information retrieval
IS	information seeking
L&Lship	the library and librarianship
LID	library, information, and documentation (studies and/or field)



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# 1 Introductory question about the rationalities of the library and librarianship (L&Lship)

This treatise is primarily about the possible rationalities or, more exactly, about the foundations and conditions within cultural, social, and even political philosophy of some possible rationalities of the library and librarianship (L&Lship) and about their intelligibility. My assumption is that our options in conceiving of the rationality of L&Lship depend on our wider understanding of the conditions of our cultural, social, and even political being. It also seems to me that what we could characterize as prevailing views of the library are in this respect somewhat restricted.

Here I must immediately add that the theme of this treatise is deeply practical as well. The way in which we think about the rationality of L&Lship certainly would be the foundation of exercising librarianship on the practical and professional levels. Right away, I also should remark that rationality as I conceive of it in this treatise is a normative notion and an obligation. Lucien Laberthonnière—a French philosopher of religion and a scholar of medieval as well as of Cartesian philosophy—phrases most eloquently the idea of philosophy.

The aim of all philosophical doctrine is to give a sense to life and human existence. Consequently, all philosophical doctrine is a work of moral [...] its truth cannot be an abstract truth. It is beauty, it is life, its truth, I would say, is to be livable. ... One then should find the germ of moral life that constitutes the living principle of a doctrine.<sup>1</sup>

The history of the library is enormously long. In my view, while considering the notion of the library, we should pay attention to this long history as well. Jesse Shera, the classic of the American library science, writes:

We do not know when libraries began, but such records that have survived indicate that they are of great antiquity. Therefore, they must be essential to the development of a sophisticated, and one might say even to a relatively primitive society. They fulfilled a human need and I assume that this first need was the one for custody, the one for preservation, to pass on from one

---

<sup>1</sup> Laberthonnière 1935, 1–2. Transl. by VS from the following: “Tout doctrine philosophique a pour but de donner un sens à la vie, à l'existence humaine ; qu'en consequence tout doctrine philosophique est oeuvre morale. [...] .. sa vérité ne peut être un vérité abstraite. Elle est beauté, elle est vie. Sa vérité, dirai-je, c'est d'être viable. [...] il faut donc découvrir le germe de la vie morale qui constitue le principe vivant d'une doctrine [...]”. I see Laberthonnière's formulation as a good advice also while reading the philosophical sources in this treatise.

generation to the next the benefits and the thought and the ideas and beliefs of previous generations.<sup>2</sup>

What has been there nearly always might have to do with something rather fundamental in human culture and societies. What Shera writes about the “first need” served by the library gives me already here an opportunity to anticipate the major theme of this treatise. Rather persistently, I shall stick to and build on the idea of preservation as the essential characteristic of the library. The question, then, would be about the cultural, social, and even political significance and rationality of such preservation.

### **1.1 The relatively eternal library: the place where the books are**

Not without self-irony, I shall approach the library in view of an idea of what we could call the ‘eternal library’. We must already here notice that even the ‘eternal library’ can be ‘relatively eternal’ only, in spite of the obvious contradiction and some further irony in combining the attributes of relativity and eternity, taking into account the absolute nature of the latter. While approaching the theme of the library, in any case, one often tends to focus on change. One asks how the library figures out in terms of the new particular conditions at the time of such a contribution itself<sup>3</sup>. My approach here is different.

The library undeniably is a part of society. Societies do change, and so would change the library as well. Yet, as a point of departure, I would prefer to focus on the library as such, instead of the library at some particular phase of its development and history, for instance. This certainly can be only a starting point. I think, however, that particularly as a starting point, this might have some justification and even merits.

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<sup>2</sup> Shera 1970, 44. Shera continues somehow amusingly: “How all this came out, of course, is a mystery”. Obviously, however, we could have some more or less speculative theories on this matter as well. Shera might be quite right in saying that we do not know the very first beginning of the libraries, even if we have a plenty of knowledge about libraries that existed quite early, thousands of years ago, such as those in Assyria and Egypt, dating back to 2000 B.C. and even to earlier periods (see Harris 1984, 23 ff.).

<sup>3</sup> As good, not history-ignoring contributions of this kind, see, for instance, Hansson 2010 and Harris & Hannah & Harris. With Michael Gorman (2003), even the title of his book, *The enduring library*, reminds of the significance of continuity. With Birsall and the myth of the library as his starting point, we already could see something approaching by my point of departure here—though Birsall’s ‘myth’ is very much an outline of some fundamentals of the public library particularly and its institutional logic established in the course of time.

### **1.1.1 A minimalist-phenomenal notion of the library**

A plausible candidate for a concept of the library here could be that the library is a place where there are books. I shall denote this concept as the *minimalist-phenomenal notion of the library* since it would be a view based on only a few quite phenomenal and even banal characteristics of the library. We even could formulate this more sharply, into a claim that the library is the place where the books are. We must immediately notice, however, that we have to elaborate some elements of these ‘definitions’, especially the notion of the book.

First, however, an immediate consequence of conceiving of the library in this way would be that L&Lship would be quite essentially oriented towards history. The books that the library contains always and necessarily represent the past. They are the products of either closer or more remote past. Further, a library comes to be what it is in the course of time, possibly in the course of even quite long periods of time—perhaps centuries that the creation of all the books and collecting them into the library have taken. Thus, in a sense, what the library contains as a whole would constitute a history of books created in the course of time—or, at least, a ‘picture’ of such a history. I shall denote this by the notion of the *inner historical substance of the library*.

The notion of the library as outlined above would be a rather primitive one and, perhaps in this sense already, a rather universal one as well<sup>4</sup>. We may say that libraries in this sense have been there for an extraordinarily long time and relatively universally in various higher civilizations. This universality of the library, in turn, is an issue worth some consideration. We could say, for instance, that while the public libraries gradually emerged in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, in some sense, even before, what actually happened was that the ‘old library’ of the privileged people in the society now became open to all. Similarly, we could consider the virtual or digital library around the change of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries as the library in the ‘old sense’ of the ‘eternal library’, now appearing in the context new technology. To a degree, I see this as quite a justified way to deal with concepts like the public or digital library. Yet, it would be quite justified to claim

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<sup>4</sup> It is a rather primitive business to collect and preserve in a safe place what one has collected and what one then, perhaps, even sanctifies and cherishes as in a sense or another holy. This all could suggest that while thinking about the library we should take as our point of departure a rather primitive notion that we can apply to something that has been there nearly forever.



also that the conceptual content of the library itself would change within these special or new forms of the library.

We must accept that there is continuity and there are changes. The inner historical substance of the library would suggest that we should have a somewhat cautious attitude as regards overly dramatic changes to our notion of the library and our consequent library policies. In addition to this, however, we should pay attention to developments within the ‘outer’ history of the library itself as well as the history around the library. The ‘outer’ history can urge us to modify the notion of L&Lship while we should be cautious as well because of the ‘inner’ historical substance of the library.<sup>5</sup>

### ***1.1.2 Literature combining the works and documentation, and the notion of L&Lship about scriptum est***

Elaborating the concepts within my minimalist-phenomenal notion of the library, we especially have to understand in a ‘broad sense’ the notion of the book. We perhaps could substitute it with the notion of a document, even if this notion, in turn, might be even too broad here. I use the notions of document and documentation in the sense that they have within a renaissance that the notions have had around the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries, within so-called neo-documentation movement.

Niels Winfeld Lund’s notion of documentation as a process the result of which is a document is a plausible point of departure, as opposed to the Otletian documentation ‘after document’<sup>6</sup>. Lund’s concepts are stressing the “documentation processes resulting in documents”<sup>7</sup>, a process of “something” (*nogen*) becoming into a document and then typically re-documented as well. It would be the

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<sup>5</sup> As regards my claim of the ‘eternal’ library, I should admit that there is a danger of projecting our present of more recent to history to the past or the earlier phases of history. The general nature of my minimalist-phenomenal notion of the library, however, could make it applicable to the history rather widely. Within the Thomist scholastics, for instance, while Aristotle became an authority, he probably received the position of an author and his texts began to appear—at this point, at least—as works as well. Then again, the libraries in their history have also been like museums or treasury chambers containing whatever might have value and add to the prestige of the prince owning it, like scientific exhibit rooms, or like archives of records that may have judicial or administrative significance, for instance.

<sup>6</sup> See for instance Otlet 1934, 7.

<sup>7</sup> Lund 2010, 744.

process where things like books and other documents first come to be.<sup>8</sup> This clearly is something that is happening in the culture and society all the time and that constitutes a particular sphere of the cultural and social reality, often combined, however, with other spheres, such as scholarship and science, popular non-fiction literature, fiction, music and other arts, etc. Due to its temporal aspects, my own notion of the document as a message with some considerable permanence could here complement Lund's notion<sup>9</sup>.

I actually would broaden the notion of the book and narrow the notions of document and documentation into a notion of *literature* by which I mean the instance where the documents and documentation combine with the works. I further denote by *scriptum est* the products of literature produced so far<sup>10</sup>. Thus, we could denote by the notion of literature the process that produces and has produced *scriptum est*. The very notion of *scriptum est* particularly serves my concept of the library as a place where there are books that always represent the past.<sup>11</sup>

I shall also use expressions like fields, instances, or pieces of *scriptum est*, where there is a need to stress that we are talking about some limited parts or even singular instances or items of *scriptum est*. Literature obviously divides into identifiable subfields, such as popular or scientific literature, sociological or philosophical literature, and fiction or poetry. In view of my wide notion of literature, fields like cinema, opera, sculpture or rock'n roll will still be parts of it. Particu-

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<sup>8</sup> See, Lund 1999.

<sup>9</sup> See Suominen 1997, 57

<sup>10</sup> The notion of *scriptum est* is somewhat metaphorical by its nature. In the rhetoric of the Bible, a frequently repeating 'explanation' for something that had happened is that it had to happen, since so it had been written: something happens "*sicut scriptum est*" or "*ut facerent omne quod scriptum est nobis*", or still, "*enim scriptum est*". The significance of this metaphoric expression in my argumentation here is that it is indicating that it may matter, what one has written. The way in which *scriptum est* could matter, however and of course, differs here from the model and logic of 'Divine Word' of the Bible. We also could say that a major question in this book is, how the literature and especially *scriptum est* could matter in terms of an 'earthly logic', without considering the option that it has a divine origin.

<sup>11</sup> We could find further support for this kind of notion of literature as the content of the library from the conceptual basis of cataloguing in the libraries. Since Antonio Panizzi, the head of British Museum in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the 'father of cataloguing', thinking about cataloguing has been going on in terms of the works and publications that actually are documents. The perspective of works and documentations is particularly prominent in the FRBR-model (Functional Requirements of Bibliographic Records) of IFLA (International Federation of Library Associations) that has since 1990's been becoming the new fundamental structure of library cataloguing. What there is in a library and what one consequently has to recognize and catalogue would then be both the documents and works (see FRBR 1997). In continuation, my notion of literature gets further support from the notion of literature with the French exegete and hermeneutician Paul Ricoeur (see Section 5.1).

larly in the case of printing, an instance or piece of *scriptum est* can typically be a set of singular copies that are practically identical with each other, i.e. an edition or printing of a particular work published by a particular publisher. We further may have translations of texts, music as recordings or sheets, the latter as a score or a set of parts, etc.

Since I defined literature as the instance where works and documentation combine, we could also see *scriptum est* on these two levels. We may have new works or works as modifications of earlier works. Particularly on the level of documentation, however, new editions and printings of a work would be new instances of *scriptum est*. If one edits a traditional handwritten or printed text into a hypertext, for instance, there can be some substantial interaction as well between the levels of the work and the level of documentation.<sup>12</sup>

My claim will be that the library in substantial sense rests on what literature has produced and has its foundation of rationality in the fact that literature and what it has produced exist. By the expression L&Lship about *scriptum est*, I denote a conception of the library according to which L&Lship exists and is going on ‘on the top of’ literature and *scriptum est*, so to speak. We could characterize such notion of the library as literary. As regards my argumentation in continuation, it is useful already here to remark that all that there is in literature and *scriptum est* are instances in our historical, cultural, and social reality, which then would be a part of the foundation of L&Lship as well. Consequently, a variety of actual states of affairs, influences, and dependencies, even rights, and obligations, etc. related to such realities would be parts of the rationality of L&Lship about *scriptum est*.

We should notice here that my notion of *scriptum est* is somewhat ambiguous and vague—or, in positive terms, open and flexible. As a determinant of the notion of the library, it would serve as a landmark, rather than a strict notion leading to sharp criteria for extensionally deciding what should or should not be in the library. If we start from my own attempt to define the document, the vague notion “considerable” already would make the notion of document as well as of documentation somewhat fuzzy. The notion of work, the other of the elements of my

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<sup>12</sup> At this point already, we can see how the notion of *scriptum est* can serve to make the distinction between the library and other ‘memory institutions’ such as museums and archives that are collecting and preserving materials representing the past as well. If we stay on a general level, the materials collected and preserved by them would not belong to literature or *scriptum est*. Then again, an art museum, for instance, would be an exception in this respect, wince it would be collecting the works of art or pieces of artistic *scriptum est*, such as paintings.

notion of literature, requires particularly some further consideration. I shall return to it in Section 2.5.

### **1.1.3 The notion of obligation of *scriptum est* as a landmark and the notion of special-purpose libraries opposed to L&Lship in general**

If we start from the stricter formulation of my minimalist-phenomenal notion of the library as a place where the books are or where *scriptum est* is, then we are already approaching what I shall call the obligation of *scriptum est*. The library in this sense would ‘promise’, so to speak, that whatever instances or pieces of *scriptum est* exist, they are in the library as well. This notion is certainly problematic, even in several respects.

An instance where we can find the obligation of *scriptum est* as an actual norm, however, is the national collection<sup>13</sup> of a national library. Historically, the national collections have aimed to collect all the books published in a particular country. Consequently, the fact that someone has produced and published some book in that particular country is a good enough reason to include the book in the national collection. The books published in that country would have a ‘right’, ‘*un droit subjectif*’—if we could say so about books—to be a part of the national collection. Every single existing instance of *scriptum est* would ‘deserve’ to be present in the national collection as well<sup>14</sup>. In a sense, the national collection is a kind of picture that ‘tells the truth’ about *scriptum est* in the particular country—even if there often are some restrictions as regards the format.

If we shift our attention from national libraries and national collections to perhaps smaller and typically, in a sense or another, local libraries and their collections, the obligation of *scriptum est* cannot be similarly absolute anymore. The collection of a library in a small countryside village cannot tell the whole truth about *scriptum est*, not even on the level of one country. In such cases, on the

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<sup>13</sup> While using the notion of collection at the beginning of 21<sup>st</sup> century, during the ongoing ‘digital revolution’, the following remark is in place. For me here, the collection is not necessarily physically in the actual library space. The important thing is that the library has a sufficient control over the materials of which the collection consists. There are most important practical issues related to this, and I shall quite at the end of this treatise comment on some of them. On a general level, however, I here want to avoid the otherwise quite important questions about the notion of collection in the time of digitalization, which would be unnecessary largely as regards my argumentation in this treatise.

<sup>14</sup> Concretely, within the world of printed books, this can mean that a copy of any single literary product—be it on the level of works, of editions, or of printings—should be in the collection

other hand, one typically would take into account also other factors in deciding what the library should contain, and here one plausibly could consider the factors related to the particular library's actual or potential users or customers and their communities as well. Even then, however, we can think about what one often calls the library network as one 'Big Library', and the principles of the bigger units and this network, the national libraries included there, would expand then to smaller ones as well, to a degree. The network could also help the small library to 'tell the truth' about *scriptum est* more exhaustively. Furthermore, we perhaps could consider the own collections of even such smaller library units as representations of the existing *scriptum est*—even if not as exhaustive representations—and the obligation of *scriptum est* as one of the foundations of and maxims within building such smaller collections as well.<sup>15</sup> In the case of the national libraries, for instance, we could use the metaphor of a 'preparation' of *scriptum est*. The collection of a smaller library could then be a 'sample preparation', hopefully representative enough and in any case, complemented by the 'Big Library'.

It thus would be possible and plausible to consider the obligation of *scriptum est* as a comprehensively fundamental component within the rationality of L&Lship that I am outlining in this treatise—even if it manifests itself differently in different contexts. In continuation, I shall also use a distinction between *L&Lship in general* and what we could denote as the *special-purpose libraries*. Such a distinction would help us to deal with this problem. I should remark here still that there are many ways to specify the purpose of a library. In this sense, we could consider most—perhaps all—of the concrete particular libraries as special-purpose libraries but in spite of this and for the reasons of argumentation, I find useful the notion of the library in general as well.

Finally, it would be in many cases more concrete to talk in plural about particular *literatures*, instead of using an abstract, single, and all-encompassing

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<sup>15</sup> Once we leave the relatively clear instance of national collection, what the obligation of *scriptum est* could mean practically becomes quite complicated. We may consider *scriptum est* merely as an unorganized set of existing instances, and then the 'truth' of the non-exhaustive representation of *scriptum est* in the collection of a small library could perhaps be only some kind of resemblance in quantitative terms. Then again, we could think that the positions that various works, for instance, may have belongs to the actual cultural and social reality of *scriptum est*. There can be canons, classics, noteworthy works, and works that are not so noteworthy, for instance. While considering this would make the picture of *scriptum est* considerably richer if compared to mere list of existing units, it also would bring along a plenty of problems of interpretation, historical change, and power. I shall not discuss these problems on a concrete level in this treatise. The again, some more general issues of political theory and philosophy, which I shall discuss, particularly in Chapter 8, would have relevance on them.

notion of literature in the singular. Literature(s), in any case, is (are) a phenomenon (phenomena) in social and cultural reality and as such, typically not so easily categorizable. With particular fields of literature, however, the situation could be easier and more concrete. What the notion of the work means, for instance, could become more concrete within fields such as scholarly literature, artistic literature, drama, or popular non-fiction literature, or perhaps even blogosphere or classical concert music, with their particular cultures and forms of authorship or documentation and publishing.

I claimed that the library has a long history as a place where *scriptum est* is. Yet, even something that has been there for a very long time would not necessarily remain forever. We may ask quite well whether some change in conditions would totally annihilate the possible rationality of the library as a place where *scriptum est* is. A leitmotiv in this treatise will be that the library rests on literature. Consequently, the question of the future of the library in this sense would relate closely to the question of the future of literature as the instance where works and documentation combine. In spite of my focus on the eternal library, I shall make some remarks in this respect quite at the end of this treatise. Especially there, it will be useful to talk about particular literatures in the plural, instead of using an all-encompassing notion in the singular.

## **1.2 The library, information, and documentation (LID) studies, the notion userism, and the practice of L&Lship**

I denote by the notion of the library, information and documentation studies (LID-studies<sup>16</sup>) a bundle of disciplinary currents that we can recognize more specifically under names such as library science, documentation, library and information science, and information studies or information science<sup>17</sup>. Further, one can count here more specified fields, such as information or knowledge management (in continuation IM/KM), information retrieval (in continuation IR), information seeking (in continuation IS), and bibliometrics or informetrics. Some of these various fields of scholarship sometimes appear as more or less established sub-

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<sup>16</sup> In a logical sense, a more appropriate abbreviation could be, for instance, LAMID (library, archive, museum, information, and documentation), but for historical reasons as well as brevity I think that LID is appropriate enough.

<sup>17</sup> I shall in this book use the notion information sciences to refer to this nowadays-dominant way to outline the field, notwithstanding its appearing in literature either as information studies or as information science.

fields to some other. It would be fair to claim, however, that the field as a whole has not reached any established and universally recognized structure.

For my purposes here, it would be particularly useful to recognize the parts of LID-studies that directly and explicitly deal with L&Lship. What one calls or has called library science, of course, would be one of them. Among the more specified parts of LID-studies, bibliography and book studies or book history would have relevance, particularly as regards my notion of L&Lship. We can also count here understanding of L&Lship closer to the professional level of the field. Especially these parts of LID-studies, however, tend to be quite fragmentary.

Then again, there is what we could call the mainstream of LID-studies and I shall start here from this part. As a mainstream within this mainstream, we can see the disciplinary currents of library and information science or information science, which also are typically the scholarly foundations and environments of education for librarianship. I also shall start by making some remarks on certain naivety of those mainstream views in view of wider spheres of rationalities in our cultural, social, and political being.

### ***1.2.1 The first formulation of the notion of userism, with premises in common with the liberalist political theory and philosophy?***

One major development within the mainstream LID-studies—in my view, an unfortunate one as regards our understanding of the library, at least in certain aspects—has related to naming the field. The move from “library science” to “information science/studies” (where we can see the notion of library and information science as an intermediate phase) has not been a change of the names only. It has also been a change in the interests and focus of the scholarly field. Argumentation in this development included questioning of the possibility of a

science the basis of which would be an institution like the library<sup>18</sup>. Within the mainstream of LID-studies in the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, L&Lship do not appear very typically or explicitly thematized as a special topic, especially not as an object of theoretical or conceptual treatment. As Christine McCarthy Madsen writes: “Pure ’library theory’ is relatively rare”<sup>19</sup>.

Another unfortunate result of this development has been that it actually has resulted into a narrowed view of what the library intelligibly could be and how its rationality could shape. This actually is quite ironical, as another frequently used argument against the notion of library science has been that there should be a wider perspective. There was an aim to broaden the perspective by recognizing the wider functions like information seeking that would be the foundation of the rationality of the library as well. According to Kalervo Järvelin and Pertti Vakkari—the prominent Finnish information scientists—“Information seeking is the most important of the phenomena instigating library and information service activities”<sup>20</sup>. This irony will become more apparent in continuation.

My notion of *userism* is a critical concept to indicate certain one-sidedness and restrictedness within the conceptions of the rationality of L&Lship expressed

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<sup>18</sup> See for instance Wersig 1992. I have here no interest, however, in the questions of possible and possibly justified or false prestige the library could have if it had a ‘science of its own’, neither in the issues of where we can use the notion of science, where not. The question rather is about whether or not we should also conceptually reflect on the library as such—or, to put it shortly, about the possible meaningfulness of something we could call library theory. The scholarly field where this could take place does not need to be ‘science’: it could quite well be called, for instance, librarianship, and the notion would to some degree have similarity with, for instance, jurisprudence or journalism. Wersig’s argument that an institution could not be the basis of a branch of science nether seems to me very convincing. Political science is a good enough counter-example as it especially in its classical forms quite substantially is a science of the state and even in its modern forms have the issues of state, constitutions, political systems, etc. as quite central issues. The notion and expression science is not so important here. There is the German notion of *Lehre* and in Swedish correspondingly *lära*, which could be the bases for quite appropriate nominations for the scholarly field like *Bibliothekslehre* or *bibliotekslära*. A Finnish equivalent could be *kirjasto-oppi*, and similarly we have, for instance, *valtio-oppi*, in Finnish, in accordance with the Swedish *statslära*, for political science and the especially earlier used expression *jumaluusoppi* for theology.

<sup>19</sup> Madsen 2010, 57. She then continues: “The field that used to be known as library science is now dominated by theories of information retrieval, information management, and information organization, or by theories about the conservation, preservation, and storage of objects of cultural heritage.”

<sup>20</sup> Järvelin & Vakkari 1988, 27. Transl. VS from the following: *Tiedonhankinta on tärkein kirjasto- ja informaatiopalvelu toimintaa virittävistä ilmiöistä*.). We could characterize the article as a programme proclamation of the Finnish information studies, despite the fact that the name of the discipline there is still library and information science—or, translated more literally, “library science and informatics” (*kirjastotiede ja informatiikka*).



within or opened by mainstream LID-studies<sup>21</sup>. I formulate my first illustration of the limitations of the userist point of view in conceiving of the library in terms of three claims about the purpose of the library. If asking, what the library is for, we could have the following answers, for instance.<sup>22</sup>

- (1) The library certainly can be—and quite often has been founded and maintained—for some assumed users, i.e. for those receiver-users who need or wish to have access to some knowledge, information, documentation, literature or *scriptum est*, or however we name and define what the library contains<sup>23</sup>. This would mean that the library is for the receivers if we consider *scriptum est* as messages sent through the library.
- (2) Then again, we could also think that the library is for the authors or other creators and/or producers of *scriptum est*, i.e., for those who have produced whatever the library contains. In terms of communications from senders to the receivers, these producers would be the senders of the messages and my claim is that the library could intelligibly be for them as well.
- (3) Furthermore, we could think that the library is for a community, society, for various organizations, or even for the state. This could relate, for instance, to the possible and quite legitimate educational interests of and within the communities, societies, and the state. In a logical sense homologously but somewhat abstractly, we could add here that the library could be for the culture or civilization. This all would refer to a possible context around the whole of the chain from the senders to the receivers.<sup>24</sup>

*By the notion of userism*—or, in terms my later analysis of the general notion of userism into subspecies more exactly, by the notion of *service-userism* partic-

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<sup>21</sup> Here the problem is that a LID-scholar may be dealing explicitly (though seldom) with L&Lship, or explicitly with matters other than L&Lship, or he or she may be implying somehow that all within information science, for instance, would concern L&Lship as well, since L&Lship assumingly is about information.

<sup>22</sup> Cf., for instance, Suominen 2001, 133–134, 2002, 2004b, and 2007a.

<sup>23</sup> It is important to notice this specification of the notion of user, even if it reflects the quite established usage within LID-studies. Yet, as the notion of use is quite wide, we also could think about an author wishing to have a channel for his or her products to reach the readers—or a dictator disseminating propaganda—as a user of the library.

<sup>24</sup> Since i am actually claiming that this is an ignored aspect, I should remark about the difference between my claim here and what Audunsson (1996, 36), for instance, claims. Then again, my reference here is the dominating logic within LID-studies, not so much the formal policy statements. Furthermore, the ‘for the state’ as it will shape in my argumentation differs substantially from orientation “towards collective and social needs, rather than towards individual needs” with Audunsson.

ularly—I mean the position, which takes claim (1) above as the only possibly intelligible and ‘serious’ basis of legitimation for the library.

By serious, further, I mean here possible legitimacy of the library that we can see intelligible even in other contexts than the speeches in ceremonial occasions about the values and significance of history, cultural heritage, etc. A major theme of this treatise will be that we actually can see the significance of history, tradition, heritage, etc. in terms of a most strict, hard, and compelling logic of our being as humans.

My assumption is that behind our possible conceptions of the library, there would be assumptions of what kinds of possible intelligible rationalities there can be more widely within our cultural, social, and even political life and being. In userism as introduced above, we could see a plenty of affinity with a view called liberalism within political theory and philosophy. Steven B. Smith condenses the liberalist understanding of the society in four aspects or “principles” as follows.

- (1) The meaning of “*The principle of methodological individualism*” is that “rationality is, on this account, exclusively a predicate of individual actors and actions”.
- (2) The meaning of “*The principle of value-neutrality*” is that “rationality is concerned with means and not ends. It is a form of calculation that allows the agent to acquire the objects of his desire, rather than prescribing what kind of objects he ought to desire”.
- (3) The meaning of “*The principle of psychological hedonism*” is that “the natural goal of each agent is to maximize the number of pleasures and minimize the number of pains”.
- (4) Finally, the meaning of “*The principle of the social contract or the ‘natural condition’*, which is in turn said to generate the conditions for political legitimacy” is that “the problem of politics is conceived as finding ways of limiting the infinity of human desires so that each can coexist with all under the rule of universal law”.<sup>25</sup>

These premises would reduce all the ultimate rationality of the society—as well as of what intelligibly can be going on there—into the needs, desires, and even urges of individuals. Liberalist thought could make it quite plausible to think about societies as apparatuses providing individuals with services and the indi-

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<sup>25</sup> Smith 1986, 133–134.

viduals as a kind of clients or even customers within their societies. Even citizenship could be evolving towards mere customership.

The userist view of the library as presented above would reduce the library too into a part of such service apparatus the ultimate legitimacy of which always would come from the needs of assumed users, clients, or customers. Since we can think that the library is substantially what it contains—i.e. *scriptum est* produced by literature—the following question would arise. Is there any plausibility in thinking that we are as users, clients, or even customers in our cultural traditions and even history to which literature and *scriptum est* belong? The foundation of such absurdity would be reducing all possible intelligible relationships in our cultural and social being to the models of commerce and of actors changing assets that they own. It would be the model of selling and buying goods—and the ‘Customer is King’, at least ideologically.

What we can call republicanism within political philosophy, in turn, would see the individual, society, and state in a considerably more plentiful and multifaceted perspective. I shall address the republicanist political theory and philosophy more widely in Chapter 6, but some introductory remarks are in place already here.<sup>26</sup> Robert Pippin—a scholar of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, the great representative of the German Idealism—uses illustratively the notion of “ultimacy” to formulate his criticism of liberalism or the “liberal version of the state”. As a common orientation within this, he summarizes “the pre-eminence and in some sense the theoretical ‘ultimacy’ of the human individual”. He then defines as “a critique of the putative ‘ultimacy’ or original status of the individual” a position that obviously comes close to republicanism, though he does not use the actual notion of republicanism.<sup>27</sup>

A thematic within LID-studies around the change of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries—obviously outside what we could characterize as the mainstream—has been the connection between developments within the library field, on one hand, and of what we may denote by the notions of “neo-liberalism”, “New Right”, “new public management”, or “new public philosophy”, for instance, on the other<sup>28</sup>. Here, however, I prefer to operate with the more fundamental even if also somewhat

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<sup>26</sup> It is already here worth noticing that we should by no means confuse the notions of republicanism and liberalism as they appear in this treatise with the Republican and Democrat parties of USA. For a long time already, the case has actually been that there is more republicanism as I use the notion in the Democratic than Republican Party (see, for instance, McCabe 2001, 64–65).

<sup>27</sup> Pippin 2006, 126–127.

<sup>28</sup> See, for instance, Usherwood 1989, 28 ff; Buschman 2003, 15 ff.; Stevenson 2010.

fuzzy distinction and opposition of liberalism and republicanism as two ways of conceiving of the rationality of and within the society and the state, including the possible foundations of a democratic government and freedom.<sup>29</sup>

### **1.2.2 Instrumental vs. constitutive, and the notion of practice in modern social science**

In Smith's concise "principles" of liberalism above, we saw the dominance within liberalist political philosophy of what we could call the rationality and logic of instrumentality. Rational questions are questions about means only, not about ends. The question of ends would be subordinate to the "psychological hedonism" ultimately. We may further say that instrumentality dominates the userist conception of the library as well. The legitimacy of the library would ultimately have its foundation in an instrumental value that the library and what it contains could have for its typically individual—though possibly, we could say, 'individual-like'—users, clients, or customer even. There perhaps could be no other rational questions about the ends or pursuits of L&Lship itself.<sup>30</sup>

We could characterize as the 'value-in-itself' what such dominating instrumentality is ignoring. The notion of a value-in-itself, however, is problematic in several respects even. After a claim of something being a value-in-itself, we easily remark that having such a value is good in view of something else, and the value-in-itself actually becomes a means for something else. Quite easily, such reasoning ends with a result very reminiscent of Smith's principle (3) of liberalism, and we actually lose the option to conceive of any foundation of rationality beyond the wishes, enjoyments, and happiness of individuals. Another option, of course, is that the value-in-itself has in a way or another divine foundation but I would not appeal to such options in this treatise. Then again, we can dismantle—to a degree, at least—this problematic notion through the notion of *constitutive*. The opposition of *instrumental vs. constitutive* would then substitute the opposition of *instrumental vs. the value-in-itself*.

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<sup>29</sup> As nouns denoting representatives of liberalism and republicanism and as adjectives qualifying their views accordingly, I shall use expressions 'liberalist' and 'republicanist'. This helps us to separate these particular notions from the various contents that expressions 'liberal' and 'republican' may have.

<sup>30</sup> Instrumentality, however, would appear here in quite a wide sense, including means of having fun, of entertainment, etc., in addition to serious utility in view of satisfying some necessary needs.

All instrumentality assumes the fundamental structure of means and some purposes the realization of which the means should serve. There always would be the agent aiming at something. Fundamentally, the constitutive comes to the scene on the basis of what the agents and their aims actually have become to be. Before we can talk about instrumental activity, for instance, there should be the constitution of the very agents and their aims. What is constitutive can also be a foundation of genuinely moral imperatives for a subject to the constitution of whom or which it belongs. Further, a substantial part of the constitution of an individual even can exist on the level of wider cultural, social, and political realities and their constitutions.<sup>31</sup>

My aim is by no means to deny or underrate the value of instrumentality and the fundamental technical rationality as such. Technical manipulation and causing effects on our environment and even on ourselves are a substantial part of our being as humans. We do cook potatoes and build bridges that should be durable enough for the traffic; we take medicine that should cure the disease and, at least, try to avoid what could harm us. We can try to cause effects on ourselves by meditation. What I am claiming in this treatise, rather, is that instrumental rationality perhaps is not enough while considering the rationality of L&Lship. Subordinating the library to the general instrumentalist logic, however, is characteristic of LID-studies and of (library and) information science in particular.

A remark by Peter Ingwersen—a prominent Danish information scientist—is quite illustrative as regards the attitude assumed as regards the themes of L&Lship within LID-studies and especially within the scholarly current called information science.

Library science is a special R&D activity within information science. Library science [...] is concerned with the information processes that takes place in libraries. As such, library science becomes a special case where for instance information retrieval is called reference work and information management is named library management.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Even then, we could end with a view of complex functionality that dissolves into quasi-instrumentalities arranged in a particular way, but we could also see here the condition within which we actually could make questions of genuinely normative character, questions of right vs. wrong or rational vs. irrational, for instance.

<sup>32</sup> Ingwersen 1992, 5–6.

The library would appear merely as another place for something called “information processes”<sup>33</sup>. In continuation (Section 2.6 to 2.7), furthermore, we shall see that LID-studies and perhaps especially information science tend to deal with the “information processes” rather exclusively in instrumentalist terms while categorizing information (knowledge, etc.) as a resource.

To overcome the individualism and instrumentalism characteristic of liberalist political theory and userist views within LID-studies, the notion of practice provides us with some plausible points of departure. The notion of practice as such has quite respectable roots with Aristotle with whom we find a foundation for radically challenging the instrumentalist particularly, and we shall discuss this further in the next section.

The notion of practice as it appears within modern social sciences as well would provide us with a fertile and substantial way to think about L&Lship. This notion typically denotes more or less institutionalized, structured, and established forms and even conditions of human activities and thereby social order as well. While talking about practices, further, the notion of constitution introduced above would be crucial. Theodore S. Schatzki writes about “nonindividualist accounts” that “attribute social order to phenomena that are something more than features of individuals and their immediate interactions”, and further

[...] these phenomena determine order either by affecting the actions that produce it — causing them, constraining them, forming them, organizing the contexts in which people proceed — or by directly determining order independently of human activity (as when one macro state of society causes another).<sup>34</sup>

Schatzki then proceeds to an “even longer history of wholism (e.g., Hegel, Malinowski, Parsons, and Luhmann)” where “social wholes, usually societies, [...]”

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<sup>33</sup> Here, of course, we have to notice a similarity with the notion of the library from which I started, as there also the library was a place, the place where the books are. Yet, my intention was by no means that this would be the end of what we conceptually can say about the library. Furthermore, the difference between the place where there are books and a place where information processes may take place is symptomatic.

<sup>34</sup> Schatzki (2000), 13–14.

determine the actions and interactions occurring within them by way of shaping societal subdomains and institutions”<sup>35</sup>.

According to Anthony Giddens, social sciences fundamentally are about “neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of any form of societal totality, but social practices ordered across space and time”. Further, “In and through their activities agents reproduce the conditions that make these activities possible.”<sup>36</sup> That practices exist through continuous reproduction already implies a further matter of importance. There always is continuity that makes the practices “distinctively ‘the same’ across space and time”<sup>37</sup>. A practice would never be here and now only. A practice always has a history in the course of which it has evolved into a practice or a history that has constituted it as a practice.

This continuity of practices as social structures of activity already brings them close to the repeated modes of acting called habits or routines as well. Even if, in my view, this would not be the most noteworthy point of the notion of practice in modern social science, the notion of practice approaching mere habit has appeared within LID-studies as well (see more about this in Section 2.5[c]). We can find, however, within LID-studies as well the notion of practice in forms that are more elaborate. An example of this is Birger Hjørland’s and Hanne Albrechtsen’s domain analysis. Even if the notion of practice as such does not appear explicitly as a major thematizing notion with them, the very notion of the domain comes quite close to it<sup>38</sup>.

In my view, in any case, it is quite a symptomatic of the lack of interest in conceptual questions related to the library that one so seldom within LID-studies suggests that we could talk about L&Lship as a particular practice with institutional dimensions. There are exceptions as well. Joacim Hansson writes quite

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<sup>35</sup> Schatzki writes further, “Practice approaches to social order refer order, however conceived, to the field of practices. This means, first, that order is understood as [a] feature(s) of this field and, second, that components and aspects of the field are deemed responsible for the establishment of order. [...] Practice approaches also tend to reduce the scope and ordering power of reason. They do this by abandoning the traditional conception of reason as an innate mental faculty and reconceptualizing it as a practice phenomenon: as (1) a way of being dependent upon and thus varying among practices or (2) ways of operating within practices, e.g., rational procedures and argumentation [Schatzki then refers to Winch and Toulmin]”. (Schatzki 2000, 13–14.)

<sup>36</sup> Giddens 1984, 2.

<sup>37</sup> Giddens 1984, 3.

<sup>38</sup> Hjørland & Albrechtsen 1995. Sanna Talja, as another example of an information scientist interested in the notion of practice, makes remarks on most crucial aspects of practices in the sense of this notion in modern social science, including their resources-structuring capacity (see Talja 2010, especially 213 ff.).

thematically about the library as an institution and about “analysing the norms, values, and rules of practice of librarianship”<sup>39</sup>. Historically, in any case, the library has been one of the major interests of LID-studies. As an institutionalized and arranged set of interrelated activities it consequently could be a most plausible candidate within the possible sphere of interests of LID-studies for application of the notion of practice as it appears within the modern social sciences.<sup>40</sup>

### **1.2.3 The notion of practice since Aristotle and the question of genuine and rational obligations and norms**

Within the mainstream LID-studies, there certainly have been more subtle views on the particular nature of L&Lship as well than the rather straightforward way of subordinating L&Lship to the notion of “information processes” and categorizing “library science” as an R&D-activity with Ingwersen. Marcia Bates, for instance, refers to the difference of the “valuesystems” between information science and the practice of L&Lship. She first describes information science as “tended to

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<sup>39</sup> Hansson 2010, 3 ff.

<sup>40</sup> Neither in *The turn* by Ingwersen and Järvelin (2005) appears the notion of practice or information practice as a thermalizing notion, but their idea of integrating IS and IR would give us an option to apply this notion quite illustratively in a context most proper to information science and further. Furthermore, we could see here a way in which also some parts, at least, of my interest in of the notion of the practice of L&Lship could become plausible even in view of the core of the mainstream information science. Returning to Ingwersen and Järvelin, an obvious motivation for integrating IS and IR research would be that investigation of IS can provide the researcher and developer of IR with knowledge about the context where the IR-systems should function. They also stress the significance of wider “socio-cultural environments” as well as aspects of history and temporality (summarized in op cit., 307–309). With the concept of practice particularly, we could say that one side of integration of IS and IR in related investigation could be that various developments in systems for IR and the very existence of some particular systems and options would obviously be an infrastructure that could be a part of the constitution of particular practices of IS. Shaping of IS behavior of people would obviously be very much a function of the options that there are, and a most illustrative example would be the emergence of the Internet. I am not focusing in this treatise very much on phenomena of such behavioral level and I would not consider beneficial a view of the library as a system for IR (see Section 2.6.1). We could see particularly at this place, however, some even noteworthy analogy between the possible significance that the systems for IR and the institutional practice of L&Lship could have, at least as infrastructures. We could have here practices as quite concrete and even material foundations constituting other practices and structuring the ways in which people act, very much like the existence of railways, for instance, conditions and constitutes the practices of traffic. While indicating how the object of research at least partly is the product of professional practices within a discipline like LID-studies, this reasoning could help us to see in a more nuanced manner the relationship and dialectics between the professional and scholarly. It could even be a foundation for rehabilitating the problematic of L&Lship within LID-studies.



follow the ‘valueneutral’ science or engineering model”, and then proceeds to librarianship, which

[...] in contrast, follows a more service-oriented and empowerment-oriented valuesystem. The library is there to produce a certain desirable social result, and, as a consequence, many of the activities of the library field are organized and directed to meet that values-laden goal.<sup>41</sup>

Yet, talking about “valuesystems” could have restrictions similar to the notion of the value-in-itself.

Instead of “values” and “valuesystem” that there might be, I would prefer to talk about rationality, which would be a more comprehensive notion and quite directly a normative one as well. It clearly would refer to actual and genuine obligation to which we should respond, instead of talking in a sociologist manner about values that some people or institutions might or do have. This, in turn, shifts discussion from the sociological perspective to the genuinely philosophical one. The question would be about rationality as an obligation and norm for us in the being or our own as well and especially. This leads us to another side of the notion of practice—or, to another notion of practice, perhaps.

With Aristotle, the notion of practice (*praxis*<sup>42</sup>) is the result of the distinction where practice is opposed to the productive activities (*poiesis*). Quite in the beginning of *Nicomachean Ethics*, we can find the basic distinction between those activities that are the ends or objectives of themselves, on one hand, and those in which the end is separate from the activity itself. After noticing that “Every art and every investigation, and likewise every practical pursuit or undertaking, seems to aim at some good”, Aristotle proceeds to establish the distinction itself between the activities in this respect.

It is true that a certain variety is to be observed among the ends [Gr. *telos*] at which the arts and sciences aim: in some cases the activity of practicing the art is itself the end, whereas in others the end is some product over and above the mere exercising of the art.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Bates 1999, 1049.

<sup>42</sup> We could well ask whether the notion of practice with Aristotle and in modern social science is the same notion at all. If they are not, then I could have made the distinction on expressional level by using the expression *praxis* to denote the Aristotelian notion. I think, however, that absolute separation of these notions would not be appropriate, and to indicate the connection I use the somewhat complex expressions like the Aristotelian notion of practice and the practice in the sense of the modern social sciences to separate them when needed.

<sup>43</sup> Aristotle 384BC/1975, 1094a.

The text then proceeds to define politics that is in the position to determine the ends of itself as well as of many other activities within the social life. We could imagine an endless recursion of instrumentality, a recursion ‘*ad infinitum*’, where we always can ask what is the purpose or end of an activity outside the activity itself. We can ask, for what is A. If it is for B, then we can ask the same question about B; if B is for C, we encounter the same question as regards C, etc. With Aristotle, the halt mark of this endlessly recursive asking is the type of activity that he denotes as practice and the political science. There we would encounter the question about the end or the “Supreme Good”, which then also is the foundation of other faculties, even the “most esteemed” ones like “[military] strategy, domestic economy, oratory [i.e. rhetoric]”.<sup>44</sup>

Aristotle calls practical reason or prudence (*phronesis*) the faculty of thinking that one uses in a practice, as opposed to skill (*tekhne*) applied in productive activity. His argumentation on prudence or the practical reason starts from reason in personal matters, and then separates it from both the skills of productive activities, on one hand, and science and theory, on the other. He finally recognizes practical reason or *phronesis* as a capacity to think about what is good for not only the person himself but for the whole of humanity, society, community, etc. Aristotle writes as follows about Pericles, i.e. about a man in politics.

Hence men like Pericles are deemed prudent, because they possess a faculty of discerning what things are good for themselves and for mankind.<sup>45</sup>

Among other things, we could read this saying that the practice is also an activity that contains the consideration of its end. It obviously is within politics that Pericles is exercising his capacity to discern what is good. There are not only ends fixed from outside the activity—or a particular kind of product as the end. Also and particularly, the question of the ends is as open inside the practice. As politics is the practice *par excellence*, we could say further that a practice in this sense would be politically open.

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<sup>44</sup>Aristotle formulates as follows a further distinction between science, on one hand, and practical reason or prudence and the skill of productive activity or the art, on the other:

“[...] no one deliberates about things that cannot vary, nor about things not within his power to do. [...] Prudence ... is not Science, because matters of conduct admit of variation; and not Art [skill of productive practice], since doing [practice] and making [productive activity] are generically different.” (Aristotle 384BC/1975, 1094a–1094b.)

<sup>45</sup> Aristotle 384BC/1975, 1140b.

The Aristotelian notion of politics as a practice as well has received attention in modern social and especially political science and philosophy. In his book *Theory and praxis*, Jürgen Habermas follows the long history of marginalization of the classical, Aristotelian way of thinking about politics. Episodes in this long history reflect the emergence of new capacities of control provided by modern empirical science, which then menace to suffocate the practical reason in the Aristotelian sense. The continual expansion of the options and rationality of “control over objective or objectified processes”—not only in nature but also in the society—is replacing the “emancipation by means of Enlightenment”. Habermas’ conclusive comment to all this is as follows:

But, of course, the real difficulty in the relation of theory to praxis does not arise from this new function of science as a technological force, but rather from the fact that we are no longer able to distinguish between practical and technical power. [...] For then, no attempt at all is made to attain a rational consensus on the part of citizens concerning the practical control of their destiny. Its place is taken by the attempt to attain technical control over history by perfecting the administration of society, an attempt that is just as impractical as it is unhistorical.<sup>46</sup>

Instrumentality and massively emerging capacity to produce some particular, assumingly beneficial effects quite forcefully tends to suffocate richer possible understandings of what is rational.

Combining the notions of practice discussed here, we could say that a practice meant by the notion in modern social sciences can be—but not necessarily is—a practice in the Aristotelian sense as well. Expressions like technical, political, communicative, etc. practice as well would then become intelligible, with the notion of the practice of modern social sciences as the foundation and the Aristotelian notion of practice as a qualifier of it.

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<sup>46</sup> Habermas 1971/1977, 255. Giddens expressing this basic theme with Habermas as follows: “At the core of the technocratic ideology of advanced capitalism, Habermas says, is the collapse of the distinction between the categories of labor and interaction, or the technical and practical: positivism, which also assimilates these categories, reducing the latter to the former, is hence a philosophical expression of technocratic domination” (Giddens 1977, 206). J. Richard Bernstein summarizes these aspects of the notion of practice or praxis with a reference to Habermas and Hans-Georg Gadamer: “... there is a common agreement between Gadamer and Habermas about the pressure of modern society to confuse and deform genuinely practical questions with technical and strategic issues, and both seek to defend the autonomy and legitimacy of a praxis that is distinguishable from technē ...” (Bernstein 1983/1985, 43.)

The Aristotelian notion of practice has two major points of significance as regards my thematic in this treatise.

- (1) We can think about the practice of L&Lship as a practice in the Aristotelian sense as well. This would mean that there would be, within this practice, a level of *phronesis*. It seems to me that once we start to think about librarianship as a profession, we cannot avoid this. The notion of profession requires that the activity in question have some autonomy, which can manifest itself in professional ethics, for instance.
- (2) While considering the relationships of the practice of L&Lship to wider social reality and other practices, it would be most important to recognize that among these other practices as well and especially there can and perhaps should be elements of the Aristotelian practice. In other words, there can be politics as well, not only administration and skills, in the constitution of our social life and being. This, of course, has to do with democracy, among other things.

Applying the option to combine the notions of practice, then, we could ask whether we could or should conceive the practice of L&Lship as a technical practice only and whether we on the level of the society could or should avoid talking about political practices. Furthermore, the Aristotelian notion of practice helps us in—though is not a necessary condition of—overcoming the kind of in a sociologist manner objectifying use of the notion of practice that seems to be present in LID-studies, probably as the result of in a fundamental sense positivist understanding of what scientific research should be like. I shall return to this particularly in Section 7.4. The Aristotelian practice certainly is something in which we are participating, instead of only looking at or theorizing about it.

### **1.3 A (quasi-)Kantian question about the possible conditions of intelligibility of the rationality of the practice of L&Lship**

As it is well known, Immanuel Kant's question in *Die Kritik der Reinen Vernunft* was not whether experiential knowledge is possible or not, neither about whether it is trustworthy as knowledge. Rather, the question was about the epistemological conditions of such knowledge, the possibility and value of which the Newtonian

mechanics, for instance, already quite well testified<sup>47</sup>. My question in this treatise has some similarity to Kant's way of questioning. My (quasi-)Kantian question would be *the question about*

- *the conditions within cultural, social, and political philosophy*
- *of intelligibility of the rationality of L&Lship about scriptum est*
- *with the obligation of scriptum est as the maxim of this practice and the expression of its fundamental rationality.*

In looking for an answer to this question, I shall start from the particular features suggested by my minimalist-phenomenal concept of the library as a place where *scriptum est* is. The obligation of *scriptum est* as well is a part of the conception of the library from which I shall start.

A result of my way of posing the question is that the whole of my argumentation will be most hypothetical by its nature, and there certainly is some arbitrariness even in the choice of the threads of argumentation that I shall follow. Yet, any attempt to reconstruct the huge sphere of cultural, social, and political philosophy on a level that would be even close to conclusive and then 'choosing' therefrom the appropriate premises would be far beyond any realistic possibilities in this treatise. It further would be somewhat dishonest even to pretend that behind the conclusions that I shall suggest there would be such a firm basis. In this treatise, I shall proceed with a kind of a thought experiment, first asking whether and how we could reach the end after starting from some seemingly plausible points of departure and what we then could learn about the rationality of L&Lship from the reasoning that ensues from those points of departure.

Raili Kauppi—a Finnish professor of philosophy at the University of Tampere who earlier was a librarian and a teacher of librarianship—suggests a discipline that she calls "library anthropology", which should be partly a field of empirical investigation, partly a part of philosophical anthropology<sup>48</sup>. My (quasi-)Kantian question would obviously belong to the philosophical part of the library anthropology as suggested by Kauppi. In this sense, an answer to my (quasi-)

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<sup>47</sup> Kant (1781/1922, 78) writes: "There is therefore a principle for the transcendental deduction of all concepts *a priori* which must guide the whole of our investigation, namely, that all must be recognized as conditions *a priori* of the possibility of experience, whether of intuition, which is found in it, or of thought."

<sup>48</sup> Kauppi 1982.

Kantian question would be a suggestion for a *cultural, social, and political philosophy of L&Lship*.


Here, however, it would be useful to specify a little further what the notion of (library-)philosophical will mean in this treatise. In Figure 1, it is pivotal that we perhaps could make a distinction between philosophy proper and the notion of meta-theory in which some LID-scholars as well have had interest<sup>49</sup>.

The figure illustrates—even if perhaps in a somewhat schematic manner—a process of distancing from practice through various levels of scholarly work. First, there is the form of R&D-activities (1) and thereafter, the form of properly scientific research. Finally (4), we could reach a level where we could talk about metatheories—or, perhaps, about philosophy if we understand the notion of philosophy in a kind of an everyday meaning that it could have. We could say that R&D-activities are concrete and in this sense practical while the philosophy or metatheory would be highly abstract or ‘theoretical’. The properly scientific research, then, could be somewhere in the middle in this respect.

My point here, however, is a distinction that we could make between philosophy and metatheory. I think that we should consider the metatheories as parts of the science and their task would be to enhance further the understanding of the object of research. In this sense, they indeed would be quite abstract, ‘theoretical’, and remote from the practice. Philosophy in the sense of library philosophy here, in turn, would be a part of or quite a direct contribution to the professional practice of L&Lship and particularly, to the intellectual activity, which we could characterize as *phronesis* and which could and perhaps should be a part of a genuinely professional practice. In this sense, library philosophy would be quite close to, perhaps even a part of the practice of L&Lship—in spite of its seemingly ‘theoretical’ or abstract nature. Philosophy in this sense would be a most practical matter.

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<sup>49</sup> See, for instance, Talja, Tuominen, & Savolainen. 2004; Tuominen, Talja & Savolainen 2003.



**Fig. 1. From practice to increasingly theoretical and finally once again practical levels of intellectual activity**

Finally, however, I should remark that metatheory and philosophy, even if conceived of as I suggest, are not entirely separate from each other. It would be quite plausible to think that much of the philosophy of L&Lship can be a part or foundation of possible metatheories within the research related to the libraries as well.

#### **1.4 Anticipating the mode of argumentation while answering the (quasi-)Kantian question**

A major part of the kind of work that I am doing here is giving some discursive form to connections of themes that first appear as intuitive. This also contains an option to test the plausibility of the intuitions. If I were to define the methodology of this kind of work, an erudite speculation could be a good candidate for such defining. I leave it to the reader to assess whether I shall be considering thoroughly enough what my literary sources could actually be teaching as well as the

possible questions remaining open or the possible counter-arguments. In spite of the generality of this methodological point of departure, some anticipation of the lines of argumentation could be useful.

As indicated already in the main title of this treatise, the notion of L&Lship that I am elaborating consists of two major dimensions, one of the *bibliographic rationality of L&Lship about scriptum est*, and another of the *educational rationality of L&Lship on behalf of scriptum est*.

- (1) The library would be *about scriptum est* in the sense that the products of literature, i.e. *scriptum est*, would be the foundation on which the library exists and functions, its particular responsibility, and consequently the reality with knowledge about which L&Lship should provide us, for instance.
- (2) The library would be *on behalf of scriptum est* in the sense that the library would be ‘speaking’ on behalf of *scriptum est*, reminding us that *scriptum est* is a noteworthy part of our cultural and social environment and even might have a say that we perhaps should heed.

The obligation of *scriptum est* as well would have a double meaning. The responsibility of L&Lship would be an obligation of ‘telling the truth’ about *scriptum est*, so to speak. The obligation of *scriptum est* would become even a criterion of truth since to respond to their responsibility, the library and librarian, in particular, should know the reality that is their responsibility. When needed, I shall use the notion of *the truth criterion of scriptum est* to indicate this particular side of the obligation of *scriptum est*.<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, if *scriptum est* may have a say that we should heed, there obviously would be an obligation in another sense as well. To denote this side, we could use the notion of the *say of scriptum est*.

The practice of L&Lship as I shall outline it in this treatise would be a literary practice, a practice that has a particular relationship to literature and especially to what literature has produced. This particular relationship gives another attribute to the practice of L&Lship. It would be a bibliographic practice. This all

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<sup>50</sup> Some further remarks on the truth about *scriptum est* are useful already here. We may consider *scriptum est* merely as an unorganized set of existing instances, and then the ‘truth’ of the non-exhaustive representation of *scriptum est* in the collection of a small library could perhaps be only some kind of resemblance in quantitative terms. Then again, we could think that the positions that various works, for instance, may have belongs to the actual cultural and social reality of *scriptum est*. There can be canons, classics, noteworthy works, and works that are not so noteworthy, for instance. While considering this would make the picture of *scriptum est* considerably richer if compared to mere list of existing units, it also would bring along a plenty of problems of interpretation, historical change, and power.



is still about *scriptum est*, but as far as the practice of L&Lship can be a practice on behalf of *scriptum est*, it would also be an educational practice or a practice related to the practices of education, where we should conceive of education in a most general and fundamental sense. Here the obligation of *scriptum est* would already turn into the say of *scriptum est*. I further suggest that the fundamental rationality of L&Lship would be literary and bibliographic and the educational rationality would be in a sense an additional one. In spite of this, the educational rationality also is a further foundation making intelligible or adding to intelligibility of the literary and bibliographic rationality of L&Lship about *scriptum est*.

Argumentation within this treatise will have the form of reflective questioning of possible intelligible ways to conceive of the rationality of L&Lship. The notion of rationality here appears in a wide sense. I shall build up my argumentation in terms of the following questions.

- (1) What *necessities* that we perhaps should not ignore in conceiving of the possible intelligible rationalities within our cultural, social, and even political being there are?
- (2) What *options* of possible intelligible rationalities there are within our cultural, social, and even political being?
- (3) Which of these options could be *preferable*, leading to the questions of morals, politics, rights, etc.?

The necessities that will appear will mostly have the character of what I would call existential necessities. Assumptions of them would be the results of analysis of what we could call the human condition, such as the fact that our being is temporal and temporally finite. What is possible has a logical connection to necessities, of course. Necessities with their implications can exclude some options. If something is necessary, its negation is not an option. Then again, the negation of something that is not a necessity would be an option. In this sense, much of what we can say about necessities applies to possibilities as well. The question of the possible preferences among the options is the question that the Aristotelian notion of practice opens to us—once we assume the practical perspective also in this sense.

As regards the preferable options, we still can consider several foundations of possible preferences. In continuation, there will appear rather generally assumed and accepted preferences on a political level, such as the preference of democracy over undemocratic forms of government—or of freedom over the absence of it.

Further, preferability of some options may quite well find a part of their foundation in even the existential options and necessities. An option that is in line with existential necessities may have the merit of quite a fundamental realism.

While considering the rationality of L&Lship, furthermore, we can also think about preferences in the sense that the library by its very existence ‘speaks for’ some ideals. If the society invests in the maintenance of collections of reading materials, we perhaps could assume that the society considers reading appreciable in some sense. If the library were to advance knowledge, then logically, maintaining a library would tell us that there is some appreciation of knowledge, of knowledgeable citizens, etc.

### **1.5 The line of argumentation**

*The cultural, social, and political philosophy of L&Lship* that I shall suggest will contain three major reconstructions of lines of thought that I find plausible premises for conceiving of the rationality of L&Lship about and on behalf of *scriptum est*.

- (1) Hermeneutics of the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer provides us with a foundation for making intelligible the fundamental educational moment in our relationship to our traditions and possibly even in the rationality of L&Lship (see below, since Chapter 3 particularly.).
- (2) Hermeneutics of the French philosopher, hermeneutician, and exegete Paul Ricoeur complements and partly challenges the Gadamerian points of departure in another direction and provides us with foundations for conceiving of the bibliographic rationality of L&Lship about *scriptum est*. (see below, since Chapter 4 and 5 particularly, with a complementary reasoning in Chapter 9, Sections 9.2 to 9.3)
- (3) Liberalism-critical political theory and philosophy in this treatise will be the manifold though also a recognizable tradition of thought called republicanism, which provides us with a further foundation for conceiving of the educational moment in the rationality of the practice of L&Lship and thus, further challenge the userist premises. Because of some reservations that I find nec-

essary, however, I shall use the notion of *agnostic republicanism*<sup>51</sup> to denote the position that seems to me plausible as regards political or politico-ethical matters (See reasoning below since Chapter 6 and particularly in Chapter 9.)

In *Part I* of this treatise, I shall start with remarks on the dominance of userism that we can find within LID-studies. This will also contain a further analysis of the notion of userism itself. Thereafter, I shall proceed to ideas of hermeneutics with Gadamer and Ricoeur. The former will make intelligible the educational rationality of L&Lship on behalf of *scriptum est* while the latter will lead us towards the bibliographic rationality of L&Lship about *scriptum est*. The Gadamerian and Ricoeurian premises to which I shall appeal have also some tension between them. This relates to Gadamer's criticism of what he calls historical objectivism or romantic historicism (see Section 3.3.2[a] below) and within my notion of L&Lship, this concerns particularly the obligation of *scriptum est* in the sense of a criterion of truth. In this treatise, the Ricoeurian argument will appear as a kind of 'footnotes' to Gadamer, which I consider legitimate since it seems to me that these two philosophers conceive of the fundamental rationality of hermeneutics rather similarly.

*Part II* of the treatise widens our reasoning towards the sphere of political life and politico-ethical premises and rationalities in terms of which we could conceive of the rationality of L&Lship about and on behalf of *scriptum est*. I shall there first formulate criticism of liberalism within the republicanist views of political theory and philosophy. Thereafter, I shall suggest some reasons for which we should perhaps mind about the past objectivities around *scriptum est*, in spite of Gadamer's criticism of historical objectivism.

I should still remark already here that there is some rather fundamental affinity between the Gadamerian-like hermeneutics and republicanist political theory and philosophy as it shall shape in this treatise. In view of what I shall call agnostic republicanism, furthermore, we can make some 'footnotes' to or reminders within republicanism, which are somewhat analogical with the Ricoeurian footnotes that we can make to Gadamer.

In addition to agnostic republicanism, I shall refer to some other, possibly beneficial, in a sense or other aspects of what we could characterize quite broadly

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<sup>51</sup> The use of the notion of agnosticism here does not primarily refer or confine to the sphere of religion, which is the domain where one most typically would use this notion. I find this appropriate since the original Greek word, of course, means simply a kind of lack of knowledge, which can be the foundation of suspicion as well.

as ‘agnosticism’. We even could say that Ricoeurian thought, in a sense, adds some agnosticism to the Gadamerian hermeneutics and with Gadamer himself even, we find a particular aspect of agnosticism as regards history<sup>52</sup>. This all has to do with a particular view of the ethos and disposition that would be, in my view, most appropriate to L&Lship. As a form of humanism and even as a practical and professional manifestation of the humanities, L&Lship, as I conceive of it, would by no means manifest what we could see as an overly self-confident or arrogant humanism. By its very existence, rather, the library would remind us of the need to modestly recognize the realities and pluralities of and within *scriptum est*. From this ensues also my claim that L&Lship should be

- *primarily*, in a bibliographic manner, about *scriptum est*, and thereafter,
- *quite plausibly*, in an educational sense, on behalf of *scriptum est* as well,

*Ultimately*, however, L&Lship could and should be open for a variety of possible and possibly significant other ends as well.

It would be still useful to anticipate here already the structure of the rationalities under my general notion of literary, bibliographic, and educational rationalities of L&Lship.

- (1) By *educational rationality* of L&Lship on behalf of *scriptum est*, I mean the most substantial educational rationality that we can see in L&Lship, the rationality that gives *scriptum est* and literature a say, so to speak. *Scriptum est* would be the Great Teacher in the library.
- (2) By *bibliographically educational rationality* of L&Lship about and on behalf of *scriptum est*, I mean the educational rationality proper to the very practice of L&Lship, which would be, in a sense, the rationality of supporting and advancing the educational rationality proper on behalf of *scriptum est*.

In (2) as well, L&Lship would be ‘speaking for’ *scriptum est* while (1) would mean that *scriptum est* itself is ‘speaking’. Both of these rationalities, of course, would be in quite a fundamental sense literary rationalities as well.

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<sup>52</sup> As regards Gadamer in this respect, see Suominen 2016 and Section 9.4 below.



## **Part I:**

**Userisms of legitimatization and of the scholarly  
and professional focus challenged by  
hermeneutics around and within L&Lship**



## 2 Preliminary remarks on L&Lship about and on behalf of *scriptum est* and on LID-studies

In this chapter, I shall outline the foundations of my alternative to the userist conceptions of the rationality of L&Lship on a concrete and, we could say, pre-hermeneutical level. I would see the center of gravity of L&Lship in its inner historical substance. My notion of L&Lship about *scriptum est* culminates in the notion of bibliography, conceived of as knowledge about what literature has produced and what thus constitutes the content and even the substance of the library.

Since the conception of L&Lship that I am suggesting here opposes to the userist views, which I claim to dominate within both the professional and scholarly field of LID, a little closer look at these userist trends is appropriate. In Section 2.6, I shall argue that some particular or paradigmatic notions of and within established subfields of LID-studies contain in a way or another userist points of departure. In addition to this, a short excursion to the historical development of the field would be illustrative (Section 2.7). I believe that such combination of approaches serves to achieve better the phenomenon. I cannot claim, however, that I could actually prove my argument of the userist mainstream within LID-studies, but I can give some rather substantial indications of it. Both of the approaches below will focus mainly on the most established, in the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century institutionally strongest and most influential parts of LID-studies, typically denoted by notions of information science or library and information science.

In Chapters 3 to 5, I shall continue with hermeneutical philosophy, first with Gadamer's thought with his rehabilitation of authority and tradition that provides us with foundations of the educational rationality of L&Lship on behalf of *scriptum est*. After this, we shall find with Ricoeur perspectives towards conceiving of the bibliographic rationality of L&Lship about *scriptum est*. In Sections 5.2 to 5.5, I shall make first attempts to resolve the tension that there is between Gadamer and Ricoeur.



## 2.1 Semioticity of documentation, literature, and L&Lship

While considering the library, it could be an even self-evident point of departure that we are dealing with semiotic matters or the matters related to meanings<sup>53</sup>. This would direct our attention towards such disciplinary traditions as semiotics or semiology, on one hand, and hermeneutics, on the other. In this treatise, hermeneutics will have the major role, and we shall discuss it extensively later. Semiotics or semiology would rather have the role of a presupposition only in continuation, even if in Section 5.3, we shall discuss some rather specific conceptions within structuralist semiology. For this reason, it is in place to make some general remarks on semiotics or semiology already here.

In semiotic terms, we could conceive of the document as a semiotic object. There would be all the time present the combination of something that we can call meanings or contents with something else belonging, in a sense or another, to the sphere of 'materiality' or, perhaps better, to the sphere of sense-observability, such as visibility or audibility, for instance. With Aldirgas Greimas—the Lithuanian-born French semiotician—perception is the concrete instance where we apprehend meaning<sup>54</sup>.

A short remark is here in place as regards some types of *scriptum est* where the notion of content is somewhat problematic. The very notions of absolute music or abstract, nonfigurative painting, for instance, actually seems to exclude the notion of content. It is not always appropriate to ask what a painting represents

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<sup>53</sup> The notion of meaning here is somewhat problematic. Its use in various fields of the humanities and social and cultural studies is quite frequent, to the degree that one often has to wonder what its conceptual content is. An alternative concept could be the *content* or *signifié* used particularly in structuralist semiology (see Hjelmslev 1943/1961 and Saussure 1916/1984). These notions, in turn, refer rather exclusively to content of some particular *expression* or *signifié* joint to some particular *significant*. Meaning, on the other hand, is a wider notion often referring, for instance, to something that can come to be in a mind of a person, for instance, while the person reads texts that has some particular content.. With Ricoeur, whose thought we also shall discuss here extensively, there is still the notion of sense (*sens*), which comes close to meaning.

<sup>54</sup> Greimas (1966, 8) writes about "[...] *la perception comme le lieu non linguistique où se situe l'appréhension de la signification*". Content in the same fashion could be defined as something 'conceivable', or just as thought, "concept" or "idea", and in this sense mental, as opposed to the expression as a material "acoustic image" (see Saussure 1916/1984, 99 ff., 155 ff.). My notion of *scriptum est* is quite wide in the sense that it would encompass recorded music as well, in addition to textual works, for instance. Then again, conceiving of so-called absolute music or abstract painting, for instance, in semiotic terms as I suggest here could be somewhat problematic. Without going deeper to this most tricky problematic, it is useful to notice it as a source of some reservations that we should make in continuation as well.

and there are pieces of music where—according to the composer, at least—no ‘story’ is present. There would be no semantics in this sense. In spite of this unsolved problem, however, I would on a general level consider content and semioticity—or having a content, in a sense or another—as a characteristic of literature and *scriptum est*, which we should not ignore.<sup>55</sup>

Bernd Frohmann, however, questions the communicational function of a scientific publishing through “the dilemma of the scientific journal article”, which

[...] has been shown to be deficient in conveying the information needed in the performance of advanced scientific work. Moreover, studies also show that the massive systems apparatus, including human intermediaries such as librarians or other information professionals dedicated to the organization of and access to journals, is largely ignored by active research scientists.<sup>56</sup>

The important conclusion could be that we should not think about phenomena of documentation as epistemic, semiotic, or communicational only. Their significance could be also in various social practices outside the properly semiotic or communicational spheres, in realities such as legislation and institutional practices, including what we could call the politics and economics of prestige among scientists.

I would claim, however, that we can consider scientific journals and articles in them *primarily*—though not necessarily most importantly—*as semiotic and communicational*. As regards writing a book, quite a concrete matter is that writing as such is a communicational act, while the primary purpose of a car, for instance, is to move. The facts that a Jaguar in front of a house can be a strong message or that a book a part of the merits of a scholar—or merchandise produced for the market—are not enough to nullify the significance of such primary and intended functionalities. Even considering this, however, we can and should consider the other functionalities as well. They even may have some impact on the

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<sup>55</sup> We shall later see that the content of an expression neither within structuralist concepts would be equivalent to the semantics in terms of a reference to the reality ‘talked about’. This is a rather intelligible position while considering the languages and texts. Then again, if we respected a composer’s claim of absolute nature of his or her composition, it would become very difficult to consider, what would be, in Hjelmslevian sense (see Section 5.2), the content form connected to the acoustic, hearable expression.

<sup>56</sup> See Frohmann 2004, 90–91. In this respect, Hjørland, after scrutinizing the notions of information and documentation, concludes that the object of study within the field should move “from mental phenomena of ideas, facts and opinion, to social phenomena of communication, document and memory institutions” (See Hjørland 2000, 39).

communicational or semiotic functionalities of a book. This, however, would not be the only reason for considering them.

I should comment still on another argument with Frohmann. With a reference to the Wittgensteinian “language games”, he finds something “occult” in the classical semiological conception of “acoustic images” and of ideas that could be images “built up in our mind”.<sup>57</sup> In my view, however, things start to become occultic exactly, once we depart totally from our most fundamental experiences. The difference between the ‘red’ in an object that that I see and the ‘red’ that I think about—or, in more general terms, the difference between something that is to me through my senses and something that is to me in my mind, so to speak—belongs to the fundamental experiences total and annihilating it could make things occult.

My comment on Frohmann’s argument above leads to still another fundamental methodological point of departure in my argumentation in this treatise. Conceptual approaches clearly can have significance, particularly in instances where they help us to go beyond what we can conceive of in terms of our immediate everyday experience and reflection. Everyday immediacy can be most superficial. Then again, going beyond them as well could be most problematic if it nullified entirely our immediate experience.

## **2.2 For knowledge simply or around and on behalf of true, good, beautiful, etc., yet ultimately about *scriptum est*.**

Within LID-studies as well as within the professional field of librarianship, it is quite typical that the notion of knowledge appears as the major determinant while defining what the library is actually and by its nature. On the level of the fundamental determinations, however, I would consider better to approach the library in terms of the notions of the document, documentation, literature and *scriptum est*, as I have already done above.

Related to the notion of knowledge, furthermore, we could have aspects of philosophy, psychology, sociology, linguistics, etc., either as alternatives or combined with each other. My suggestion of the practice of L&Lship about and on behalf of *scriptum est*, in turn, would find its scholarly foundation mostly within

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<sup>57</sup> Frohmann 2004, 13–14. We can find with David C. Blair (1990, 132–136), for instance, a somewhat similar argumentation within a more specific and technical context of IR and content representation within LID-studies.

the humanities since *scriptum est* obviously is a part of what the history and human culture have produced.

In my view, there is something megalomaniac in thinking that the library could have some responsibility of all that relates to knowledge. Similarly, megalomaniac would be if our ambition were to master all the possible forms of messages, documents, etc. In addition to the danger of megalomania, another major problem with the notion of knowledge here is that it is too restricting for denoting what there is in the library. In my view, it actually would be plausible and healthy to restrict even the very notion of knowledge so that there must be a proposition with a referent. Knowledge then would always contain some claim about something. In this sense, of course, it would be a rather restricted mode of intelligence—or, of the life of the spirit, so to speak<sup>58</sup>. I would consider this kind of ‘deglorification’ of the notion of knowledge particularly healthy because of the position that the notion has received and because of the somewhat reckless use of it within parts of LID-studies as well as within the professional field of L&Lship<sup>59</sup>. In any case, we cannot characterize as knowledge in this sense everything that there is in a library without recklessly stretching the very notion of knowledge.

To illustrate this further, I would appeal to a quite classical triad of Good, True, and Beautiful, which also is the triad of the highest ideas within the Greek Antiquity. What I especially wish to stress here is that we primarily should regard none within this triad as superior to the others; neither should we reduce any of

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<sup>58</sup> We still should notice that what I suggest here as regards the notion of knowledge here would by no means imply that there would not be even a variety of cultural and subjective moments in knowledge. The propositions, already, are certainly dependent on the language and meanings in terms of which we can formulate them. Furthermore, there quite clearly are various interests and perspectives that determine our knowledge in quite a fundamental sense. Knowledge can well and probably is inevitably interwoven with the rest of intelligence in many, both logical and factual ways. This factuality, furthermore, could be psychological, social, or cultural by nature. What I try to get somehow in a reasonable shape here is the notion of knowledge itself.

<sup>59</sup> Within the Finnish scholarly and professional field of LID, the habit of translating information frequently as *tieto*, which literally means knowledge, makes the need of some deglorification even more urgent.

them to any other<sup>60</sup>. Some poem of a piece of music, for instance, could as such be beauty and perhaps even about beauty, rather than knowledge. Someone hearing the 5<sup>th</sup> symphony of Beethoven, for instance, can learn to know something about this symphony, but this would not be the primary rationality of such music. If we were to put it very shortly, knowledge by no means is all of the life of the human spirit. For these reasons, among some others, I would say that the practice of L&Lship is about *scriptum est*, rather than for knowledge. *Scriptum est* might then be about, around, and for truth or knowledge, beauty or beautiful, or about, around or for good or morality as well.

Still returning to the classical triad of True, Good, and Beautiful, I could see even it as restricting. Rather, we perhaps should keep the list open, so to speak, since otherwise, we would once again restrict our conception of what the library intelligibly and even beneficially could contain within the limits of the particular views and ideals of culture and of humans' being in within the culture. We perhaps should be ready to continue the list by matters such as holy and pleasant, even fun and exciting, etc.

In addition to the reservations that I made as regards the notion of knowledge as the major determinant of the library, we should keep in mind my wide notion of literature and *scriptum est*. There could be texts, but there could be also sound and pictorial materials, the latter as either still or moving pictures, etc. Here again, I would claim that on the fundamental level, we should consider as equals with each other such forms and modes of (re)presentation.

We thus would have a specter of valuable matters within our cultural, social, and political being with a specter of fundamental forms of presentations as well as possible combinations

- of true, good, beautiful, holy, pleasant, fun, etc.
- with textual, auditive, pictorial (either still or moving), etc.

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<sup>60</sup> For instance with Plato, however, the triad had an order as well, the idea of Good being the one that is present in two others and in a sense culminates the sequence. In Republic, he lets Socrates say to Glaucon as follows. "At all events, this is the way the phenomena look to me: in the knowable the last thing to be seen, and that with considerable effort, is the idea of the good; but once seen, it must be concluded that this is in fact the cause of all that is right and fair in everything—in the visible it gave birth to light and its sovereign; in the intelligible, itself sovereign, it provided truth and intelligence—and that the man who is going to act prudently in private or in public must see it." (Plato 427–347 B.C/1991, 196 [517b-c])

We further could say—perhaps depending on the views of life that each of us might have—that each of what we have listed above could have some particular value and significance—without situating any of them above the others on the fundamental level. We could think that both beautiful and good have a value in the formation of a personality. Encountering and focusing on beauty and art could contribute to the development of feelings, for instance, and we could further assume that the development of a personality in its entirety requires the development of feelings as well. We also could claim that the text has a special affinity with rationality, while non-textual, e.g. auditory and visual, could relate to the feelings and perhaps particularly to the beautiful.

We even could continue and say that the ‘art of words’ or *belles lettres*—novels and poems, for instance—would combine the option of maintaining rationality through the texts and sophistication of feelings by beauty, and thus have a special combined value. On the other hand, we could say that combined with text, both truth or knowledge, on one hand, and good or morality, on the other, would have a special value in constitution and maintenance of general rationality, in the sense of awareness of the realities of life as well as of the just and otherwise proper relationships between humans. Such general rationality would matter widely in our cultural and social life. In an all-encompassing manner aestheticizing attitude and disposition could lead to even horrible consequences: even war could appear as beautiful for someone, as a part of the Great Drama of the History, for instance. If one then had aesthetic as the only or privileged criterion, one even could wish to make war merely for the beauty of the Drama, which pictorial presentations perhaps could bring out best and most expressively. Yet, the rationality of morals and knowledge—typically requiring written or otherwise linguistic and textual presentation—could be a vaccination against such follies.<sup>61</sup>

*Scriptum est* thus could be about, around, or for many different things that certainly may have some value. Within the conception of L&Lship that I am suggesting here, furthermore, any manifestation of *scriptum est* would have a value already because it is a part of our historical, cultural, and social reality. The fundamental though still a somewhat abstract foundation of the bibliographic rationality of L&Lship ‘telling the truth’ about *scriptum est* would be here. Therefrom,

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<sup>61</sup> Recognition of the fundamental sense of holy, in turn, could perhaps protect us against becoming too self-confident and arrogant. Even familiarity with nuances of the fun could teach us some self-irony and modesty. Once again, however, this would not mean necessarily that the ultimate *raison d’être* of fun or the holy would be in such possibly personality refining functions.

however, raises the question that I shall deal with in Chapter 8 particularly. Why should belonging to our historical, cultural, and social reality have such value and why should we mind about such realities?

What I have written in this section is fundamentally my reason for starting from the notion of documentation and then for specifying it into the narrower notions of literature and *scriptum est*. If one claimed to assume the responsibility for everything, one perhaps could not carry actual responsibility about anything. A merit of the notion of *scriptum est* is that it recognizes a somewhat reasonable—even if in itself still quite waste—portion of our cultural and social reality about which the library could actually carry some responsibility. Further, we can say that literature in a wide sense—as the instance where works and documentation combine—and *scriptum est* as its product constitute a significant and particular part of all the messages that there are and even of our cultural, social, and political being. Then again, *scriptum est* certainly is not the only part of communication that has significance. The practice of L&Lship, however, cannot have the responsibility for everything.

### **2.3 The notions of bibliography (bibliography) and fundamental and content-historical bibliography (CHB)**

It would be quite appropriate to say that bibliographic knowledge—and only it—is the type of knowledge that is characteristic of the practice of L&Lship throughout. Bibliography as a name of a field of scholarship and professional practice, however, has had and has various conceptual contents. A rather classical notion of bibliography has emphasized investigation of quite physical characteristics of books, such as the printing marks, but there have been also much more content-related instances.

Analytical bibliography of Fredson Bowers, the classic of this kind of bibliography, is analyzing the print product as a physical object. Bowers, however, stresses that in a wider sense, the bibliography can combine with perspectives of other disciplines, such as textual criticism.<sup>62</sup> With Donald F. McKenzie, the idea of bibliography goes far beyond this. Bibliography with McKenzie would have as its foundation the sociology of text, particularly related to the material production of the book. McKenzie's own example of such bibliography is an account of the

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<sup>62</sup> Bowers 1950.

“oral culture, literacy, and print in early New Zealand”.<sup>63</sup> Even if considerably more substantial than the classical model of Bowers, even McKenzies notion of bibliography seems to me somewhat restricted.

On the other hand, bibliography quite often also appears as a particular practical field of producing bibliographic registers, catalogs, or databases. This is the notion of bibliography that is dominant within the practical and professional field of bibliographic control. A major functionality of a bibliographic database, for instance, would be to help retrieval of pieces of *scriptum est*, and in this sense, it would belong to the subfield of IR within LID.

I am dealing with bibliography here in a sense that we could characterize as *fundamental bibliography* by which I mean bibliography simply as knowledge about *scriptum est*. It would be a form of historical knowledge about one part of our cultural life and environment. Particularly characteristic of bibliographic knowledge, however, is that it would typically be comprehensively about some in a way or another systematically defined fields of *scriptum est* (scholarly literature of some particular discipline, books published in some particular country, etc.) and furthermore, because of its comprehensive nature already, somehow systematic by its form<sup>64</sup>. In my view, such knowledge about *scriptum est* would be present in the bibliography in all of its manifestations, to a degree at least. The systems for IR as well—ultimately and in some respect—have to represent the historical reality of *scriptum est*. A counterpart of or even a corollary to this is that bibliographic work for purposes of IR as well can contribute to the fundamental bibliography.

By the notion of content-historical bibliography (in continuation CHB), I mean the part of bibliography producing knowledge about *scriptum est* with a particular reference to the contents.<sup>65</sup> Further, since *scriptum est*, in any case, is semiotic by its nature, we may well regard content as the core giving sense to the whole practice of literature combining the works and documentation the product of which *scriptum est* is. We have a plenty of good reasons to consider also the

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<sup>63</sup> See D.F. McKenzie 1984/1999, 13 ff. and 77 ff. Philip Gaskell—in his extensive volume A new introduction to bibliography, dedicated “To Don Mckenzie, in friendship and admiration”—contains the history of book production since the 16<sup>th</sup> century, with applications to bibliographic identification and description and within textual bibliography and criticism (Gaskell 1972/1985).

<sup>64</sup> Cataloguing rules would provide us with an example *par excellence* of such systematic form.

<sup>65</sup> Within the established vocabulary of bibliographic control and IR, my CHB would correspond to content representation as opposed to cataloguing. CHB also is the part of bibliography where we most likely may encounter problems that have a hermeneutical dimension as well.



non-semiotic aspects of documentation and *scriptum est*, such as those stressed by McKenzie (see Section 2.3) or even by Frohmann (see Section 2.1). Books are products of an industry, they are merchandises, scientific publications are formal indications of the merits of the scholars, etc. Ignoring the semiotic and particularly the contents within literature and *scriptum est*, however, would be ignoring their fundamental rationality. Content in a sense or another is the *sine qua non* within the fundamental rationality of *scriptum est* and literature. CHB obviously is the part of bibliography to which hermeneutics as well could have relevance.<sup>66</sup>

Within what I denote as fundamental bibliography particularly, however, we could have a wide variety of wider or narrower scopes and what such bibliographic study tells about *scriptum est* can be richer or scantier. We may have, for instance, a specter

- from typical library catalogs compiled according to cataloging rules and containing only the bibliographic description, which some content representation (indexing, classification, etc.) can complement;
- to actual studies of some phenomena of interest in some wider or narrower field of literature and *scriptum est*.

The latter could approach the idea of a ‘history of the industry’ with D. F. McKenzie, for instance<sup>67</sup>, but it could also emphasize systematic and methodical approaches to contents of *scriptum est*. In an earlier work, I have outlined such approach on a methodical and methodological level with a foundation in structuralism<sup>68</sup>. This shall also be the point of departure while I shall illustrate a possible bibliographic approach as an example of explication (starting from Section 5.3). In this respect, most interesting is also Ingwersen’s notion of “cognitive overlap” that fundamentally suggests stacking of different methods, one after another on the top of the pile. Bibliometric data, such as analysis of citations, the results of co-word analysis or automatic classification, or pieces of knowledge purely on the level of cataloguing, such as the year or publication or the publisher’s name, or

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<sup>66</sup> As early instances of this kind of thinking, I would mention the accounts by Daniel Benediktsson (1989) and Bruno Richardot (1996). Richardot, particularly, is focusing on the communicational conditions of bibliography as a new interpretation in an endless chain of interpretations (“*chaîne infinie de retours sur soi de l’interprétation*”, op. cit. 14). My own interest, in turn, is in the rationality of a bibliography as a knowledge about *scriptum est*. What Richardot writes could partly belong to the foundations of such rationality but partly, it would remain in the position of a mere methodological reservation.

<sup>67</sup> See also Hulme 1923.

<sup>68</sup> See Suominen 2004a and 2007b.

classical content representation can complement, fortify, or contest each other. Eventually, there could be a multi-faceted and multi-level picture of the contents of *scriptum est* and relations therein the origin of which classification or indexing, for instance, could have given us.<sup>69</sup> Ingwersen's notion is most insightful also in the sense that it shows how methods and standards for compiling catalogs or databases for IR, for instance, are not so separate from possibilities of actual studies within what I denote as the fundamental bibliography.<sup>70</sup>

## **2.4 The communicative practice of the bibliographically history-oriented professional L&Lship about *scriptum est***

Bibliography as a form of knowledge about *scriptum est* would be present throughout the practice of L&Lship. We may say that a collection as such already 'tells about' and contains in this sense knowledge about *scriptum est* that exists and consequently, the collection itself already would thus be a kind of bibliography. In addition to the building of collections and bibliographic catalogs or databases, we could say that in reference work and in so-called reference interview, for instance, the clients of a library even could be 'talking' about literature or *scriptum est* that they need or wish to find and access. Here bibliography would already have quite concretely the form of communication.

Further, librarianship as 'talking' about *scriptum est* is not only a communicative practice in itself. It also takes place in a thoroughly communicative and semiotic environment of the literature and *scriptum est*. Thus, the practice of L&Lship in general and particularly, the practices of the bibliography would be, in quite an essential sense, 'talking about talking', communication about communication, or semiotics about semiotics. In this sense, L&Lship would be a metasemiotic practice<sup>71</sup>.

While addressing the scholarly foundation of professional practice, we should also consider the roles within this communicative process, especially the role of the library professional. He or she probably would be the one who particularly could and should know about *scriptum est* and literature, in addition to his

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<sup>69</sup> See, for instance, Ingwersen & Järvelin 2005, 206–207.

<sup>70</sup> Another, most interesting option could be comparison of the results that nearly or purely automatic methods—such as bibliometric mappings or automatic classification, for instance—on one hand, and properly disciplinary-historical approaches to some field of literature and *scriptum est*, on the other, could produce.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. Suominen 1997, 89 ff. and 139 ff. See also Section 5.5.3 to 5.3.3 below.

knowledge about the bibliographic systems. My point of departure here is the nearly banal idea that the librarian particularly should know about the books or about *scriptum est*. In spite of possible banality, I see this as quite a sound point of departure and as a realistic view of what the L&Lship concretely and beneficially can be on a practical level and as an expertise. A result of this would be that bibliography in the wide sense in which I use the notion would be the core competence of a librarian, and the scholarly foundation of this competence would be in bibliographic scholarship.

A somewhat stereotypic idea of the expertise of the librarian is that he or she knows about the IR-tools, but not about the proper substance or about the subject matter of *scriptum est*, while his or her client would know about the substance, but not about the bibliographic systems and their techniques.<sup>72</sup> The client, indeed, can be a professor of history, but he or she can also be a teenager looking for literature for a school project. The roles around the substance knowledge even could also be the other way around. Instead of the dichotomy of (i) knowing either the substance or (ii) the IR systems and techniques, furthermore, we perhaps should think about the triad of

- (1) bibliographic systems and techniques a part of which R-tools too would be,
- (2) literature or *scriptum est*, such as the literature of physics or of sociology, and
- (3) the substance, such as physical or sociological knowledge in itself.

Obviously, the borderlines—between (2) and (3) particularly—would not be very tight. To know about literature and *scriptum est* can extend to the substance. Even bibliographic systems and techniques incorporate in their structures some knowledge about literature and *scriptum est*.

In a particular way, then, the bibliography would be between the professional practice and the sphere of the scholarship proper—or, perhaps better, it would extend to the both of them. In my view, there should be a combination of (i) scholarship with a practical dimension and (ii) professional practice with some scholarly characteristics. In the case of the practices of the library, librarianship, and bibliography, this combination could and perhaps should be particularly close, a continuum by its nature and the core of the scholarly side could be nearly identical with the core of the professional competence. This has to do with the notions of continuity and parallelism of bibliography and L&Lship that I shall

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<sup>72</sup> See, for instance, Ingwersen 1986.

formulate in Section 5.5. We thus could see ‘bibliographic talk’ on several levels and in various forms,

- in communication within the library profession as well as between the profession and its environment represented by the clients of the library, for instance<sup>73</sup>;
- in building up and maintaining collections, formal catalogs, databases, etc.;
- and finally, in actual bibliographic studies on some particular phenomena within some particular part of *scriptum est*.

Furthermore, these levels would not be entirely separate from each other. They all could contribute to each other as well as to what we could plausibly consider as an (or the) core competence of librarianship, which the levels in themselves would also require.

## **2.5 Additional remarks on vagueness of the notion of literature: more or less ‘workish’ works and literatures in plural**

There can be variation in the ways that documentation and works combine with each other. It can be that the work and document are quite the same. In the case of an oil on canvas painting, the document itself—the material object in its materiality—would be the actual work, including such quite material features as the thicker and thinner layers of paint in various parts of the painting, the material structure of the paint surface that the implement of painting has left there, etc. With music, then, the case can be much more complicated. Typically, the people who are not music professionals encounter a piece of music only in performance. Yet, already before this, there can be—as the case typically is with classical Western concert music, for instance—a whole complex of documentations and redocumentations in the form of sheet music, possibly separately for the voices or as a full score, first typically hand-written and thereafter, in many instances, printed and published. Possible recordings could come on the top of this all, as well. Especially after printing, there will be a clear distinction between the work and its documentations, as opposed to the case with a painting. The original composition is quite abstract if compared to oil on canvas painting. Then again, per-

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<sup>73</sup> Cf. Suominen 1986 and the notions of communication within the library community (*kirjastoyhteisö*) and within the library-professional community (*kirjastoammatillinen yhteisö*)

formance as well could be another work –the work of those who perform—through a work related to the original composition.

As regards vagueness of my notions of literature and *scriptum est* more particularly, the notion of work itself obviously is a notion with somewhat muddled borderlines. I would not take the legal criteria in copyright legislations as the decisive criterion for the notion of work here, but it could be worthwhile to consider the notion of work there as well and particularly, the demand of originality. There can be varying levels of originality, however. We perhaps could say that some works are ‘more ‘workish’ if compared to some others. We certainly can recognize clear instances of works and non-works. We can say that all the symphonies of Ludwig van Beethoven and *Quatrevingt-treize* by Victor Hugo—and even the present treatise of mine—are undoubtedly works. Furthermore, they certainly are more ‘workish’ than a restaurant invoice, railway ticket, or a price tag, especially as regards the content proper of the latter<sup>74</sup>. The latter as well, however, would count as documents.

Still on the level of more nuanced differences, we even could say that a philosophical monograph from the beginning of Modernity can be more ‘workish’ than the Medieval scholastic Summa-type works, in view of originality. It is characteristic of the latter that there is a relatively permanent table of contents from work to work, and the author of the present Summa typically proceeds from topic to topic, summarizes what earlier authorities have said about it, and then gives his own formulation. As regards the books of early modern philosophers, such as Descartes or Spinoza, it is characteristic that each of them has a most original line of argumentation, which one can see also in their tables of contents.<sup>75</sup> We could continue the comparison of more or less ‘workish’ instances of *scriptum est* by a claim that textbooks tend to be less ‘workish’ than the original contributions that the textbooks review. Textbooks—even if they can be the results of an amount of creative work—should also give a kind of standard representation of the ‘state of art’ within some particular field in some particular time. A scientific journal article reporting an empirical study would have a more standardized structure than a philosophical essay or an article of, say, literary studies. For this reason, perhaps,

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<sup>74</sup> Even an invoice or a price tag could be the product of designers work and in this sense a work, but we hardly could count as works the particular sums or prices that someone has marked there.

<sup>75</sup> Summa-type works and especially the classics of early modern philosophy are, of course, only a tiny part of *scriptum est* of their times, but they do have in some respect similar cultural positions. The works of St. Thomas was the literary foundation of Thomism, like the works of Descartes was the literary base of Cartesianism, and these both ‘-isms’ were noteworthy scholarly currents in their times.

such an article could be a little less ‘workish’ than the essay within literary criticism. A novel or poem could be more ‘workish’ than a table of logarithms or chemical elements for the high school students. Then again, all of those less ‘workish’ instances that I have mentioned here would certainly count as works in view of L&Lship.

Another aspect of a work is that we probably should be able to connect there some kind of authorship. There can be a single person as the only or undeniably most important author, or the authorship can be quite complicated. There can be a corporate body as an author, to use the vocabulary of cataloging, and in some cases, authorship can be most complicated like in a drama movie with the director, producers, cinematographers, actors of major and minor roles, and a plenty of staff in many other categories<sup>76</sup>. The case can still be that we cannot know the author, and in some instances, we actually cannot even know if there is any author at all. Yet, a work can be the work of an anonymous author as well, and we further may have instances with quite diffuse and even ‘disappearing’ authorship, such as folklore. We still could think that there is a work.<sup>77</sup>

I could refer here to the notion of work as well in view of the notion of “long contribution” (*pitkä puheenvuoro*) that I have used earlier<sup>78</sup>. By this notion, I have meant a presentation that contains *a question and an answer*, rather than being directly and only an answer to some actual or an assumed questions that come from ‘outside’, so to speak. In this sense, a long contribution would be a whole on its own. Most clear instances of such contributions are research reports or other forms of scholarly texts with an explicitly posed research question, task, or determination of the thematic that the text ‘promises’ to deal with. In some other kind of works, the question could be much more indefinite. In cases of artistic works, it perhaps could relate to stylistic or genre-related choices. It perhaps could be a theme, which the work introduces, thus ‘promising’ to make something out of it in some particular style or genre. In any case, we perhaps could say that

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<sup>76</sup> We actually could see similar complexity within the authorship of a single scientific journal article as well (see, for instance, Cronin 2008).

<sup>77</sup> Within complex authorship, the significances of various authors can also be confusing. In everyday talk, there are films by Pier Paolo Pasolini and films by Humphrey Bogart.

<sup>78</sup> See Suominen 2001, 116–117.

the more there is originality in the question, the stronger the ‘workishness’ of a particular piece of *scriptum est* would be<sup>79</sup>

A consequence of the vagueness of work would be that the notions of literature and *scriptum est* as well, with the work as an element defining them, would not be extensionally very sharp. Consequently, as I already remarked, we perhaps should see the notions of work, literature, and *scriptum est* constituting a paradigm or landmark, rather than an extensionally sharp definition of what the library contains. Yet, this would not mean that literature would be less noteworthy as a part of our historical, cultural, and social reality. Furthermore, such vagueness of the notion of work could be even beneficial, since one could in particular and perhaps somehow specific instances of L&Lship position the boundaries of work and *scriptum est* in a manner that is appropriate in view of the specificity of this particular instance of L&Lship. We could have, for instance, a library of social media postings, even if on a general level of L&Lship such postings perhaps would not qualify as works. On quite a general level and in view of L&Lship, in any case, we perhaps could think that paying attention to even instances that

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<sup>79</sup> This idea has some affinity with the notion as well as problems related to the notion of aboutness that I shall deal with shortly in Sections 5.2 and 5.3. It also relates to the idea of a history of questions with Robert G. Collingwood (see, for instance, Section 3.3.2[b] and 4.2.3[a]). The notion of long contribution, in any case, could serve in taking a distance from userist thinking and from categorizing whatever there might be in a library, for instance, as sources of information. Applied to the rationality of L&Lship, it could open us an option to see how the library as well could be for the authors as well, instead of being for the users only. Even in view of the user, reader, etc., it would be a most educating exercise to listen to the questions of the others as well, instead of only looking for answers to one’s own questions.

would not deserve very much attention could be better than ignoring something that one should not ignore.<sup>80</sup>

## 2.6 Analytics of userism in view of some paradigmatic notions and subfields within LID-studies

Starting from Ingwersen's suggestion that a library is a place where "information processes" can be going on (see Section 1.2.1), we should further ask, what such processes could be more particularly. On quite a rough and general level, we could consider processes such as information seeking (IS), information retrieval (IR), and information or knowledge management (IM/KM) as "information processes". This list, even if quite rough, is useful as a point of departure here, since IS, IR, and IM/KM are major subfields of the disciplinary current called information studies of information science, nowadays the most substantial part of LID-studies, which Ingwersen himself as well is representing. Consequently, processes of IS, IR, and IM/KM, could plausibly qualify as "information processes" as well or, at least, as categories and contexts of such processes.

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<sup>80</sup> Further, some words are in place as regards the sense that there certainly is in trying to amplify the sphere of the content of the library towards materials of less formal nature, yet related to works and consequently to *scriptum est* proper. Publication has been the traditional sphere of the library. Yet, there can be pre-publishing materials, such as manuscripts from even several pre-publishing moments. There can also be materials that are quite substantial as regards the publication proper. In scientific publication, actually, the electronic forms have made it possible to include in the publication—to link to the article proper, for instance—the original data of the study, which was not so plausible in the time of printed publications. A part of publication or not, such materials obviously would be most valuable. In my view, it is quite reasonable to keep the scope of the library open in this direction as well. Here again, however, a reasonable landmark could be that the library takes responsibility of such less formal materials especially or only as far as such materials have a connection to literature and *scriptum est* proper. Attempts to take responsibility of whatever spheres of messages and materials of semiotic nature that there are would be megalomaniac. Even more megalomaniac is to go beyond the sphere of semiotic—or, I would say, in some appropriate vein specified semiotic. Within the professional field, a document aimed by the International Federation of Library Associations (IFLA 2013[?]) at rising strategic discussion about the library, pays astonishingly much attention to phenomena like 3D printing, where information technology and computer—not literature neither even knowledge—seems to become the landmark defining the practice of L&Lship. Measuring the amounts in bytes and celebrating the limit of zettabyte exceeded further fortify the impression.



### **2.6.1 Userisms of legitimation and of professional and scholarly focus within major subfields of mainstream LID-studies**

The notion of IS is referring to humans' activities for obtaining information, where 'information' can come close to knowledge or it can also mean documentation, which someone can use to learn to know something, for instance<sup>81</sup>. The focus then, in any case, would be in what people actually do and how they act in such instances. The notion of IR, in turn, has to do with particular systems, arrangements, or tools that should help the people to find what they are looking for. In this sense, IR is a more complicated concept than IS. Besides the behavioral moment of the people looking for information that they wish to have, IR contains aspects of the systems or tools to help the people, including the aspects of engineering such systems. IM/KM is an even more complicated concept. It refers to a variety of phenomena related to and activities with the objective of making and advancing information or knowledge into and as an actual resource that contributes to the successful functioning of various organizations typically. We can well open the problematic IM/KM by the notion of "value added spectrum" from "data" and "information", via "informing knowledge" to "productive knowledge" and "action"<sup>82</sup> Such chain is actually a list of phases through which knowledge can evolve and become into an actual resource.

Starting from the concepts of IS, IR, and IM/KM and applying them to L&Lship, in accordance with Ingwersen's claim that the library is a place where "information processes" may happen, we could form the following 'theories of L&Lship', or general statements of what a library is fundamentally.

- (1) From the perspective of IS, we could see the library *as a channel for IS*, a channel that one can use, among other such channels, to find and have access to something that one needs or wishes to find and use in a way or another.<sup>83</sup>
- (2) From the perspective of IR, we could see the library *as a system for IR*, a system the basic functions of which would be collecting and organizing recordings of knowledge and other cultural content, information, or even data

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<sup>81</sup> See, for instance, Michael Buckland's (1991, 3–6) differentiation of the possible conceptual contents of the notion of information.

<sup>82</sup> Taylor 1986, 5–9.

<sup>83</sup> As quite a straightforward introduction to this direction could be Järvelin's and Vakkari's claim of IS as "the most important of the phenomena instigating library and information service activities" (see Section 1.2.1).

in such a way that one could later find materials that one needs or wishes to find.<sup>84</sup>

- (3) From the perspective of IM/KM, we could see the library *as an instance of IM/KM*, and the question is then how to make into and enhance as a real resource the knowledge, information, or data, or however we wished to conceptualize what the library contains.<sup>85</sup>

The options (1) and (2) would typically manifest what I shall call the *service-userist* rationality. The conception of the library as a channel for IS or as a system for IR come actually quite close to each other, as the very distinction between IS and IR is a line drawn in water, so to speak. There is the agent who wants to find something, and the legitimacy of the library and foundations of developing it are in its function to serve—as either a system of IR or a channel for IS—those agents, typically denoted as the users. Ultimately, the interest that can legitimize the library here are interests of the users. Rather categorically and by its nature, then, the library would be a service satisfying the needs of the users that we could see as clients or even customers. Service-userism totally ignores the option of conceiving of the library as being for the authors, let alone the state (cf. my first formulation of the notion of userism in Section 1.2.1). Rather clear individualism as well is characteristic especially of these points of departure: individuals or perhaps groups of individuals particularly could have the needs and wishes to which the library should respond. This comes quite close to the liberalist view of the society. In this sense, however, the idea of the library as an instance of IM/KM is different.

Activities of IM/KM within an organization quite typically should serve the whole, the performance of the organization. They should serve the individual employees, for instance, only as far as serving them serves the whole. Obviously, this option of conceiving of the library is no more as individualist as the case was

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<sup>84</sup> Buckland (1991, 33–35) while using information system as the dominant notion, becomes with his understanding of the library rather close to this, though information system as such with Buckland is not only a retrieval system (see op. cit. 30).

<sup>85</sup> Here the idea of the potential significance of IM/KM as regards the library is somewhat more fundamental than Ingwersen's idea that in the library "information management is named library management". Yet, we could quite well think the public library in some country, for instance, as a nation and population wide IM/KM project that is aiming at making information and knowledge a real resource for the nation. I shall later use discussions of library in view of the notion of social capital as an example of this. We could conceive of as a manifestation of the idea of the library as an instance of IM/km considerations of public library, for instance, in view of social capital. Social capita on a societal level would be a resource advancement of which would be the rationality of a public library.

with the service-userist conceptions based on IS and IR. Even here, however, we can say that the organization itself can be as if an individual beneficiary. It can be an entity functioning very much like an individual in terms of the liberalist view of what actually can be rational. Both an organization and an individual would be aiming ultimately at their own success or otherwise advancing pursuits determined by them.

In a sense, service userism would be the simplest and most obvious form of userism, even a paradigm of it, but it would not be the most fundamental one. In legitimizing the library as an instance of IM/KM, we already cross the limits of the service-userism in some respects. Yet, we can apply the notion of userism to the conception of the library as an instance of IM/KM as well, and I would denote this other kind of userism as *resource userism*. A moment of instrumentality is present and even dominant in all of the foundations (1) to (3) of conceiving of L&Lship. The library and *what it contains* appear primarily and perhaps even only as something that we can use and from which either an individual or an organization can benefit. They would be fundamentally and as if self-evidently resources. The conception of the library and of what it contains as a resource is also a part of service userism. Thus, we can say that resource userism is, in a sense, a more fundamental form of userism, while service userism would be a special case only, after all, even if probably the special case that we can recognize easier than the fundamental form of resource-userism.

While service-userism has both obvious and substantial affinity with liberalist political theory and philosophy (see Section 1.2.1), we could say—in quite a rough sense, though—that the rationality of IM/KM in some respect might approach some motives within liberalism-critical political theories and philosophies. Within the very idea of IM/KM, in any case, there is present understanding of the whole, in addition to the interests and wishes of the individuals. Then again, if we broadened the logic of IM/KM to the society as a whole, there certainly would be a risk of viewing the society in quite a technocratic perspective. Thus, we already here can anticipate themes of political theory and philosophy further discussion of which we shall start in Chapter 6.

### **2.6.2 Userisms of say vs. beneficiary and of legitimation vs. the scholarly and professional focus**

We can make still another distinction as regards the notion of userism. All the notions of userism and remarks on them above—with the ‘fors’—refer to the legitimation of the library, to its *raison d’être*. All the notions of userism so far discussed, then, would manifest *userism as regards legitimation* or, shortly, *legitimation userism*.

The notion of userism could refer, however, also to the kind of knowledge that would form the core or a substantial part at least of the scholarly basis of the practice of L&Lship. The question would be about what the librarian especially should know. If the answer were that he or she primarily should have knowledge about the users and uses that the library should serve, we would again have another kind of userism. I would denote this form of userism by the notion of *userism of scholarly and professional focus* or, in a shorter form, *focus userism*.<sup>86</sup>

I illustrated userism as a view according to which the legitimation of the library could intelligibly be only in being *for the users*. Before going ahead, some words are in place as regards what the ‘for’ can mean. It is somewhat schematic and simplifying to speak in terms of ‘fors’ as I have done so far. The library, however, can be simultaneously serving several causes, for instance, and it can serve several interests that are more or less parallel. Further, the library can be ‘for’ someone or something

- (1) in the sense that the library is there for someone’s benefit, where the beneficiary would not necessarily have any say as regards his, her, or its own good.
- (2) in the sense that the library is to promote the pursuits as well as the will or wishes of someone or something: he, she, or it would have the say as well, so to speak.

If we make this distinction, we can analyze further the notion of userism into *userism of the say* (2) and *userism of benefit* (1). We can have userism of the say

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<sup>86</sup> As regards the suggestion of the “science of information seeking” by Järvelin and Vakkari (see Section 1.2.1), however, we should notice that as such it is by no means focus-userist. The authors explicitly, carefully, and seemingly quite deliberately enumerate as phenomena in which the “science of information seeking” should be interested phases from messages and documents and their production to their intermediation and use. In this respect, their suggestion has features of holism that I shall later indicate with other LID-scholars as well. (see Section 2.5[c]).

and userism of benefit combined, or we may have userism of benefit without the userism of the say, and perhaps even other combinations.

If we assume the library to be for the benefit of those using it as a channel for information seeking and if they, furthermore, have the say as regards what is beneficial for them, the fundamental rationality and legitimation of the library shapes indeed in terms of market ideology with services and clients of those services. *Service-userism as regards the benefit, say, and legitimation of the library* would be an exact formulation of what I mean by and shall denote shortly as service userism. Then again, the case can be that someone or something is to benefit from the library, whereas someone else than the one to benefit would have the say. The case could be that the founder and maintainer of the library—the state or some other public authority, for instance—has the fundamental say, while the receiver-users of the library would be the assumed beneficiaries. The former would determine the good of the later. Instead of the logic of the market, we could see some educational rationality.

Further, the authors could have an additional say in the sense that the founder and maintainer of the library appreciating these authors would wish to give them a say through the library. The maintainer of the library could assume that *scriptum est* produced by those authors is good for the actual receiver-users of the library, for the society and the state, or perhaps particularly for the maintainers themselves even if we wished to consider a somewhat ugly option as well.

We should notice that all these combinations might be real and sincere or only manipulative or ideological. We thus could ask whether the real beneficiaries would be the ones who are using the libraries to have access to what the library contains or rather the founders, owners, and maintainers of the library. The maintainers of the library could use it ruthlessly as a propagandist organ, with the only intention of spreading among the public views that are useful for the maintainers themselves. Without any logical obstacle, we could consider as a formal possibility at least even such an ugly state of affairs, of course. On the formal level of asking who has the say, however, we could have some difficulties in separating from each other the legitimate and beneficially educational pursuits, on one hand, and ruthless propaganda, on the other.

Returning to the notions of legitimation and focus userism, I would finally remark that there would be no absolute separation between the two aspects of userism. If our way of legitimizing the library were userist, it would be plausible—but *not necessary*—that the knowledge about the users would be the center

of gravity of our scholarly and professional knowledge as well. Criticizing userism of focus, on the other hand, could remain within userist logic as regards legitimation. One may pay attention to realities other than the user, such as *scriptum est*, merely because bettering the service for the user may demand that we know what is available. The library could be, perhaps, about *scriptum est*, among other things, though not on behalf of it. Probably we could see this even *vice versa*. While criticizing userism as regards legitimation—and particularly as regards the say of the user—we still could focus on the users<sup>87</sup>.

## 2.7 Scholarly focus within LID-studies wandering around, yet retaining the userist legitimation


A most substantial result of our analysis of userisms so far is the distinction of legitimation userism and focus-userism. As regards my further argumentation, I should here emphasize that what I am aiming at in this treatise would be *a particular combination of challenges to these two aspects of userism*.

If we assumed that *scriptum est*—or how ever we denote what the library contains—might have a legitimate say, furthermore, criticizing the userism of focus and userism as regards legitimation could also combine with each other in a particular manner. The library could be intelligibly for the authors as well or on behalf of *scriptum est*, indeed, and this as well would be a good reason to focus on and to pay attention to *scriptum est*. There would be a foundation of intelligibility for the library about *and* on behalf of *scriptum est*. This kind of combining the aspects of userism-critical thought is the foundation of my own argumentation in continuation and the general line of my argumentation in this treatise.

A rough historical reconstruction of some developments within the disciplinary history of LID-studies can illustrate further the dominance of userist understanding within the mainstream of the field. We can map the history of LID-studies *grosso modo* as a history where the scholarly and professional focus is wandering around through the phases (1) to (4) in Figure 2.

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<sup>87</sup> The case could be like this in views of the library that are educational possibly in a particular and in a somewhat ‘harsh’ and indoctrinating sense, approaching perhaps propaganda even. Such combination could be intelligible if the idea were to effect actually and quite concretely those using the library. Among other things, psychology of the user—or the target, we perhaps should say—could then be quite useful. This, however, is by no means what I am aiming at as a preferable option to see the rationality of L&Lship.



**(5) Literary and "neo-bibliographic" librarianship:**

the focus on the "senders" and messages, once again

**Fig. 2. A concise reconstruction of the longer history of LID-studies with major phases recognized under label-like names<sup>88</sup>**

Before going ahead, I should remark that what follows is by no means an exhaustive or otherwise complete reconstruction of the disciplinary history of LID-studies. I rather shall follow some currents of thought that have relevance as regards my own thematic in this treatise. Neither can the result of my outline of the disciplinary history here be a conclusive 'proof' of the dominance of userist thinking within the field. In this respect, however, I assume that there will be some noteworthy indications.

*[a] Proceeding from historia literaria librarianship to library science of the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century*

Phases (1) and (2) in Figure 2 contain the move

- from the view of the main expertise of a librarian as knowledge about the books, *cognitio librorum*, in the first centuries of Modernity
- to emergence of library science proper with a focus moving towards the library itself and its functions, in the 19<sup>th</sup> and earlier 20<sup>th</sup> century

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<sup>88</sup> See Suominen 2001,

Vakkari quite eloquently characterizes the transition from *historia literaria* librarianship to the emerging library science (*Bibliothekswissenschaft* in Germany in the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century) as a move from “a living library” to “a dead library”. Towards and at the course of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, it was not anymore possible for a person—for a professor of *historia literaria*, a librarian, or both in the same person, for instance—to master the ever-increasing amounts of books. Vakkari also remarks that *historia literaria*—originally the scholarly field producing knowledge about the essential contents of important books in various fields—tended to flatten into mere lists of books. Thus, the questions of principles of compiling such lists as a scholarly question of librarianship took over the question of actually knowing about the books. The bibliographic list, the “dead library”, replaced the “living library”, i.e. the person with considerable learning in *historia literaria* proper. In the early *Bibliothekswissenschaft*, then, the major focus was in the questions of cataloging, which also was the interest of Karl Dziatzko, the first professor of *Bibliothekswissenschaft* in Georg-August-Universität Göttingen<sup>89</sup>.

This already anticipates the library science in the form in which it became to be in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, very much as a discipline about the activities of the library, first about cataloging and classification, but then also about management, collections, various other services to clients, etc. This led to phase (2) in my configuration of the history of LID-studies<sup>90</sup>. In my view, phase (2) of the history of LID-studies as well is noteworthy: it encourages reflection on what L&Lship actually is by its nature and in essence, so to speak. Among this kind of contributions, probably the most famous are the “Five Laws of Library Science” formulated by Shiyali Ramamrita Ranganathan<sup>91</sup>. I see as more interesting, however, the contributions by Shera. With Shera, the conception of L&Lship is firmly rooted in cultural and social reality.<sup>92</sup> We shall return to some of his ideas later.

We could see what I am suggesting in this treatise as a form of what we could denote as neo-bibliographic L&Lship. In this sense, what I am here suggesting approaches Phase (1) of Figure 2. At this point—still using Vakkari’s metaphorical expression—I would assume that the “living” and “dead” libraries could combine somehow with each other. The classical methodologies of librarianship, such as cataloging and classification, actually could lead towards and even reach some-

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<sup>89</sup>Vakkari 1991 and, as a wider account, Vakkari 1992.

<sup>90</sup> See, for instance, Miksa 1992, 230–232.

<sup>91</sup> See Ranganathan 1957.

<sup>92</sup> See Shera 1970 and 1976.



thing of genuine *historia literaria*. Thus, we should not consider the “dead library”—i.e. the lists and registers—as absolutely dead. There is life in them as well, the living knowledge about literature and *scriptum est*. There is knowledge that the living librarian has produced and feed there. On the other hand, the living librarian as well perhaps should accept his or her dependence on some not quite alive notes as parts of his or her *cognitio librorum*. In the light of all this, we could think about renewing the idea of a librarian that would know the books in some sense similarly to the *historia literaria* librarianship of the earlier centuries did. Yet, such renewing certainly calls for some further discussion.

My aim is not to deny the significance of the increasing amounts of literature. ‘Information revolutions’ or ‘explosions’ have succeeded one another. There was the invention of printing that increased the amounts of books amazingly during the centuries that followed<sup>93</sup>. The invention of making paper of wood pulp made its own contribution in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, as the paper became considerably cheaper than earlier and the amounts of books in society still increased massively<sup>94</sup>. Since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, audio recordings, and cinema or the moving picture, gave birth to forms of *scriptum est* that were, in a fundamental sense, unforeseen. Already in the early stages of the evolvment of the modern state, the administrative bureaucracy made its own contribution to the amounts of documentation in general, though not necessarily so much to literature and *scriptum est* in particular. Then, in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the revolution of journal publishing in sciences and the general growth of especially scientific activity in the industrialized world and finally the electronic forms of publishing and the Internet caused further ‘revolutions’ or ‘explosions’ that leave in a shadow all the earlier ones. Even after this, however, the librarians could have possibilities to achieve some *cognitio librorum*, familiarity at least with some particular literatures and fields of *scriptum est* or even with *scriptum est* widely, if the form of knowledge and familiarity is appropriately schematic and based on systematic methodologies. This, in turn, could be one of

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<sup>93</sup> One only has to look at pictures representing late medieval libraries interiors and compare them to those from the 17<sup>th</sup> to the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Estimation of the amount of different printed books in the 16<sup>th</sup> century in Europe is more than 100 000. Growth in the sizes of the libraries can tell something. Harris tells that the first printed catalogue from 1622 of the Royal Library of France (*Bibliothèque du Roi*), the predecessor of *Bibliothèque Nationale*, contained some 6000 titles (printing and manuscripts), though we may assume that this catalogue was not comprehensive. In the first half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the amount of books there was some 80 000, but in the course of the 19<sup>th</sup> century the amount of books in *Bibliothèque Nationale* already rose from 1 000 000 to 3 000 000 of 1908.(see Harris 1984, 121–123).

<sup>94</sup> See, for instance, Valentine 2012, 119.

the good reasons to consider the literatures in the plural as well and thus open the option of concentrating on some more restricted parts of *scriptum est*, which could be a little more concretely perceivable. This could be a plausible dimension of the division of labor within the field.

*[b] Focusing particularly on knowledge and the user while proceeding towards “increasingly general perspectives”*

Phase (3) in my schematic reconstruction of the disciplinary history of the field in Figure 2, of course, is the one that relates to userism most directly and closely. One frequently denotes as user-orientation this phase, which one typically claims to date in the last decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Canonized history of the discipline recognizes the article by Brenda Dervin and Michael Nilan, titled *Information Needs and Uses*<sup>95</sup>, as one of the major landmarks of user-orientation. It actually would be an oversimplification, however, to claim that the user comes into the scene only in this phase of the evolvement of LID-studies. Bernard Berelson’s study *The library’s public* is a product of quite classical library science, of phase (2) in my outline of the disciplinary history of LID.<sup>96</sup>

The development towards views dominant in the change of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries, in any case, is quite straightforward, decreasing interest in literature and library and increasing one in “scientific” procedures for satisfying what we nowadays recognize under the notion of “information need”. There is quite a sound line of thought: we plan and run services best if we know those whom we serve and the needs that we should respond to. Yet, it also is quite ‘engineerish’ thinking, so to speak. In the context of a practice like that of L&Lship, with a substantially communicational and cultural character, it also may be somewhat overly ‘engineerish’ and for this reason, also restricted.

A companion of orientation towards the users was focusing particularly on knowledge, rather than on literature or documents as parts of our historical, cultural, and social environment and reality. Paul Otlet already incorporates in his notion of documentation the concept of “monographic principle”, which somewhat ironically means shredding conceptually into pieces the monographs so that

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<sup>95</sup> Dervin & Nilan 1986.

<sup>96</sup> Berelson 1949. Sanna Talja and Jenna Hartel (2007) trace the ‘user-orientation before user-orientation’ back to 1960’s and 1970’s, where the user has been a constituent of conceptualizing systems and sources of information as well as contexts and methodologies by several authors.

one can store and describe for access any piece of knowledge (*élément intellectuel*) that they contain.<sup>97</sup> This is quite in line with and perhaps even anticipates a reduction of the books and other documents into mere sources of what one calls information, without any significant reality of their own outside this function. The objective is knowledge or information. The document is only a tool, and what matters is the objective.<sup>98</sup> In 1960's, the notions of information and informatics replaced the notions of documentation and documentalistics within the *Fédération Internationale de Documentation* (FID) as well. The initiative came from the Soviet partners. Alexandr I. Mikhailov and Ruddzheri S. Giljarevskij reasoned for the change as follows:

We believe that both these terms—‘documentation’ and ‘documentalistics’—are inadequate, for they lay the stress on documents whereas the subject studied [...] is [...] scientific information.”<sup>99</sup>

By information, they mean “certain knowledge, a totality of some data, and known facts”.<sup>100</sup> Thus, they effectively define the practice of informatics as a practice about and for knowledge—or, we perhaps should accentuate, about and for “certain knowledge”. One cannot avoid the impression of rather rude scientism. Shera describes with a wonderful irony what “scientific” meant while the

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<sup>97</sup> Otlet (1934, 385): “Principe de la monographie: chaque élément intellectuel d’un livre est (après avoir été sectionné de l’ensemble du texte) incorporé en un élément matériel correspondant”. Paul Otlet’s “monographic principle” (*principe monographique*) containing a distinction of physical and intellectual with the dominant aim of collecting the latter into an encyclopedia-like reservoir of knowledge (see Otlet 1935, 386). A similar idea of collecting and organizing into concise collections all the genuine knowledge that we can find in the endless redundancy of the literature in the libraries—an encyclopaedist illusion, I would say—appears already with Francis Bacon. Under the Commonwealth of Oliver Cromwell in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, realization of the encyclopedic ideas became then the task of the Office of Public Adresse (see Rayward 1992, 52–55).

<sup>98</sup> Hjørland (2000, 33) describes this attitude quite aptly. “This tradition [of IR since Granfield experiments in the 1950’s] has always concentrated on document/text retrieval, but very often researchers have hoped that it would be possible in one way or another to eliminate the concept of document/text and to store and retrieve just the facts or ‘information’ contained in the documents”.

<sup>99</sup> Mikhailov & Giljarevskij 1971, 16. We perhaps could see the fact that this initiative came from the Soviet partners somehow symptomatic of a tendency within the field of LID to consider in technocratic terms the possible intelligible rationalities even on a wider level of social life. Such technocratic emphasis of rationality of means could support even my assumption of liberalist assumption as a premise behind the views of the library that seem to be dominant within LID—in a most bizarre way, however, since there certainly was not much of liberalism in Soviet Union. Then again, there was a plenty of technocracy and reducing of political practice into administrative technology.

<sup>100</sup> Mikhailov & Giljarevskij 1971, 15.

Otletian idea of documentation—with Otlet’s passionate interest in the potentials of microphotography—landed to America<sup>101</sup>:

Because these American documentalists, most of whom were librarians, based their technology on the science of photography, they tended to regard themselves as scientists, tended to avoid the term librarian, and formed the American Documentation Institute (ADI).<sup>102</sup>

With Boyd Rayward, then again, we find a good example of how developed the idea of the library as an instance of more general functionalities, as “only a partial solution to the constellation of problems related to the conservation, organization, and diffusion of recorded knowledge and information”. Between notions like “librarianship, bibliography, documentation, library science, and information science”, Rayward sees only “subtle occupational distinctions”. We also could consider that they “represent attempts at obtaining these new and increasingly general perspectives”<sup>103</sup>. This serves as an example of the dominant idea during the last decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to generalize the scope and the interests within the field to a wider sphere of library-like phenomena. A now and then argument was that there cannot be a discipline the foundation of which is a single institution or organization. Gernot Wersig’s remark is quite typical in this sense.

There is little proof that specific kinds of organizations provide a sound basis for a scientific or academic discipline. As long as there are no disciplines like ‘hospital science’ or ‘jailhouse science’ in existence, something like ‘library science’ is not very convincing.<sup>104</sup>

After an extensive account of the disciplinary history of the field since earlier centuries of the Modernity, Vakkari remarks that there have been “generalised library-based” views an example of which Rayward’s reasoning as well obviously would be. Then again, there were other views, such as those of Wersig, Ingwersen, or Tom Wilson, which were “relatively radical” as regards their relationship to the library, according to Vakkari.<sup>105</sup> As a comprehensive outcome, Vakkari remarks:

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<sup>101</sup>Interest in new technologies has been a permanent companion of the development of this particular discipline. Long before the digital libraries of today, Paul Otlet, in his *Traité de documentation*, frequently ends treating of particular topics by a look at how microfilm could help dealing with it.

<sup>102</sup> Shera 1983, 380

<sup>103</sup> Rayward 1983, 343

<sup>104</sup> Wersig 1992, 202.

<sup>105</sup> Vakkari 1994, 11.

Information science has been characterised from the outset as being purpose-minded. [...] The purpose to which information science is pledged is to facilitate access to desired information.<sup>106</sup>

Vakkari thus summarizes the long history of the discipline in terms that come quite close to what I call userism. In terms of my differentiation of the views of the library that the major subfields of mainstream LID-studies can open, Vakkari's formulation could be consistent with the views of the library as a channel for IS or a system for IR. The view of the library as an instance of IM/KM would perhaps go beyond them.

I should mention here also quite a striking and symptomatic way of classifying the methods of collection evaluation. It also is an instance that even as a part of scholarly LID is quite close to the professional practice as well and especially the practice of L&Lship, since in the library particularly within the field of LID we do have collections. It is typical within the field is to classify these methods for collection evaluation into user-centered/oriented and collection-centered/oriented. G. Edward Evans, in his classic monograph of collection work, writes that American Library Association's Guide to the evaluation of library collections from 1989 "divides the methods into collection-centered measures and use-centered measures". As an example of collection-centered, one tends to mention so-called list-checking or list method, which means comparing the collection evaluated with a list that assumingly is more comprehensive and better in this sense.<sup>107</sup> Characterizing such method "collection-centered", as opposed to what one calls "user-centered" is not only somewhat strange but also symptomatic. Symptomatic of userism here is that the user and uses, but nothing else, are in the position of a particular reference within the evaluation of collections. This leads to the odd characterization of list-checking or "verification studies" as "collection-centered", instead of literature-centered, for instance. It seems as if it did not even occur in the mind of the classifier of the methods of collection evaluation that existing literature as well could be a meaningful reference.

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<sup>106</sup> Vakkari 1994, 47.

<sup>107</sup> Evans 1995, 405 and 407 ff. Another pair of expression with similar effect is between "user-oriented" and "collection-oriented" (see, for instance, G.E. Gorman & Howes 1989/1991, 148–153). As indications of the wider and persistent role that this way of dividing the collection evaluation methods, see, for instance, Borin & Yi 2008,

At the end of his monograph on the social history of books and libraries, Patrick M. Valentine tells us what would be the library in and probably since the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century:

Today, a possible definition is that the library is an entry or access point to a multidimensional and dynamic universe of informational materials, resources, and potentially mutable sources, which a team of specialists assembles, organizes, and makes available for various and changing purposes in an interactive manner, often but not necessarily with specific users in mind. If libraries were once book places, today they must be openly accessible information treasure troves.<sup>108</sup>

In spite of the combination of the histories of literature (or books) and the library that the overall thematic of Vallentine's book is emphasizing, his view of the future has a strong affinity with the view the library as a system for IR or a channel for IS. Access is a notion that characterizes the service-userist views. I would not deny that the library may and even should provide us with an access. Crucial, however, is the question: *access to what?* This question most obviously challenges userism as regards professional and scholarly focus.

*[c] Bibliographic paradigm and holistic criticism of userism as regards the focus, maintaining the userist legitimation, however?*

Around the shift of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries, some particularly holistic arguments have challenged user-orientation within LID-studies, at least in some respects. This would be the general message of phase (4) of the disciplinary history of LID-studies as I outlined it in Figure 2. Such critical views, however, typically appear in contexts where the ultimate legitimation remains userist—even service-userist. Thus, while challenging the userism of scholarly focus, one may maintain the userism of legitimation.

Birger Hjørland suggests what he calls the “object paradigm” or “bibliographic paradigm”<sup>109</sup>, which in a particular respect should overcome the limitations of user-orientation. According to Hjørland, “Studies of literatures cannot be substituted by, for example, studies of users”<sup>110</sup>. The full meaning of Hjørland's

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<sup>108</sup> Valentine 2012, 169.

<sup>109</sup> Hjørland & Albrechtsen 1995, 410, and Hjørland 2007. The alternatives to “The object paradigm” in with Hjørland and Albrechtsen (1995) are the “communication”, “behavioral”, and “cognitive” paradigms.

<sup>110</sup> Hjørland 2007.

suggestion becomes more visible if we contrast it with the way in which another prominent representative of LID-studies, Carol Collier Kuhlthau, summarizes the developments within the field at about the same time with Hjørland's first remarks that pave the way towards the notion of bibliographic paradigm.

This bibliographic paradigm of collecting and classifying texts and devising search strategies for their retrieval has promoted a view of information use from system's perspective. Information retrieval has concentrated on what matches the system's representation of texts rather than responding to user's problems and process of information gathering.<sup>111</sup>

With Kuhlthau, in some respect at least, "bibliographic paradigm" appears as a general orientation that one should have overcome, even if Kuhlthau as well continues right after the passage quoted: "there is no question that the difficulties of controlling increasing quantities of information must continue to be creatively addressed". In my view, however, we could say that Hjørland and Kuhlthau are advancing in opposite directions, and in 1990's at least, Kuhlthau's direction was closer to the mainstream.

Ingwersen, too, criticizes the user-oriented view in quite explicit words. His claim is that within what he calls the "cognitive approach" or "cognitive viewpoint", one should recognize the cognitive structures all over the process, not only with the user. One also should consider such structures with the authors and their products as well as within the intermediating systems<sup>112</sup>. We could ask, however, whether even the holistic criticism that we can find with Ingwersen and Hjørland, for instance, would remain on the level of criticism of the userism as regards the scholarly focus only. Even in view of the fundamental service-userist legitimation, we perhaps should pay attention to and know about "literatures" or "information objects" as well—or even to and about *scriptum est*—to be able to perform successfully our tasks in service of the user. This, of course, is quite a significant matter as such. In view of the foundation of possibly intelligible conceptions of L&Lship, however, the challenge to userism would remain somewhat restricted.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> Kuhlthau 1993/1994, 1.

<sup>112</sup> Ingwersen 1992, 55–57.

<sup>113</sup> Here particularly, however, I should remark that userism can be quite legitimate as well. If we think about a system for IR, for instance, we think about a system the rationality of which is to serve some uses, and then it is quite appropriate to think about it in userist terms. The problem arises, once we reduce the library into a system for IR especially if we think about the content of the library as its substantial determinant.

Relevance is a notion manifesting in quite a fundamental sense the userist orientation within LID-studies in general and particularly within the scholarly current called information science there. Ultimately, the notion of relevance is very much a notion representing the user's point of view, so to speak. Once again, however, I should remind that userism as such can be quite a legitimate and rational perspective to *scriptum est* as well though it would not be an appropriate foundation for conceiving of L&Lship on a fundamental level. In line with Hjørland's emphasis of bibliography as well as with the holism that we can find with Ingwersen is Tefko Saracevic's most insightful—but also exceptional—reasoning on relevance. With Saracevic, we can find the notions of “subject knowledge view” and “subject literature view” to relevance the latter of which particularly would make this fundamentally userist notion on a fundamental level interesting in view of L&Lship as well. Literature, which in itself, inevitably, is historical by nature, would become a constituent of relevance as well. Relevance would no more be merely a function of the document and the assumed user only. What there already is, including the existing *scriptum est* and documentation, would become a constituent of relevance as well.<sup>114</sup>

Also, the often quite narrow way of conceiving of the notion of practice within LID-studies is particularly symptomatic of the tendencies of reducing all rationality to individuals and their interests and needs, and consequently, to focus on individuals' behavior in terms of which we could find ways to respond to those needs and interests. At least seemingly, much of the discussions on whether one should talk about information behavior or information practices failed to reach much of the actual potentials of the notion of practice—at least at the beginning of such conceptual debates<sup>115</sup>. Reijo Savolainen, while outlining a notion of “in-

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<sup>114</sup> See Saracevic 1976. What one calls “socio-cognitive relevance” around the change of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries would be a further symptom of the holistic trends. Ingwersen and Järvelin (2005, 237) define it as signifying “situational relevance assessments and interpretations made by several cognitive actors simultaneously”. Some history-orientation even would be the result of the obviously cultural and social aspects of this notion.

<sup>115</sup> See, for instance, Wilson Somewhat symptomatic is an argument by Tom Wilson: “In my understanding the common phenomenon is human behavior, which is composed of cognitive, physical and social actions, which constitute activities. ... I would define a practice, on the other hand, as a customary activity ...”. (Behaviour/practice debate 2009.) Practice, then, would appear as special case, as a sub-species of behavior. As far as this would mean a generic relationship, it would be, of course, most problematic. We may well think that practice and behavior as concepts belong to different types or categories. Consequently, there could be no generic relationship between them. Suggesting such relationship, on the other hand, could be a symptom of not recognizing the category of structures in our social life and being as a possible and meaningful category.



formation practice”, stresses the diversity of the views on it, then writing as follows.

Despite this diversity, it seems that most practice theorists understand practices as embodied, materially mediated arrays of human action (or activities), centrally organised around shared understanding.

[...] practices are understood to be an organised composite of actions”.<sup>116</sup>

Pamela McKenzie—“the most prominent proponent of the concept of information practice”, according to Savolainen—suggests a conceptual differentiation of four different “information practices” (“active seeking”, “active scanning”, “non-directing monitoring”, and “by proxy”) with a set of four different modes of “connecting” and “interacting”. These constitute information practices that “may be used as counter-strategies in the face of connection of communication barriers”.<sup>117</sup> Such “counter-strategies” seem very much to be just different modes of reacting or behavior that individuals may choose to react to and in particular situations, without any actual indication of their constitution genuinely into and as practices within the social reality.<sup>118</sup> Phenomena like information seeking or information use seem to be the instances in which one could apply one or the other of the notions, and the very notion of “information practice” as well seems to remain

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<sup>116</sup> Savolainen (2008), 24–25.

<sup>117</sup> P.J. McKenzie 2003, 26.

<sup>118</sup> The following complement that Raimo Niemelä suggests to P.J. McKenzies figure is interesting as it gives us an opportunity to think further, what the notion of practice in modern social science could mean. “I suggest as an addition to McKenzie’s model the information practice of avoiding information” (Niemelä 2006, 161. Transl. by VS from the following: “Esitän McKenziin malliin lisättäväksi informaatiosta pidättäytymisen informaatiokäytännön”; as an indication of further impact of this notion, see also, for instance, Hirvonen & Huotari & Korpela 2012). Avoiding information as well, however, would be a deed or a part of behavior, rather than properly speaking a practice. Yet, we could think about particular practices of avoiding information or related to such avoidance, at least. In Northern Finland, there is the Laestadian religious movement within which watching television has been forbidden, and this could be an example of a part of the social reality that already could constitute a particular practice of avoiding information. There would be norms and argumentation behind them accepted by a particular religious community, which would give the particular instance of avoiding information a character of a practice, indeed. The example of the Laestadian movement is from Niemelä from an informal discussion that we had.

quite close to the level of behavior<sup>119</sup>. Art Huizing's and Mary Cavanagh's critical remark on Savolainen's way of applying the notion of practice could be an even more widely appropriate comment on such theorizing about and around the notion of practice:

Savolainen seems to understand practice as practices, which in his study hardly extend beyond the micro-social level of analysis, the traditional domain of information behaviour research.<sup>120</sup>

We should notice, however, that the notion or idea of practice in the sense of modern social sciences has appeared within LID-studies in forms that are more substantial as well. In other places, with notions like "communities of practice", "practices of organizational recordkeeping", "practices of personal information management" and "documentation practices", P.J. McKenzie as well has used the notion of practice with some actual structuredness. Then again, even in these instances, the notion of practice remains close to personal choices of how to make things.<sup>121</sup>

In Section 1.2.2, I already mentioned Talja's account on this matter as well as how Hjørland's and Albrechtsen's notion of domain analysis genuinely approaches the notion of the practice as it appears within modern social sciences.

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<sup>119</sup> Cf. Savolainen 2008, 37 ff. In *The turn* by Ingwersen and Järvelin (2005), the notion of practice (or information practice) does not appear as a thematic notion, but their idea of integrating IS and IR would give us an option to approach this notion quite illustratively in a context most appropriate to information science. We would have there an option to elaborate the notion of the practices of information seeking, indeed. They do emphasize aspects of wider "socio-cultural environments" as well as aspects of temporality (see summarized in op cit., 307–309). With the concept of practice particularly, however, we could say that one side of integration of IS and IR could be that various developments in systems for IR and very existence of some particular systems and options would obviously be an infrastructure that could be a part of the constitution of particular practices of IS. Shaping of IS behavior of people would obviously be very much a function of the options that exist, and most illustrative examples could be the fact that there are libraries or emergence of the Internet towards the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. We could have here quite concrete, even material, foundation constituting practices structuring the ways in which people act, very much like the existence of railways, for instance, conditions and constitutes the practices of traffic and travelling. In another perspective, this could be one possible starting point for re-establishing the connection between L&Lship and some parts of LID-studies where this connection seems to have vanished nearly entirely. The practice of L&Lship, in any case, is a practice that is creating, on its part, the reality that an information scientist, for instance, is investigating. Furthermore, we should notice that Järvelin's and Vakkari's "science of information seeking" (see Section 1.2.1) already contains an option for this---though on the practical level of Finnish information studies, for instance, it has not become reality. The direction has actually been even quite opposite.

<sup>120</sup> Huizing & Cavanach 2011.

<sup>121</sup> See P.J McKenzie 2004 and 2010.

Within such a domains, the whole—or, we may say, the practice—conditions particular activities, such as reading, using, or otherwise receiving instances of *scriptum est*, documentation in general, information and knowledge, or some other kind of cultural content. Furthermore, the particular practice of the whole may condition production of knowledge, information, documentation, or *scriptum est*. It even could ‘dictate’ or, at least, condition the rationalities of possible functions or intermediation, which could include L&Lship as well.

Our discussion here provides me with an opportunity to anticipate on a general level the view that I shall elaborate in this treatise. My criticism of legitimation userism has its foundation in the assumption that *scriptum est* as well as the authors behind it *may have a say, which we should not ignore and which even the society of the state could legitimately assume us to heed*. For this particular reason, *we also should focus on scriptum est*. This is a different matter than the assumption that knowledge about literature and *scriptum est* could give us a better understanding of such “information processes” as those related to IR.

*[d] What one wants, needs, or should listen to: the genuinely educational right around the corner within the mainstream LIS-studies as well?*

Among the major subfields of LID-studies and information science, in particular, views such as those of Hjørland and Albrechtsen (see Section 1.2.2), like other, similarly individualism-critical views within LID-studies<sup>122</sup>, seem to be particularly suited for considering thematic of IM/KM. There particularly, the interests and rationalities of the wholes or the organizations and the conditions of emergence, development, and functioning of knowledge as a resource are always necessarily present. The resource-userist fundamental rationality, however, could and typically would remain dominant even then, and we could remain on the level of what we could characterize as system-functionally founded instrumental reason. Only looking at wider spheres of cultural, social, and political or politico-ethical rationalities could perhaps help us to overcome such fundamentally instrumentalist assumptions. We shall discuss this particularly in Chapter 8 below.

The legitimation of IM/KM, in any case, rests typically on the interests of some organization or otherwise somewhere else than the direct interests of the actual and immediate information seekers or retrievers, for instance. This actually

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<sup>122</sup> See, for instance, Talja, Tuominen, and Savolainen 2004.

already means that there also is a moment of education present, and the rather classical notion of “organizational learning” within IM/KM already reflects this<sup>123</sup>.

Some remarks by Madsen are finally in place as a further interesting instance, We could see there some genuinely educational rationality, yet possibly conceivable as an instance of the resource-userist rationality of IM/KM, after all. Madsen first critically comments on my notion of userism, yet finding there some sound core as well:

Ironically, Suominen’s argument about “userism” is correct in its characterization of a misplacement of understanding of “library,” but his naming is unfortunate. The problem comes not from focusing on users, per se, but from putting information at the centre of library services. The failure has not come from focusing on the needs of the user to the exclusion of all else, but in trying to meet all of these user needs through the three dominant information-based paradigms: IR, IM, and IS.<sup>124</sup>

She is criticizing the views of the library as “an information-centric, indexing and access machine”, claiming that such view of the library is “failing the institution itself (and thereby failing the humanities.)”<sup>125</sup>. Yet, her suggestion of what the library actually should be could come quite close to the idea of the library as an instance of IM/KM as well. The practices that the user is involved with—such as the scholarly practices, taking into account that Madsen is dealing with L&Lship in an academic environment—would then define his or her actual needs. Consequently, the library should focus on those practices, with an emphasis on what the user actually needs, opposed this time to what he or she wants.

The user must be put back in the centre of the academic research library again, but the users’ needs must be considered within the broader context of the process of scholarship. In focusing on information, academic research libraries have been trying to address what users want, not what they need.<sup>126</sup>

We could see in Madsen’s remark some userism-critical emphasis of education, which would challenge the service-userist legitimation, and here opposing what the user wants and needs is pivotal. If a user needs a particular text, for instance, in spite of the fact that he or she does not ‘want’ it, the text actually would have a

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<sup>123</sup> See, for instance, Choo 1998, 68 ff.

<sup>124</sup> Madsen 2010, 66

<sup>125</sup> Madsen 2010, 66

<sup>126</sup> Madsen 2010, 66

say over the say and wishes of the one assumed to use it. The professor demanding that a student reads the particular text in question would have the say, perhaps, and the student or the user should read the text since the text has something important to say to him or her.

Here again, however, we may ask whether there is a kind of IM/KM-logic in the sense that the interests of an organization, this time of the university or some other educational institution, would dictate what the student needs, as opposed to what he or she only wants. Here, however, the ultimate answer would depend on the educational philosophy within the wider educational environment. If it were such that what the student needs, as opposed to what he or she wants, goes back to the scholarly traditions of the discipline that he or she is studying, then what Madsen suggests could come, in some respect, close to what I am suggesting as the rationality of L&Lship. Focusing on what one needs, instead of what one wants, could be a part of the authority present in the tradition within which our student is living—though his or her professor perhaps had to help him or her a little to realize this authority of the tradition.

Still another example of the conception of the library formally as an instance of IM/KM would be viewing the libraries in the light of the notions like social capital. Niels Ole Pors describes the form in which the thematic of social capital has influenced the “discourse in the public library profession” in the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The discourse is also influenced by factors of a more societal character such as the debate of learning, lifelong education, the multicultural society with associated integration and assimilation problems, serving the broader municipalities, and similar topics. [...] There is also a strong discourse related to the public library as a place, a commons, a third place intended to generate social capital and create cohesiveness in the local society.<sup>127</sup>

Here we can see clearly and as quite explicit the connection to education. Even here, however, I think that there might be some problems related to the restrictions of resource-userist legitimatization while thinking about L&Lship in general. The lines of demarcation here become extremely fine.

Anticipating my further argumentation particularly in terms of the notions of practice, we could ask whether the notion of practice as it appears in modern social sciences was enough or whether we should pay particular attention to the

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<sup>127</sup> Pors 2010, 11; see also, for instance, Johnson & Griffis 2009.

Aristotelian notion practice as well. The latter option would be a foundation of considering politico-ethical rationalities in particular<sup>128</sup>.

What I am suggesting here approaches the neo-bibliographic option (5) in Figure 2. I should remark that my view in this respect is perhaps not as obsolete as it might seem. Hjørland's "bibliographic paradigm" and Ingwersen's criticism of user-orientation already tell about a rising interest in such a perspective. While discussing the various history-related fields of investigation within LID-studies at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Ilkka Mäkinen gives book history a position as an emerging part of this field.<sup>129</sup> Coming out of *An introduction to book history* by David Finkelstein and Alistair McCleery only a year later could exemplify what Mäkinen is claiming<sup>130</sup>. Then again, we perhaps should remind that in the Baltic Countries, for instance, book history, book studies, or book science has had an established position as a part of the scholarship related to L&Lship quite traditionally already<sup>131</sup>. In view of my argumentation in continuation, a further matter of importance is that I would see quite a close relationship between the educational and the book-historically bibliographic rationality of L&Lship.

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<sup>128</sup> Micheal Olsson (in his contribution to the Behaviour/practice debate 2009) declares that he "wholeheartedly" shares the view that "information research is essentially sociological". The problematic to which I refer here, however, could suggest that while aiming at conceiving of L&Lship, we perhaps should avoid sociologism looking only at social phenomena and ignoring genuinely philosophical and ethical questions.

<sup>129</sup> See Mäkinen 2004.

<sup>130</sup> Finkelstein & McCleer 2005.

<sup>131</sup> See, for instance, Möldre 2013.



### 3 Gadamerian hermeneutics and L&Lship on behalf of, though not about, *scriptum est*

My first major argumentation against the seeming self-evidence of the userist foundation of legitimizing L&Lship has as its foundation what the Gadamerian hermeneutics could teach us of the conditions of our being as humans. We can find with Gadamer premises that come close to—or actually are—what we could characterize as existential conditions and necessities. Then again, we find there cultural and educational ideals that could be preferable options, rather than actual necessities, but even such ideals may be significant, particularly since they could be ideals with a foundation in what we could conceive of as existential necessities. In this sense, the foundation of the possible educational moment in the rationality of L&Lship would be most fundamental and noteworthy, convincing and, in a sense, even compelling.

The conceptual cornerstone of my argumentation below will be Gadamer's "rehabilitation of authority and tradition". This phrase—as a phrase already—could create impressions of what we in everyday speech could call 'authoritarianism'. As we shall see below, however, such impressions are false. On the other hand, the condition of our being as humans expressed by this Gadamerian "rehabilitation" shows intelligibility of the educational rationality of L&Lship on behalf of *scriptum est*. Furthermore, it paves the way to a particular educational and cultural ideal of *Bildung*<sup>132</sup>, which we most plausibly could consider as an ideal within which the educational rationality of L&Lship as well could find a foundation.

On the other hand, I should remark already here that the same Gadamerian thought that provides us with a foundation for conceiving of the intelligibility of such educational rationality would also make somewhat problematic the rationality of L&Lship about *scriptum est* and particularly the notion of *scriptum est* as a criterion of truth. Before going to the properly Gadamerian thematic, in any case, I shall start here by some remarks on the long historical connection of L&Lship to education. The notion of educational appears here in quite a wide as well as fun-

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<sup>132</sup> Since there is no accurate enough English expression for the Gadamerian and even more widely German idea(l) of *Bildung*, I shall use the German expression. In the Finnish—because of the fact that German cultural influences have been strong within the area that we nowadays recognize as Finland—the expression *sivistys* has the meaning of the German *Bildung* as well—even if in everyday speech, the content of it can be wider.



damental sense: I would say that wherever there is an authority of a kind or another, there is education as well.

### **3.1 The long historical connection between education and L&Lship with the distinction of substantially and instrumentally educational**

A noteworthy instance of the earlier libraries was that of the libraries of schools, like those of Plato's *Academeia* and Aristotle's *Lyceion*. In the Middle Age, there were two major categories of libraries, those of the monasteries and those of universities. Especially the latter are even in a formal sense educational or teaching-related.

Towards the end of the Middle Age, the third category of libraries, the libraries of aristocrats, including the kings' libraries, started to increase their significance. As such, they perhaps were not so emphatically educational, but the kings' libraries particularly, in the later history of the libraries, typically became the cores of the national libraries the first ones of which have their origin in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. The national libraries have to do with the emergence of the nations and nation-state, and we can consider civic or popular education as a part of nation formation. Most concretely civic or popular education-related libraries in emerging bourgeois societies were the public libraries proper, the first origins of which were in the 18<sup>th</sup> century as well, and the real breakthrough in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries.<sup>133</sup>

To get a little more specified historical ground for considering the educational dimension of L&Lship, we could look at Michael H. Harris', Stan A. Hannah's, and Pamela C. Harris' general-level outline of the development of the views in the USA of the public library. In spite and perhaps even because of their focusing on public libraries, we can see this as a history of viewing the library in the society, particularly in the bourgeois society or *societas civilis*. Based on their wider

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<sup>133</sup> Even earlier, however, we have precursors for them, like the Bibliothèque de Mazarin from the 17<sup>th</sup> century, taken as the first publicly open library (as opposed to the later public libraries proper) in France. As the library of the prime minister of the king, open to the subjects of the king, it can be seen as a kind of state library and consequently as a precursor to the later publicly open libraries, either national or public ones, which were intended to serve the citizens and were maintained by the public authority. We could further mention here the town libraries of Italian and German towns in the Renaissance time. As in many cases especially in Italy the towns were actually states as well, we could consider, in a sense, their libraries as precursors of both the public and national libraries.

presentation, we can reconstruct an outline of this development as a four-step progression.

- (1) The first phase, since Melville Dewey and the latter half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, is a strongly educational view of the library where the library and librarians had the role of educators civilizing the common people by good literature. The authors describe the somewhat authoritarian role of the librarian in such a library and then explain that such authority “could be confidently placed in the hands of the professional librarian because of the library professions well known, and selfless, commitment to the production of reproduction of a civically virtuous citizenry”<sup>134</sup>.
- (2) A liberal view of the library and librarians as essentially neutral intermediators and in this sense, not so emphatically as educators, follows and in quite a substantial sense negates the educational view in its Deweyan form. This new view emerged around the World War II and connected to the Library Bill of Rights, the famous liberal declaration of the American Library Association. The authors write that the librarian “was now mandated to take a neutral and passive position on all issues, and was expected to provide ample information on all sides of the issue in order to enable the user to make an informed decision”<sup>135</sup>.
- (3) Then—starting from the 1970’s—connected to the developments in information technology and so-called information society—there appears a view denoted by the authors as the “paperless library”. Suggested new professional titles for librarians were “knowledge engineer”, “information doctor”, “cybrarian”, etc., and these professionals should help, perhaps even teach, their clients or customers to deal with the amounts of information that the new “post-industrial society” makes available and crucial for successful actions and participation in the society<sup>136</sup>.
- (4) Finally, the liberal Library Bill of Rights librarians, once again, challenged the educational view of the library—this time, the educational pursuit that seems to reappear, though in a new form, within the ideas of “paperless library” with its “knowledge engineers”, “information doctors” etc. A tension emerged this time between the more classical Library Bill of Rights librarian-

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<sup>134</sup> Harris, Hannah, and Harris 1998, 28.

<sup>135</sup> Harris, Hannah, and Harris 1998, 28.

<sup>136</sup> Harris, Hannah, and Harris 1998, 29 ff.

ship and the “information paradigm” with “technological determinism” incorporated in the ideas of the “paperless library”.<sup>137</sup>

The last phase is in a peculiar way interesting, and Harris, Hannah, and Harris further describe it as follows:

At this point the most aggressive defenders of the library as ‘the arsenal of democratic society’ moved forcefully into the fray, insisting that the technocratic vision of the information professional was a direct and dangerous challenge to the role of the library and the librarian as defined by the Library Bill of Rights and other official statements of purpose endorsed by ALA.<sup>138</sup>

We probably could trace more or less similar developments also in many other countries, at least in the Western, economically developed and industrialized societies<sup>139</sup>.

In addition to the general historical connection between the library and education, we should recognize different levels or modes of the educational itself. The recognized and explicitly expressed educational role of the library has in the course of time changed from what we could characterize as substantial—or personality formative, we also could say—to more instrumentally emphasized objectives. It is one thing to educate in the sense of refining the personality, which could characterize the Deweyan education by ‘good literature’. Another thing, then, is to educate in the sense of teaching skills of instrumental nature, which could be the task of an “information doctor” of the “paperless library”. Even if the borderline perhaps is not very clear-cut, these two aspects of education are rather different. Around the change of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries, an actual example of education restricted to instrumental matters has been the notion and idea of various ‘new’ skills and literacies, such as the notion of “information skills” or “information literacy” even, at least in the beginning of discussion around the notion. As a classical example of what information literacy did mean in its early phase,

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<sup>137</sup> Harris, Hannah, and Harris 1998, 40–41

<sup>138</sup> Harris, Hannah, and Harris 1998, 42

<sup>139</sup> In Finland, we can recognize the steps 1 to 3 even if they appear several decades later than Harris, Hannah, and Harris presents them in the history of library thinking in USA. The turn to a liberal intermediary librarianship in Finland should be timed somewhere around the 1960’s and the beginning of 1970’s, and the ideas of librarianship encouraged by so-called information society start to have a stronger impact since 1980’s and especially in 1990’s. The reaction, even a counterattack, of more traditional intermediary librarianship, the phase (iv) has not appeared very strongly in Finland, not at least as such a clearly visible, logically from previously assumed principles ensuing trend as Harris, Hannah, and Harris describe it in the USA.

there are, for instance, the “Big Six Skills” by Michael B Eisenberg and Robert E. Berkowitz, including the skills of (i) task definition, (ii) information seeking strategies, (iii-iv) location of and access to information, and use of information, (v) synthesis, and (vi) evaluation<sup>140</sup>.

In the course of time, of course, views of various ‘new’ literacies become to have more nuances, partly while related to IM/KM<sup>141</sup>. Quite an explicit way to challenge the instrumentalism characteristic of some notions of the ‘new’ literacies could be the notion of “literary literacy”<sup>142</sup>.

### **3.2 Introductory remarks on the hermeneutical foundation for a non-userist notion of L&Lship**

Two major themes of hermeneutics especially have relevance for my theme in this treatise.

- (1) Hermeneutics is about understanding in general and humans’ understanding of themselves particularly, the latter advancing in terms of and through understanding of the traditions and history that ‘have made’ the human subjects and persons.
- (2) Hermeneutics also is about the constitution of ‘us’, which means that understanding oneself as well is, in a substantial sense, understanding oneself as ‘one of us’, as a participant in common and shared understanding. The person of hermeneutics, then, is the plural ‘we’.

Ricoeur expresses the first of these themes as follows:

By ‘appropriation, I understand this: that the interpretation of a text culminates in the self-interpretation of a subject who thenceforth understands himself better, understands himself differently, or simply begins to understand himself.<sup>143</sup>

Josef Bleicher, in turn, writes:

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<sup>140</sup> Eisenberg & Berkowitz 1992. Even if such notions can be in many cases merely new names for an old idea, one can also try to make some conceptual distinctions. Still in relatively early phase of evolution of the notions, James O. Carey (1998), for instance, talks about (i) “library skills”, which means “knowledge and tool skills”, (ii) “information skills”, which means “tactics and strategies”, and (iii) “Information literacy”, which means “cognitive strategies (metacognition)”. .

<sup>141</sup> See, for instance, O’Farrill 2008.

<sup>142</sup> See, for instance, Baleiro 2011 and Suominen & Tuomi 2015.

<sup>143</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 158.

The realization that human expressions contain a meaningful component, which has to be recognized as such by a subject and transported into his own system of values and meanings, has given rise to the 'problem of hermeneutics'.<sup>144</sup>

The hermeneutical problem here has its place in a situation where a person understands oneself while interpreting and understanding a text. Further, the texts or other forms presentation as constituents of our self-understanding would represent the past. While we read or receive them, they are there and have become to be there, possibly long ago but in other cases, quite recently.

The fact that the interpretation is of a product of the past or a tradition already leads us from the first singular to the first plural, from 'I' to 'we'. A tradition always is common to more than one person—even if different people certainly may see the same tradition differently. Habermas defines the practical interest of what he calls the hermeneutical sciences as the "constitutive interest in preservation and expansion of the intersubjectivity of possible action-oriented mutual understanding"<sup>145</sup>, and this emphatically expresses this dimension of commonness in the understanding of oneself and understanding oneself as 'one of us'.

Within the history of Christianity, Protestant Reformation has a position as one of the classical instances of hermeneutics. To grasp the whole starting point and logic of hermeneutics, we could imagine a question that the early Protestants might have made: *how should we, the good Christians, understand and interpret the Bible?*<sup>146</sup> We can see here the relatively simple starting point: a community and members of it making questions about a text. Yet, the answers to the questions would actually constitute the community itself as well (i.e. 'we, the good Christians') through understanding the text (the Bible in the case of Protestantism) commonly in some particular way<sup>147</sup>. As the common understanding is the primary matter, understanding oneself of an individual as well would be, in a way or another, a part of the common understanding.

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<sup>144</sup> Bleicher 1980, 9.

<sup>145</sup> Habermas (1965/1971, 310)

<sup>146</sup> I must right here remark that we could substitute the Christianity as well as the Bible here by some other tradition of thought and some other text. Whether we could substitute them by any other tradition of thought and text is a tricky question that I shall not even try to solve in this book.

<sup>147</sup> Here perhaps I should remark that the actual foundation of such communities is quite often not only, at least, in common understanding and interpretations, but in other kinds of conditions, interests, etc. as well. This, however, would not annihilate the significance that the hermeneutical level of understanding and interpretations may have, and we actually can claim that there is inevitably within any community some common understanding as a part of its constitution.

Here, however, we have to notice a difference between this early hermeneutics and consequent developments within the field. Gadamer quite explicitly describes as follows the early phases of hermeneutics—not only of Reformation but also of Humanism the roots of which in Renaissance make it—*grosso modo*—contemporary with the Protestant Reformation:

The art or technique of understanding and interpretation developed along two paths, theological and literary critical, from one analogous impulse. Theological hermeneutics [...] from the reformers' defense of their own understanding of scripture against the attack of the Tridentine theologians and their appeal to the essential place of tradition; literary critical hermeneutics as a tool of the humanist claim to revive classical literature. Both involve a revival of something that was not absolutely unknown, but whose meaning had become alien and unavailable.<sup>148</sup>

In Reformation, hermeneutics fundamentally means a technique of revealing the true meaning of God's word, corresponding to revealing the true spirit of classical Antiquity, which Renaissance Humanism saw as superior to the medieval culture. It is noteworthy as regards the continuation that especially on the theological side the (scholastic or Tridentine) tradition was what one had to overcome and nearly nullify if one wished to find the true meaning of the Bible. With Gadamer, in turn, tradition is by no means something that we should or even could overcome or nullify, as we shall see later. Quite on the opposite, tradition with Gadamer is the very foundation of all our being and understanding. In spite of these differences, however, the situation of the reformed Christians as illustrated above serves to open the fundamental rationality of the modern philosophical hermeneutics as well, especially because of the moment of community among people and the constitution of 'we' through common understandings and interpretations.

Here already, we can see how hermeneutics probably would relate particularly to the educational in the sense that I characterized the substantial. While providing us with a foundation for challenging the instrumentalism and individualism within the userist legitimations of the library, however, hermeneutical thought could also make somewhat problematic my notion of bibliographic rationality of L&Lship telling the truth about *scriptum est*, especially with the truth criterion of *scriptum est*. In this respect, the following little debate within LID-studies would be illustrative. Daniel Benediktsson—exceptionally among the hermeneuticians within LID-studies—starts from Ricoeur and Emilio Betti, rather

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<sup>148</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 153.

than from Gadamer or Heidegger<sup>149</sup>. According to Benediktsson, "Objectivations of mind is the best description for what LIS [Library and Information Science] is about".<sup>150</sup> As such, Benediktsson's claim might appear as quite a plausible point of departure. Ian Cornelius, however, is explicitly criticizing Benediktsson's views in a manner that is characteristic of the hermeneutically inspired argumentation within LID-studies—though with intentions somewhat different from what I would see as the most substantial possible relevance of hermeneutics within the field of LID and as regards the problematic of L&Lship particularly. Cornelius' argument, in any case, is as follows.

I firmly reject the idea of objectivation of mind, if that means that there is only one way of regarding a particular text. Similarly, the concentration which Benediktsson and Bennett see in Ricoeur on constructing an analysis of text to discover authorial intention or original meaning must also be rejected, because my concern is not to recreate a past state of mind but to discover what has currency in a current, shared, intersubjective environment.<sup>151</sup>

Drawing from the Gadamerian hermeneutics and considering the notion of L&Lship that I am suggesting, particularly illustrative here is a question that Ivar A. Hoel makes as well as his answer to it.

[...] information passed on by a library or information system is inevitably a record of knowledge that is from the past; there is no escape from that. That knowledge has already become historical long before it is transformed and disseminated by the system. But does this fact entail that library and information science (LIS) is by nature historical?

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<sup>149</sup> I should already here remark that Martin Heidegger appears in this treatise as a background figure only. Consequently, I leave all the responsibility of accuracy the manner in which his thought is present to those who in particular places refer to him. The significance of those referring to him here is only that it can clarify the thought of the one referring to Heidegger in a way or another. The same applies in this treatise to authors like Edmund Husserl, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Rudolf Bultmann.

<sup>150</sup> Benediktsson 1989, 14.

<sup>151</sup> Cornelius 1996, 25. As we shall see later, Ricoeur's position appears here in a somewhat inaccurate manner. Ricoeur as well quite explicitly "rejects" the idea of aiming at "authorial meanings", suggesting instead that we should be looking for objectivities of sense or meaning (*l'objectivité du sens*) which is quite another matter (see below, Chapter 2.2). In continuation, however, I shall suggest, for my part, that we perhaps should pay attention to the "authorial meanings" as well, after all, while considering widely the various aspects of wider cultural, social, and politico-ethical rationality. Furthermore, we should notice here, however, that Cornelius' focus in his monograph is what we could characterize as hermeneutics of the very notion of the library and notions related to it like information society or information culture, rather than hermeneutics of what the library contains.

As far as I can see, it does not. That would be to confuse knowledge about the medium with insight into the message.<sup>152</sup>

Hoel thus quite directly refuses to accept for the foundation of L&Lship the fact that the materials of a library represent the past. He rather proceeds directly to talk about “messages”. Remarks by Hoel have a foundation within Gadamerian thought, which we shall see later. It would come from Gadamer’s criticism of what he calls “historical objectivism” (*der historische Objectivismus*)<sup>153</sup>. My ultimate question, of course, is not about any Gadamerian ‘orthodoxy’, but this dilemma certainly deserves attention, if we wish to avoid reckless eclecticism. In this sense, the remarks by Hoel particularly—but view of Cornelius as well, in spite of the difference between his and my argumentative contexts—would serve here as a short introduction to the problematic of historical objectivism, which we shall discuss quite extensively in this treatise (particularly Sections 4.1 to 4.2 and Chapters 5, 7, and 8).

### **3.3 Gadamer and the hermeneutical foundation of the rationality of L&Lship on behalf of *scriptum est***

Gadamer makes quite a strong and even solemn claim of history and our existence as humans, at the end of the section titled *The hermeneutical problem and the problem of prejudices* in *Truth and method*:

In fact, history does not belong to us, but we belong to it. Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society and the state in which we live. The focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life. That is why the prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being.<sup>154</sup>

Tradition, authority, and prejudice are among Gadamer’s cardinal concepts, and we actually could see tradition and prejudice as a pair. In a sense, the authority would be on the level of our belonging to history what prejudice is on the level of an individual. These two concepts express as regards the two levels the same message: on a fundamental level, there are no fresh starts. Further, there is a strong

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<sup>152</sup> Hoel 1992, 70.

<sup>153</sup> See, for instance, Gadamer 1960/1992, 268 and Gadamer 1960/1975, 284.

<sup>154</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 245.



connection between these levels in the sense that individual existence with Gadamer is, in quite a substantial sense, participation in the common, in common history and traditions especially.

The temporal string of the traditions on the collective level, however, is obviously in a considerable measure longer than that of an individual and his or her prejudices. Related to this and in spite of the analogy between tradition and prejudice, there also is a kind of contrast, since we could crystallize a major theme within Gadamerian thought, on quite a general level, into a claim that we should be ready to contest our prejudice against the traditions. This would be the fundamental sense of *Bildung* as well.

### **3.3.1 First approach to Gadamerian hermeneutics: prejudice and “rehabilitation of authority and tradition”**

After declaring that we belong to history, rather than history to us, Gadamer defines the moment where “the hermeneutical problem comes in”, quite in the beginning of the next section titled *Rehabilitation of tradition and authority*. Gadamer stresses that prejudice is there necessarily, “if we want to do justice to man’s finite, historical mode of being”. Further, we should realize that there are “legitimate prejudices” as well, and what “presents itself, under the aegis of an absolute self-construction by reason, as a limiting prejudice belongs, in fact, to historical reality itself”<sup>155</sup>. Gadamer further remarks that Enlightenment’s conception of reason and freedom has made us consider authority “as diametrically opposed to reason and freedom: to be, in fact, blind obedience”. In spite of this being “the meaning that we find in the language critical of modern dictatorships”, we should understand better “the essence of authority”.

It is true that it is primarily persons that have authority; but the authority of persons is based ultimately, not on the subjection and abdication of reason, but on recognition and knowledge—knowledge, namely, that the other is superior to oneself in judgement and insight and that for this reason his judgement takes precedence—i.e., it has priority over one's own.<sup>156</sup>

The basis of authority, as we saw, is that the authority ‘knows better’—due to a position where he, she, or it can have a wider experience or otherwise a founda-

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<sup>155</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 245–246

<sup>156</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 248.

tion for such superior knowledge. This, in turn, fits well with the concept of teaching and education—even in a relatively banal sense, we could say<sup>157</sup>.

Gadamer's argumentation becomes sharper since he links it to the concept of tradition that explains wherefrom authority actually draws its power. With a reference to Romanticism, he writes how free and rational will alone cannot create authority—even if it is an act of free and rational will to accept or reject it.

That which has been sanctioned by the tradition and custom [*Das durch Überlieferung und Herkunft Geheiligte*] has an authority that is nameless, and our finite historical being is marked by the fact that always the authority of what has been transmitted [*Autorität des Überkommen*]<sup>158</sup>—and not only what is clearly grounded—has power over our attitudes and behaviour. All education depends on this, [...]. The validity of morals, for example, is based on tradition. They are freely taken over, but by no means created by a free insight or justified by themselves.<sup>159</sup>

A most significant conclusion follows: “This is precisely what we call tradition: the ground of their validity [i.e., of the validity of morals]”. We could reverse this claim into the form: without tradition, there is no validity. Neither would there be any rationality, we probably should conclude. This would give Gadamer's rehabilitation of authority and tradition a serious ground. On the other hand, there are fundamental differences as well between Gadamer and Romanticism, which we shall see later.

Largely, from another perspective, we can understand the thought of Gadamer as a reflection on how tradition reproduces itself in human culture—for instance, and most undeniably, when the generations follow one another. We may well say that some fundamental cultural structures—the languages as the paradigmatic instance—exist only through reproduction within the minds and practices of generations following one another. Gadamer's notion of “effective history” (*Wirkungsgeschichte*) fundamentally consists of a reciprocal relationship: once the history and tradition have ‘made’ us, we also can ‘make’ the history. The latter

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<sup>157</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 247–248.

<sup>158</sup> Notions quite closely connected to tradition (in German as well *Tradition*) with Gadamer is that of *Überlieferung* and *Überkommen*. They have contents like ‘what the past or history has handed down / transmitted to us’. (See, for instance, Gadamer 1960/1992, 321, and Gadamer 1960/1975, 340.) In this sense, we even could consider them providing us with a definition of the notion of tradition itself with Gadamer: tradition would be simply what the past has handed down to us. As Gadamer himself is using the expression *Tradition* and those other ones with the prefix *über*, I shall also use the expression ‘what the history has handed down to us’ along with the notion of tradition.

<sup>159</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 249.

obviously contains a moment of continuing and maintaining as well.<sup>160</sup> Drawing from what we so far have seen, Gadamer's claim that there is, within the Enlightenment a "prejudice against prejudice itself, which deprives tradition of its power" becomes intelligible<sup>161</sup>.

Here finally, it is in place to stress again that Gadamer is not necessarily talking in favor of any kind of 'authoritarian' attitude but rather about the fundamental conditions of our being as humans and of understanding that we may and probably even should have. We neither should assume that there necessarily is only one, all-encompassing authority and tradition that dominates the life of a person or a community. It is quite plausible to think that he or she lives within and participates in several traditions, which are possibly parallel or overlapping. Between such traditions, furthermore, there can be tensions. In spite of this, further, there can also be some commonly acceptable premises and some common, 'wider' traditions in this sense 'behind' them as well. Thus, we should not categorize Gadamer in a straightforward manner as a conservative, though there is, in my view, some substantial conservatism as well in his thought. We also should notice that Gadamer makes some quite critical remarks too as regards radicalism based on liberal ideals assumed in an unreflected manner.

### **3.3.2 "Subordination to the text's claim to dominate our minds" vs. "knowledge as domination" and the Gadamerian notion of Bildung**

While now proceeding towards the instance where Gadamerian thought provides us with a clearer and perhaps the most concrete foundation for challenging userism of legitimation, we shall approach notions that belong to the most fundamental fabric of his thought. Then again, this also would be the phase where appears the tension that there could be between the Gadamerian premises and the idea of L&Lship with the truth criterion of *scriptum est* as a maxim.

- (1) Instead of *historicism* (*Historismus*), interested in depicting what actually has been there in the past, we should think in terms of *historicity* (*Geschichtlichkeit*) of our being and experience<sup>162</sup>. This fundamentally means that instead of

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<sup>160</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 267 ff.; Gadamer 1960/1975, 284 ff.

<sup>161</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 240.

<sup>162</sup> As one of the instances contrasting these notions quite explicitly, see Gadamer 1960/1975, 283 and "Die Naivität des sogenannten Historismus" in methodical thought that forgets "seine eigene Geschichtlichkeit".

focusing (only<sup>163</sup>) on history, we are actually participating in it, which also is the foundation of Gadamer's criticism of what he denotes as historical objectivism.

- (2) Consequently, the history to which we belong according to Gadamer is a reality that extends to our present from and via moments in the past, and—using an expression that appears frequently with Gadamer—*what the history has handed down to us (Überlieferung)* is what matters, rather than the past as such.
- (3) Gadamer's notion of the *fusion of horizons (Horizontverschmelzung)*<sup>164</sup> connects to (1) and (2) above as well as to the notion of *effective history* already mentioned.

Through Gadamer's view of our relationship to history as one of a dialogue or conversation, finally, we come to his remarks that quite directly challenge the self-evident plausibility of the notion of the resource as the categorization of what the library, for instance, contains. Then again, my notion of the truth criterion of *scriptum est* as the maxim of L&Lship could also be somewhat historicist.

*[a] Subtilitas intelligendi / explicandi / applicandi, with first critical remarks on "historical objectivism" within Romanticism and on lack of tradition in the Enlightenment*

Gadamer's thought gets further structure, as he summarizes the hermeneutical problem by a reference to a charming triad from earlier hermeneutics.

- *Subtilitas intelligendi* makes it possible that we understand a text.
- *Subtilitas explicandi* makes it possible that we explicate or express what we understood.
- *Subtilitas applicandi*, finally, means application into our present situation of what we understood and explicated.<sup>165</sup>

While referring to this triad, however, Gadamer also stresses that these three parts actually form only one whole—and in this sense, actually, they are no parts at all.

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<sup>163</sup> Whether there should be this specification 'only' or whether Gadamer would exclude focusing on history entirely is, in a sense, a question that we shall discuss extensively in continuation.

<sup>164</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 273 ff., and Gadamer 1960/1975, 290.

<sup>165</sup> Gadamer 1969/1986, 274. Gadamer further remarks that *subtilitas applicandi* was an addition made by Pietism.

Gadamer further describes how there was, in the history of hermeneutics, a tendency to fuse understanding and interpretation, while the application was left totally outside the hermeneutical problematic. With Gadamer, however, the application is exactly the moment where we are participating in history, instead of only being interested in, focusing on, or ‘looking at’ it. This moment romantic hermeneutics and historicism ignore, which leads to historical objectivism, according to Gadamer. The step forward from romantic hermeneutics, according to him, should be “regarding not only understanding and interpretation, but also application as comprising one unified process”<sup>166</sup>.

Gadamer further pays special attention to the expression “*subtilitas*”, a kind of sophisticated and proper attitude—rather than a technique, a skill to perform a task or a method<sup>167</sup>. Instead of the skillful methodical approaches, Gadamer frequently accentuates that we should keep our mind “open” towards the history and traditions. We perhaps could see *subtilitas* as the capacity of being open or as the open disposition of mind that we should assume. This has to do with Gadamer’s suspicious or even directly negative position as regards the role of method in what he calls the modern science, and we shall discuss this further in Section 3.3.3[b].

In spite of praising the recognition of tradition within Romanticism, Gadamer also makes quite fundamentally critical comments on “traditionalism” that is characteristic of Romanticism and that actually turns out to be an objectivist attitude as regards history. Traditionalism here is a view that renews the truth of tradition that the Enlightenment had denied, still missing the living connection that we might and should have with the traditions within which we live. With Gadamer, we see Romanticism and the Enlightenment nearly as reversed reflections of each other: Romanticism makes absolute the tradition while silencing the reason. Similarly, the Enlightenment is silencing the tradition while making absolute the reason<sup>168</sup>. While the Enlightenment praises the reason, Romanticism merely takes an opposite stand of traditionalism. Yet, traditions as well depend on our activity:

Even the most genuine and solid tradition does not persist by nature because of the inertia of what once existed. It needs to be affirmed, embraced, culti-

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<sup>166</sup> Gadamer 1969/1986, 274–275.

<sup>167</sup> See Gadamer 1960/1992, 274 ff.

<sup>168</sup> See Gadamer 1960/1992, 250.

vated. It is, essentially, preservation, such as is active in all historical change. But preservation is an act of reason, though an inconspicuous one.<sup>169</sup>

The emphasis of continuity—one of the fundamental themes of Gadamer’s thinking—comes from our fundamental dependency on history and traditions, connected to a recognition of the significance and even necessity of preservation—which also, as we should particularly notice, is the act of reason. Gadamer continues right after the passage above with a most history-sensitive remark:

Even where life changes violently, as in ages of revolution, far more of the old is preserved in the supposed transformation of everything than anyone knows, and combines with the new to create a new value.<sup>170</sup>

The greatest revolutionary events even—as glorious and significant as they were—can be a ripple on the surface only, in view of the huge historical flow. True revolutions tend to take decades and centuries. Yet, even if we easily recognize as acts of reason “what is new or planned”, we must remind that preservation as well is an act, according to Gadamer.

The problem with romantic hermeneutics and historicism, drawing from Gadamer, is that it orients to and is most interested in history but without recognizing our participation in it. If we considered tradition and reason in purely antithetical terms, the result could be “the automatic dominance of tradition” “unaffected by doubt and criticism”. Gadamer actually does not blame even romanticism for this.<sup>171</sup> The remark, however, is most significant, since Gadamer’s own argumentation could raise similar—in some sense perhaps even warranted—objections and in this sense, it could be somewhat confused and ambivalent.

If we summarized the problem and fallacy with Romanticism as the inability to recognize the ‘here and now’ acts and reason, with the Enlightenment the fallacy could be that ‘here and now’, it recognizes only the acts and possibly quite abstract principles behind them. In this respect, illustrative is Gadamer’s remark that already anticipates the problematic of political theory and philosophy, which we shall discuss extensively in Chapter 6.

It is even a mark of the superiority of classical ethics over the moral philosophy of the modern period that it justifies the transition of ethics into ‘politics’,

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<sup>169</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 250.

<sup>170</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 250

<sup>171</sup> See Gadamer 1960/1992, 249–250.

the art of right government, by the indispensability of tradition. In comparison with it the modern enlightenment is abstract and revolutionary<sup>172</sup>

*[b] Participation in and openness to the great questions of history and the notion of Bildung*

What Gadamer calls the “hermeneutical primacy of question” as well deserves attention here. Gadamer writes about the point where “the hermeneutic phenomenon also contains within itself the original meaning of conversation and the structure of question and answer”, then continuing:

For a historical text to be made the object of interpretation means that it asks a question for the interpreter. Thus interpretation always involves a relation to the question that is asked of the interpreter. To understand a text is to understand this question. [...]

Thus a person who seeks to understand must question what lies behind what is said. He must understand it as an answer to a question. If we go back behind what is said, then we inevitably ask questions beyond what is said. We understand the sense of the text only by acquiring the horizon of the question [...]<sup>173</sup>

Gadamer then refers to remarks on the significance of a question in historical investigation by Robin George Collingwood, a British historian and a philosopher of historical studies. Collingwood ultimately claims that we only can understand history and the pieces of knowledge collected as the evidence in the historical investigation if we consider them as answers to some particular questions. We must return to this later (See Section 4.2.3[a]), since there seems to be some tension as well between the properly Collingwoodian claim and the Gadamerian premises that we are dealing with here. We may ask whether the questions are (i) those posed to the agents in the past by their situations or (ii) those that the historian in his or her present is making while encountering what the history has handed down.

The case with the questions with Gadamer, in any case, seems to be similar to the case of horizons. *A prima facie* but inaccurate, I assume, visualization of the fusion of horizons could be that the fusion of horizons takes place somewhere in the middle between the past moments and our present, as a kind of a compromise

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<sup>172</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 249.

<sup>173</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 333.

and mutual adaptation. A better understanding of what Gadamer means by this concept could be that there ultimately is one big and at least potentially common horizon that exists and evolves over the time. Reading a text, then, would be fusing oneself into this common horizon already containing the past readings and including even the horizon of the author of the text. Gadamer depicts the horizon that we should attain through the fusion of horizons as “the one great horizon that moves from within and, beyond the frontiers of the present, embraces the historical depths of our self-consciousness”<sup>174</sup>. This could apply to the hermeneutical primacy of the question as well. Somewhat solemnly, we would be pursuing the Great Horizons and Questions of the History. If reconstructing the Gadamerian notions in this way, we actually could see the question behind the text, but the reader also starts to make questions, which have something in common with those questions of the past.

Fusing one and one’s questions into such great horizon, or becoming to participate in the questions of history and traditions, furthermore, could be a short definition for what Gadamer means by *Bildung*. With a reference to the notion of *Bildung* with Hegel, Gadamer writes that “the general characteristic of *Bildung*” is “to keep oneself open to what is other, to other, more universal points of view”, then continuing:

It embraces a general sense of proportion and distance in relation to itself, and hence is capable of being raised above itself to universality. To distance oneself from one’s private purposes means to look at these in the way that others see them.<sup>175</sup>

As regards to “universality”, further, we should notice that

The universal viewpoints to which the cultivated man (*gebildet*) man keeps himself open are not a fixed applicable yardstick, but are present to him only as the viewpoints of possible others.<sup>176</sup>

In the light of what we already have learned from Gadamer, history and traditions constitute a substantial part, at least, of this universality and “the viewpoints of possible others”. Here, of course, the library in quite a banal sense already could make its particular contribution.

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<sup>174</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 271.

<sup>175</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 17.

<sup>176</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 17–18. Gadamer uses the notion of universality here with an explicit reference to Hegel, which would be perfectly consistent with rejection of the ‘yard-stick notion’ of universality (cf., for instance, Mäki 2013, 114).



As regards his criticism of historical objectivism particularly, what Gadamer is talking about is *not* ultimately understanding or learning to know the texts, literature, or *scriptum est* in themselves. It rather would be understanding or learning to know about the subject matter, *die Sache*, about which the texts or other forms of *scriptum est* are telling something. It means understanding and *knowing through the texts*, rather than *knowing about the texts*.

The concept of understanding undoubtedly breaks right out of the circle drawn by romantic hermeneutics. Because what we are now concerned with is not individuality and what it thinks, but the objective truth of what is said, a text is not understood as a mere expression of life, but taken seriously in its claim to truth.<sup>177</sup>

We thus should take seriously what the text says, instead of starting to question and explain why it says as it says, for instance. We should share the text's interest in the subject matter that the text deals with, so to speak. This anticipates the sincerity assumption in a rational dialogue to which we shall return particularly in Section 8.3.3.

Then again, these last remarks also make somewhat problematic my notion of L&Lship 'telling the truth' about *scriptum est*, particularly if we understand the obligation of *scriptum est* as a criterion of truth, which could make the text an object of knowledge and perhaps even "a mere expression of life". Gadamer's view of reading a text and encountering what the history has handed down to us certainly is most important, but I would see some significance and rationality also in an attempt to know about the texts and *scriptum est*.

### *[c] The model of legal and theological hermeneutics*

According to Gadamer, legal hermeneutics is an instance where the moment of application is necessarily present. In legal hermeneutics, applying the law is quite concretely present in judging of the cases in the court of law. For this reason, it also qualifies as the general model of the hermeneutical problem and process. Theological hermeneutics as well, according to Gadamer, could qualify as such a model, but only if it does not "give up its dogmatic commitments". To qualify as a model of hermeneutics by the side of legal hermeneutics theology must be the search for knowledge about God, about the will of God, etc., not merely a search

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<sup>177</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 264.

of sociological knowledge about religious views that people somewhere have on such matters. On this condition, we could consider preaching, for instance, as a moment of application.

The following lengthy quotation from Gadamer brings us quite close to the conclusions that we can make as regards L&Lship. In addition, it illustrates and even summarizes the Gadamerian thought more widely.

It is quite mistaken to base the possibility of understanding a text on the postulate of ‘connaturality’ that supposedly unites the creator and the interpreter of a work. If this were really the case, then the human sciences would be in a bad way. The miracle of understanding, rather, consists in the fact that no connaturality is necessary to recognise what is really significant and fundamentally meaningful in tradition. We are able to open ourselves to the superior claim the text makes and respond to what it has to tell us. Hermeneutics in the sphere of literary criticism and the historical sciences is not ‘knowledge as domination’, ie an appropriation as a ‘taking possession of’, but rather subordination to the text’s claim to dominate our minds. Of this, however, legal and theological hermeneutics are the true model. To interpret the law’s will or the promises of God is clearly not a form of domination but of service. They are interpretations—which includes application—in the service of what is considered valid. Our thesis is that historical hermeneutics also has a task of application to perform, because it too serves the validity of meaning, in that it explicitly and consciously bridges the gap in time that separates the interpreter from the text and overcomes the alienation of meaning that the text has undergone.<sup>178</sup>

Gadamer, however, is not talking about theological and legal hermeneutics only, even if they have the position of paradigms. Rather, we should see the logic that so illustratively manifests itself within these particular fields as the logic of all true interpretation. Shortly, by being open to the tradition, to what it has to say, by being ready to listen to it, and by then applying it to our present situation, we also participate in the tradition. Thereafter, we also can bring our own contribution into the tradition and history, and this essentially is what Gadamer means by effective history.

A further quite noteworthy aspect of Gadamer’s thought here is that the authority of tradition constitutes the condition of communication and community. It appears in the text quoted as the condition of our possibility to understand texts, and we obviously can extend it to people’s possibility to understanding each other in general as well. According to Gadamer, “the human sciences would be in a bad

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<sup>178</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 277–278.

way” if we look for this possibility in “connaturality” or in some shared nature that would make it possible for us to understand each other. Instead, the basis of communication and community would be in our participation in a common historically evolving basis, in living within and participating in the common traditions and sharing common authorities. This has to do with the claim that the foundation of validity is in traditions. To avoid all possible connotations of romantic traditionalism, we perhaps could say that the foundation of validity is there as a tradition, or even, it is a tradition, which by no means diminishes its significance and obligation. This also has to do with the fact that Gadamer’s ultimate aim relates to the rationality of the humanities, which we shall discuss further in the next section.

Most importantly in view of my thematic in this treatise, the quotation above contains the fundamental arguments that make intelligible the view that we could see an instance of *scriptum est*—a text or a book, for instance—as an authority, instead of viewing it self-evidently as a resource that we could use for our own purposes only. The authority may intelligibly have a real say in the sense that we perhaps should “open ourselves to the superior claim the text makes and respond to what it has to tell us”. We should listen to and heed, though thereafter, we have the liberty to accept, criticize, or even reject “what it has to tell us”.

### ***3.3.3 The rationality proper to the humanities and universality of hermeneutics: substantiating what we saw and anticipating what we shall discuss below***

I shall continue a little further with remarks on Gadamer’s most fundamental premises, which will partly substantiate the views that we already discussed. On the other hand, these remarks fortify the challenge that Gadamer’s criticism of historical objectivism can cause as regards L&Lship about *scriptum est* and finally, they help us to get a grasp of the tension between Gadamer and the Ricoeurian points of departure, which will be a major thematic in my argumentation since Chapter 4.

For conceiving of the Gadamerian thought better, it is useful to notice that his ultimate intentions relate to the rationality proper to the humanities. He depicts how his project continues from where Heidegger ends. Gadamer praises the “far-reaching consequences for metaphysics of the Heideggerian “analysis of There-being” after which “the problems of a hermeneutics of the human sciences sud-

denly look very different”, thereafter continuing: “The present work is devoted to this new aspect of the hermeneutical problem”<sup>179</sup>.

[a] *The huge synthetic unity with Gadamerian, with the restoration of the human subject by the notion of hermeneutical experience*

I would characterize the rationality of the humanities as it appears with Gadamer, which seems quite plausible to me as well, as the rationality of ‘listening-to’ or—perhaps more precisely—of preserving and fostering, listening-to, and cultivating what the history has handed down to us. In the third and last main part in Gadamer’s *Truth and Method*, titled “*The universal aspects of hermeneutics*”, Gadamer opens in front of us a huge, all-encompassing synthetic unity around the concept of language in which his thought culminates. The philosophy of language with Gadamer, in turn, culminates in his famous and, *prima facie* at least, even somewhat mysterious dictum “Being that can be understood is the language”<sup>180</sup>.

Gadamer’s thought becomes easier to understand if we remind his major interest in legitimizing the humanities. To approach his thought, it might be particularly helpful to ask, *against what* he actually is arguing. According to Gadamer, “The objectifying procedure of the investigation of nature and the concept of being in itself, which is behind all such knowledge, proved to be an abstraction when viewed from the centre that language is”. After such abstraction, however, “the ideal of scientific objectivity” can claim a position as the model of all of the scholarship, thus threatening also the rationality proper of the humanities.

Abstracted out of the fundamental relation to the world that is given in the linguistic nature of our experience of it, it seeks to become certain about entities by methodically organising its knowledge of the world. Consequently it condemns as heresy all knowledge that does not allow of this kind of certainty and hence is not able to serve the growing domination of beings. As against this we have endeavoured to liberate the mode of being of art and history, and the experience that corresponds to them, from the ontological prejudice that is contained in the ideal of scientific objectivity; ...<sup>181</sup>

Gadamer’s interest is in defending the humanities against the dominance of the natural sciences and of what he often denotes simply as the modern science. A

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<sup>179</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 230.

<sup>180</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 432, or, as formulated nearly immediately after the above formulation: “That which can be understood is language”.

<sup>181</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 433.

part of his defense of the humanities is also “the linguistic nature of our experience” as “the fundamental relation to the world”. Gadamer writes further that while considering the experience of art and history, “we were led to a universal hermeneutics that was concerned with the general relationship of man to the world”<sup>182</sup>.

Related to the language as the centre of gravity, Gadamer can ‘play’ with the roles of subject and object: the world, language, and traditions become to be the true agents while we are the objects—or, perhaps, patients—that the world, language, and traditions are working on<sup>183</sup>. He writes, for instance,

[...] the world that has come down to us in tradition and to which we are to listen really encounters us and does so in such a way that it addresses us and is concerned with us.<sup>184</sup>

Then further, “... it is literally more correct to say that language speaks us, rather than we speak it”<sup>185</sup>. Gadamer then refers first to the philosophy before modernity and especially, to that of Antiquity where the “original unity” is still present. Thereafter, however, he wants further specify how we should see the “belongingness between subject and object”:

We belong to elements in tradition that reach us. Everyone who is in a tradition—and this is true, as we know, even of the man who is released into a new apparent freedom by historical consciousness—must listen to what reaches him from it. The truth of tradition is like the present that lies immediately open to the senses.

The mode of being of tradition is not sensible immediacy. It is language, and in interpreting its texts, the hearer who understands it relates its truth to his own linguistic attitude to the world.<sup>186</sup>

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<sup>182</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 433.

<sup>183</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 419

<sup>184</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 421

<sup>185</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 420

<sup>186</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 420. Gadamer here clearly aims at a kind of dialogical balance between the humans and their traditions, and this is probably most apparent in the light of his notion of effective history: the history makes humans who then, in their turn, are making the history. Yet, if the balance were to sway to a side or another, in many places Gadamer’s text would suggest that it would sway to the side of the world, history, traditions, and language, not to the side of individual humans, even to the measure that sometimes it seems as if the individual human as an agent were annihilated. It is, as we saw above, the world, the history, the language and the traditions that are “speaking”, “coming down to us”, “encountering us” and “concerned with us”.

It appears here as if one big happening of the world and language made disappear all human subjectivity, however. Some further remarks are necessary to show how Gadamer brings his view back to the level of the actual human subjects. Gadamer himself asks, “Are we not forced to admit that Hegel was right and regard the basis of hermeneutics as the absolute fusion of history and truth?”, and then, a little later, says that this would mean that understanding would ultimately find “its fulfillment only in an infinite consciousness, which is also the ground of the idea of individuality”. This vanishing of all individuality could continue as follows.

It is the pantheistic enclosing of all individuality within the absolute that makes possible the miracle of understanding. Thus here also being and knowledge interpenetrate each other in the absolute.<sup>187</sup>

According to Gadamer, “[...] we shall have to define the structure of the effective-historical consciousness with an eye on Hegel, setting it against his own approach”. Critical of Hegel here is that effective-historical consciousness, according to Gadamer, “has the structure of an experience”.<sup>188</sup> Hermeneutical experience, by the side of the effective-historical consciousness, is the notion with Gadamer, which brings the humans as subjects back into the landscape from which the synthesizing remarks above nearly faded them out.

The linguistic nature of the relationship that the humans have with their world combines with the way in which Gadamer is taking distance from Hegel. The foundation of this is “the finiteness of the linguistic event, in which understanding is constantly concretised”<sup>189</sup>. Our own finite and historical nature connects to the historically finite nature of language.

The language [...] that things have—of whatever kind of things may be—is not the *logos oustias*, and it does not attain its perfect form in the self-contemplation of an infinite intellect, but is the language that our finite, historical nature apprehends<sup>190</sup>.

Once we understand experience in this way, we can conceive of the hermeneutical experience as the moment where an individual person actually is participating in

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<sup>187</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 306.

<sup>188</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 310. I take here no responsibility of Gadamer’s understanding of Hegel. The case could be even that while taking distance from a stereotypic understanding, Gadamer approaches what might have been the actual line of thought with Hegel himself. What Gadamer says, in any case, illustrates well his own position. The Hegelian thematic that I shall discuss in Sections 6.3 and 6.4 will suggest that this could be the case.

<sup>189</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 433.

<sup>190</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 433.

being, history, and traditions—without in a pantheistic manner “enclosing of all individuality within the absolute”.

*[b] Criticism of historical objectivism remaining and even fortified*

The criticism of historical objectivism is present in the notion of hermeneutical experience as well. Within the Gadamerian notion of the hermeneutical experience, we find a familiar structure, similar to that of prejudice and tradition. Gadamer writes:

[...] we use the word ‘experience’ in two different senses: to refer to the experiences that fit in our expectation and confirm it, and to the experience that we have. This latter, ‘experience’ in the real sense, is always negative.<sup>191</sup>

The process of experience is, in fact, an essentially negative process. The crucial aspects of reservation, then, would be in questioning two assumptions:

- (1) One would be the assumption of a possibility of ‘purified’ experience (the idea according to Gadamer coming from Francis Bacon) in the spirit of the methodological thinking of modern science. The demand itself of the possibility to repeat the experience rules out history<sup>192</sup>. Especially experience cannot be ‘purified’ of language that, according to Gadamer’s famous dictum, is “the being that can be understood”.
- (2) The other would be the assumption that an experience only leads to concept—as Aristotle, according to Gadamer, sees it<sup>193</sup>. Actually, however, the experience can typically be the basis of rejection of earlier conceptions. This, in turn, has quite a strong affinity with the general emphasis of the historicity of human existence and knowledge that has to do with the theme of authority and tradition with Gadamer.

We perhaps could not take these remarks, however, as an absolute denial of the possibility to talk about objects or something objective. There can be no fresh starts in experience either, but once we start to test our earlier conceptions by our

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<sup>191</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 317.

<sup>192</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 312. Then again, in the practice of natural sciences, for instance, one can perhaps create ‘practically same enough’ conditions. Gadamer, of course, is not talking, not at least specifically, about natural sciences, but Bacon quite well could be

<sup>193</sup> Gadamer (1960/1992, 316) writes: “What concerns Aristotle about experience is merely its contribution to the formation of concepts”.

experience, we neither could reduce what we experience to those conceptions that we perhaps should reject. In this sense, Gadamer's analysis of experience is testifying simultaneously about his objectivism-critical position and, in a sense, of a 'moderate' nature of this criticism.

A repeating theme with Gadamer is a criticism of the idea of the method characteristic of modern science. Gadamer refers to his own letter to Emilio Betti. Quite categorically, he first remarks, "Fundamentally I am not proposing a method, but I am describing what is the case. ...", and thereafter continues:

[...] I am trying to go beyond the concept of method held by modern science (which retains its limited justification) and to envisage in a fundamentally universal way what always happens.<sup>194</sup>

Gadamer's antipathy against the idea of modern science with its methodical approaches combines with his claim of the universality of hermeneutics, and this time, he refers to Hegel quite approvingly. He first mentions "Hegel's explicit appeal to the Greek concept of methodology" and opposes this with "the concept of a method that dealt with the thing, but was alien to it, calling it 'external reflection'". The result of opposing these two is as follows.

The true method was an activity performed by the thing itself. [...] Certainly, the thing does not go its own course, without our thinking being involved, but thinking means unfolding the proper logic of the thing itself.<sup>195</sup>

We now can see that the method of modern science criticized by Gadamer is the method separated from the "proper logic of the thing itself". Reminding that the world, traditions, and language are addressing and 'talking' us, rather than the other way around, this is quite plausible.

Illustrative, in any case, is Gadamer's metaphorical remark on peculiarities of hearing among the senses.

When you look at something, you can also look away from it, by looking in another direction, but you cannot 'hear away'. This difference between seeing

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<sup>194</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 465–466.

<sup>195</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 421. Gadamer here clearly aims at a kind of dialogical balance between the humans and their traditions, and this is probably most apparent in the light of his notion of effective history: the history makes humans who then, in their turn, are making the history. Yet, if the balance were to sway to a side or another, in many places Gadamer's text would suggest that it would sway to the side of the world, history, traditions, and language, not to the side of individual humans, even to the measure that sometimes it seems as if the individual human as an agent were annihilated. It is, as we saw above, the world, the history, the language and the traditions that are "speaking", "coming down to us", "encountering us" and "concerned with us".



and hearing is important for us because the primacy of hearing is the basis of the hermeneutical phenomenon, as Aristotle saw.<sup>196</sup>

We further find with Gadamer a general figure that emphasizes “belongingness between subject and object”<sup>197</sup> and the “original unity” of being. Such unity would comprehend all that the “ontological prejudice” behind “the ideal of scientific objectivity” separates from each other. “Belongingness” or belonging-to, in turn, will be a conveniently short expression to denote major emphasizes of Gadamerian thought in continuation while discussing the relationship between Gadamer and Ricoeur, for instance.

We now could formulate the rationality of the humanities as it has figured out above as the rationality of cultivating what happens in any case. According to Gadamer, the problem of modern science would be that it cuts off the living communicational connection within our being, traditions, history, and the language through which all in the culture and being of the humans is going on. This makes also intelligible that the modern natural science is a special case only<sup>198</sup>. Viewing the natural science in this way—instead of allowing it to become the paradigm of all (scientific) rationality—would not ruin the rationality of listening to and cultivating what is there, i.e. the rationality most proper to the humanities.

### **3.4 The Gadamerian authority and its possible relevance for the rationality of L&Lship: not as ‘authoritarian’ as it might seem**

I already suggested that we could see Gadamer depicting even what we could denote as the human condition and existential necessities. This requires, however, some further reasoning, also in view of the significance of the Gadamerian thought for our possible conceptions of L&Lship.

At this point, it would be still useful to sharpen the notion of authority and its opposition to the notion of resource. The pair and opposition of these notions, in any case, have quite a crucial position in my argumentation.

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<sup>196</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 419–420.

<sup>197</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 418

<sup>198</sup> It is quite plausible to think that all of human culture goes on in terms and on the conditions of what we call nature, and in this sense we could say that the human culture is a special case of the nature. Yet, natural science is a part of human culture, and this makes intelligible that it is a special case and goes on in terms of and conditioned by what is particularly proper for the humanities.

### **3.4.1 Mere social phenomena or a genuine authority with a possible foundation in existential necessities**

If wishing to specify further the authority that Gadamer is writing about, we perhaps could make a distinction between three options. We could be talking about the authority

- *as a social phenomenon* among some people or communities, as a fact that some people respect something as an authority;
- *as a functional component of a functional society*, meaning that there must be some common authority since otherwise the society could not function; and finally
- *as a genuine authority* that we genuinely respect, since we recognize that it deserves the position of an authority.

It should be clear that the authority with Gadamer is a genuine obligation, which a rational person can recognize. It is not appearing as a phenomenon or a possible factor influencing the behavior of some other people only, neither as a functional necessity in terms of which we could understand why there tend to be some authorities in the communities and societies. I suppose, the question with Gadamer would be *How should we think about traditions while we wish to learn, understand, or know something?* rather than *How are people thinking and functioning when they aim at learning, understanding, or knowing something; or: Why are they thinking and functioning in the manner in which they are?* Reading Gadamer only as a sociologist analyzing the behavior of some groups of people or the conditions of the functionality of a society or community would be a failure. Throughout his argumentation, Gadamer is suggesting that we should be “open” to the tradition and to what the history has handed down to us. This certainly is a normative moment in his thinking and writing—even if as a norm, it is rather vague and even if with Gadamer, there is some reluctance as regards the very notion of the method.

We still can make another distinction of possible understandings of Gadamer’s thought. Within his reasoning that proceeds from rehabilitation of authority and tradition, he could be talking

- about an educational or cultural ideal, suggesting that we should listen to tradition and its authority, or

- about something that we can best characterize as an existential necessity or condition.

As far as we take what Gadamer presents as an existential condition of our being as humans, it would give L&Lship quite a strong and universal foundation, of course. This foundation would be in something that inevitably and quite universally is a part and condition of our being. Yet, even if the very foundation were universal and inevitable in this sense, we could not assume that L&Lship would have any monopoly in responding to requirements of this condition. There certainly can be and even have been communities without anything like the library or even literature, and still people have been living their lives and had the foundation of community with each other. Oral traditions, for instance, may have functioned—and still function, even in our literary cultures, of course—ultimately in a manner that is similar to the role of literature.

If then considering that Gadamer is suggesting an educational ideal of *Bildung*, its connection to the library would be much closer: it would be hard to think about any *Bildung* even closely in the Gadamerian sense without literature and even without the library. Such an educational ideal, however, would be ‘only an ideal’ and in this sense, a matter of choice only, so to speak. We can take into account or ignore educational or cultural ideals, and we can maintain or not some particular practices that they require. If compared to something that we could categorize as an existential necessity, at least, such an option to make choices would be more characteristic of cultural and educational ideals. As regards a necessity, there is no choice.

These two possible interpretations of Gadamer’s writing, however, would not necessarily be mutually exclusive. We perhaps should say that the educational ideal could mean particular and conscious investment to an existential necessity and condition. It could mean that we are consciously cultivating the historicity that necessarily would be a part of our being as humans even without any attempts to cultivate it and while even entirely ignoring it. As an educational ideal, it could mean that we should cultivate what is happening in any case since as cultivated, it could happen even better. *Bildung* would be an educational and cul-

tural ideal with a foundation in an existential necessity. I assume that this kind of ‘Hegelian’ reading could come rather close to Gadamer’s own thinking as well.<sup>199</sup>

### **3.4.2 Gadamerian authority opposed to the notions of resource, on one hand, and dictatorial dominance, on the other**

As regards the notions of authority and resource, we can think about a situation where someone is planning a business trip to another country and culture. In order to have success in his or her business, for instance, he or she might study the authorities respected by those with whom he or she wishes to cooperate. For instance, in the country where one is traveling to make business, the people, the assumed business partners among the others, could respect some religious authority and the religion that the authority represents is a serious matter in the life of the people there. To learn to know such an authority and behaving accordingly could be good for business.

Then again, we cannot say that the one preparing in this way for business negotiations would genuinely respect the authorities respected by his or her business partners. Quite the opposite, actually, it seems that he or she would have respect for those authorities even less than the case would be if he or she totally ignored them. Actually, he or she would be reducing the authority of the other people into a mere resource in quite a rude and tactical manner. In this sense, we may say that the notions of authority and resource express quite opposite ways of thinking about something that we may encounter.<sup>200</sup>

In a particular sense, the Gadamerian authority is not a strict one and it would not necessarily point towards any kind of ‘authoritarianism’ or emphasis of cul-

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<sup>199</sup> I here have to comment on the expression “matter of choice” shortly in another respect as well. I do not mean that a matter of choice necessarily would be a matter of an arbitrary and indifferent choice purely, without any possibility to explain it in historical terms, for instance. As a further aspect to the cultural or educational ideal of *Bildung*, we quite well could assume that it is plausible and functional ideal in a certain phase of the historical development of the society, social life, economy, production, etc., while not so plausible and functional in some other phases. We could see the *Bildung*-philosophy as a manifestation of the bourgeois society and emerging industrialism that demanded enhancement of the educational level of population widely and consequently a somewhat intellectual legitimation for the prevailing state of affairs widely among the population as well. Further, we also could see here the genuinely political aspect, the question of what kind of social and cultural development and structures would be preferable, if we wish not to accept as such a purely determinist views of society and politics.

<sup>200</sup> One could counter-argue my example by claiming that an authority with a religious foundation is not typically a Gadamerian authority as conceived of here. Then again, there is no reason to exclude the option of heeding and listening to scripture or revelation, for instance, in quite a Gadamerian sense.

tural uniformity. Obviously, a side of the notion of authority with Gadamer is that what the history has handed down to us functions in a necessary manner and in this sense, in a ‘silent’ manner, which we neither wished nor could resist.

Even if the authority were ‘silent’, one cannot “hear away” (see Section 3.3.3[b]). In addition to this and once become a part of our conscious use of reason, however, it rather is an authority in the sense that we have good reasons to listen to and heed what it has to say. According to Gadamer, as we saw (Section 3.3.1), it is the act of a rational will to accept or reject an authority. This we cannot do without noticing and heeding what the authority or a tradition has to say. As far as we are not talking about the necessary and ‘silent’ functioning of what the history and traditions, the Gadamerian authority, in my view, would be an authority of a say that we should not ignore, rather than an actual dictatorial dominance of some instance of power over a person. Furthermore, a part of *Bildung* could quite plausibly be the aim of becoming aware of what so far has been ‘silent’.

Further, we should remind here again that there plausibly—particularly in the library—can be several traditions and authorities, possibly parallel or overlapping one another, or one inside another, and there can be tensions as well between and even within the traditions and authorities. We probably should not think that there is or should be only one, big, all-encompassing, and innerly harmonious authority and tradition. The community that can have its foundation in common traditions and authority may be wider or narrower. It may be also looser or tighter, and especially in a loose community, there can be plenty of tensions and disagreement as well within the commonness of a tradition, with perhaps some agreement only on what are the matters on which there are disagreements and on what kind of different views there are or intelligibly can be. In this sense, the Gadamerian view by no means appears necessarily as the theory of somehow monolithically unified culture and it could be a fallacy to criticize it as such. The issue rather is the logical necessity of some foundation of community within any kind of community, and we may think that beyond such logical foundation the Gadamerian view is quite flexible. There furthermore is, with Gadamer, a consistent and strong ethos of encountering respectfully another person, possibly representing another time and quite plausible even another culture.

### 3.4.3 Additional remarks on the conditions of substantial criticism

Above, we have discussed the Gadamerian hermeneutics as a possible philosophical explication of the foundation of the rationality of L&Lship. Already here, however, there have been also some references to actual political theory and philosophy. This leads us towards the option that the library could be for the state as well (see my first formulation of the notion of userism in Section 1.2.1). A difference between the ways in which republicanist political theory and philosophy, on one hand, and hermeneutics, on the other, can found the rationality of L&Lship is worth a remark here, however. L&Lship can be plausibly for the authors by ‘speaking on behalf of’ them and their products, *scriptum est*. As regards the state, we probably should think that the library is for it only in an indirect way. To say that L&Lship is and perhaps even speaks on behalf of the state could have an impression of making the library merely another agency of propaganda—particularly if we had an in a way or another restricted understanding of what the state actually can be. An appropriately generally featured remark by Shera could come close to what I mean:

[...] it is between the library and the individual that the library operates. But, the aim, of course, is not only the improvement of the individual but also the improvement of the society of which the individual is a part.<sup>201</sup>

In addition to remarks already made, finally, it would be beneficial to discuss quite an essential aspect of substantial criticism as well that the Gadamerian rehabilitation of authority and tradition actually helps us to recognize. If our criticism was to be substantial—or if it really should make a difference and be effective—then we should consider it as related to traditions, in several ways actually.

- (1) The substantial criticism that really could make a difference must recognize as objects of criticism the levels of action and thinking that have become common and collective, instead of staying at the level of the separate individual instances and views of some individuals.
- (2) The substantial criticism that really makes a difference requires elaboration of critical arguments, and often even this critical argumentation itself is a matter common to more than one person, which all may lead to an emergence of a new tradition of criticism itself. The emergence of critical traditions could be a prerequisite of substantial criticism, which makes a difference.

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<sup>201</sup> Shera 1970, 55.

- (3) Finally, substantial criticism that really makes a difference often—albeit not always—is going on within the same tradition, even under the same authorities, with what it is criticizing. While criticizing what may be the prevailing views, the criticism itself can be appealing to premises that are common to the critics and the views criticized. Further, instead of remaining a part of argumentative tactics merely, this appealing can be quite sincere in the sense that the critics sincerely recognize some authorities, premises, etc. common with the criticized.

Especially (3) refers to criticism as a rational dialogue, and an important factor then would be that critical argumentation is appealing to premises that we may assume, at least, to be common to the critic and to what he, she, or it is criticizing. Then, even a critical dialogue could ultimately be going on in terms of agreements, where one can put forward remarks on premises that should be commonly recognizable and acceptable.<sup>202</sup>

This structure around common tradition is a most important prerequisite of substantial criticism as far as it takes the form of a rational dialogue. If such connection to tradition and authority disappeared from our understanding of our social and political activity and life, the result may be that what pretends to be most radical criticism quite easily remains only opinions—or indeed, the very notion of criticism may flatten to a matter of mere opinions. In view of this analysis of traditions and substantial criticism, the library on behalf of *scriptum est* can clearly be advancing substantially critical awareness as well.

### **3.5 L&Lship on behalf of *scriptum est* for communities and continuity**

We may sum up as follows the result of viewing the major points of departure within and of the historical evolvement of the mainstream LID-studies and especially within information science as reconstructed in Sections 2.1 and 2.2.

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<sup>202</sup> Here, a remark is in place on the fact that criticism and struggle of power and for rights and justice cannot always proceed in the form of a rational dialogue. Now and then, revolutions as well take place and may have a justification. Then again, even if the adversaries seemingly had no common ground, there typically would be present some commonly recognisable legitimacy as well. Such questions would be present in complex and not only tactical ways probably even while there seemingly is nothing but an open war. For this, Gadamerian views argue most effectively and convincingly and in many cases, the revolutions actually start by appeals to something that everyone in the society, including those in power as well, are recognizing—at least assumingly..

- (1) Largely, thinking goes on in terms individuals, their interests, which are the foundation of the legitimacy of whatever requires legitimation, and their behavior, which is the sphere of reality that especially seems to matter and which is the dominant scholarly focus.
- (2) There can be and have been, however, currents of thought that have overcome the individualist emphasis and taken into account practice-type social realities more substantially. As regards the scholarly focus, a result of this has been looking holistically the different aspects of “information processes”. This may have led to even views that come relatively close to what I am suggesting here.
- (3) The fundamentally userist legitimation, however, seems to be strong.

The Gadamerian premises as reconstructed above, however, challenge both the individualism and the position of the individuals—in the role of the users of the library, for instance—as the only ones who may intelligibly have a say.

### **3.5.1 History-aware L&Lship for the user as well?**


Within the notion of L&Lship that I am suggesting and elaborating here, the educational rationality of L&Lship is the one where what one within LID-studies frequently denotes as the user is particularly present. The educational rationality would be a rationality on behalf of *scriptum est*, but it would be also a practice directed towards the user, reader, client, or even customer, or by what notion ever we were to denote the one looking for something in the library. A short reasoning of this serves as an introduction to further remarks on the possible Gadamerian rationality of L&Lship here.

In a strict sense, my notion of the educational rationality of L&Lship would challenge the userism of say, the assumption that the user alone could intelligibly have the ultimate say. It would not challenge the userism of the beneficiary. (See Section 2.6.2.) In some respect, however, the line of demarcation between service-userism and the educational rationality of L&Lship as well would become here rather fine.

Even in view of the problematic conception of L&Lship categorically as a service, we could see beneficiality of what we could characterize as history-aware librarianship. I can illustrate this by a comment to Ingwersen’s concise shaping of what he calls simplistic IR-interaction (see Figure 3) since one of my examples of



service-userist conceptions of L&Lship was the conception of the library as a system for IR.



**Fig. 3. The Collingwoodian history of questions complementing the “simplistic IR-interaction” with Ingwersen**

I wish to pay attention here particularly to the “problem space” behind the “information problem” of the “user”. Ingwersen, in another place, quite emphatically illustrates the individuality and even situational characteristics of what he calls the cognitive paradigm or viewpoint<sup>204</sup>. Within the simplistic IR-interaction, this would mean that the problem spaces would be most individual and even situational. My question, then, would be as follows. Are we and our problems, situations, and the questions that we pose, after all, always so individual, unique, and proper only to each of us in each of our particular situations?

Somewhat provocatively, I could claim that by looking at the history, we can learn to know something about what those who we should serve actually wish or need to find. Their problems or question would belong to the common problem or question history, which we could conceive of partly applying the idea of history of questions with Collingwood, partly in view of the wider specter of premises within hermeneutics. Here, perhaps, we should read Collingwood in particularly

<sup>204</sup> Ingwersen 1992, 124 ff.

Gadamerian spirit and talk about the ‘Gadamerian-Collingwoodian’ history of questions (cf. Section 4.2.3 below). The questions that people are posing to the library in our present would probably be the question handed down by the history, rather than questions “out there” in the past. We even could see here an option of ‘Gadamerian userism’, here particularly in the form of ‘Gadamerian service userism’ as a counterpart to a kind of ‘Gadamerian resource userism’ that we could find within considerations of IM/KM in the light of Gadamerian thought (see Section 8.5 below).

Practically speaking, of course, the situation is much more complicated. Neither would I deny that there certainly is also individuality in the ways in which we think, pose questions, etc. The reality on a practical level would be a mixture of individuality and common lines of thought. Then again, particularly because of this, we should not ignore the common lines, traditions, and history either. Furthermore, the more we emphasized the educational rationality of L&Lship in the Gadamerian spirit, the more significance exactly the questions handed down by the history would have.

### ***3.5.2 From transient library policies towards a possible fundamental moment of education in the rationality of L&Lship***

Partly, at least, we can see the changes in viewing the library described by Harris, Hannah, and Harris (see Section 3.1) as major changes on the level of library policies that have taken place in particular historical periods and have concerned the public library particularly. Even the major historical orientations of librarianship—such as the ones outlined—would be, in a sense, matters of choice. They are such in spite of the fact that we certainly could find substantial connections between them and mainstreams of social and political thinking and the general political, social, and even economic and technological developments. We even could try to give the developments of library policies historical explanations. Industrialization, for instance, certainly has had a role in the development of popular education a form and part of which the public library could be.

As opposed to such varying and transitory library policies, however, I am here interested especially in the possible and more fundamental intelligible rationalities of L&Lship. We could assume that the concept of the library should leave space for varying library policies and library-political orientations and pursuits. Otherwise, we would have no option to discuss the thematic of library pol-

icy in terms of our concept of the library, and our conceptual considerations on the library would have no critical potential as regards the actual library policies and politics. Such wider view of what L&Lship can be would have significance also in view of the metatheories within research focusing on or related to the library, of course.

As regards the distinction of education in substantial matters or in matters of more or less instrumental nature, hermeneutics would most substantially relate to education in substantial matters an instance of which could be the Deweyan phase of education by ‘good literature’. The Deweyan view of the library, however, might seem obsolete in the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, due to its seemingly patronizing touch, among other things. To avoid such obsolescence, we perhaps should have a particularly open mind while considering what parts and pieces of literature are good. Hermeneutics, in any case, could found a substantially educational view of the library that is fundamental in such a strong manner that question would no more be about obsolescence or up-to-dateness. Most concretely, we can see the foundation of the possible educational rationality of L&Lship while Gadamer opposes the genuinely hermeneutical rationality—or “Subordination to the text’s claim to dominate our minds”—to “knowledge as domination”.

William F. Birdsall combines in his concept of the “politics of librarianship” elements of three major ‘-isms’ of political thinking that there are in Western political cultures in general as well as in America, according to Birdsall. These ‘-isms’ are conservatism, liberalism, and socialism.<sup>205</sup> Conservatism is the oldest among them and has to do with the “sense of community” among people and with “social order”. Socialism with Birdsall appears not in very radical forms of challenging private ownership of productive resources, for instance. According to Birdsall, socialism as a part of the politics of librarianship “shares with conservatism a concern for the enhancement of community”, but has more interest in “egalitarianism through an activist role for government, a role whose primary objective is to ensure equality of result for all”. Liberalism, finally, appears as a view having “different meanings at different times and places” and as a kind of major trend, as a “liberal view” prevailing “in modern Western societies.”<sup>206</sup> I shall return in Chapter 6 (Section 6.1) to Birdsall’s reasoning on what he calls the American liberalism because Birdsall makes as regards it remarks that are most

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<sup>205</sup> Birdsall 1994, 110.

<sup>206</sup> Birdsall 1994, 110–114.

interesting for our general thematic there. Here it is enough to mention Birdsall's general characterization of liberalism as a view with a "commitment to individualism", a belief that "each individual knows what is best for himself", combined with an emphasis on education, "self-development, and rationality".<sup>207</sup>

To a degree, the whole of Birdsall's "politics of librarianship", especially as regards the conservatism and liberalism in it, has some similar constituents with the historical outline by Harris, Hannah, and Harris—even if Birdsall does not suggest the '-isms' of the politics of librarianship as phases in a historical development. Yet, there is a certain resemblance between his conservatism and the Deweyan educational librarianship with Harris, Hannah, and Harris, as well as between Birdsall's "American liberalism" and the Library Bill of Rights librarianship in the historical scheme of the other authors. Birdsall has also the notion of the "politics of electronic librarianship"<sup>208</sup>, which could correspond *grosso modo* to the "paperless library" with Harris, Hannah, and Harris. We should notice here still that Birdsall makes a distinction between different kinds of liberalism, including the "autonomous liberalism", which would be particularly individualist and approach what one denotes as neo-liberalism around the shift of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries, and an appropriate depiction of it could be Smith's summary of the principle of liberalism (see Section 1.2.1).<sup>209</sup> Broadly, this could correspond to the "paperless library" in the outline of the history of library thinking with Harris, Hannah, and Harris.

Birdsall's notion of the politics of librarianship, however, seems to be not only a historical mapping of the political ideals influential around and within the development of thinking about the library in eras that are following one another. It would be an ideal as well, a kind of an outline and summary of the views that have value as parts of the rationality of the library. Community among the members of a society would probably have some significance notwithstanding the phase of historical developments. Once leaving the historical mode of speaking about what actually has been, however, we should consider questions of politico-ethical nature as regards acceptability and possible preferability of the resulting rationality of an institutional practice such as L&Lship.

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<sup>207</sup> See Birdsall 1994, 116–118.

<sup>208</sup> Birdsall 1994, 123 ff. Here I would think that electricity or digitality as such is not what matters. With Birdsall as well, electronic librarianship seems to refer to a particular trend in thinking about L&Lship, which finds its inspiration in the options that electricity or digitality seems to open.

<sup>209</sup> See Birdsall 1994, 123 ff.

Reflecting on the three elements of Birdsall's politics of librarianship, we probably should think that both liberalism and socialism there would connect to the public library particularly. The element that Birdsall calls conservatism, in my view, would have to do with L&Lship in general, including the public as well as academic libraries.<sup>210</sup> The conservative vein of the politics of librarianship is also the one that most directly combines with such hermeneutical as the Gadamerian rehabilitation of authority and tradition.

We find conservatism's emphasis on the importance of an organic community reflected in the stress placed in library ideology on the library as a 'community institution'. The library serves as the social memory of the community.<sup>211</sup>

The metaphor of memory obviously refers to a kind of continuity, which as such would be a conservative ideal. The Gadamerian emphasis of authority and tradition and in this sense, of our being as participation in tradition and history, or as belonging to them would give his thinking a conservative and perhaps even reactionary impression, indeed. Further, it might not be an impression only. As far as there were something conservative in Gadamer's view, however, it could be a most intelligible, beneficial, and thus justified conservatism, in my view. Conservative or not, the view of Gadamer brings out aspects of our historical, cultural and social being that we should not ignore.

At this point, we could see quite a direct option to combine the Gadamerian view of the role of what the history has handed down to us with Birdsall's view of conservatism as a part of the politics of librarianship. The former could be a plausible point of departure in explicating further in fundamentally philosophical terms possible foundations of the latter. We could recognize as a moment of literature as well the same conservatism of creating and preserving community and continuity, which Birdsall contains as an element in his politics of librarianship.

Furthermore, we could think here even in terms of a kind of the division of the labor as regards what we could call the 'labor of the spirit'. The particular responsibility of L&Lship could be close to what Birdsall calls conservatism if we start from my conception of the library as a place the content of which always represents and is the product of the past. Other practices and institutions may have

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<sup>210</sup> It could be somehow plausible but also fallacious to think that on the academic side, this would not concern the natural sciences or technological fields, for instance. Even engineering in itself has and proceeds as scholarly traditions—notwithstanding the fact that aiming at technological innovations is characteristic of the overall rationality or engineering.

<sup>211</sup> Birdsall 1994, 112

other focuses, but the focus of the library and its contribution within wider sphere of practices and social life would relate to such ‘conservative’ aspects—or, to the aspects and historicity of our being and history awareness as an ideal and a part of *Bildung*. The librarian, then, could be a ‘conservative’ on behalf of his or her position, notwithstanding whatever his or her political views otherwise were. In any case, the aspects emphasized by conservatism—by the ‘healthy conservatism’ reflecting an awareness of history and historicity of our being, we perhaps could say—would matter as well.

Shera as well approaches the spirit of some fundamentals of my argumentation here and especially the spirit of the Gadamerian rehabilitation of authority and tradition by the following remarks.

The traditional role of the library as a part of the communication system is the preservation and transmission of the cultural heritage. The library can, of course, communicate the values of other cultural systems, and indeed, it probably should; but if it departs too far from the attitudes and value system of its own culture, it is certain to be in trouble. The library, then, reflects a particular ‘world view’, a ‘paradigm’, to use Thomas Kuhn’s term, or an ‘image,’ to borrow from Kenneth Boulding.<sup>212</sup>

The significance of this part of the library would become intelligible especially based on what we learned from Gadamer—even if I once again would use the notion of rationality, rather than “value system”. We further should pay attention to another notion with Shera, the notion of “social epistemology” that has a classical position within LID-studies and especially in thinking about the scholarly foundation of the professional practice of L&Lship. Social epistemology as Shera uses the notion should answer the question of how the society knows, as opposed to the traditional epistemological focus on knowledge of an individual. Communication particularly would be a factor related to society’s knowing, according to Shera.

It [social epistemology] should lift the study of the intellectual life from that of a scrutiny of the individual to an enquiry into the means by which a society, nation, or culture achieves an understanding of the totality of stimuli which act upon it. The focus of this discipline should be upon the production,

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<sup>212</sup> Shera 1976, 49.

flow, integration, and consumption of all forms of communicated thought throughout the entire social fabric.<sup>213</sup>

The Gadamerian thought as reconstructed above would give us a good reason to claim that common authorities and traditions as well would be cardinal components in knowing of a society or a community. Once again, we could see the foundation of the educational moment in the rationality of L&Lship having a foundation in quite a fundamental constitution of our social being.

Both conservatism in Birdsall's politics of librarianship and Shera's social epistemology—particularly if we considered common authority as a part of the latter—would thus stress the moment of education in the rationality of L&Lship. The common and the social would have a right and legitimacy of their own, so to speak. In this sense, it would be plausible to think in terms of authority about *scriptum est* as well of L&Lship on behalf of *scriptum est*, instead of viewing them in view of the notion of resource only. Once there is an authority, further, there is, at least, a moment of the educational present.

### **3.5.3 'Being since the past' and 'on the top of traditions', and L&Lship not only on behalf of the users towards *scriptum est***

We could condense the views of Gadamer discussed in previous sections into a claim that *we all start in our turn, and always we start something that already was there*. An instance of the "man's finite, historical mode of being", of course, would be the most fundamental, even banal and trivial fact that all the humans are born at some particular time into the world that already is there. We could say that here we have an existential necessity, indeed. In this sense, the being of a human is, according to Gadamer, *being since the beginning of oneself* or, even better, *'being since the past before oneself'*, in quite an essential sense and even literally. Whether we recognize it as such or not, our life and existence in a fundamental sense consist of participation in what there has been before us already, which also is a foundation of a fundamental moment of authority.

The fundamental idea of the being of the humans as being since the past is a

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<sup>213</sup> Shera 1970, 86. In another place with Shera (1976, 50), we find somewhat poetic illustration for another kind of particularities related to the knowledge of a society: "We know that society knows both more and less than the individual ... . Society 'knows' the content of all the encyclopedias that have ever been written, but it cannot 'know' the beauty of a sunset or the emotional impact of a great poem." This already could suggest that Shera's own theorizing of social epistemology, after all, does not contain very much insight that we actually could characterize as hermeneutical.

plausible point of departure also for conceiving of the rationality of the library as a place where the *scriptum est* is or where there are the books, which always are the products of the past. It indicates that *scriptum est* as a part of history and tradition and representing them could have a say. Even as regards the rationality of L&Lship, consequently, the receiver-user would not be the only participant with a say, and reducing all possible legitimacy of the library to the interests of the users would no more be the self-evidently only intelligible option. This would be quite a direct counter-argument to what I called legitimation userism. The library indeed could be intelligibly on behalf of *scriptum est* as well.

We further could benefit here my metaphorical claim of the practice of L&Lship going on ‘on the top of’ *scriptum est*. This would be quite well in accordance with hermeneutical thinking in general and with Gadamer in particular. We can see as a fundamental theme with Gadamer as well that our being and understanding always take place ‘on the top of’ traditions and history, which are the ground on which we stand, function, and are what we are, so to speak.<sup>214</sup> Within the somewhat broad and vague semantics of the preposition ‘about’, we even here could say that L&Lship is about *scriptum est*, but not in the particular sense of telling the truth about *scriptum est* with the truth criterion of *scriptum est* as its maxim.

Still another way to illustrate the question of userism is to position it in the classical chain on communication from the sender through a channel to the receiver. Hermeneutics classically is a discipline about reading. In this sense, we even could characterize it as an ‘inherently userist’ point of departure. In terms of the classical chain of communication if applied to the life of the books, after all, the reader is in the position of the receiver, at the end of the chain. Hermeneutics, however, as a discipline of reading already, especially emphasizes the say of what one is reading. We may ask then whether the library should orient

- *towards the sender and his, her, or its product on behalf of the user, reader, or receiver only and self-evidently or, in addition to this, at least,*

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<sup>214</sup> The being on the top of history and traditions as it figures out with Gadamer is not a mere ceremonial declaration of the significance of history or praising and perhaps mythologizing the past because of some reactionary, nostalgic, or even irrationalist motivations. It neither would mean only the solemn declaration that ‘we stand on the shoulders of Giants’, thought in Gadamerian terms, even this dictum could become more concrete. What we find with Gadamer, in any case, is the result of a most convincing analysis and argumentation about our being as humans and its conditions.



- *towards the user or receiver on behalf of the sender and his, her, or its product, i.e., on behalf of literature and scriptum est.*

The question would be about the say and about who or what intelligibly might have a say, and this would combine even to the questions of legitimation userism and userism as regards the focus. The foundation of the possible educational role and function that the library might have would combine with focusing on *scriptum est* as well, in addition to or even above focusing on the users, as far as we are talking about the primary scholarly and professional focus of L&Lship.

I can summarize my notion of the obligation of *scriptum est* into two claims, which could be alternative aspects of the obligation and combine with each other.

- (1) *Scriptum est* may have a say that we should recognize and to which we perhaps should listen. This particularly would be the result of our Gadamerian excursion.
- (2) In a general sense, the possibly say of *scriptum est* also makes intelligible that we should pay attention to it and perhaps make it a scholarly and professional focus and even the center of gravity of L&Lship. This, in turn, could imply that we should recognize *scriptum est* as a criterion of truth.

Then again, Gadamer's criticism on historical objectivism could make this combination of L&Lship on behalf of and about *scriptum est* somewhat problematic. We could see the tension between the truth criterion of *scriptum est* particularly and the strictly Gadamerian premises.

Here, once more, it could be useful to summarize as follows the Gadamerian idea of authority and tradition and the fundamental dimension of education there as a dialectical duality.

- The tradition is influencing, in any case, all of us—did we notice it or not—and this, in turn, is the condition of our community, which actually is the condition of our very being as humans.
- Consequently, we also have a reason to listen to it while it 'speaks aloud', i.e. in instances where we become aware of it. We perhaps should even be actively looking for such instances. This would be the Gadamerian *Bildung* if we were to define it in a concise manner.

Whether we realize it or not and whether we wish to take it into account or not, our dependency on history is there, as a part of quite the fundamental conditions

of our being and even of any rationality among us, to the degree that being unaware of it would also be alienation of a kind.

Finally, a remark might be in place as regards my view of L&Lship as a ‘seriously educational’ or, in Gadamerian concepts, a *Bildung*-related institution and practice, which could seem somewhat idealist. In reality, people while using the public libraries, for instance—perhaps particularly in modern industrialized societies—quite often are aiming by no means at highly educational goals, let alone the Gadamerian *Bildung*. In many cases, they can be looking for reading—or, perhaps, videos and music recordings—for leisure-time pleasure and merely for entertainment. I would not have anything to say against such reasons to use the library either, but in view of the society, we perhaps expect something more.

Here, however, we perhaps could appeal to the famous Hegelian notion of the “cunning of Reason”<sup>215</sup>. Activities of humans can produce—sometimes even tend to produce—valuable effects even beyond their actual aims. Actions of people motivated by not so noble passions can contribute to the emergence of something that is worthy in view of the history and reason. Similarly, in a community with good libraries that people actually are using, the people can also be more knowledgeable than the case would be otherwise. Their taste can be more sophisticated, more sensitive to varying aesthetics; they can be more sensitive to recognize the rights and wishes of the other people, etc.—even if they, in view of their conscious and deliberate aims, used their library for entertainment and pleasure only.<sup>216</sup>

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<sup>215</sup> See, for instance, Hegel 1837/1956, 33.

<sup>216</sup> Furthermore, even those reading for pleasure and entertainment only can also develop habits and skills of reading or otherwise receiving instances of *scriptum est* and in other occasions apply them in ‘seriously educational’ pursuits as well. The habits and skills of reading thus evolving could be purely instrumental. In a literary culture, however, such skills would be in quite a fundamental sense instrumental and instrumental for education and even *Bildung*, though certainly as such not what I denote by the notion of substantially educational.



## 4 A cul-de-sac with Gadamer and introductory remarks on the Ricoeurian way ahead

In spite of the firm foundation of intelligibility of L&Lship on behalf of *scriptum est* that we can find in Gadamerian hermeneutics, the other side of the rationality of L&Lship as I conceive of it, the library about *scriptum est* becomes problematic in view of the Gadamerian thought. This is the case particularly if we conceive of L&Lship about and obligation of *scriptum est* in such a manner that the latter as a criterion of truth is the maxim defining the primary rationality of L&Lship. This also leads us to a tension, perhaps even a controversy, between the Ricoeurian and the Gadamerian hermeneutics.

Within the sphere of bibliographic scholarship, assumingly, content-historical bibliography (CHB) would be the instance containing most genuinely hermeneutical problematic. CHB would also be the instances of bibliography that particularly matters because of the semiotic nature of *scriptum est*. Then again, my notion of L&Lship about *scriptum est*, particularly if we stress the truth criterion of *scriptum est* as its maxim, would not be compatible without problems with Gadamer, let alone all the possible readings of Gadamer.

### 4.1 “Obsessive concern with radicality” vs. the descending pathway towards multiple fields of regional hermeneutics

Ricoeur—obviously referring to Gadamer as well—criticizes “philosophical hermeneutics” for not having enough concern in learning from historical research or from other more concrete fields of “regional hermeneutics”, such as philology or depth psychology. According to Ricoeur, “philosophical hermeneutics” is too eager to proceed “along the ascending pathway toward ontology”, while neglecting the “descending pathway which leads back toward historical inquiry”, for instance. Here already, we can see how he pays particular attention to history in the sense of concrete historical investigation as well, i.e. to history as an investigation of how things actually have been. This is a part of his ‘regionalism’. Within my thematic as well, the ‘regionality’ that particularly matters is history. It would be the literary history—derived from the sense that I have given to the notion of literature as the instance where works and documentation combine—i.e. the literary history as materializes in *scriptum est*.

In this respect, we perhaps could pay attention to the following aspects of the Ricoeurian hermeneutics.

- (1) Ricoeur pays more than Gadamer attention to various concrete and particular instances of interpretation and understanding.
- (2) The position of the specific and even formal features of literature as one ‘regionality’ is with Ricoeur more emphasized than with Gadamer. This feature would have particular significance here. Library and bibliography obviously have to do with writing and texts—even if we perhaps had to conceive of these notions widely and include there such forms of discourse as music and either still or moving pictures, etc.
- (3) Because of the specific feature of writing, texts, and literature as forms of discourse, Ricoeur claims that an intermediate, objectifying, or distancing semantic phase of structural analysis is necessary while encountering them in a manner characterized as mature. This is the specific instance where we can recognize an actual tension between him and Gadamer’s criticism of historical objectivism, including a suspicious or even negative position on the very idea of the method in what Gadamer calls the modern science.

Ricoeur characterizes as an “obsessive concern with radicality” what is driving “philosophical hermeneutics” towards what he calls the “ascending pathway”. Yet, “The ascending dialectic, Plato said, is arduous. But the descending one is even more so”.<sup>217</sup> According to Ricoeur, the claim of universality of hermeneutics—the aspiration towards an all-encompassing, huge synthetic unity, as I characterized it—remains a problem with Gadamer. According to Ricoeur, “... the hermeneutical experience itself [with Gadamer] discourages the recognition of any critical instance”, then continuing:

The primary experience of this hermeneutics, determining the very place from which it raises its claim to universality, involves the refutation of the ‘alienating distancing’—*Verfremdung*—which commands the objectifying attitude of human sciences.<sup>218</sup>

Ricoeur then suggests a shift in “the initial focus of the hermeneutical question”. The “mainspring, the key to the inner life, or hermeneutics” would be “a certain dialectic between the experience of belonging and alienating distancing”<sup>219</sup>.

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<sup>217</sup> Ricoeur 1976, 683

<sup>218</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 90

<sup>219</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 90

Quite briefly, we could say that what we can characterize as the Ricoeurian cut-off and ‘regionalism’ here confronts with the Gadamerian synthetic unity. Distanciation with Ricoeur, however, is not an absolute opposite of belonging-to. It rather indicates another dimension that we should not ignore. We can see this quite clearly in the following.

This concept of distanciation is the dialectical counterpart of belonging-to, in the sense that our manner of belonging to a historical tradition is to be related according to a distance which oscillates between remoteness and proximity.<sup>220</sup>

The notion of interpretation with Ricoeur specifically means a process through which we move towards the “hidden” (*caché*) meanings behind the ones that are apparent in a text. Related to Ricoeur’s claim that we should pay attention to the particularities of “regional hermeneutics”, there are different temporal orientations. According to Ricoeur, there is a kind of “archaeology of subject” in psychoanalysis, since we should be looking for the meaning of present dreams and thus present problems of a person in an earlier suffocation of instincts and desires. Within “phenomenology of spirit”, then, there is a reversed direction and temporal orientation. It would seek for the true meaning of what is at some particular time in what it is to become or should become, in the *telos* to which its essence and potentials would lead once accomplished and actualized.

The split of hermeneutics to such particular fields, on a general level again, reflects a position that Ricoeur himself calls “*un kantisme post-hégélien*”. The particular characteristic of Kant, as opposed to Hegel, here would be what Ricoeur calls “the philosophy of limits”, as an opposite to a “philosophy of system” (*philosophie des limites et non philosophie de system*).<sup>221</sup> According to Ricoeur, there necessarily would be fundamental and fundamentally different and distinct dimensions and rationalities. Though Ricoeur here is taking distance from Hegel particularly, we probably could assume that according to Ricoeur, the same criti-

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<sup>220</sup> Ricoeur 1975, 92. As an anticipation of remarks that I shall make on ambiguities of Gadamer’s view, what Ricoeur writes here certainly reminds Gadamer’s claim of the intermediary place between strangeness and familiarity as the “true home of hermeneutics” (see above, Section 4.2.3[b]).

<sup>221</sup> Ricoeur 1969/1974, 403, and Ricoeur 1969, 405.

cism would apply to an all-encompassing synthetic unity of the Gadamerian type as well.<sup>222</sup>

As regards teleology and the phenomenology of spirit, a remark that Ricoeur makes on Hegel could be noteworthy. After quoting Hegel from the preface of the *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Ricoeur repeats from there the claim that philosophy, in a sense, comes always too late (“*La philosophie vient toujours trop tard*”). In a sense, the nature of philosophy is that it is going on as a reflection of what there already is, rather than as a plan or a projection towards the future. Even if this was as claimed by Hegel (and I would think that it is), we may ask whether the case could be the same with reason, which we can see when Ricoeur continues: “[...] *la philosophie, sans dout. Mais qu’en est-il de la raison?*“<sup>223</sup>. In other words, the reason might demand us to look at the future as well, so to speak, as well as plan and think about questions of morality now and in the planned future.<sup>223</sup>

While with Gadamer, there is the aspiration of seeing and, in a sense, even preserving the original unity, we can see here, once again, how the Ricoeurian thought is going on in terms of dualities and tensions. It might be, however, that even Gadamer intends to say something similar in the claims like the one of the “true home of hermeneutics” as well as his own attempts to take a distance from Hegel. with Gadamer as well, in some instances at least, hermeneutics seems to be ‘doomed’ to this intermediate area, similarly as finite human understanding always proceeds within some fundamentally restricting conditions.

To conclude introduction to the differences between Gadamer and Ricoeur, I would make still a further remark on Gadamer’s appeals to the original unity losing of which would result in alienation (see Sections 2.3 and 2.3.4). Opposed to this would be Ricoeur’s obvious interest in what may happen after such origi-

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<sup>222</sup> Ricoeur (1969, 405 ff.) deals with this particularly within his philosophy of religion, where he refers to Kant whose thought in this respect can be seen in the ‘division of labour’ between his three major works, opening three major and separate questions. The first question of what we can know would be the question of *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. The second question of what we should do is the one of *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*. Finally, the third question of religion and faith, or of what we can hope, is the one dealt with in *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, in addition to the themes of aesthetics. (See also Coplestone 1960/1964, 237 ff.). Ricoeur, however, does not actually refer to the last one of the *Critiques* in this context, but within this frame, in any case, the rationality of religion, according to Ricoeur, would be the intelligence of faith and hope (*intellectus fidei et spei*). (Ricoeur 1969, 405.)

<sup>223</sup> Ricoeur 1969, 405. After this reasoning, Ricoeur still continues as follows. “*C’est ce question qui me renvoie de Hegel à Kant qui ne sombre pas avec l’éthique de l’impératif, à un Kant qui, à son tour, comprend Hegel [...] c’est le Kant de la dialectique ; le Kant des deux Dialectiques.*“

nal unities within particular and “regional” practices and in hermeneutics proper to such practices. We saw Gadamer appealing to a kind of starting-point of individual development or about early childhood as the place of such original unity (“Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society and the state in which we live”, see Section 3.3.1). As adults—or, as an allusion to thematic that we shall discuss later, even as citizens emancipated from our original “self-evident way” of belonging to the family, society, and the state, however, we perhaps cannot avoid all alienation, and we could think that Ricoeur is focusing particularly on this with the views that separate him from Gadamer.

## **4.2 Specifying remarks on the (Gadamerian) notion of (historical) objectivism**

By references to remarks within LID-studies by Cornelius and particularly by Hoel in Section 3.2, I already anticipated the problematic that we should discuss here further. Remarks by Hoel and Cornelius certainly have a foundation in Gadamerian thought.

Another reason to pay particular attention to this is the fact that there has been, within LID-studies—as well as within various fields of cultural and social studies and the humanities since the last decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century—a trend of objectivism-critical argumentation with at least some resemblance to Gadamer’s criticism of historical objectivism.

### **4.2.1 Specification of the notion of (historical) objectivism**

Above, we have already seen some instances of criticism of historical objectivism with Gadamer. Furthermore, Gadamer writes as follows about the “non-objectifying” nature of our belonging to history and traditions:

[...] we stand always within tradition, and this is no objectifying process, ie we do not conceive of what tradition says as something other, something alien. It is always part of us, a model or exemplar, a recognition of ourselves which our later historical judgment would hardly see as a kind of knowledge, but as the simplest preservation of tradition.<sup>224</sup>

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<sup>224</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 250.



Perhaps the most straightforward critical comment that Gadamer makes against historical objectivism or historicism proceeds as follows. He first criticizes the “naiveté of so-called historicism”, which “in trusting to its own methodological approach forgets its own historicity”<sup>225</sup>, and then continues as follows.

True historical thinking must take account of its own historicity. Only then will it not chase the phantom of a historical object which is the object of progressive research, but learn to see in the object the counterpart of itself and hence understand both. The true historical object is not an object at all, but the unity of the one and the other, a relationship in which exists both the reality of history and the reality of historical understanding.<sup>226</sup>

Even here, however, if we are reading carefully, we should notice that “the reality of history” and “the reality of historical understanding” appear in a manner that reminds a balance, which could mean that neither the “reality of history” would be without significance. Simultaneously, however, Gadamer also quite clearly excludes thinking about the history or tradition as an object.

Richard J. Bernstein defines objectivism as follows, rather strictly, but also abstractly.

By ‘objectivism’, I mean the basic conviction that there is or must be some permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, or rightness.<sup>227</sup>

With the notion “ahistorical matrix” as a determinant of objectivism, Bernstein here comes close to the Gadamerian criticism of historical objectivism, for instance. More concretely, however, we could see objectivism manifested in “metaphysical realism”, according to Bernstein:

‘Objectivism’ has frequently been used to designate metaphysical realism—the claim that there is a world of objective reality that exists independently of us and that has a determinate nature or essence that we can know. [...] What is ‘out there’ (objective) is presumed to be independent of us (subjects), and knowledge is achieved when a subject correctly mirrors or represents objective reality.<sup>228</sup>

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<sup>225</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 266–267

<sup>226</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 267.

<sup>227</sup> Bernstein 1983/1985, 8.

<sup>228</sup> Bernstein 1983/1985, 9.

This formulation would come close to Gadamer's remark on "ontological prejudice that is contained in the ideal of scientific objectivity" (see Section 3.3.3[a]). Truth in view of such prejudice would mean that our knowledge in some sense should correspond to some states of affairs, some reality "out there" about which we should know something and which we can categorize as the object of our knowledge. In this treatise, I find such a notion of objectivity and objective warranted, already because of its connection to what the critics of objectivism—Gadamer among the others—seem to be criticizing.<sup>229</sup>

We could here use even Alfred Tarski's classical formulation of "the semantic concept of truth", which Tarski himself also relates to the correspondence theory of truth. Tarski's short, quite clear and at least apparently quite incontestable statement is as follows.

The sentence 'snow is white' is true if, and only if, snow is white"<sup>230</sup>.

Applied to Gadamer's notion of historical objectivism, this would mean that a claim about some historical issue is true if and only if the case in the past was as claimed, or the claim and past state of affairs in some sense correspond to each other. In my view, the fact that a proposition or a text, for instance, can correspond to the past states of affairs only in a relative, non-exhaustive, and actually rather complex manner is not enough to make Tarski's notion unintelligible. Some relative correspondence already could be enough. We only should recognize its relativity as a methodological reservation.

It is useful to collect in a somewhat schematic form the options of what one might be saying while criticizing objectivism. As regards the idea of truth as correspondence and the consequent conception of knowledge, we could have following options.

- (1) One could make minor or major methodological reservations related to the impact of making observations and the instruments used, as well as the im-

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<sup>229</sup> Otherwise, it would be quite plausible to conceive of objectivity in a sense that approaches the conditions of intersubjectivity.

<sup>230</sup> Tarski 1944. 343. A more extensive formulation is as follows. "Thus, if we ask a highschool boy, or even an adult intelligent man having no special philosophical training, whether he regards a sentence to be true if it agrees with reality, or if it designates an existing state of affairs, it may simply turn out that he does not understand the question; in consequence his response, whatever it may -be, will be of no value for us. But his answer to the question whether he would admit that the sentence "it is snowing" could be true although it is not snowing, or could be false although it is snowing, would naturally be very significant for our problem." (Op. cit., 360.)

fact on the object of the results of the scholarly activity itself<sup>231</sup>. One also could make remarks on the fundamental dependency of knowledge on the constitution of our capacity to know or on our interests and practical perspectives, for instance<sup>232</sup>.

- (2) One could make minor or major epistemological reservations, such as remarks on the fundamental impossibility of achieving the things “out there” as such (or the Kantian *das Ding an sich*, we could say) and compare it to our knowledge about it as the correspondence theory of truth could assume us to do. This is present, of course, in arguments of empiricism as well, as a remark that we can immediately have only sense perceptions.
- (3) One could be challenging or denying all possibility of any rational reasons behind and the sense of any pursuit of achieving knowledge or truths in the sense of correspondence. This could be a particularly noteworthy option while considering history and, it seems to me, this would actually be the core and the substantial and—in my view—most intelligible meaning of Gadamer’s criticism of historical objectivism.
- (4) Finally, one could deny—in terms of a kind or another of ontology, for instance—all intelligibility of any notion of truth in the sense of correspondence or any notion of knowledge in the sense that would follow from such a conception of truth. We saw Gadamer as well doing this by denying as an “ontological prejudice” the very assumption of knowing subjects and known objects. In my view, however, this would not be a noteworthy argument. My

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<sup>231</sup> As regards the question of objectivity and objectivism, a now and then mentioned aspect of the difference between natural sciences and various socio-cultural fields of study is that scholarship and investigation within the latter particularly has quite a direct impact on the object that is under investigation. Umberto Eco (1976/1979, 29) formulates the argument in a most eloquent manner while discussing the nature of semiotics as a scholarly field. “I would put the matter this way: the object of semiotics may somewhat resemble (i) either the sea, where, independently of the continuous movement of water molecules and the interplay of submarine streams, there is a sort of average resulting form which is called the Sea, (ii) or a carefully ordered landscape, where human intervention continuously changes the form of settlements, dwellings, plantations, canals and so on. If one accepts the second hypothesis, [...], one must also accept another condition of the semiotic approach which will not be like exploring the sea, where ship’s wake disappears as soon as it has passed, but more like exploring a forest where cart-trails or footprints do modify the explored landscape, so that the description the explorer gives of it must also take into account the ecological variations that the has produced”. My footnote in Section 1.2.2 on Ingwersen’s and Järvelin’s integration of IS and IR, of course, would have an affinity with what Eco is metaphorically expressing here.

<sup>232</sup> A classical instance of this, of course, is Habermas’ (1965/1971) division of the interests of knowledge, which we shall discuss a little further below.

reservations as regards such arguments comes from an assumption that it would be equally in an ontological sense prejudiced to assume or claim that there *cannot* be and, as the consequence of this, that we should think in terms of knowing subjects and known objects.

According to Gadamer, in any case, historical objectivism or historicism is a fallacy. According to Gadamer, we rather should focus on what the history has handed down to us and on what the text means for us here and now while applied in our present situation. Here we also can see how the two aspects of objectivism with Bernstein combine with each other. In a historicist view, to use Gadamer's notion, correspondence would mean that a claim is true if and only if it corresponds to what actually was "out there" in the past. The state of affairs "out there" in the past would be the "permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework" in the sense that it would be a lasting fact that once in the past, things were in some particular way. The state of affairs that once has been there would be the criterion of truth for a text, for instance, treating of history even here and now.

#### ***4.2.2 The wider currents of argumentation against and around objectivism within LID-studies and elsewhere***

A further reason to pay particular attention to the issue of objectivism is that within LID-studies as well as elsewhere within various fields of social sciences, cultural studies, and the humanities, objectivism-critical argumentation has risen towards the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In addition to hermeneutics, one has found foundations for objectivism-critical views within a wider range of theoretical and conceptual thought.

An example of wider currents of objectivism-critical thought could be Richard Rorty—an influential representative of (neo-)pragmatist current with the notion of the "linguistic turn"<sup>233</sup>—who mentions John Dewey, Heidegger, and Ludwig Wittgenstein as the "three most important philosophers of our [i.e. the 20<sup>th</sup>] century"<sup>234</sup>. Reference to Heidegger, of course, creates a kind of connection—though still an abstract one—towards Gadamerian thought. Rorty himself is claiming that the epistemological problematic of the Modern Western philosophy—manifested in thinking of Descartes and Kant, for instance—has been "set

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<sup>233</sup> See, for instance, Guignon & Hiley 2003.

<sup>234</sup> Rorty 1980, 5.

aside” in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The question is not so much of argumentation for or against the premises of and within this epistemological problematic. Rather, according to Rorty, we simply should leave them behind us. In view of this, of course, there should not be very much argumentation against objectivism either, but this exactly makes the verdict particularly harsh.<sup>235</sup>

Within LID-studies, we can find with Talja, Tuominen, and Savolainen comments with some obvious resemblance with Gadamer’s claim of the linguistic nature of our relationship to the world and consequently of knowledge. The ”origin of knowledge” in constructionist terms would be “in ongoing conversations” where “knowledge and identities are constructed in discourses that categorise the world and bring phenomena into sight”. In another place, they further remark that “We produce and organise social reality together by using language”. The authors criticize view “based on the distinction between mind and language, on the subject-object dichotomy characterising modern thought”.<sup>236</sup>

A lengthy quotation from Kenneth J. Gergen—a researcher of psychology quite appreciatively referred to by Talja, Tuominen, and Savolainen as well—illustrates well the premises of post-modern objectivism-critical positions.

For modernists, the world simply is out there available for observation. Within the texts of postmodernism, however, there are no grounds for such a presumption. There is no means of declaring that the world is either out there or reflected objectively by an "in here." To speak of ‘the world’ or ‘mind’ at all requires language. Such words as *matter* and *mental process* are not mirrors of the world, but constituents of language systems. To speak, then, of the material world and causal relations is not to describe accurately what there is,

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<sup>235</sup> Rorty (1980, 6) writes: “For all three, the notions of "foundations of knowledge" and of philosophy as revolving around the Cartesian attempt to answer the epistemological skeptic are set aside. Further, they set aside the notion of "the mind" common to Descartes, Locke, and Kant-as a special subject of study, located in inner space, containing elements or processes which make knowledge possible. This is not to say that they have alternative "theories of knowledge" or "philosophies of mind." They set aside epistemology and metaphysics as possible disciplines. I say "set aside" rather than "argue against" because their attitude toward the traditional problematic is like the attitude of seventeenth century philosophers toward the scholastic problematic.”

<sup>236</sup> Talja & Tuominen & Savolainen 2004, 82 and 89–93.

but to participate in a textual genre—to draw from the immense repository of intelligibilities that constitute a particular cultural tradition.<sup>237</sup>

Ard Huizing and Mary Cavanagh combine their objectivism-critical view quite particularly with the notion of practice.

In sum, practice theorists oppose the artificial divide between objects and subjects, simply because both can be observed to live intimately together in actual social and organizational life. [...] Pursuing this aim results in a distinct ontology that can be summarised as being heterogeneous, connective and constructive; in a non-individualist, socio-material epistemology; and in a methodology which approaches objects and subjects symmetrically as bearers and generators of knowledge that suggests concentrating on their actions and practices to understand how social order and change are achieved.<sup>238</sup>

An argument by Ruben Toledano O’Farrill, still another LID-scholar inspired by hermeneutics, is an example of explicitly reserved objectivism-critical views within LID-studies.

Positivist epistemologies have of course been heavily (and rightly) criticized, but it is important to also be critical of extreme subjectivist positions which seem to leave no reality (or are interested in no reality) beyond the cultural-theoretical construction of research objects from interpretive approaches. The fallacy is to believe that, after the failure of the positivist epistemology in social science, there is no objective reality that can be apprehended.<sup>239</sup>

In spite of his seemingly most straightforward criticism of objectivism, O’Farrill continues: “This consideration has been intensified by the rise of post-modernist relativism”. As regards social constructionism particularly, Hjørland seems to be criticizing it, even if not very explicitly, for being “anti-realist”<sup>240</sup>. O’Farrill’s and

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<sup>237</sup> Gergen (2001, 805.), then continuing: “Or, to amplify my earlier remarks, the view of human beings as constituted by universal mechanisms (cognitive, emotional, etc.), causally related to environmental antecedents and behavioral consequences, is not derived from what is the case. Rather, this conception of the person is an outgrowth of a particular tradition—including both its linguistic genres and the institutions in which they are embedded. This conception the person cannot itself be verified or falsified through observation; rather, a linguistic forestructure is essential to direct and interpret whatever observations we do make.” Partly Gergen’s argumentation is quite incontestable. As far as we can read this as reservation as regards reduction of knowledge into the object that we aim to know, there is not very much new in what Gergen characterizes as postmodern, of course.

<sup>238</sup> Huizing & Cavanagh, 2011.

<sup>239</sup> O’Farrill 2008, 160.

<sup>240</sup> Hjørland 2005, 159. Further illustration for what Hjørland means by anti-realist, we can find in the following. “So, the realist/materialist position is that tropical fish exist, while the antirealist/idealist/nominalist position would say that they only exist as ideas, concepts, social constructions or the like, not as mind-independent entities”. (Hjørland 2004, 489.).

Hjørland's intentions seem to come closer to my own views. Instead of relativism, however, I rather would worry about voluntarism in particular. Relativity and thereby a kind of relativism could be something that we cannot entirely avoid, but voluntarism could be an actual hazard in view of morality. As a difference from Hjørland, furthermore, I would neither emphasize "realism" so universally. Instead, I would subordinate the very problematic to rationalities of particular practices. In some particular practices, we perhaps should mind about some objectivities and realities because of requirements of success in reaching the objectives that we could have in a technical sense, in some other practices because of moral obligations, and still in some other practices, we perhaps have no reason at all to mind about such realities and objectivities. (See more on this in and since Section 7.1)

#### **4.2.3 Some questions about Gadamer's own actual position**

My main interest in this treatise is not in any kind of Gadamerian 'orthodoxy' or in finding out what actually was the position of Gadamer on some particular matters. His criticism of historical objectivism, however, has a close connection to and—at least seemingly—a sharp tension with the rationality of L&Lship about and particularly with the truth criterion of *scriptum est* while the library is 'telling the truth' about *scriptum est*. Then again, as I already have suggested, it seems to me that Gadamer's position on this matter is somewhat confused, after all.

*[a] Paving the way for "late Heidegger" or "from Heidegger back to Husserl", and Gadamer's Collingwood?*

The arguments by Hoel and Cornelius (see Section 3.2) are well 'in the spirit' of reading of Gadamer by Gianni Vattimo, a post-modern philosopher, who writes that "[...] the good, appropriate interpretation is never so in virtue of its correspondence to a previously set truth"<sup>241</sup>. Vattimo then proceeds, in radically objectivism-critical manner, through remarks on the Heideggerian premises behind Gadamer, and concludes that hermeneutics, according to Gadamer,

[...] is also a true "ontology of actuality", a philosophy of that late-modern world in which the world really dissolves, and more and more so, into the

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<sup>241</sup> Vattimo 2002, 301.

play of interpretations. Insofar as it is assumed as a responsible historical project, hermeneutics actively grasps being's vocation of giving itself, and increasingly so, as the truth of human language, and not as thing and datum *Gegenständigkeit*.<sup>242</sup>

The “play of interpretations”, could bring there some relativism, of course. In view of morality, however, I would see even worse the danger of a kind of voluntarism there.

Martin Kusch, on the other hand, makes some remarks on the possible “Husserlian” motives with Gadamer. Kusch writes that some lines of thought with Gadamer could be for Heidegger “[...] like a new Husserlian dichotomy between consciousness (*qua* subject) and tradition (*qua* object) ... like a withdrawal from the Heideggerian conception of world, language and tradition as one universal medium”. According to Kusch, here is some irony, as Gadamer assumes that he would be paving a way to “late Heidegger” while Heidegger himself “is likely to have thought that Gadamer was rather paving a way from Heidegger back to Husserl”<sup>243</sup>.

We could also return to Gadamer's reference to Collingwood (see Section 3.3.2[b]), who writes that the historian

[...] must see what the philosophical problem was, of which his author is here stating his solution. He must think that problem out for himself, see what possible solutions of it might be offered, and see why this particular philosopher chose that solution instead of another. This means re-thinking for himself the thought of his author, and nothing short of that will make him the historian of that author's philosophy.<sup>244</sup>

Collingwood characterizes this “re-thinking” as “re-enactment of the past experience”, which clearly indicates that the historian would indeed aim at reaching the reality “out there” in the past, the question and problem that the philosopher in the position of an object of historical study has had while writing a text, for instance. In view of Gadamer, however, this could come too close to romantic historicism or historical objectivism. At least in a particularly formal sense and while looking for consistency with what we already have seen, it could be more in the spirit of Gadamer to think that the question, albeit a question posed by the text, is the question that the text in the present raises in the mind of the present reader.

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<sup>242</sup> Vattimo 2002, 305. James Risser (2010, 169) explains what Vattimo means by “ontology of actuality”, as follows: “... an ontology of actuality is simply what being means in our current condition”.

<sup>243</sup> Kusch 1989, 237.

<sup>244</sup> Collingwood 1946/1976, 283.



Martin Kusch, in any case, writes as follows on this theme with Gadamer—and especially on Gadamer’s view of Collingwood’s history of questions:

Gadamer parts company with Collingwood in that he emphasizes the fact that the reconstructed question that the text is assumed to have been intended to answer is always more than the original question. This because it is posed by an interpreter who reconstructs the original question only to answer himself the challenge that the text poses for his prejudices.<sup>245</sup>

Even according to Gadamer himself, furthermore, “a hermeneutically trained mind must be, from the start, sensitive to text’s quality of newness”. This would be the consequence of the assumption that the reader expects the text “to tell him something”. Right thereafter, however, Gadamer continues: “this kind of sensitivity involves neither ‘neutrality’ in the matter of object nor extinction of one’s self”.<sup>246</sup> We can ask, however, whether there were, after all, some moment of neutrality, some moment of leaving one’s own situation and the horizon, and some pursuit of objectivity in the sense of neutrality even. In my view, this would advance considerably intelligibility and acceptability of Gadamerian thought. Even an observer, who does not assume that he or she is neutral, can make the serious question of what actually is what he or she is observing—if only he or she has some reason to do it. (Later, in Chapter 8 and particularly, in Sections 8.2 to 8.4, I shall suggest some reason that there could be). Without recognizing this, the whole of the conceptual figure remains somehow mysterious and the fusion of horizons could result in vanishing all actual subjectivity of human beings in some entirely undifferentiated ‘happening’.

*[b] The obligations of a translator and the intermediate place between strangeness and familiarity*

In some respect, Gadamer's position seems quite radical, but in some other respects, we can see him as a rather moderate critic of most straightforwardly objectivist views only. Illustratively though perhaps somewhat roughly as well, I reduced the notion of objectivism to the notion of truth as correspondence. In this sense, in any case, the following remark by Kusch is interesting while wondering what might have been, after all, Gadamer's own position on this matter.

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<sup>245</sup> Kusch 1989, 236.

<sup>246</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 238.

Gadamer has also mentioned (in pers. comm.) that he always remained committed to the notion of truth as correspondence, even though he has not dealt with this notion explicitly<sup>247</sup>.

The notion of knowledge as a proposition with a referent, which I would prefer (see Section 2.2), comes quite close to this, in a sense. The notion of truth would be an attribute of knowledge and the criterion and the very concept of truth would be correspondence with the referent in a sense or another. Coherence, for instance, could be a substitute or an operationalization even that we must accept because of some epistemological reservations.

While illustrating the hermeneutical process by comparing it to the task of the translator, Gadamer makes a tiny remark that we should not ignore. According to Gadamer, “the translator must translate the meaning to be understood into the context in which the other speaker lives”. Then—nearly as if in passing or as a self-evident matter—he remarks, “This does not, of course, mean that he is at liberty to falsify the meaning of what the other person says”<sup>248</sup>. Thus, what the original speaker said would actually be one of the criteria of translation—albeit probably not the only one—quite in the sense of truth as correspondence: the translation should correspond, in some appropriate sense of the word, to what the original speaker originally said. If this really is a self-evidence for Gadamer, then we should perhaps ask what further self-evidences there are, and his seemingly even rather radically objectivism-critical claims might become more or less relative. Gadamer himself, furthermore, quite explicitly tells us that we must not understand meanings “in an arbitrary way”<sup>249</sup>.

We here could return, once again, to the subtleties *intelligendi*, *explicandi*, and *applicandi* as well and their unity (see Section 3.3.2[a]). Would it be a unity that liquidates what it unifies or a unity of something that remains somehow separate even within the unity? The remarks here suggest that *subtilitas intelligendi* as well could have, after all, some independent significance as well. In this sense, also, the remark that Gadamer makes on “the true home of hermeneutics” is interesting.

The place between strangeness and familiarity that a transmitted text has for us is that intermediate place between being a historically intended separate

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<sup>247</sup> Kusch 1989, 242.

<sup>248</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992 346.

<sup>249</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992. 238.

object and being part of tradition. The true home of hermeneutics is in this intermediate area.<sup>250</sup>

I think, we should read this short remark quite literally if we wish to make the Gadamerian view intelligible. The "true home of hermeneutics"—perhaps of human existence even in a wider sense—is exactly this "intermediate place", not either of the extremes or the ends between which this intermediate place is. Consequently, there always remains the moment of strangeness. It seems to me plausible to assume that once encountered, what is strange is also, but not only, an object. As far as it would be an object, however, it would be it quite in the sense of thought criticized for objectivism.

*[c] An additional remark on agnosticism as regards the sense of history and as regards oneself of a subject that the history made*

Finally, I shall reflect a little further on the views of Gadamer and our options to see them in terms of a particular kind of agnosticism that we could find with Gadamer as well. As I already mentioned in Section 1.5, various aspects of agnosticism constitute an undercurrent thematic in this treatise and becomes manifest in some conclusive parts of my argumentation. In this sense, the remarks that I make here can anticipate my argumentation particularly in Section 9.4 against self-righteousness and even arrogance as dangers within humanism.

The remark from which I proceed here relates to the way in which Gadamer while taking distance from an assumingly Hegelian view emphasizes the finite nature of the hermeneutical experience and linguistic event (See Section 3.3.3). Gadamer remarks that history can never become completely transparent taking thus criticizing the assumed Hegelian "absolute fusion of history and truth".

That we should become completely aware of effective-history is just as hybrid a statement as when Hegel speaks of absolute knowledge, in which history would become completely transparent to itself and hence to be raised to the level of a concept.<sup>251</sup>

There would be a kind of agnosticism. It would be an agnosticism as regards the history or, we perhaps could say, the Deep and Great Logic of History—notwithstanding whether we assumed that such a logic actually existed or not. A result of

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<sup>250</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 262–263.

<sup>251</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 268.

this would be, in any case, that “To exist historically means that knowledge of oneself can never be complete”<sup>252</sup>. If the history that a human can never conceive of entirely has made him or her, in a sense, an obvious result would be that he or she would also remain unknown to him/herself, to a degree at least. In my view, a logical consequence of this kind of historical agnosticism within the overall frame of Gadamerian thought could actually rehabilitate a kind of a subordinate moment of historical objectivism or even a kind of ‘subordinate positivism’ as regards history. Such agnosticism could justify and even require acceptance of some ‘less perfect’ and fragmentary kind of knowledge about the history that has made the subject. Also simple propositions of what there actually has been as parts of the history that has made him or her could matter. I shall return to this shortly in Section 9.4.2, with a somewhat peculiarly Cartesian perspective.

We thus could make some questions and reservations—in view of what Gadamer’s own actual position could be as well as of morality—as regards Gadamer’s criticism of historical objectivism and especially as regards its radicality. Furthermore, we may say that Gadamer himself is not always very consistent with this matter. In continuation, however, I proceed from the assumption that Gadamer’s criticism of historical objectivism is relatively radical, in spite of the remarks above. This assumption would be consistent with the radical conclusions that one seems to draw from him, and one of my intentions in this treatise is to indicate possible one-sidedness and questionability of such exaggeratedly radical conclusions. I wish to take seriously the dangers the foundation of which a possibly even “obsessive concern with radicality” could be .

### **4.3 Alienation, something to be overcome or as a price to be paid?**

In this and the next section, I shall reconstruct some premises of Ricoeurian thought that we can oppose to Gadamer or, at least, to radically objectivism-critical readings of him. As opposed to Gadamer’s reluctance as regards the very idea of the method in modern science, Ricoeur aims at combining the objectifying and distancing methodologies as a moment, on one hand, with belonging-to, on the other, in such a way that the former would not destroy the latter and the fundamental rationality of the humanities and hermeneutics could remain. The founda-

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<sup>252</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 269.

tion of intelligibility of Ricoeur's position comes from what I shall denote as the Ricoeurian cut-off.

In Ricoeur's own scholarly environment in France of 1960's, he saw the methodology of structural analysis as quite a new mode of explanation—even if I would use the notion of explication, rather than explanation, to denote the intellectual activity about which Ricoeur is talking. In any case, there would be quite a noteworthy difference between it and the ideal of explanation within modern natural sciences or even within the human or social sciences following the fundamental ideals typical to modern natural sciences. Ricoeur accentuates that linguistics—especially in its structuralist form—provides us with a mode of explanation appropriate to the humanities. Ricoeur thus can suggest that one should rethink the whole question of explanation within the humanities and even in hermeneutics.<sup>253</sup>

According to Ricoeur, there is with Gadamer “the opposition between alienating distanciation and belonging”. Ricoeur, however, continues by a remark on “an untenable antinomy” with Gadamer.

[...] on the one hand, alienating distanciation is the attitude that renders possible the objectification which reigns in the human sciences; but on the other hand, this distanciation, which is the condition of the scientific status of the sciences, is at the same time the fall that destroys the fundamental and primordial relation whereby we belong to and participate in the historical reality which we claim to construct as an object. [...] either we adopt the methodological attitude and lose the ontological density of the reality we study, or we adopt the attitude of truth and must then renounce the objectivity of human sciences.<sup>254</sup>

Ricoeur then continues with his own suggestion, which “stems from a rejection of this alternative and an attempt to overcome it”.

The first expression of this attempt consists in the choice of a dominant problematic which seems to me to escape from the alternative between alienating distanciation and participatory belonging. The dominant problematic is that of the text, which reintroduces a positive and, if I may say so, productive notion of distanciation. In my view, the text is much more than a particular case of intersubjective communication: it is the paradigm of distanciation in communication.<sup>255</sup>

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<sup>253</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 153.

<sup>254</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 131.

<sup>255</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 131.

Distance, as well as distanciation, would then be a part of the primordial and fundamental conditions of “the very historicity of human experience”. As the foundation of what Ricoeur suggests here, we actually can see a particular kind of view of the human or of philosophical anthropology with an emphasis on the finitude of our being, emphasized even more than with Gadamer.

The Ricoeurian cut-off contrasts to Gadamerian aspiration towards an all-encompassing synthetic unity and universality of hermeneutics. Distance—and particularly temporal distance—figures in the Gadamerian thought as well, but the significances that Ricoeur, on one hand, and Gadamer, on the other, give to the notion of distance as a constituent of our being are quite different.

We still could approach the difference between Gadamer and Ricoeur through and around the notion of alienation, a notion that obviously relates to distanciation. With an explicit reference to Gadamer, Ricoeur writes as follows.

To interpret is to bring close the far (temporal, geographic, cultural, spiritual). The mediation by the text is, in this regard, the model of a distanciation which is not simply alienating, as the *Verfremdung* against which Gadamer fights in all his work.<sup>256</sup>

Opposed to the Gadamerian view, Ricoeur emphasizes that distanciation can be “authentically creative” as well. Further, alienation appears with Ricoeur as a “price paid”<sup>257</sup> for something that in itself is positive. To have to pay a price as such is not totally a positive matter, of course. Yet, if paying a price promotes something positive and even is a *sine qua non* of some positive matters, there would be a positive moment as well in the price that we pay.

The notion of alienation relates to particularity and the finitude that is characteristic of humans’ way of being, even with Gadamer. What is particular is also finite. Since we in our finite mode of being would not reach the whole and consequently, there inevitably is present a certain moment of alienation as well as a part of our being. We even could summarize much of the difference between Gadamer and Ricoeur in this, perhaps. While Ricoeur seems to be particularly aware of the necessity of ‘paying prices’, Gadamer somehow seems to ignore such earthly matters. Especially, if we assume with Gadamer that unity is in some sense original and authentic, we may also assume that there is some alienation in all particularity. Furthermore, we could say that what is historical is also particular, and we

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<sup>256</sup> Ricoeur 1975, 92.

<sup>257</sup> Ricoeur 1976, 693.

perhaps should consider the Gadamerian universality of hermeneutics as well from this perspective. Revisiting shortly the topic proper of this treatise, it also could be noteworthy here that the practice of L&Lship certainly is a particular practice.

#### **4.4 From the fate of Moses to rehabilitation of method with “*une épistémologie de l’interprétation touchée, animée et, si l’on peut dire, aspire, par une ontologie de la compréhension*”**

Ricoeur characterizes by the notion of “long detour” (*chemin longue*) the kind of hermeneutical process that he is suggesting. This long detour would contain the intermediate phase of structural analysis or the semantic moment, which we shall discuss further in Section Chapter 5. As an opposite alternative would be an interpretation without this intermediary phase, an immediate interpretation, which Ricoeur sees within the thinking of Heidegger particularly, but which—to a degree, at least—is present with Gadamer as well.

The ontology of understanding which Heidegger sets up directly by a sudden reversal of the problem, substituting the consideration of a mode of being for that of a mode of knowing, can be, for us who proceed indirectly and by degrees, only a horizon, an aim rather than a given fact. A separate ontology is beyond our grasp: it is only within the movement of interpretation that we apperceive the being we interpret. The ontology of understanding is implied in the methodology of interpretation, following the ineluctable ‘hermeneutic circle’ which Heidegger himself taught us to delineate. Moreover, it is only in a conflict of rival hermeneutics that we perceive something of the being to be interpreted: a unified ontology is as inaccessible to our method as a separate ontology. Rather, in every instance, each hermeneutics discovers the aspect of existence which finds it as method.<sup>258</sup>

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<sup>258</sup> Ricoeur 1969/1974, 19. Original French text is as follows : “Au terme de cet itinéraire, qui nous a conduit d’une problématique du langage à un problematique de la reflexion, je voudrais montrer comment pourrait être rejointe, par void regressive, une prométique de l’existence. L’ontologie de la compréhension, que Heidegger élabore directement par un soudain renverstemt quie sustitue la consideration d’un mode d’être à celle d’une mode de connaître, ne saurait être, pour nous qui procédons indirectement et par degrés, qu’un horizon, c’est-à-dire une visée, plus qu’un donnée. Un ontologie séparée est hors de notre portée: c’est seulement dans le mouvement de l’interprétation que nous apercevons l’être interprété: une ontologie unifiée est aussi inaccessible à notre méthode qu’une ontologie séparée, c’est chaque fois chaque hemenéutique qui d’couvre l’aspect de l’existence que la fonde comme méthode.” (Ricoeur 1969, 23). I leave the responsibility of the accuracy of reading and understanding Heideggerentirely to Ricoeur.

In spite of the criticism present in this quotation, Ricoeur actually comments the Heideggerian line of thought quite approvingly. “Before objectivity, there is the horizon of the world; before the subject of the theory of knowledge, there is operative life”<sup>259</sup>, writes Ricoeur, after first referring to the mathematizing foundation of modern natural sciences since Galilee. In other words and with obvious resemblance with Gadamerian thought, hermeneutics as the foundation of the humanities is primary and the perspective of the natural sciences, for instance, is only a particular case under it. The humanities have to do with the “horizon of the world” and “operational life” in such a fundamental way that it is necessarily in a logical sense prior to the natural sciences with their objectifying and mathematizing methods.

In spite of the appeal of the Heideggerian view—or, “*quelle que soit la force extraordinaire de seduction de cette ontologie fondamentale*”<sup>260</sup>—however, Ricoeur is suggesting another way, the “long detour” of an “epistemology of interpretation” (*une épistémologie de l’interprétation*). The problem with Heidegger, according to Ricoeur, is Heidegger’s “short detour”, his proceeding to ontology immediately and directly. With Ricoeur, however, the “ontology of understanding” can be a horizon only, not something that we could achieve directly and immediately. Thus, we should not try to avoid the “long detour” through the degrees. In addition to the “ontology of understanding”, we should consider epistemological issues as well, the “epistemology of interpretation”.

Ricoeur actually asks if a human could ever achieve the “ontology of being” in the Heideggerian sense. Continuing from his reasoning discussed right above, Ricoeur writes with some eloquence about the fate of Moses.

In this way, ontology is indeed the promised land for a philosophy that begins with language and with reflection; but, like Moses, the speaking and reflecting subject can only glimpse this land before dying.<sup>261</sup>

Ricoeur here again is arguing for his point of view—in his way—by the same argument, the historically finite mode of being of humans, which Gadamer as well appeals to while rehabilitating tradition and authority. Furthermore, we can

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<sup>259</sup> Ricoeur 1969/1974, 9. (“Avant l’objectivité, il y a l’horizon du monde; avant le sujet de la théorie de la connaissance, il y a la vie opérante.” Ricoeur 1969, 13.)

<sup>260</sup> Ricoeur 1969, 14. “However great may be the extraordinarily seductive power of the fundamental ontology”, (Ricoeur 1969/1974, 10).

<sup>261</sup> Ricoeur 1969/1974, 24. Orig. text: “Ainsi, l’ontologie est bien la terre promise pour une philosophie qui commence par le langage et par la réflexion; mais, comme Moïse, le sujet parlant et réfléchissant peut seulement l’apercevoir avant de mourir.” (Ricoeur 1969, 28.)



see here an agnosticism that reminds what I characterized as agnosticism as regards history with Gadamer. In terms of Ricoeur's metaphor, like Moses was not able to enter *la terre promise*, we cannot reach the sense of history.

The difference that there certainly is between Gadamer and Ricoeur would be partly on quite a general level of what we could call philosophical mentalities. As we have seen, alienation is an inseparable companion of a human in his being, according to Ricoeur. Thus, both the "ontology of understanding" and the "epistemology of interpretation" are inevitably present in the condition of our being as humans as it appears with Ricoeur. We should not reduce either of them off and consequently, the whole becomes genuinely dialectical by its nature. Ricoeur sums up his problematic as follows:

My problem will be exactly this: what happens to an epistemology of interpretation [*épistémologie de l'interprétation*], born of a reflection on exegesis, on the method of history, on psychoanalysis, on the phenomenology of religion, etc., when it is touched, animated, and, as we might say, inspired by an ontology of understanding [*lorsqu'elle est touchée, animée et, si l'on peut dire, aspiée, par une ontologie de la compréhension*]?<sup>262</sup>

#### **4.5 Ricoeurian dualities of appropriation / structural analysis, philosophy / science, understanding / reconstruction, and meaning / content**

As regards the danger that the ideal of method suffocates the rationality proper to the humanities, the Ricoeurian answer could be that within the humanities as well there are particularities—and perhaps only particularities even there, reminding that fundamental ontology of understanding is possibly only a horizon, which Ricoeur eloquently illustrates by the fate of Moses. These particularities, however, would be of a different kind than those of and within the natural sciences, for instance. On this level, the Ricoeurian view would perhaps be a complement or a 'footnote' only to Gadamer. In my view, however, it would be an indispensable complement, but also a complement having a tension that we cannot ignore in view of what it is complementing.

With Ricoeur, there frequently and typically are pairs of opposed notions and typically also, after opposing, a kind or another of reconciliation between them. The reconciliation, however, never seems to make the duality with tensions there

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<sup>262</sup> Ricoeur 1969/1974, 7, and Ricoeur 1969, 11.

entirely disappear. A result of this is that the Ricoeuran thought is all the time charged with tensions, which gives it a poignant appearance, we perhaps could say. On the other hand, the continuously simultaneous presence of principles and motives that are not totally consistent with each other could reflect a kind of moderation in his thought or willingness to take into account a plenty of aspects none of which one should not ignore—even if they were not so consistent with each other.

Ricoeur's suggestion of structural analysis as the intermediate phase within the long detour of hermeneutics illustrates the feature that is most characteristic of his thought even more widely.

It is not at all my intention to oppose hermeneutics to structuralism, the historicity of the one to the diachrony of the other. Structuralism is a part of science, and I do not at present see any more rigorous or more fruitful approach than the structuralist method at the level of comprehension which is its own. The interpretation of symbols is worthy of being called a hermeneutics only insofar as it is a part of self-understanding and of the understanding of being; outside this effort of appropriating meaning, it is nothing. In this sense, hermeneutics is a philosophical discipline. To the extent to which the aim of structuralism is to put at a distance, to objectify, to separate out from the personal equation of the investigator the structure of an institution, a myth, a rite, to the same extent hermeneutics buries itself in what could be called 'the hermeneutical circle' of understanding and of believing, which disqualifies it as science and qualifies it as meditating thought.<sup>263</sup>

Here deserves our attention the way in which Ricoeur, if not opposing, in any case, separates from each other the historicity of hermeneutics and diachrony of structuralism, the latter as well referring to history in the sense of temporal sequence, as opposed to synchrony. With Ricoeur as well, consequently, the histo-

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<sup>263</sup> Ricoeur 1969/1974, 29–30. Orig.French text: "Mon intention n'est as du tout d'opposer l'herméneutique au strutralisme, l'historicité de l'un à la diachronie de l'autre. Le structuralisme appartient à la science; et je ne vois pas actuellement d'approche plus rigoureuse et plus féconde que le structuralisme au niveau d'nbelligence que es le sien. L'interprétation de la symbolique ne mérite d'être appelée herméneutique que das la mesure où elle est une segment de la compréhension de soi-même et de la compréhension de l'être; hors de ce travail d'appropriation du sens, elle n'est rien; en ce sens l'herméneutique est une discipline philosophique; autant le strucutralisme vise à metre à distance, à objectiver, à séparer de l'équation personnelle du chercher la sturcture d'une institution, d'une mythe, d'un rite, autant le pensée herméneutique s'enfonce dans ce qu'on a pu appler 'le cercle herméneutique' du comprendre et du croire, qui la disqualifie comme science et la qualifie comme pensée médiate" (Ricoeur 1969, 33–34.)

ricity in hermeneutics is more than a mere consecution in time, but the temporal consecution as well matters.

Further, we should notice the sharp distinction that Ricoeur makes between science and philosophy: Science is a distancing, objectifying, and methodical form of intelligence and enterprise, while subjective and personal involvement in appropriation, in “taking one’s own what originally was alien”, is characteristic of philosophy. Further, he is emphasizing that these modes of intelligence should not be opposed one to another. The need for this intermediate phase, the distancing moment of structural analysis, comes from the “fundamental characteristic of the very historicity of human experience, namely that it is communication in and through distance”<sup>264</sup>.

Since we proceed to the intermediate phase of structural analysis in the arc of mature hermeneutics, according to Ricoeur, we also proceed to an area where the tensions between his and Gadamer’s thinking are coming to the surface. A remark that Ricoeur makes while discussing the relationship between hermeneutics and criticism of ideologies gives us in a concise form the general line of his thought:

We are here in a situation similar to that described by Habermas: *reconstruction* is the path to understanding.<sup>265</sup>

In spite of the obviousness and seeming ‘innocence’ of this point of departure, it also is a moment where Ricoeur and Gadamer go to different veins.

We could say that Ricoeur here gives *subtilitas intelligendi* and *explicandi* positions as steps on their own, while according to Gadamer, they would be only inseparable moments of the whole of the hermeneutical process. There is between Gadamer and Ricoeur, quite a nuanced, but still a real difference and even opposition. In the case of structural analysis and appropriation, the foundation of the Ricoeurian reconciliation is a temporal sequence of phases, where the phases, even if not opposed in a fundamental sense, retain their own rationalities and consequently, some relative separateness, at least. We could see here something of his “*kantisme*” (see Section 4.1).

Here finally appears also a distinction that Ricoeur makes within the conceptual content that otherwise could be covered by the concept *meaning*. What Ricoeur characterizes as *l’objectivité du sens* is the beginning of the existential move-

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<sup>264</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 131

<sup>265</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 92.

ment of appropriation<sup>266</sup>. This objective level of meaning would come quite close to the notion of *signifié* in structuralist semiology. I shall in continuation use the term content used by Hjelmslev<sup>267</sup>. (See Chapter 5 for more detailed treatment.)

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<sup>266</sup> Ricoeur (1969, 389) writes: "... il faut dire que le sens du texte tient étroitement liés ces deux moments; c'est l'objectivité du texte, entendue comme contenu, teneur et exigence du sens, qui amorce le mouvement existentiel d'appropriation ... précède le moment existentiel—celui de la décision personnelle, ..."

<sup>267</sup> Hjelmslev 1961, 47 ff.



## 5 Ricoeuran *l'objectivité du sens* and content-historical bibliography (CHB) as an explication

In spite of my reasoning in Section 2.2, we should notice that knowledge indeed is an appropriate determinant of one particular level of the practice of L&Lship. We may say that *scriptum est* of physics, for instance, is or contains knowledge, indeed, but there also can be *bibliographic knowledge* about *scriptum est* of physics as well as of fine arts—even if the latter in itself would not be knowledge so plausibly. We would be talking here about knowledge in quite a fundamental and even primitive sense, however. It would be knowledge only in the sense that there are or have been such and such instances of *scriptum est* with perhaps some additional knowledge about the origins and fates of those instances, about their contents, and about their positions within wider fields of *scriptum est*, etc.

In this chapter, I shall proceed to some fundamental notions of Ricoeuran hermeneutics and especially to his view of particular worlds of reference of its own of texts or literature. Dealing with such worlds is exactly the task for which Ricoeur suggests that within the “long detour” of hermeneutics, there should be the intermediate phase of structural analysis. In this chapter, the structural analysis will be a general level methodical approach of content-historical bibliography (BHC).

### 5.1 Quasi-worlds or words of reference of its own of texts and literature, with the notion of *l'objectivité du sens*

We now can proceed to a thematic with Ricoeur, which relates quite concretely to L&Lship. Connected to writing, text, and literature—which obviously are already matters with which the practice L&Lship has to do—there is a particular moment of distanciation, while characteristic of oral dialogue is a kind of immediacy, according to Ricoeur.

Within writing, text, and literature, according to Ricoeur, there would be an inevitable moment of alienation that would cut off the particular kind of Gadamerian immediacy of belonging-to. This also has to do with my views of L&Lship being (i) primarily about *scriptum est* and only thereafter, though quite plausibly, (ii) on behalf of *scriptum est* as well. Furthermore, it would be consistent with my view that rather than for knowledge, L&Lship is about *scriptum est*.

### **5.1.1 Immediacy of speech vs. writing with an inevitable moment of distanciation**

A rather generally accepted view—obviously the position of Gadamer as well—is that writing is secondary to speech in the sense that writing only is speech fixed by material means. Ricoeur, in turn, sees writing and speech as parallel forms of discourse, thus subordinating neither of them to the other. The notion of discourse here is the common generic concept behind this parallelism. A consequence of this is that discourses can form differently depending on whether they take place in the form of and through writing or in the form of and through speech. Neither of these concepts would be subordinate to the other.

What is fixed by writing is thus a discourse which could be said, of course, but which is written precisely because it is not said. Fixation by writing takes the very place of speech, occurring at the site where speech could have emerged<sup>268</sup>

According to Ricoeur, a text is fully a text only as far as it is an inscription of a discourse that did not first appear as speech. As regards history, we could think that since such writing started to take place, the literary culture was born. We probably should think that thereafter the text and literature is in our being and world as parts and elements with their own logic that we should not ignore. This, of course, could provide us with an insight into the foundation of the library in cultural and social reality if we think, for instance, that the library substantially is about *scriptum est* and thus about literature or writing. Documentation, the other constituent of my notion of literature and *scriptum est*, always implies writing or some other form of “fixing”, such as drawing some shapes or recording sounds.

Proceeding towards specific features of writing, Ricoeur asks whether we could consider a reader of a text as an interlocutor with the author of the text, and then answers this question negatively. The author, for instance, would not answer the questions of the reader.

Dialogue is an exchange of questions and answers; there is no exchange of this sort between the writer and the reader. The writer does not respond to the reader. Rather, the book divides the act of writing and the act of reading into two sides, between which there is no communication. The reader is absent from the act of writing; the writer is absent from the act of reading. The text thus produces a double eclipse of the reader and the writer. It thereby replaces

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<sup>268</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 146.

the relation of dialogue, which directly connect the voice of one to the hearing of the other.<sup>269</sup>

Such “double eclipse” is quite substantially characteristic of text and reading it. According to Ricoeur’s somewhat dramatic claim, “it is when the author is dead that the relation to the book becomes complete and intact, so to speak. The author can no longer respond; it only remains to read his work”<sup>270</sup>. The whole idea of a text is that the author is not there, and most unconditionally, this comes true only once the author is dead.

Further, the disappearance of what the dialogue is about is actually the result of the same phenomena.

In speech, the interlocutors are present not only to one another, but also to the situation, the surroundings and circumstantial milieu of discourse. It is in relation to this circumstantial milieu that discourse is fully meaningful; [...]

This is no longer the case when the text takes the place of speech. The movement of reference towards the act of showing is intercepted, at same time as dialogue is interrupted by the text. I say intercepted and not suppressed; it is in this respect that I shall distance myself from what may be called henceforth the ideology of the absolute text.<sup>271</sup>

As the last remark in the quotation already suggests, the disappearance of the reference from a text is only temporal, not absolute. The argument then goes on: “The suspense which defers the reference merely leaves the text, as it were, ‘in the air’, outside or without a word.”<sup>272</sup> Temporarily, at least, this would be the case.

According to Ricoeur, the process of reading and interpretation of a text is exactly the process of bringing back the connection to reference or reality dealt with there: “As we shall see, the text is not without reference; the task of reading, *qua* interpretation, will be precisely to fulfil the reference”<sup>273</sup>. Connected to this, neither is the text without a reference in the meantime between its creation and read-

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<sup>269</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 146–147.

<sup>270</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 147.

<sup>271</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 148. Here Ricoeur approaches argumentation that we can find already with Plato. Yet, what Plato sees as a weakness in written communication, is with Ricoeur actually strength. Among other things, it is an answer to distance that according to Ricoeur belongs to the primordial constitution of the being of humans. Thus, distance and distanciation that are inevitable companions of text and writing are also answers to an existential condition. See Ricoeur 1970/1981, 136–138. We shall return to this in Section 8.3.3.

<sup>272</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 148–149.

<sup>273</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 148.



ing. In view of my argumentation in continuation, this is most important. After having lost the communicative and referential contexts that speech has, a text or a literary work becomes to have its own referential, i.e. a ‘world’ of reference that is proper to the text and the work in question or the world of reference of its own of the text. At least in the beginning, this world of reference exists only in this particular text.

Ricoeur’s hermeneutical theory contains as a fundamental premise a dialectics “between the experience of belonging and alienating distancing”. A part of this is dialectics between the personal actuality of decision connected to hermeneutics, appropriation, and understanding. The other part is structural analysis that should do justice to the particular worlds of reference of its own of texts and literature and to the objectivity of meaning or *l’objectivité du sens* (for conceptual clarity, I shall use in continuation this French expression<sup>274</sup>). Ricoeur also uses the notion of the “quasi-world”. The quasi-world of a text or its *l’objectivité du sens* is a “proposed world” that the text opens in front of it by talking and to talk about it. Noteworthy is, for instance, his remark that without recognizing the moment of objectivity there would be no room for any kind of textual criticism<sup>275</sup>.

Because my own notion of literature with the notion of work as an essential constituent of it, still another moment in Ricoeurian thought deserves attention here. Ricoeur recognizes the works as a special type of texts. Somewhat formally, a work with Ricoeur is a part of a discourse, which is longer than one sentence. Ultimately and on a more substantial level, this could mean that a work is in some degree complex<sup>276</sup>. This actually could contain an idea that would be—to a degree, at least—similar to my notion of “long contribution” characteristic of which would be that such a contribution contains both a question and an answer to it

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<sup>274</sup> It would help to maintain the linkage to the distinction that Ricoeur makes between *sens* and *signification*. Another reason is the somewhat vague relationships between such English terms as meaning, sense, and signification could obscure.

<sup>275</sup> Ricoeur (1969, 389) writes as follows. “Sans une telle conception du sens, de son objectivité et même son idéalité, nulle critique textuelle n’est possible.” The possibility of criticism is a general theme where the argumentation between Ricoeurian and Gadamerian views culminates, especially on the side of Ricoeur, and we shall return to it in more details in Chapter 7. Yet, once again, we see that what seems to separate the philosophers is with Ricoeur a moment becoming after what is common to both of them

<sup>276</sup> In addition to this, genres (or submission “to a form of codification which is applied to the composition itself” transforming discourse “into a story, a poem, and essay, etc.”) and style (or “a unique configuration which likens it to and individual”) are characteristic of a work. (Ricoeur 1970/1981, 136.)

(see Section 2.5), instead of being only an answer to an assumed question that comes from somewhere else.

Furthermore, not only single texts or works but also fields of literature have their own quasi-worlds, which are the foundation of intertextuality, for instance, according to Ricoeur. After telling how the text is left ‘in the air’, he continues:

In virtue of this obliteration of the relation to the world, each text is free to enter into relation with all the other texts which come to take the place of the circumstantial reality referred to by living speech. This relation of text to text, within the effacement of the world about which we speak, engenders the quasi-world of texts or literature.<sup>277</sup>

This world of a single piece of literature or *scriptum est* or of a wider field connected by intertextuality, then, is neither the original or ‘real world’ about which the authors might have aimed to say something, nor the world within which some reader might live, but a world that exists only in and by the texts.

In view of my own notions of literature and *scriptum est*, further, we could notice that since Ricoeur is talking about texts, his notion of literature would also contain the moment of documentation. Within the Ricoeurian analysis of the text, still further, this documentation is by no means without significance.

In view of my notion of L&Lship with *scriptum est* as its foundation, Ricoeur’s notion of *l’objectivité du sens* or the quasi-worlds of the texts and literature is significant. It obviously recognizes literature and *scriptum est*—because of their quasi-worlds or the worlds of reference of their own—as a noteworthy part of the reality within which we are living. The notion of intertextuality as Ricoeur is using it would make literature a wide and complex reality of its own, which would add to the plausibility and potential meaningfulness of my notion of L&Lship the foundation of which consists of literature and *scriptum est*.

### **5.1.2 Ricoeur as well warning of romantic hermeneutics**

We now should still return to Gadamer’s criticism of romantic hermeneutics, which aims at leaving one’s own present situation and replacing oneself in the past that has produced the text that he or she reading. We can see a somewhat similar warning with Ricoeur as well, but with Ricoeur, this has a foundation exactly in his analysis of *l’objectivité du sens*. Ricoeur even makes visible a con-

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<sup>277</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 148–149.

crete connection between the romantic hermeneutics and the Romanticism proper as an actual historical current of culture and cultural thought, through the myth of geniuses.

We may recall that Romantic hermeneutics placed the emphasis on the expression of genius: to liken oneself to this genius, to render it contemporary, such was the task of hermeneutics.<sup>278</sup>

If we assumed that some geniuses had existed, leaving our perhaps a little banal present existence and ascending into the world of such geniuses could be quite an exciting and even sublimating adventure. There is a temptation, but Ricoeur—with some resemblance to Gadamer's view—is firmly resisting it, and this is, in my view, a noteworthy similarity between them.

With Ricoeur, however, we can see criticism of “Romantic hermeneutics” connected to his view of the “quasi-worlds” of literature and thus to his concern of *l'objectivité du sens*, while similar criticism with Gadamer seemed to mean rejection of any idea of such objectivities. With Ricoeur, in any case, the question is about how we should conceive of the quasi-worlds of literature. Should we consider them as something “behind” or “in front of” a text? The quasi-world behind the text could refer, for instance, to the psychology of the author, such as the vision of a Romantic genius, for instance. Ricoeur, however, has no interest in such psychologies, and here he is taking a distance from Dilthey particularly. Consequently, “the most decisive break with Romantic hermeneutics is here: what is sought is no longer an intention hidden behind the text, but a world unfolded in front of it”<sup>279</sup>.

Even in other respects, Ricoeur actually, comes close to a view that we should see as Gadamerian as well. He describes interpretation as an act of culture and literature, not only of an individual: when we interpret a text, we actually are interpreting interpretation, as the text in itself quite often is an interpretation of some other texts. The result of this reasoning with Ricoeur is that it is not so much the subject here and now who is doing the interpretation. Interpretation is rather the work of literature and texts, even language—or the work of the tradition and effective history, to use the Gadamerian concepts. Once again, history and traditions seem to be speaking us, rather than the other way around. With Ricoeur, however, there is the moment of objectification as well, the moment where we

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<sup>278</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 140.

<sup>279</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 93.

should look at texts and literature from a distance and as semiotic entities with a world of reference of their own and consequently, with a structure of their own as well.

Ricoeur explicitly equals the “proposed world” that a work “unfolds, discovers, reveals” in front of it, on one hand, and the “matter of text” or *die Sache* that we should focus on and understand while reading or otherwise receiving a work, according to Gadamer, on the other.

Above all, the *vis-à-vis* of appropriation is what Gadamer calls ‘the matter of the text’ and what I call here ‘the world of the work’.<sup>280</sup>

Then again, language or *die Sache* with Gadamer seems not to represent alienation in any particular sense. According to Ricoeur, on the other hand, the failure within the Gadamerian thought is disregarding alienation and its inevitable presence, particularly in writing, texts, and literature, but perhaps in all of our being. With Ricoeur, in any case, this world of the work is emphatically a distanced and even alienated object as it is a product of the distancing and objectifying process of writing that conceals the communicational and referential contexts.

Since Ricoeur writes that our interest should not be in “an intention hidden behind the text, but a world unfolded in front of it”, we may conclude that neither he is interested in what one calls the authorial meanings.<sup>281</sup> Then again, I actually shall suggest later in this treatise (Sections 6.4 to 6.6) that we do have reasons to pay attention to these authorial meanings as well. Then, however, the problematic is no more purely hermeneutical but already relates to politico-ethical issues of recognizing the rights of other persons, for instance.

Still anticipating argumentation in Chapter 8 (particularly Section 8.3), the worlds behind the text can explain—quite plausibly as well as in a rather strict sense—the worlds in front of the text. This could be noteworthy in instances where some other reasons warrant such explanations. This actually could conflict rather badly with even with the rationality preserving and fostering, listening-to, and cultivating, i.e. the fundamental rationality proper to the humanities. In spite of this, such explanatory approach even could have a justification.

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<sup>280</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 143.

<sup>281</sup> In this respect, the accusation present in a remark by Cornelius (see Section 3.2), for instance, is not quite accurate.

### **5.1.3 An intermediate phase of structural analysis within the “long detour” of hermeneutics as a “mature” form of intelligence**

At this point, we can return to structural analysis, which has with Ricoeur a specific role and position when a human appropriates his culture when he or she “understands him/herself better, or understands him/herself differently, or even begins to understand him/herself” (see above, Sections 3.2 and 4.5). Structural analysis should belong as an intermediate phase to the hermeneutical process, according to Ricoeur.

The idea of structural analysis will also have a particular position when I shall outline below how bibliography and CHB particularly can proceed as knowledge about the contents of *scriptum est*. The rather classical bibliographic methods—such as bibliographic classification in general and faceted forms of it in particular—have an obvious resemblance to what we could denote on a general level as structural analysis. To a degree, at least, we could recognize in classical structuralism originating from Ferdinand de Saussure as a common background for such a method and the Ricoeurian notion of structural analysis. In 1960’s, furthermore, the literature on classification and what so-called documentary languages assumed some fundamental categories of structuralist linguistics<sup>282</sup>.

Structural analysis with Ricoeur is the particular moment of doing justice to *l’objectivité du sens*. The need and justification for such distancing and objectifying approach—the explanatory attitude in reading—comes with Ricoeur from the very essence of writing, texts, and literature that we saw above. Quite concisely, we can express this as follows.

- Writing contains the moment distancing, the eclipse of the world and the communicative context, which leads to the emergence of *l’objectivité du sens* or the quasi-world of the text,
- Consequently, reading as well should include a distancing, objectifying moment or phase.

As Ricoeur writes:

To begin with, appropriation is dialectically linked to the distancing characteristic of writing. [...]

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<sup>282</sup> See, for instance, Gardin 1973 and Hutchins 1975/1978.

In the second place, appropriation is dialectically linked to the objectification characteristic of the work.<sup>283</sup>

Trying to proceed immediately to understanding while reading—as if one were in the position of an interlocutor with the speaker and the common situation and world were present—would be simply naïve. In this argument, there seems to be quite a convincing intuitive logic.

Objectification and distancing also mean alienation. Thus, Ricoeur still can write, “*Verfremdung* [alienation] is not only what understanding must overcome, but also what conditions it”<sup>284</sup>.

Structural analysis with Ricoeur, indeed, is an intermediate phase only and only the other side of the dialectics.

[...] the semantic moment, the objective meaning [*celui du sens objectif*], must precede the existential moment, the moment of personal decision, in a hermeneutics concerned with doing justice [*rendre justice*] to both the objectivity of meaning [*l’objectivité du sens*] and the historicity of personal decision.<sup>285</sup>

To emphasize that the structural analysis or “semantic moment” is not sufficient in itself but only an intermediary phase, he continues by a claim that without the “existential” moment, a text would no more be living “speech” or communication (“*sans appropriation existentielle, ce qu’il [le text] dit, n’est plus parole vivante*”<sup>286</sup>). The result of the “long detour” would be “mature” interpretation, opposed to the naivety of the original and immediate one. Ricoeur brings structural analysis to the “hermeneutical arc”, “in the hope of leading hermeneutics, through the discipline of objectivity, from naïve to mature intelligence, through the discipline of objectivity” (... *dans l’espoir de conduire l’herméneutique d’une intelligence naïve à une intelligence mûrie, à travers la discipline de l’objectivité*)<sup>287</sup>.

The notions of the existential and appropriation with Ricoeur correspond, *grosso modo*, to what Gadamer denotes by the notion of understanding. Structural

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<sup>283</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 143.

<sup>284</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 140. Following Ricoeur’s own logic, we actually should presume a similar moment of distancing, objectification, and alienation even before literature culture: even face-to-face dialogue cannot avoid the distancing that is present in language already. Then again, the problem rises to a higher order and becomes more concrete and ‘acute’, so to speak, with writing and literature.

<sup>285</sup> Ricoeur 1969/1974, 397–398 and Ricoeur 1969, 389–390

<sup>286</sup> Ricoeur 1969, 390.

<sup>287</sup> Ricoeur 1969/1974, 30, and Ricoeur 1969, 34.

analysis and semantic, on the other hand, should do justice to *l'objectivité du sens*, which is a notion that would be problematic in view of Gadamerian thought and to which we probably could not find any correspondence there.

Ricoeur further describes the relationship of appropriation and structural analysis as one of two “attitudes”, explanatory attitude, on one hand, and attitude of interpretation, on the other, and consequently, two types of reading:

What we have called the eclipse of the surrounding world by the quasi-world of texts engenders two possibilities. We can, as readers, remain in the suspense of the text, treating it as a worldless and authorless object; in this case, we explain the text in terms of its internal relations, its structure. On the other hand, we can lift the suspense and fulfill the text in speech, restoring it to living communication; in this case, we interpret the text. These two possibilities both belong to reading, and reading is the dialectic of these two attitudes.<sup>288</sup>

This is the basis of Ricoeur’s claim that hermeneutics should take the “long detour”. It should not proceed to appropriation immediately. It should go through the long “hermeneutical arc” through the intermediate phases of structural analysis and explanation.<sup>289</sup>

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<sup>288</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 152. Ricoeur (op cit., 158 ff, for instance) explains further the dialectics and dynamics of these two ways of reading, but for my purposes here this foundation is enough. “Eclipse” is another word—in addition to “emancipation”—used by Ricoeur to describe the loosing of real world, once text has come into the place of oral communication.

<sup>289</sup> Emilio Betti (1962/1980) proceeds along lines similar to Ricoeur’s demand of the intermediate moment of structural analysis, at least seemingly and to a degree. Betti summarizes hermeneutic method in four “canons of interpretation”, which are: (i) The hermeneutic autonomy of object, (ii) Coherence of meaning, (iii) Actuality of meaning, and (iv) The hermeneutic correspondence of meaning. The third of these, “the canon of actuality of meaning”, tells us that a meaning has to be in some sense actual and alive for the interpretator. With this canon as well as the others, however, Betti takes care that text as “objectivation of mind” is also taken into account. Interpretation cannot be only a function of the interpreter’s existential situation. Neither can it be a search for the ‘original meaning’ of the text, for the interpretator cannot escape his/her situation and horizon. It only can be a ‘harmonization’ of the ‘original’ and interpretator’s horizons, which is the message of Betti’s fourth canon. In general terms, Betti’s Canons (i) and (ii), could correspond to Ricoeur’s structural analysis and the semantic moment. With Gadamer as well, there certainly is the moment of correspondence—or agreement—between the text and understanding of the reader but what we see in Betti Canon (ii) is a different matter while the Gadamerian view would be more or less present with Betti in Canon (iv).

#### **5.1.4 Concluding remarks in terms of the “dialectics of event and meaning”**

What Ricoeur calls the “dialectics of event and meaning” also deserves some attention here and actually, it can summarize what we have discussed in the previous sections. Writing especially goes around this dialectic while speech or oral communication is at least seemingly ‘simpler’ in this respect. The starting point is “the irrationality of the event and the rationality of meaning”, where meanings belong to language and discourse has the nature of an event<sup>290</sup>. On the dialectic of event and meaning, Ricoeur writes as follows.

I propose to say that, if all discourse is realised as an event, all discourse is understood as meaning. What we wish to understand is not the fleeting event, but rather the meaning that endures. This point demands the greatest clarification, for it may seem that we are reverting from the linguistics of discourse to the linguistics of language. But that is not so; it is in linguistics of discourse that event and meaning are articulated. This articulation is the core of the whole hermeneutical problem. Just as language, by being actualised in discourse, surpasses itself as system and realises itself as event, so too discourse, by entering the process of understanding, surpasses itself as event and becomes meaning.<sup>291</sup>

Within this dialectic, events of discourse get their meaning and the language would be an actual reality only in and through the events of discourse. We actually can now see within the ‘life’ of a text with the “double eclipses” a dialectics similar to the dialectics of the language and event. We can summarize the whole process discussed above into a claim that this original contextuality of discourse or event is not present in a language and disappears also in writing, texts, and works, which in this sense would become somehow similar to the language. If there are speakers, listeners, and references, they are inside the language or literature. A language, literature in general, or a particular instance of literature becomes exactly an object and it ceases to be an event in which we could participate.

Anticipating the detailed discussion on the structuralist premises (Section 5.3), there is an affinity with Ricoeur’s view of the eclipse of the texts and the structuralist view that content in a language or another semiotic system is an element immanent in the language, instead of a referred object outside the language.

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<sup>290</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 137.

<sup>291</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 134.



Ricoeur, on his part, writes that the language—exactly as the structuralists are teaching—has neither a reference, nor a communicative context of speaker and listener while a discourse fundamentally has this all. As regards the reference, Ricoeur writes, in a rather laconical manner, “... if we did not speak of the world, of what should we speak”<sup>292</sup>.

We could ask, however, in what sense of existence those quasi-worlds or *l’objectivité du sens* could exist. I would think that their existence must have a foundation in the actual existence of the language but in itself, in a sense, their existence would be being as potentials. The language exists through its reproduction quite concretely and actually in the minds of the people as linguistic competencies. The quasi-worlds of texts and literature, in turn, cannot exist directly in this way. Given that the language exists, however, there also is a code in terms of which a competent language user can reach the quasi-worlds or *l’objectivité du sens* of texts and literature. Assuming that the linguistic competencies are common to people within particular linguistic communities, such existence would be objective in the sense of intersubjectivity. The dialectics of event and meaning would thus contain

- speaking, writing, listening-to, and reading as events of discourse, and
- the language as well as the quasi-worlds or *l’objectivité du sens* of texts and literature as moments of meaning, signification, or content

In the latter, the existence of the quasi-worlds, however, would be potentiality dependent on the actual existence of language in the linguistic competence of the people. Furthermore, we probably should consider the reproduction of the language and linguistic competence among the people as an event.

We now can return to structural analysis as a possible attitude in reading. The structural analysis itself and as a part of reading—though orienting towards *l’objectivité du sens*—would obviously be still another, particular kind of event. It is a choice and a project by means of which “the reader decides to situate himself in the ‘place of the text’ and in the closure of this place”. Structural analysis—or the explanatory attitude— with Ricoeur means a decision to delay the replacement of the text in the world and in the communicative context, which writing has eclipsed. In its closure, “the text has no outside but only an inside”, very much

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<sup>292</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 148.

like the language according to the structuralist view. Right after this, Ricoeur states as follows a conclusion as regards the very project of structural analysis.

This project is not only possible but legitimate. For the constitution of the texts as text and the body of texts as literature justifies the interception of the double transcendence of discourse, toward the world and towards someone.

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## 5.2 Some fundamentals of structuralism: An arbitrary system of differences of expression and content

The emphasized paradigm of structuralism with Ricoeur is Claude Levy-Strauss' structuralist anthropology. Here, however, I shall go closer to the roots of structuralism, to the concept of language and to a suggestion of a possible scholarly field of semiology with Ferdinand de Saussure. With especially Louis Hjelmslev, the Danish linguist, we can find the structuralist premises formulated in a conceptually strict manner.<sup>294</sup>

The language, as conceived of by the Saussurean and Hjelmslevian structuralism, is a two-level system of differences where particular contents as well—in addition to the particular expressions, such as words or meaning-carrying endings—have their existence and identities, in principle, only in the language. With Hjelmslev, the view of a language as a two level system of differences consists of

- the notions of content (*signifié* with de Saussure) and expression (*significant* with de Saussure), and
- the notions of substance and form.

Furthermore, combinations in terms of these distinctions would lead to

- the notions of *content substance* and *content form*, on one hand, and
- the notions of *expression substance* and *expression form*, on the other

(See Figure 4). Within the basic structuralist conception, we could characterize the expression as something 'perceivable'. As we already saw (Section 2.1) Greimas situates apprehension of signification in perception. We could define content

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<sup>293</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 153.

<sup>294</sup> As opposed to the structuralism of "eternal/universal structure" that we perhaps could find with Levy-Strauss, the properly linguistic structuralism with more emphasis of the historical and particular character of the structures could more plausibly combine with hermeneutical thought (cf. Suominen 1997, 199–200).

in the same fashion as something 'conceivable', or just as thought, concept, or idea, and in a sense, as something that can be in the mind of a person, as opposed to the expression as a material or "acoustic image".<sup>295</sup>

Saussure writes that in a language, there is nothing positive beyond the connection between a particular unit of content (*signifié*) and a particular unit of expression (*signifiant*). Within both the levels of content and of expression, however, the particular units are determined in a discursively negative fashion, through and only through their 'limiting neighbors'.<sup>296</sup> According to Saussure, this discursively negative determination on the levels of expression and content is like cutting a sheet of paper into pieces: if one cuts the recto, one inevitably cuts the verso as well. Further, every piece is what it is only as determined by the pieces around it, notwithstanding whether we are looking at the recto or verso.<sup>297</sup>

(undifferentiated, formless) substance of content

*content form*

*expression form*



language, semiotic

(undifferentiated, formless) substance of expression

**Fig. 4. Language or semiotic as a two-level system of differences.**

The structuralist thesis of arbitrariness of a language or a semiotic as well—particularly of arbitrariness of content form—is a notion closely related to this point of departure. The claim, basically, is that there is no outside foundation for the

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<sup>295</sup> See Saussure 1916/1984, 99 ff., 155 ff. Argumentations like the one I referred to with Frohmann could (see Section 2.1) make this problematic, but as I already remarked, I would not consider as solid the foundation of such arguments.

<sup>296</sup> Saussure 1916/1984, 166.

<sup>297</sup> Saussure 1916/1984, 155 ff.

structure, including the content form.<sup>298</sup> The principle of arbitrariness—or, as I would rather think, the moment of arbitrariness—means that a semiotic of a language as a system of differences of contents is not reducible—at least, not necessarily, exhaustively, and in view of all the details—to the reality talked about. Here, the notion of content form becomes particularly significant. Language, including its contents, is a cultural form differentiating also various ‘things’ or ‘matters’ from each other, based solely on the social agreement and usage.

By paradigmatic and syntagmatic Hjelmslev refers to different dimensions of the structuring of expression and of content. On the syntagmatic dimension or as a process, a language partitions substances of content and of expression into units that may occur together, with each other ("both-and") in a syntagm (in Hjelmslev's terminology "chain" or "*kaede*" in Danish). On the paradigmatic dimension, on the other hand, language articulates substance into the paradigm (in Danish *paradigme*) of alternative units ("either-or").<sup>299</sup>

For my purposes here, quite a concise reconstruction of some structuralist premises or of the structuralist or ‘Saussurean’ concept of language is sufficient<sup>300</sup>. The most important notions would be as follows.

- (1) A language partitions what we here, for simplicity, could call ‘messages’ into chains or syntagms of units and syntactic categories expressing the structure of those syntagms. Natural languages typically partition messages into entity-

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<sup>298</sup> Saussure (1916/1984, 100–102) originally talks about arbitrariness of a sign. It means, for instance, that there is no ground outside the conventions of language for the fact that the chain of phonemes "s-ö-r" should correspond to the idea or content of female child of parents common with some other person (or shortly just a sister), as it does in the French language. In the course of the structuralist tradition, however, this somewhat trivial notion has been criticized. Emile Benveniste, however, points out that not the relation of expression and content that is arbitrary but the relation of the sign with reality. According to Benveniste, arbitrariness of language is in "that a certain sign, and not some other, would be applied for a certain element of reality, and not for some other". (see Benveniste 1966, 49–55. Transl. VS, orig. "*que tel signe, et non tel autre, soit appliqué à tel élément de réalité, et non à tel autre.*") In other words, a language or a semiotic 'portions' or 'classifies' the reality, things talked about, as well as expression, in some definite and particular way, which is arbitrary and has no outside foundation. Uriel Weinreich (1963/1966, 142) states this quite clearly: "The semantic mapping of the universe by a language is, in general, arbitrary, and the semantic map of each language is different from those of all other languages. Actually, Saussure himself as well refers to this side of the issue. He remarks that the content forming function of language helps to understand the arbitrariness of sign. This, in turn, "makes it easier to understand why a social state of affairs only may create a linguistic system" (Saussure 1916/1984, 157. Transl. VS, orig. "*fait mieux comprendre pourquoi le fait social peut seul créer un système linguistique*")

<sup>299</sup> Hjelmslev 1943/1961, def. 26–31, 54, 55, 67 and 68.

<sup>300</sup> For a more detailed reconstruction, see for instance Suominen 1997, 43–52.

like units (subjects, objects, etc., typically expressed by nouns) and process/activity-like predicates (typically expressed by verbs, though we could count adjectives as well into this category<sup>301</sup>).

- (2) On the paradigmatic dimension, then, a language articulates content into paradigms—or, we could say, vocabularies—of alternative units that can find their places in syntagms. Proceeding from (1), there could be articulations of content into units of nouns and verbs and furthermore, into particular kinds of nouns and verbs, and in a natural language quite typically, into various grammatical functions and relations, such as cases, number, person, etc. A sentence, then, can consist of some particular nouns as subjects, objects, etc. and of some particular verb as the predicate.

As a simple example of articulation of content, Hjelmslev gives a comparison of names of colors in English and Wales (Figure 5). Hjelmslev illustrates also the varying ways of partitioning the content in different languages by an example where the content or ‘message’ partitioned is the speaker’s own ignorance (see Figure 6). The vertical dimension or the part of the specter of colors in Figure 5 is what Hjelmslev denotes as the content purport. In Figure 6, the content purport would be the message of the ignorance of the one speaking or writing. I shall return to this most interesting notion of purport with Hjelmslev in Section 5.4.3.

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<sup>301</sup> This tends to happen even in cases without any clear distinction between entities and processes of activities, in cases such as the sentences and texts dealing with quite abstract matters, which would emphasize the nature of this structure as a structure of a language. If ‘*hermeneutics inspire LID-scholars*’, we may ask whether inspiring would be at all less entity-like than hermeneutics.

green	gwyrd
blue	glas
grey	
brown	llwyd

**Fig. 5. Articulation of colors in English and Welsh<sup>302</sup>**

We could now say that much of the core ideas of structuralism and especially the moment of arbitrariness of a language or a semiotic crystallize in Hjelmslev’s notion of the content form. We perhaps could say—if borrowing Ricoeur’s phrasing—that the Hjelmslevian content form is a world opened in front of the language or semiotic. Correspondingly, we perhaps could say that what Ricoeur might intelligibly mean by the quasi-worlds or worlds of reference of its own of literature could actually be the content form or manifestations of the content form in the Hjelmslevian sense.

Arbitrariness of the content form is one of the fundamentals of structuralism. In view of Ricoeur’s quasi-worlds of literature, we actually could see it as the very foundation of them being exactly *quasi-worlds* of worlds of reference belonging to literature particularly, rather than the actual worlds where the writers and readers, for instance, are living.

Ensuing from this arbitrariness, we can say that the quasi-worlds of writing and of literature especially are parts of cultural reality, which would be a reality on its own, not reducible to the ‘real world’, so to speak. It would be simultaneously a challenge to simple all-encompassing realism reducing the cultural to something outside it and a foundation of a peculiar kind of cultural realism, we could say, or of recognition of cultural realities as realities on their own.

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<sup>302</sup> Hjelmslev 1943/1961, 53

jeg ved de ikke (Danish)	EGO SCIO ID NON
I do not know (English)	EGO AGI(O) NON SCIRE
je ne sais pas (French)	EGO NON SCI(O) PASSUM)
en tiedä (Finnish)	EGO-NON-FACIO SCIRE
naluvara (Eskimo)	NON-SCIENS-(SU)M-EGO-ID)

**Fig. 6. Partitioning on syntagmatic dimension of one's own ignorance in various languages<sup>303</sup>**

Ricoeur, on his part, depicts structural analysis as follows, with some similarity to the Saussurean and Hjelmslevian fundamentals.

The task of structural analysis will be to carry out the segmentation of the work (horizontal aspect), then to establish the various levels of integration of the parts in the whole (hierarchical aspect).<sup>304</sup>

Here we perhaps should particularly notice that the “hierarchical” in this context obviously would not correspond to the paradigmatic as opposed to the horizontality of the syntagmatic. Hierarchical with Ricoeur is a richer notion. It could refer to a kind of inner logic of the whole and a part of it could be what I denote by the notion of syntactic. Then again, in terms of the Hjelmslevian distinction of system and process, syntactic obviously would be a part of the system. The articulations proper on the paradigmatic dimension, on the other hand, could be quite plausibly constituents of the quasi-worlds or *l'objectivité du sens* of literature and texts, which could enrich what we saw Ricoeur writing about this matter.

### **5.3 Explication for maintaining and enhancing communicative competence, instead of explanations for manipulative practices**

I already have claimed that in a practical sense, the strongest argument against historical objectivism that we can deduce from Gadamer's argumentation is the danger of losing the rationality proper to the humanities and suffocating it by the

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<sup>303</sup> Hjelmslev 1943/1961, 50, with Mario de Tullio's Latin explications (in editor's commentaries to Saussure, 1916/1984, 462).

<sup>304</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 156.

ideals of science where a crucial part is the notion of explanation. Then again, we saw above how Ricoeur claims that there can be a form of explanation proper to the humanities and produced by the humanities themselves.

In the rest of this chapter, I shall illustrate a possible methodical approach to contents of *scriptum est*. My aim is to show that such objectifying approach would not necessarily lead us outside the sphere proper to the humanities. The core of my argumentation will be the notion of explication as opposed to explanation. Esa Itkonen, a Finnish linguist, applies the notion of explication to clarify the nature of a grammar as a theory. I would use the notion of explication as a substitute and specification for the Ricoeurian idea of explanation appropriate to the humanities.

Like Itkonen, we also can approach logic of explanation through the classical formula of the deductive-nomological model (DN-model) as it appears in the analytical philosophy of science<sup>305</sup>. Albeit abstract, simplistic, and rough, DN-model expresses a rather fundamental and substantial function of a particular kind of scientific knowledge. It also assumingly expresses the logical core of a rather powerful and generally prevailing everyday conception—not only of laity but of many professional scholars as well—as regards the basic function of any kind of sciences and their intelligible relationships to any kinds of practices. I assume that DN-model would be here sufficient to represent the logic of explanation as an ideal of science and of the form of knowledge that it should produce.

In DN-model, the generalizations aimed at in science are in form of universal propositions stating that for all arguments (x), if one predicate (let it be A) is true, then also another (B) is true, schematically as follows:

$$\forall x A(x) \rightarrow B(x)$$

This kind of universal statement would be the classical form of a scientific law in the sense of the modern (natural) science, which to a degree, at least, could corresponding to what Gadamer means by modern science. In an explanation, according to the DN-model, there are—besides the universal proposition, or law—two observations, which in the example used here would be A(x) and B(x). The general law and the observation A(x) together constitute the *explanans*, which would explain another observed state of affairs, B(x), the *explanandum*. Schematically

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<sup>305</sup> See, for instance, Hempel 1965, 335–337.



we could construct this as follows:

$$\frac{\begin{array}{l} \forall x A(x) \rightarrow B(x) \\ A(x) \end{array}}{B(x)}$$

Concretizing the schema,  $A(x)$  could mean that  $x$  is copper and  $B(x)$  could mean that  $x$  conducts electricity. We could then explain an observation ( $x$  conducted electricity, which perhaps led to the death of a person who touched  $x$  and was standing in water) by another observation ( $x$  is made of copper) and the general law (copper conducts electricity). On the level on which we are discussing the issue here, no ‘smoothing’ of DN-model—such as replacing the necessity of the general law by probability—would change the fundamental logic.

Furthermore, prediction would be homologous with explanation, and thereby we can further formulate a scheme of manipulative and instrumental activity:

- if it is a law that  $\forall x A(x) \rightarrow B(x)$ , and
- if one wishes  $B(x)$ ,
- then, one should produce the conditions  $A(x)$ .

Even if once again quite simplistic and schematic, we may regard this basic structure as the basic function and structure of knowledge in all instrumental and manipulative activities. By making a wire of copper, we can cause conduction of electricity and have light in a lamp. Thus, the logic of explanation as an ideal of scientific knowledge relates to one particular type of activities, the instrumental ones. Knowledge with explanatory power is also knowledge with predictive and manipulative power. It would be knowledge that we can apply in engineering practices aiming at the production of some useful effects.

We should notice here that what Gadamer is criticizing as “modern science” is not exactly science that produces knowledge with explanatory power. Then again, the idea of explanation exactly might be what makes the “modern science” powerful enough to suffocate the rationality proper of the humanities. As Habermas writes, question within the logic of explanation is of “possible predictive knowledge” and the interest behind pursuing such knowledge is “in technical control over objectified processes”<sup>306</sup>.

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<sup>306</sup> Habermas 1965/1971, 308–309.

Now we can oppose explication, another form of intellectual activity, to explanation. Explication as the model of knowledge produced by scholarly practices could have a more direct, constitutive relationship to communication and its prerequisites consisting of meanings or contents and language commonly appropriated, through. Explication could be preservation and expansion of the "intersubjectivity of possible action-oriented understanding", as Habermas phrases the interest and rationality of the hermeneutical sciences (see Section 3.2).

With Itkonen, explication is the form of a particular kind of theories, of the grammars as the products of what Itkonen calls "autonomous linguistics". In its most general form, he defines explication as follows:

In the course of explication an intuitively known concept or conceptual system, i.e. 'explicandum', [...] is replaced by its redefined or reconstructed form, i.e. 'explicatum'. [...] Explicandum-expressions belong mostly to ordinary language, whereas explicatum-expressions are mostly part of some theoretical, formal language.<sup>307</sup>

Explication thus is a rewriting process, we could say, and Itkonen defines it further—with a reference to Arthur Pap's concept of explication—as a process where a formal necessity of an *explicandum* replaces the intuitive necessity of an *explicatum*. In the context of a grammar, this means that the grammar as a formal system would logically lead to all the sentences that are correct according to the linguistic intuition of those mastering the language in question. Grammar in itself would then be a set of formal rules, corresponding to the rules intuitively known by the competent speakers and users of the language.

The specificity of explication in comparison with explanation is that it leads to results that in themselves are linguistic and semiotic. The result of explication could be or contain, for instance, an enumeration of correct units within the language and possibly claims about some more or less invariant relationships between the units. In this sense, it also would be normative by character. Therefore, it could constitute a foundation for common understanding and communication. Explication produces meaning, languages, and systems of content—or, in Itkonen's technical terminology, "explicatum-expressions"—suitable for communication about some particular matters, instead of law-like knowledge of regularities and invariances of and around phenomena, which ultimately could help us to have

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<sup>307</sup> Itkonen 1978, 301.

“control over objectified” realities in manipulative and technical activities and practices aiming at some desired and assumingly useful effects.

#### **5.4 Illustration of and methodological reflection on content-historically bibliographic structuralism**

We can now outline how CHB could be an explication of *l'objectivité du sens* within *scriptum est*. While applying the model of structural analysis as an intermediate phase on the “long detour” of appropriation for conceiving of content-historically bibliographic work, we should make some preliminary remarks, however.

- First, I would assume that bibliography—as far as it should be knowledge about literature and *scriptum est*—would primarily be about *l'objectivité du sens* or the quasi-worlds in front of *scriptum est* in the Ricoeuran sense particularly.
- Thereafter, however, it could well proceed to worlds behind *scriptum est* as well, since such knowledge about the worlds related to literature in this sense would also be a part of knowledge about *scriptum est*.
- Further, a bibliographer would be outlining the quasi-worlds or *l'objectivité du sens* in view of wider, perhaps genre-like fields of literature and *scriptum est*<sup>308</sup>.
- Even single pieces of *scriptum est* as well could find their places within such wider spheres.

In this sense, bibliographic work would add to quite concrete, even primitive, but probably practically beneficial knowledge about *scriptum est* on both the levels of the wider fields and single pieces of *scriptum est*, though the latter cannot be very concrete because of the vast amount of *scriptum est*.

##### **5.4.1 CHB ‘talking’ about’ genre-like fields of *scriptum est***

As examples of structural analysis, Ricoeur refers, for instance, to the Greimas’ actant model assumed from the Russian formalism<sup>309</sup>. Actant model consists of

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<sup>308</sup> Jauss (1982, 82) writes about genre in “synchronic perspective” as “an ensemble of formal as well as thematic characteristics” that we should investigate in their “ruled coherence”.

<sup>309</sup> See Ricoeur 1970/1981, 155–157, and Greimas 1966, 174 ff.

the following six role-type categories that typically would appear in a folk-tale: (i) subject (ii) object (iii) helper (iv) opponent (v) sender and (vi) receiver. The tales would form up in terms of these roles as typically heroic stories where the hero (a son of the king or of a poor peasant, for instance) receives a task (from the king). He overcomes the adversaries and obstacles (fights with dragons and other evil beasts or crosses deep gulleys) with the help of beneficial forces (good fairies, perhaps), and performs the task (saves the princess and escorts her to the noble prince of a neighboring kingdom). One has applied the model to quite different texts, from folklore proper to even “*l'idéologie marxiste*”<sup>310</sup>. Fundamentally, however, I believe that the model makes better sense if we think about it in contexts closer to its origin within Russian formalism, as a description of the structures of contents in one particular genre. On the other hand, the actant model is a syntactic model in the sense defined above, even if a rather abstract one. Sentence-syntactic theories can express quite concrete and consistent linear orders of the sentences. The actant model, on the level of whole stories, is not so concrete in this respect. Then again, there is present, in any case, a syntagmatic “both-and” relationship, and there even is some inner logic that could make the relationship syntactic.

As an exegete and a philosopher of religion, Ricoeur still gives us an example of something that we may take as structural analysis within exegetics. The example, however, is not an example of a very strict analysis. It rather opens a general level structural scheme, which should then direct the interpretation and appropriation of the tradition and in which the explication in itself seems very much like a part of interpretation already. Within the Judeo-Christian kerygma, one can see a general level structure, “the temporal constitution of promise” (*constitution temporelle de la 'promesse'*), i.e. a structure of repeating alliances between God and the humans, which always contains a promise from God's side. As a counterpart on the side of the humans, then, there is an expectation and hope of fulfillment of these promises. Humans on their part, however, tend to fail, which leads to new alliances and new promises. Ricoeur concludes from this that there is an essential structure determined by promises and hope. In his philosophy of religion (Part V, *Religion et foi*, in *Le conflit des interprétations*), Ricoeur more than once uses the expression “intelligence of faith and hope” (*intellectus fidei et spei*)

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<sup>310</sup> Greimas 1966, 181.

to characterize religious thought generally or the Christian thought particularly<sup>311</sup>. To give Ricoeur's view a more structuralist appearance, we perhaps could characterize his way of analyzing the Judeo-Christian kerygma as *the syntax of expectation and hope*<sup>312</sup>. The world of reference of its own or the quasi-world of the Judeo-Christian kerygma would then be the world of promises and of hoping that the promises come true.

We still could see some common features in the actant model and Ricoeur's analysis of the Judeo-Christian kerygma. Both of them recognize a particular structuredness of content within a particular field of literature that we could categorize as a genre—though only if we used this notion in quite a wide sense. Within both of them, further, we can configure this structuredness in terms of a particular syntax, though the syntactic structure in the former is much more articulated and strict than in the latter.

Within the literature on content representation for IR, there has been discussion on a notion of “aboutness”, which helps us to see a particular feature of superficiality implied by the aimed wide coverage of *scriptum est* in bibliographic content representation. Claire Beghtol defines as a “macro-proposition” what one should represent from the content of a document or work. It would be the most general ‘message’ that some text contains. The text as a whole would then appear as a hierarchy starting from the macro-proposition, which more specific claims and themes in the text then specify and elaborate.<sup>313</sup> While discussing fundamental bibliography, I would not limit very strictly what it should say about the contents of *scriptum est*. To be able to outline contents of wider fields and in this sense, to be able to give overview-like depictions of *scriptum est*, however, the bibliographer perhaps should reduce the richness of contents within the fields of *scriptum est* as well as within the single pieces there.

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<sup>311</sup> See Ricoeur 1969, 401 ff., particularly 403 and ff. He is explicitly following Immanuel Kant's philosophy of religion. Like Kant, he suggests that fundamental essence of religion—or, once again, perhaps specifically of Christianity—is that it especially has to do with the questions and option of hope. (op. cit. 401 ff.).

<sup>312</sup> Quite in the sense of valence theory and dependence grammar, we could say that the verb ‘to hope’ typically, though not necessarily, refers to something that hopefully would be there in the future. We should notice, however, that the hope in the Ricoeurian *intellectus fidei et spei* and his philosophy of religion proper is most open. He repeatedly appeals to the formulations “*en dépit de*” and “*le fameux combien plus de saint Paul*”, which somehow indicate the hopeful orientation to what is to come, without very concrete specification of what one might hope, however (See Ricoeur 1969, 427 ff.).

<sup>313</sup> Beghtol 1986a.

Robert Fairthorne divides the aboutness—i.e. the essential content of a text, a work, or a piece of *scriptum est*—into (i) elements that the text actually mentions and (ii) elements that belong to the content of the text though not even mentioned in the text. The former would be “extensional aboutness” and the latter “intensional aboutness”. The latter is especially interesting here. Fairthorne describes this side of the essential content or the aboutness as text’s belonging to particular discourses. A text can be dealing with some particular questions and themes dealt with in those discourses even if the text does not even mention them.<sup>314</sup> At this point, we could see some resemblance between Fairthorne’s intensional aboutness and Collingwood’s history of questions (see Sections 2.3.3[b] and 2.4.2 above). For my notion of bibliography, the significance of the intensional aboutness of Fairthorne is that the focus would move from a singular and separate instance of *scriptum est* towards the literature as a whole and towards particular traditions or discourses as subfields within literature.

While trying to outline the structures of content within genre-like fields and the places of singular pieces of *scriptum est* there, a bibliographer can pay attention to

- the dimensions of differentiation of content that seem to be noteworthy within such a field;
- the articulations of content within such dimensions or categories;
- the syntaxes that are characteristic of the particular genre-like fields and consist of such categories.

I have elaborated elsewhere<sup>315</sup> general categories in terms of which we could depict the particular structures of the content of *scriptum est* within various genre-like fields. Based on what we could call the common-sense ontology of a docu-

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<sup>314</sup> See Fairthorne 1969 and 1974.

<sup>315</sup> See Suominen 2004a and 2007b. Aboutness in this sense would not be only the subject or the answer to the question of what the text ‘tells about’, though in many instances the answer to this question could qualify as an answer the question of aboutness as well. One could describe the aboutness of a novel, for instance, by telling that ‘*there is a maid, who falls in love with a knight*’ and so on. This, however, would not necessarily be the actual subject only. There is an interesting ambiguity in the Finnish word *aihe*, which primarily means subject (of a text, for instance) The same word appears also in compound *kasviaihe*, which means a plant embryo (an *aihe* of a plant), i.e. something out of which something further grows up. In the case of so-called absolute music without any actual subject, such *aihe* or embryo could be, for instance, some combination of chords or a musical theme or tune, and in an abstract painting, it could be some combination of colors, some repeating figure, or some division of the surface.

ment, we could make the distinction between (i) what the document tells something about and (ii) how it tells what it is telling. I use the notion of *disciplinary* to denote the latter and the notion of *referential* to denote the former<sup>316</sup>. We can have a Marxist study of cultural power, where Marxism would be the disciplinary and cultural power the referential. A book can be a hymnbook, which would be in such a case a disciplinary. Then again, there also can be a church-historical study telling about hymnbooks, which in such a case would be the referential.<sup>317</sup>

Furthermore, I assume that disciplinary is an always present element of the content since any piece of *scriptum est* “obeys some discipline” and there always is some rule—even if perhaps only, the ‘rule’ of breaking all the rules, in an anarchistic or Dadaist spirit. Referential, in turn, is only optional, which we can well understand while considering abstract painting or absolute music. It is not always appropriate to ask what a painting represents. The particular significance of the categorization of referentials and disciplinaries here is that the specific disciplinaries especially would be most emphatically historical by nature. The dominance of disciplinary, furthermore, would extend its historical character to the articulations of the specific categories.

With this extremely simple apparatus of categories already, I could give some examples of outlining the structures of content that could be typical of some particular genre-like fields.

- In *philosophical literature* as well as within parts of the *religious and theological literature*, within *scriptum est that is in itself artistic* (e.g. novels, paintings, pieces of music), etc., the disciplinary would be a most noteworthy category since there would be noteworthy variation related to it. There are philosophical ‘-isms’ and various theologies, there are stylistic traditions and paradigms of art, etc.

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<sup>316</sup> Since the referential relationship between a presentation and its subject is relatively clear, I can formally define the disciplinary as all the non-referential contentiously noteworthy features of a presentation.

<sup>317</sup> In view of the notion of genre, which could be an equivalent to or a specific instance of disciplinary, we could see how these two general level categories with their foundation in the common-sense ontology of documentation are not separate from each other. As regards Ricoeur’s notion of quasi-world of the text, we perhaps should think that description of referentials particularly refers to this world, but the disciplinary or genre has to do with the fact that the world talked about in a text indeed is a quasi-world or a world of reference of its own of the text. The disciplinary as well, however, is a part of the content of *scriptum est*. We perhaps could conceive of the relationship between the referential or the properly Ricoeurian *l’objectivité du sens* and the disciplinary through an analogy with the combination of sentences and modalities in linguistics.

- In some other fields, such as *physics* or *medicine*, there would be not so much variation of ‘-isms’—even if there would be a plenty of disciplinary theory behind whatever one says about concrete phenomena. In some cases, however, disciplinaries such as the Newtonian mechanics or relativity theory can have significance. Within Medicine, the opposition of ‘school’ vs. ‘alternative’ medicines could also matter. Further, medicine advancing from the notion of health, instead of the more classical starting point in diseases, could make a difference and actually create a new genre in the sense relevant here.<sup>318</sup>
- Within *social and cultural studies* as well as *the humanities*, we could assume that disciplinary elements like ‘-isms’ and ‘schools of thought’ are more important than in the ‘hard sciences’. Then again, as far as the ideals of science coming from natural sciences have an impact on these ‘softer’ fields too, the ‘-isms’ can be less significant. The positivist sociology with its ideal of science would probably not be so interested in speculative theorizing. Once again, we could see possible variation and emergence of different genres.

In all of these cases, the variation in the significance of categories can also direct the attention of a bibliographer towards particular ‘vocabularies’, either the vocabularies of particular disciplinaries or those containing possibly most specific differentiations within the referential phenomena. It may be that he or she should notice differences of existentialism, phenomenology, and hermeneutics, or of (either neo- or Vienna) classism, galant style, and baroque. Where the disciplinary has a strong position, furthermore, the ways in which the particular disciplinaries create their own particular referentials—containing such phenomena as substances, windowless monads, archangels, and cherubs, or the Marxist class structure opposed to more generally conceived of socio-economical stratification in the society, etc.—would become particularly significant, in quite a practical sense.

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<sup>318</sup> We can find an example of a syntax quite typically clinical model of medicine in Colon Classification (CC 1960, L Medicine) compiled by Ranganathan. The categories constituting medicine there are (i) Organ, (ii) Problem that includes both physiology and pathology, (iii) causes for diseases enumerated or articulated in category (ii), and finally, (iv) handling of diseases enumerated or articulated in category (ii).



### 5.4.2 Emergence of the educational potential within L&Lship

With Ricoeur, structural analysis is an intermediate phase of the “long detour” of appropriation. Figure 7 illustrates an inevitable dialectics between structural analysis and appropriation in terms of which we can conceive of CHB as keeping mainly on the level of structural analysis, where appropriation remains a subordinate moment only, in a sense. In this sense, it would appear as a reversely Ricoeur’s conception. The phase of structural analysis is the intermediate phase with Ricoeur but here, it would be the aim and end while appropriation would be an intermediate phase. Fundamentally, we perhaps could see here, once again, an instance of the Ricoeurian dialectics of event and structure. The major claim in Figure 7 is that structural analysis with a reference to content already requires at least some level of appropriation. We could illustrate this through Beghtol’s notion of aboutness.




Fig. 7. Ricoeur notions of appropriation and structural analysis applied to CHB

According to Beghtol, aboutness-analysis is a process from the “bottom” towards the “top”, a process of “controlled forgetting” of more detailed levels of the text so that eventually only the level of macro-propositions remains. This process interestingly combines with the reverse process of text comprehension, the process of adding “frame knowledge”, which actually is a process from top to the bottom. We become able to and we actually do comprehend a text—to a degree,

at least—once we become or are able to add the appropriate frame knowledge to it. We are or become able to add sentences like ‘...this means, in other words, that ...’. The configuration of a text as a hierarchy of macro-proposition and the details ‘under’ it already contains this function: the details enhance our options to understand what the macro-proposition really means. There clearly must be some dialectic between this top-bottom process and the bottom-top process of controlled forgetting. It is not possible to forget in a controlled manner unless one understands, at least to a degree, what the text actually is saying. On the other hand, one can add appropriate frame-knowledge to a text only if one can grasp what is the essential content, the macro-proposition, the ‘general message’, or aboutness of the text.

A major point here is that the result of such explicative practice would be an educational capacity, which would have the character of communicative competence or ability to discuss in a civilized and knowledgeable manner, rather than an expertise enabling one to perform technical tasks of producing some predefined effects. The communicative competence of a bibliographer, a librarian, and of the library even as I conceive of it here would consist of

- some knowledge about the matter that communication concerns, i.e. about *scriptum est*, and
- a language that would be appropriate for what communication is about,
- where the language itself already—as a system of differences of expression and of content and taking into account my argumentation above—actually could contain some knowledge about what the communication concerns as well.

The librarian obviously has to understand at least some major elements of the content of the text at hand as well as of the language that he or she is using. He or she even should and could know, through the language, something about the wider field of *scriptum est*. In this respect, characteristic of librarianship and especially bibliography would be particular practices of giving specifications to instances of *scriptum est* while ‘talking about *scriptum est*’. The result would be that the librarian learns to know about *scriptum est* and consequently becomes capable of ‘teaching’ about it, which—in my view—would be his or her particular educational task while the ‘Great Teacher’ in the whole of the library would be *scriptum est* itself.

### 5.4.3 'Life sneaking in' with the Hjelmslevian notions of content purport and metasemioticity

We can now return to the structuralist notions that I introduced concisely above (Section 5.3). With Hjelmslev, there is the most interesting notion of purport (in Danish, *mening*) to which we still should pay attention. Metasemioticity is another notion, most tightly connected to explication and its capacity to maintain the rationality of the humanities.

In the examples of articulation and partitioning above (Figures 5 and 6), there appears a common factor that the languages may articulate and partition differently. In the example of articulation, the common factor would be a part of the specter of colors. In the example of partitioning, what one partitions differently in different languages would be the 'message' of the ignorance of the speaker or the writer. Hjelmslev denotes this common factor by the notion of purport.

As Hjelmslev introduces the notion of purport, he motivates it by the needs of comparing languages with each other, as follows.

[...] it seems to be a justifiable experiment to compare different languages and then extract, or subtract, the factor that is common to them and that remains common to all languages, however many languages are drawn to the comparison. This factor—if we exclude the structural principle that involves the sign function and all functions deducible therefrom, a principle that is naturally common *qua* principle to individual languages—this factor will be an entity defined only by its having function to the structural principle of language and to all the factors that make languages different from one another. This common factor we call purport.<sup>319</sup>

The notion of purport—particularly while specified to content purport—is, in a sense, the place where 'life sneaks in' thus complements the otherwise quite formal way of seeing the language as a self-contained system of differences.

We could characterize purport also as an intermediary concept between substances and forms. Substances of expression and of content would be without any differentiation at all. Such undifferentiatedness could be a theoretical abstraction only. Purport, in turn, is something that we can empirically recognize and identify to be there behind different content forms. As such, a purport, unlike substance, would no more be only a conceptual abstraction but something that really exists. We could see there also an option to combine the purely linguistic structures with

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<sup>319</sup> Hjelmslev 1943/1961, 50.

richer phenomena of and around language and linguistic usages.

The description of purport, in respect of both the linguistic expression and the linguistic content, may in essentials be thought as belonging partly to the sphere of physics and partly to that of (social) anthropology. [...] Consequently, for both planes both a physical and a phenomenological description of the purport should be required."<sup>320</sup>

Saussure characterizes a language as a pure system of differences<sup>321</sup>. Thus, the particular units of content as well get their content in a discursively negative fashion, through the 'limiting neighbors'. In a system consisting of units A, B, [...], M, N, etc., any given unit, let it be B, would be determined exclusively as being not A neither C, [...], neither M, etc.<sup>322</sup> This, however, seems to me a little too formalist. Besides—and actually already before—the discursively negative determination of the particular units, we should take into account some kind of practical or intuitive pre-determination. The notion of content purport could grasp this. Here a comment made by Giddens may be quite illustrative:

Saussure's own example can be used to substantiate the point at issue. The identity of the 'Geneva-to-Paris train' cannot be specified independently of the

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<sup>320</sup> Hjelmslev 1943/1961, 77–78.

<sup>321</sup> Saussure 1916/1984, 155 ff.

<sup>322</sup> To give a bit more concrete example that I have used earlier (Suominen 1997, 166–167), A could be for instance 'ships' and B 'airplanes' (as it might be the case in a classification of a private collection of a schoolboy interested in sea fare and flying). Then, according to the discursively negative determination of the content units, within this ultimately simple semiotic system, 'ships' would be everything that is not 'airplanes', while the 'airplanes' correspondingly everything that is not 'ships'. Within his ultimately simple classification or semiotic, the school boy probably would include into the content 'ships' things that in a more rich semiotic system could be expressed for instance by terms such as 'sea', 'waves', 'cross-swell', 'sea ports', 'icebergs', 'Titanic', 'sails' etc. And content of his expression 'airplanes' could include things like 'air ports', 'jet engines', 'bombers' etc. But there are some notes to be done. He could have some problems with things like 'navigation', 'aircraft carrier', 'fight of Midway', 'radiator' etc. for those would be borderline cases. They could belong as well in one or the other of the classes. He could not within his semiotic system make the distinction between for instance 'sail boats' and 'steam ships', neither between 'rudder' and 'rig', not even to talk about the distinction of 'helm' and 'tiller'. Our schoolboy, of course, could solve both these problems quite easily by some refinements in his semiotic system. Anyway, after those refinements same kinds of problems could occur also in his refined semiotic world. Still one should note that even if 'rats' could still belong into the content of 'ships' (rats are in a ship in order to leave it before it sinks), 'ants' would be a real problem, not because it would be a borderline case, but because it is far too remote regarding the borderline. Actually, it is out of the interest of the hypothetical school boy and thus not to be classified in terms of his semiotic system. His interest, on the other hand, would become quite close to the notion of content purport. What is articulated, i.e. the content purport, would be the field of his interest. Thus, we actually may regard the notion of content purport as a manifestation of the 'pre-determination' required for discursively negative determination of the units of content.

context in which the phrase is used; and this context is not the system of differences themselves, such as Saussure mentions, but factors relating to their use in practice. Saussure implicitly assumes the practical standpoint of the traveler, or the time-tabling official, in giving the identity of the train; hence the 'same' train may consist of quite different engines and carriages on two separate occasions. But these do not count as instances of the 'same' train for a railway repair engineer, or a train spotter.<sup>323</sup>

The necessity of these 'pre-requirements' and 'pre-determinations' further emphasize the similarity with the hermeneutical notions like 'pre-understanding', 'horizons' and 'interests'. Here the notion of content purport serves as a bridge between structuralism and views that we could characterize as more or less hermeneutical. In view of the structuralist understanding of language and linguistic processes, it indeed would be the moment where the 'life sneaks in'.

Hjelmslev defines a metasemiotic as a semiotic, which "treats of" another semiotic, or "(scientific) semiotic one or more of whose planes is (are) semiotic(s)"<sup>324</sup>. Roland Barthes in his rather classical formula describes the metasemioticity as illustrated in Figure 8. The upper line would be the metasemiotic treating of another semiotic, which is the lower one in the figure. Further, the latter would be the content level of the former. Applying Itkonen's notion, we also could say that the upper line is a metasemiotic explication of the lower one.


We now could ask in what particular sense a semiotic can be the content level of another semiotic. Within the structuralist and particularly Hjelmslevian premises, the only logical answer could be that another semiotic is the content level of a metasemiotic in the sense that it—or perhaps, more exactly, knowledge, observation, etc. about it—is the content purport structured within the metasemiotic. I would not see any other option since a language or a semiotic, according to structuralism, is a two-level system of differences on its own, not reducible to the world of referents. Here the charming Hjelmslevian notion of content purport

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<sup>323</sup> Giddens 1979, 16. If a murder had taken place in the train, one could add to the latter list *commissaire Maigret*. For him, it would be important to investigate the physically existing carriage where the spots of blood and other possible clues would physically be. His field of interest in this particular moment of murder investigation, i.e. the content purport to be structured, would not consist of times and places but of physical objects. Thus, we perhaps could extend the somewhat vague scope of the notion of purport towards even hermeneutical notions like interest, horizon, etc.

<sup>324</sup> Hjelmslev 1961, 119–125, def. 104.

would come somehow close to the notion of referent as well, in addition to the notions of interest and horizon.<sup>325</sup>



**Fig. 8. Metasemioticity (E = expression, C = content, R = relation)<sup>326</sup>**

If we were to denote the result of CHB as a metasemiotic, this notion as well would have significance as regards overcoming the Gadamerian problem of incompatibility of the objectifying methodologies of modern science and the communicational continuity. A metasemiotic as well is semiotic. The result of a metasemiotic explication still belongs to the sphere of communication, and consequently, objectification in the form of metasemiotic explication would not cut off the communicational continuity as fatally as an explanation. The rationality proper to the humanities—conceived of in the Gadamerian sense, as communication with what the history has handed down to us—would not suffer too much.<sup>327</sup>

**5.5 The bibliographic continuum and parallelism, and “l’activité structural” with “aucune différence technique entre le structuralisme savant [...] et la littérature”**

The scholarly perspective that I would see as most appropriate for L&Lship is not towards behavioral phenomena. One behavioral assumption that I would make,

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<sup>325</sup> The somewhat formal way to define metasemiotic here leaves a plenty of options of varying levels on which a semiotic can treat of another semiotic. The grammatical formula ‘subject—predicate—object’ as a metasemiotic explication of the sentence ‘John kicked the ball’ would make disappear all the actual content. A content representation of some text in the form of classification or indexing would also be a rephrasing, but there we would have some content of the object as well remained.

<sup>326</sup> Barthes 1964/1984, 150

<sup>327</sup> The general laws and statements of states of affairs within an explanation as well, which we can find in natural sciences, for instance, must have a linguistic expression. The fundamental rationality of such laws and explanations, however, is to tell something about some reality over which we perhaps wish to have some control. An explication, in turn, can open a perspective towards an explanation, but it can also open a perspective towards continuing and perhaps enhancing communication in some particular respect.

however, is that a person visiting a library is particularly interested in *scriptum est*. Consequently, the contents of *scriptum est* could be a content purport common to him or her, the library, as well as to the bibliographic scholarship that would be the core professional knowledge of a librarian. Even for various activities and equipment of L&Lship, *scriptum est* would be the actual and formal object towards which they orientate (cf. Sections 2.3 to 2.4). We thus could have here what I would call the *bibliographic parallelism*. Everyone—the librarian, the field of scholarship providing him or her with his or her professional competence, various elements of and equipment within the library, such as the collection and catalogues, and partly at least, even the one coming into the library in the role of a client, for instance—would be ‘talking’ about *scriptum est*.

Barthes eloquently collects under the notion of “structural activity” (*l’activité structurale*) a view of structuralism that helps us to proceed towards the rationality of promoting communicational competence through explication. By activity, he means “a regular sequence of a certain number of mental operations”. The objective of these operations would be a specific kind of reconstruction of some object. In this reconstruction, there should be visible the functions and rules of functioning of this object.

The objective of all structuralist activity, be it reflective or poetic, would be to reconstruct an ‘object’ so that in this reconstruction there would be manifested the rules of functioning (the ‘functions’) of this object. The structure thus is actually a simulacrum of the object, but a simulacrum with a direction, with an interest [...] this new is no less than intelligible in general; [...] and this is an addition with anthropological value, in the sense that it is the human itself, his history, situation, his liberty and even the resistance that the nature opposes to his spirit.

Here one sees why it must be talked about structuralist activity: [...] and here there is no technical difference between scholarly structuralism, on one hand, and literature in particular and art in general, on the other: [...].<sup>328</sup>

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<sup>328</sup> Barthes 1964., 214–215, transl. by VS from the following.

“Le but de toute activité structuraliste, qu’elle soit réflexive ou poétique, est de reconstituer un “objet”, de façon à manifester dans cete reconstitution les règles de fonctionnement (les ‘fonctions’) de cet objet. La structure est donc en fait un simulace de l’objet, mais un simulacra dirigé, intéressé [...] ce nouveau n’est ren moins que l’intelligible general; [...] et cette addition a une valeur anthropologique, en ceci q’elle est l’homme même, son histoire, sa situation, sa liberté et la résistance même que la nature oppose à son esprit.

In this passage from Barthes, there actually are present—albeit in a bit metaphorical form—all the elements of what I mean by the explicative content-bibliographic practice of giving specifications to *scriptum est*, which here would actually be a substitute for "*l'activité structuraliste*" of Barthes. Barthes' claim that there is not "technical difference", in turn, would be a way to express a part of what I would denote as the *bibliographic continuum*. Texts or *scriptum est* tells about some realities, perhaps the Gadamerian *Sache* or the Ricoeurian *l'objectivité du sens*, perhaps even about the worlds behind the text, in a way or another (in a directly referential manner of a text or as material evidence once a copy of a work is in a collection, for instance). Bibliography, then, tells about *scriptum est*, rather than about what *scriptum est* in itself is telling about. Then again, telling about a text can hardly avoid entirely telling about what the text itself is telling, and here again, we would have a kind of continuum.

Applying the notion of Barthes, a summary of the bibliographic *l'activité structuraliste* or the bibliographic continuum and parallelism could be as follows.

- (1) *Bibliographic perspective* would be that object of investigation and aimed knowledge would be *scriptum est*, in CHB primarily the contents of *scriptum est*;
- (2) *Bibliographic mode* would be that the basic intellectual activity of both research and professional practice would be explication.
- (3) *Bibliographic rationality* would be that the aim of research would be to promote the communicative competence for the practices such as those of L&Lship, i.e. for communication concerning *scriptum est*, in content-bibliography especially through explication of the system of differences of content in *scriptum est*.<sup>329</sup>

The point becomes sharper if we contrast this with a schematic summary of more widely prevailing points of departure that seem to be dominant in LID-studies.

- (1) The object of research consists of "information processes", using the expression of Ingwersen once again. In the modern phase of information science,

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On voit donc pourquoi il faut parler d'activité structuraliste: [...] et c'est cela qu'il n'y, a proprement parler, aucune différence technique entre le structuralisme savant d'une part et la littérature en particulier, l'art en general, d'autre part: [...]."

<sup>329</sup> The bibliographic perspective is a reformulation of my earlier notion of "the perspective of documentalistics" (see Suominen 1997, 136–137).



for instance, most emphasized would be the users' information seeking and behaviors with the needs behind them, with a continuously widening sphere of contexts of their behavior and thinking, and even their more structured practices conditioning these behavioral phenomena. The notion of information practices as such, for instance, not necessarily changes very much.

- (2) The (ideal) form of knowledge that research should produce would be ultimately knowledge with explanatory power or—a little more modestly—with quasi-explanatory power, with explanatory power in terms of so-called probabilistic explanation, etc. Research results with explanatory power in a strict sense are rare. Then again, adding to the understanding of the phenomena in some 'smoother' sense could quite well remain under the same fundamental rationality.
- (3) The aim would be in understanding and even explaining information processes, and the ultimate rationality and objective would be typically one of design and evaluation of something that we can broadly call "information systems" or some other forms of promoting "effective communication of knowledge and knowledge records among humans", as Saracevic in the 1990's in a rather classical—yet, still in the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century in many respects current—manner defined the fundamental rationality of what he calls "information science"<sup>330</sup>

## **5.6 Criteria of adequacy of a grammar and CHB, with a remark on idiography as a characteristic of historical studies**

Since content-historically bibliographic explication as exemplified above should be an adequate representation of the cultural reality of the quasi-worlds of literature, we still should consider the criteria of its adequacy. On a very general level, Itkonen equals adequacy, quite in a correspondence theoretical tone, with similarity<sup>331</sup>. He formulates as follows the conditions of adequacy of a grammar:

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<sup>330</sup> See Saracevic 1992, 11.

<sup>331</sup> "If this new sentence which results from replacing the explicandum by the explicatum (and from changing, in the process, the structure of the original sentence) is formally true, the explicatum is said to satisfy the criterion of adequacy in question. Since the criterion of adequacy was originally used to identify the explicandum, and since it is not satisfied by the explication, it follows that the explicandum and explicatum are similar. Their similarity is guaranteed, above all, by the requirement that the explicatum must satisfy several criteria of adequacy identifying the explicandum. Explication would of course lose its point, if explicata could uncontrollably differ from explicanda." (Itkonen 1978, 302.)

If all true rule-sentences, which are intuitively necessary sentences about a language L, can be transformed in the way here discussed, and *salva veritate*, into formally necessary sentences about the generative capacity of the grammar of L, and vice versa, then the grammar satisfies its criteria of adequacy and is, consequently, adequate.<sup>332</sup>

Itkonen then proceeds to formulate the possible failure of a grammar. The case could be that the grammar fails “to generate something it ought to generate”. Further, the case could be the other way around: the grammar could generate sentences that it should not, as these sentences would not be correct in view of the intuition of the members of the linguistic community.<sup>333</sup> In the case of CHB, however, the criteria could not be as strict as they are with a grammar according to Itkonen.

A grammar with Itkonen consists of generative rules. The linguistic intuition of the speakers of the language provides the grammarian with a criterion for the set of the products generated by the rules of which the grammar consists. Content-historical explication, on the other hand, would remain closer to the classical structuralist views of structuring the content into units and their categories. We could imagine some rules. If the disciplinary is ‘Marxism’, then one could assume that there are typically collective actants as referentials, while disciplinary-level methodological individualism could actually even exclude such collective actants and deny their very existence. Somewhat metaphorically, however, CHB would remain a kind of a ‘map’, rather than a system of generative rules. Yet, maps as well can be useful. In the case of bibliography, it would be perhaps a historical map, thus approaching history reconstructing the past. We further could see as genres the fields of *scriptum est* with a particular structuredness of content, and the notion of the genre as such is a normative concept as well. For those authoring

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<sup>332</sup> Itkonen 1978, 309–310.

<sup>333</sup> Itkonen 1978, 310.

literature, genres are—or, in the case of CHB, have been—models including some regular features that function as norms, albeit not as very strict ones<sup>334</sup>.

As a whole, in any case, the result of CHB would typically be a system of differences, rather than a system of generative rules. We have not any ‘bibliographic intuition’ that could correspond to the linguist intuition as the measure against which we could look at the explication. We could think, however, that some criteria of adequacy within bibliography could have a foundation in the very process of description. As far as a particular scheme of descriptio—such as the ones I outlined above—allows us to proceed from a manifestation to another of *scriptum est* and the result plausibly explicates the contents each time, we may assume that it has some adequacy as regards the structures of content in literature. Once we start to encounter instances that would not fit any of our schemes, we perhaps had to make a new scheme since there might be a new genre. In terms of the theory of documentary languages and classification within LID-studies, this kind of procedure would approach so-called literary warrant the notion of which is originally from E. Wyndham Hulme<sup>335</sup>.

Plausibility as a criterion, of course, raises a plenty of critical questions, but we should consider them as methodological reservations. As regards bibliography, however, we could think about additional ways of testing and bettering adequacy of the explications and reconstructions resulting. In a sense, Ingwersen’s notion of “cognitive overlap” (see Section 2.3) quite well illustrates this option.

Within my categories above in illustrating CHB as structural analysis or explication, the notion of disciplinary especially culminates the historical character of the content forms or the worlds of reference of its own of literature and *scriptum est* as the objects investigated. Taking into account that disciplinary in general

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<sup>334</sup> We can first think about a simple story that a primary school pupil might write about holiday. He or she could write that he or she was with his or her family at uncle’s farm, that there were cows, pigs, and chickens; that someday uncle had to fix his tractor and ask the mechanic living in the neighbor to lend a jack, etc. The text written by the pupil could quite well be a very simple story of what there was, what happened, etc. Then, let us assume that a student of ethnography had had a similar stay on a farm as a part of his or her studies. In his or her report, it would be not enough to tell a story like the one told by the primary school pupil. He or she should perhaps further reflect on how he or she applied the methodology and theories of ethnography while observing what there was and what there happened on the farm. Thus, to use my notions of disciplinary and referential, for the student of ethnography there would be a syntactic rule of content in the sense that there should be, in his or her text, both referential and disciplinary elements of content—like there has to be explicitly present a subject and a predicate in a sentence of many natural languages.

<sup>335</sup> See for instance Beghtol 1986b, 111 ff.

is dominant as regards referential, we may say that the whole of the object reconstructed in CHB would be rather emphatically historical by character. It would be very much a matter of enumeration as well. In this sense, quite insightful is a remark by Jean Perrault in terms of inevitable “opacity” of enumerations of various instances, which “transparency” of syntax or of logical structures in general possibly could remove *but only to a degree*.<sup>336</sup> Perrault writes:

Classification (in the sense of conceptual bibliography, not of the mere preparatory creation of systematic conceptual organization) strictly speaking is inductive.<sup>337</sup>

Then, a little later, he concludes: “We must enumerate, then, too, if we are to get beyond purely *a priori* classification as a philosophical exercise”. Here, of course, the transparent syntax would have some affinity with structuralism. Perreault’s claim of inevitability of enumeration, on the other hand, would appear as if a reservation to structuralism in this particular context.

To accentuate further the historical nature of the subject matter of CHB, I would use Wilhelm Windelband’s and Heinrich Rickert’s concept of “idiographic”—as opposed to “nomothetic”—to characterize the disciplinary approach that we should have to these phenomena<sup>338</sup>. The historical and idiographic nature of the *explicandum* in CHB as such already could be a reason for which the measures for assessing the adequacy of the results cannot be as strict as in grammar. The very idea of the rules cannot be in history as strict as it can be in the case of a grammar. Then again, neither could a grammarian with the methodology suggested by Itkonen appeal to the linguistic intuition of past speakers of the language and partly at least, the difference discussed here relates to the opposition of synchrony and diachrony.

Content historical bibliography could then be—or, at least, contain—a noteworthy moment of mapping of types of content and recognition of particular instances of *scriptum est* that are instances of these types. This ultimately could be a way of learning to know about *scriptum est*, developing a particular kind of bibliographic *Bildung*. A constituent, even a tool or a support, as well as an expression

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<sup>336</sup> Perreault 1969, 113 ff.

<sup>337</sup> Perreault 1969, 115.

<sup>338</sup> Rickert 1910, 54–55. With a reference to Windelband, Rickert characterizes the difference and even opposition of natural sciences and history as follows: “Er [Windelband] stellt neben das ‘nomotetische’ Verfahren der Naturwissenschaften das ‘idiographische’ der Geschichte als dasjenige, welches auf die Darstellung des Einmaligen und Besonderen gerichtet ist, [...]“ (Op. cit., 54).

of such *Bildung*, could be a content-bibliographic language (corresponding to what one typically within IR calls documentary language). The mapping of the field(s) would be going on in terms of what we could see as a kind of typicalities. We probably should assume that the typicalities that we have in mind are only assumptions or suggestions. Then, there could be other typicalities as well. In the course of time, however, the evolving content-bibliographic language can incorporate these other typicalities.

To summarize, we could think that in a grammar and a language, there is a fair amount of logic involved while within history, there is a plenty of contingency or accidental phenomena and only a little if any of all-embracing logic. The bibliographer might be somewhere between them. Yet, if we had a rational interest in explications, we perhaps should be satisfied with less of strictness of the criteria of adequacy. We perhaps should be satisfied with what we could call a plausible outline or reconstruction. We could not talk there about transforming intuitive necessities into strictly formal ones. The issue would rather be about clarification and contesting of intuitions, which could strengthen the community of meanings. Even in such a case, however, we can and we should try to apply some criteria of adequacy in order to reach at least somehow adequate explication. As problematic as it might be to explicate historical objectivities and as sketchy as such explications might remain, we ultimately should consider such problems as methodological reservations only—if only we had reasons to try to achieve such objectivities.<sup>339</sup>

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<sup>339</sup> The discussion on the less or more strict criteria of adequacy of explication above has to do with the originally strictly positivistic intentions of the structuralist program. Intention was that also human science could give exact and objective descriptions of its object. We may see this intention quite clearly in a text of Jean-Claude Gardin (1974). He considers research carried out under the title of structuralism—in terms of an opposition of scientific analysis, "discours of science", on one hand, and what he calls "pleasure of texts", on the other (" [...] *discours de la science ou la plaisir du texte* [...]") (op. cit., 56). The truly scientific structuralism should go on in terms of hypothesis and their testing against empirical data. As examples of this kind of structuralism, Gardin mentions descriptions of the phonetic systems of particular languages. A further example of such aim of strictness could be so called commutation test, which means that a particular unit of expression exists in a particular language if and only if changing this unit to another leads to a change on the level of content, and *vice versa*. (See, for instance, Hjelmslev 1943/1961, 73–75.) This speaks of an empiricist pursuit, but we should notice that we could apply this test only if we know what the expressions mean in the language in question. Then again, much of the actual work of the structuralists would be "pleasure of texts" only, without any specific and strict methodology. Actually, this would not at all differ from the more traditional forms of scholarship within the humanities reconstructing in a relatively free manner cultural entities by combining pieces of knowledge from various sources.

### 5.7 An additional thought experiment: CHB with the truth criterion of *scriptum est* in Gadamerian terms even?

We actually could conceive of the bibliography about *scriptum est* in Gadamerian terms as well. Of course, we could consider it simply as a pre-hermeneutical practice merely providing the truly hermeneutical process with materials and knowledge about potential materials for the hermeneutical process proper. This would give the library and bibliography truly the role of an *ancilla scientiarum*—or, more widely, the role of an *ancilla* of the literary culture and erudition, we perhaps could and should say—which as such, of course, could be quite a respectable mission. This solution, of course, would be acceptable even if we assumed a most radical interpretation of Gadamer’s criticism on historical objectivism.

Yet, even more substantially, we might pay attention to Gadamer’s view that what one actually should understand is *die Sache* dealt with within what one reads. It is quite an open concept, and consequently, the *Scriptum est* as well could be *die Sache* that we could aim to understand and know. Consequently, an option to dissolve the tension between the Gadamerian criticism on historical objectivism and the obligation of *scriptum est* as the maxim of L&Lship could be to consider bibliography as well as an instance of understanding where *Scriptum est* actually is the subject matter—*die Sache*—to be understood and known. The literature through which a bibliographer could try to reach this subject matter, then, would be bibliographic literature, i.e. earlier literature that tells about the same subject matter.

In this sense, we can say that Gadamerian hermeneutics can here provide us only with a rather general and abstract possible frame. Further, it could also be somewhat problematic to ‘play’ with a scheme of concepts that we can find with Gadamer and to ‘position’ it in a somewhat mechanical manner around varying instances.

The major problem, however, would be that this way of conceiving of the bibliography would not give us very much advice as regards how we could learn to know about *Scriptum est*, in addition to the suggestion that we should be “open”, which as such, of course, is not at all an insignificant piece of advice. In this respect, in any case, the Ricoeurian premises would provide us with considerably richer methodological points of departure, which is not a surprise, taking into account Gadamer’s negative attitude as regards the very idea of methods. With its attention to “regional hermeneutics”, including historical investigation as

well, Ricoeurian hermeneutics seems to provide us with a plausible foundation and model for bibliography and for dealing with the hermeneutical aspects belonging to bibliographic work as well. This point of departure is even more plausible if we especially take into account that writing, written and literature has a special position in Ricoeurian hermeneutics. We could say that with Gadamer as well, what I mean by literature—the combination of work and documentation—is certainly present in the world, which he is talking about and in which the processes that he is talking about are going on. Yet, literature does not figure as a particularly thermalized element with Gadamer, especially not as concretely as it does with Ricoeur.

This reasoning of the option to conceive of bibliography in Gadamerian terms, in any case, serves to accentuate that the conditions of our being and understanding as Gadamer depicts them are present in all of our intellectual efforts, even in the cases where they cannot exhaust the rationality of the particular effort concerned. Neither a bibliographer could escape the Gadamerian universality of hermeneutics.

A further question that remains open here and that Gadamerian criticism on historical objectivism brings forth is the question of why should we perhaps actually mind the past objectivities of *scriptum est*. I shall discuss this question further in Chapter 8.







## **Part II:**

**Constitution of the rationality of L&Lship  
primarily about and the plausibly on behalf of  
*scriptum est* within a wider sphere of politico-  
ethical rationalities**



## 6 Politico-ethical foundations of educational rationality of L&Lship for the state even

Here first, I should make a remark on what I mean by the wider sphere of rationalities. Particularly in view of the Gadamerian notion of the universality of hermeneutics, one might wonder whether there could be something even wider. We also may assume, however, that within or under such universality, there are particular rationalities connected to particular practices, such as the Ricoeurian ‘regionalities’. The wider sphere of practices here would mean that that we could and perhaps should pay attention to these particular rationalities as well ‘under’ the universality of hermeneutics. Hermeneutics may be universal in the sense that it is present as a condition of all our understanding, knowledge, and being, but it probably is not all that we can say about particular instances and rationalities of our understandings, knowledge, and being. In this sense, we could have a wider sphere of possible and intelligible rationalities.

The library quite often is an institution maintained by public authority. In such cases, the various political theories and philosophies—i.e. conceptions of the state or some other public authority, their foundations, and of the possible relationship that there can be between them and the citizens—could give quite direct answers to the questions of the possible intelligible legitimations of the library as well. Then again, a library of an individual human and citizen as well and his or her motives to collect and maintain it can reflect his or her views about humanity, about his or her own citizenship, and even about the state.

In this chapter, I shall focus on political theory and philosophy and especially on a current there, which we can call republicanism. Within this current of thought, we can see convincing premises that quite fundamentally challenge the liberalist assumptions behind the seeming self-evidence of the userist legitimation of the library as the only intelligible option (see Section 1.2.1). In this chapter, we shall also see quite a fundamental affinity between premises that we can find with Gadamer and the republicanist premises in conceiving of the state. In this sense, these two sets of premises in my argumentation would belong together and possibly fortify each other.

Already here, I find it useful to anticipate the view of political theory and philosophy that I would prefer. Republicanist thought, in my view, contains most noteworthy arguments and is certainly superior to liberalism and even compelling, in many respects. Then again, I would also make some reservations as regard

some views within republicanism. I shall make *liberal footnotes* to or *reminders* within republicanism and the result of them would be *agnostic republicanism*.<sup>340</sup> In this respect, useful would be the general characterization of republicanism as “mixed and balanced government” with Mortimer Sellers, an American scholar of law whose account on liberalism and republicanism, the latter clearly in the form that it got in the USA, particularly in the time of the so-called Founding Fathers. In continuation, we shall discuss extensively the views of Sellers<sup>341</sup>. On the other hand, the Hegelian notion of the state also is a good starting point from which I can advance towards my notion of agnostic republicanism<sup>342</sup>. In view of the affinity that there is between Hegelian thought and republicanism as well as of Hegel’s

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<sup>340</sup> I could use also the notion of *liberal republicanism* connected to Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu (see, for instance, van Dijn 2014, who then questions, however, if in the case of Montesquieu, there were something more appropriately denoted as “liberal monarchism”. The notion of agnostic, in any case, is illustrative in view of the significance of doubt in my own argumentation (see Section 6.2.3 below).

<sup>341</sup> Sellers 1998, 99. The notion of mixed government, according to Wright (2007, 160–161), has its origins already in Ancient Greece while “thoroughly naturalized in the Anglophone world, the idea of a libertarian ‘balanced constitution,’ increasingly connected with the adjacent notion of a “separation of powers” and the emergent language of “checks and balances,” moved across the Atlantic in the eighteenth century, where it was central to the Whig radicalism that fired the American Revolution and to the intellectual innovations that resulted in the Constitution of 1787.” The idea of the separation powers becomes especially problematic if one emphasises—like Rousseau does—the indivisibility of popular sovereignty (see e.g. Mazrui 1967). With Rousseau, however, there is another kind of separation of powers with another kind of logic. On the other hand, Rousseau as well has an idea of a kind of separation of powers: “ [...] *la puissance executive ne peut appartenir à la généralité comme législative ou souveraine, parce que cette puissance ne consiste qu’en des actes particuliers qui ne sont point du ressort de la loi, ni par conséquent de celui du souverain, don’t tous les actes ne peuvent être que des lois*” (Rousseau 1762/sa, 61-61 [Livre troisième, Chapitre I). Interestingly enough, however, the rationality of this with Rousseau seems to be the protection of the legislator against the degeneration, which could be the result of meddling with particular matters and private interests dealt with by the executive and juridical powers (see Mäki 2013, 47–48 ). More typically, however, we could see the separation of powers as the protection of juridical power against ‘politics’.

<sup>342</sup> Characterizing Hegel directly as a republicanist is somewhat problematic. Smith (1986, 134) writes: “Hegel’s early flirtation with radical republicanism did not survive the failure of the French Revolution to achieve anything remotely resembling classical polis democracy”. For Sellers as well, it would be impossible to consider Hegel as a representative of republicanism. For him, republicanism means supporting republic as a formal order of government as opposed to monarchy, for instance. Sellers can write—for instance—that “To speak about Aristotle or Machiavelli as ‘republican’ (for example) is accurate only to the extent that Aristotle anticipated Cicero, and Machiavelli followed Livy”. (Sellers 1998, 2). In continuation, however, the ideas of Aristotle and even Hegel, for instance will appear as parts of republicanist thinking. Even if Hegel’s ideal of a state contains the position for the sovereign (see Hegel 1820/1967, §275 ff. )—who actually, in the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century in Prussia, would be the king—he actually bases in quite a substantial sense the legitimacy and even existence of the state upon citizens and the bourgeois society or *societas civilis*. (See, for instance, references to Mäki 2013 and Neuhaus 2000 below).

strong emphasis on the state, in any case, we can have a most illustrative contrast as a starting point for our discussion.

After our discussion on the republicanist political theory and philosophy, we can return to the issue of objectivism and objectivity. Above we already saw *how* the notion of explication as an intellectual activity could make possible the combination of the fundamental hermeneutical rationality and objectifying perspective to *scriptum est*. Another question remains, however. *Why should we mind about the past realities and objectivities of and around scriptum est?* I shall address this question since Chapter 8 and particularly in Sections 8.2 to 8.4. This will also contribute to my agnostic republicanism (see Section 9.5).

## **6.1 Some remarks related to political theory and philosophy within LID-studies**

As an introduction to the republicanist challenge to liberalism as well as political theory and philosophy in general, some exceptional examples of argumentation in a way or another related to this thematic within LID-studies are useful. Within the professional literature on librarianship, a typical theme is that democracy requires knowledgeable and enlightened citizens. Consequently, democracy would require the libraries as well. As true and even otherwise respectable as such claims may be, they could remain somewhat superficial without scrutinizing further what democracy and concepts closely related to it could actually mean. In this sense, John Buschman's remarks that the

LIS's relationship to democratic theory—from practical work in libraries through efforts to theoretically ground the field, from construction of to use and verification of databases and archived information, from its popular through its research literature—is aposiopetic in both senses of that word. It has not been systematically explored or applied, and the vast quantity of LIS work does not engage in intramural debate meant to, in Wolin's terms, unsettle settled realities toward the end of democratic efficacy.

The distinction between liberalism and republicanism is one option for opening a little further the notion of democracy as well and particularly the notion of freedom that obviously has some significance in this respect.

Argumentation within LID-studies has seldom been going on in terms of the opposition of republicanism and liberalism exactly. Ronald McCabe, as an exception in this respect, argues in view of "communitarianism" or "community

movement” as a challenge to “libertarianism”<sup>343</sup>. In view of an opposition of “access to information for individuals” and “education for democratic society”, he encapsulates the opposition of liberalism or “libertarian philosophy” and the “republican tradition of the Enlightenment”, referring by the latter to the older American tradition of republicanism with its origin in thinking of the “Founding Fathers” particularly<sup>344</sup>. According to McCabe, moreover, there is a “clear relationship” between communitarianism and community movement, on one hand, and the “republican tradition”, on the other<sup>345</sup>. What the liberalist or libertarian mainstream is threatening thus has its foundation in quite an honorable tradition within the political thinking of the USA.

I shall here also return shortly to ideas of Birdsall that we already discussed shortly in Section 3.5.2. Birdsall talks about liberalism, socialism, and conservatism—instead of liberalism and republicanism—but with reservations, we can think that socialism and conservatism with Birdsall, as opposed to liberalism, represent some aspects of republicanist political theory and philosophy. Thereafter, I shall also give examples of some other notions in terms of which one has approached problems of liberalism within LID-studies.

After his general statement of the constituents of the politics of librarianship, Birdsall proceeds to discuss extensively liberalism and how it, after all, constitutes the mainstream within the political culture as well as of thinking about the library in the United States<sup>346</sup>. The notion of liberalism with Birdsall—particularly what he denotes as “American liberalism”—opens in front of us a rather dynamic phenomenon.

Birdsall’s account of the evolvment of American political thinking is particularly interesting here, once he proceeds to combine it with thinking about L&Lship and questions that it faces in the landscape of political thought dominated by liberalism in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century. He explains how it is characteristic of American liberalism to be able “to respond to social change and to incorporate ideas from competing ideologies”. Because of this, there is a variety of different and even opposite emphases between forms of liberalism, which Birdsall characterises as “collectivist” and “autonomist”. The latter is approaching what one around the change of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries calls neo-liberalism while the

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<sup>343</sup> McCabe 2001, 19 ff.

<sup>344</sup> McCabe 2001, 27–28.

<sup>345</sup> McCabe 2001, 41 Ff.

<sup>346</sup> Birdsall 1994, 114 ff.

former would be the traditional ‘leftish’ liberalism of Anglo-American political cultures.

In contemporary America, autonomist liberalism, which stresses individualism, is now often perceived as conservatism or liberalism. In contrast, collectivist liberalism, with its emphasis on the use of central state authority to promote the common welfare, is perceived as becoming an increasingly social democratic ideology.<sup>347</sup>

Within the “collectivist liberalism”, then, there is some resemblance with the socialist moment of the politics of librarianship, connected to the egalitarian aims, which Birdsall’s reference to social democracy suggests. The fundamental characteristic of liberalism—if compared to conservatism and socialism—is “its commitment to individualism”, but “Individualized service has not been considered contrary to serving the community because it has long been a basic liberal assumption among librarians that the community is improved through the betterment of the individual<sup>348</sup>. Here, in terms of liberalist thinking as well, there is a moment of education as a part of the rationality of the library, though probably somewhat different one than in the conservative Deweyan idea of educating common people by good literature (see Section 3.1).

Birdsall then proceeds to “the emerging contradictions of twentieth-century liberalism”, which leads to a confusing situation within thinking about L&Lship as well. What leads to this confusion is the fact that what Birdsall calls the American liberalism has absorbed in itself motives of conservative and socialist thinking. According to Birdsall, “Some attack librarianship’s liberal promotion of intellectual freedom while others attack librarianship as a conservative bastion of middle-class values”<sup>349</sup>. He continues, however, by a remark on dangers within what we could call ‘pure’ liberalism.

To some, liberalism’s excessive drive for individual rights has resulted in a narcissistic concern for self over others, a striving for personal gain over public needs, and a pervasive sense of alienation.<sup>350</sup>

Somewhat paradoxically, what Birdsall calls the American liberalism

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<sup>347</sup> Birdsall 1994, 115. Birdsall uses the notion of “autonomist liberalist” in a sense that approaches what one often denotes by the concept of neo-liberalism while his notion of “collectivist liberalism” would refer to the leftish liberal tradition of Anglo-American politics.

<sup>348</sup> Birdsall 1994, 117.

<sup>349</sup> Birdsall 1994, 120.

<sup>350</sup> Birdsall 1994, 119.



- if absorbs in itself some particular moments of conservatism and socialism, becomes confusing and is open to criticism from a variety of angles;
- if does not absorb such moments and remains ‘pure’, so to speak, ignores significant aspects of the social and political reality and life, such as the “public needs”, and even creates the risks of “narcissistic” alienation.

The former may be uncomfortable, but the latter could be even worse since it can risk the very foundations of the society and perhaps also the dignity of our life and being. We even could see here a symptom of significance and inevitability of what conservative and socialist currents of political thinking emphasize. As the long-term mainstream of political understanding as Birdsall claims it to be, the “American liberalism” perhaps has had to assume some conservative and even socialist elements. The case could be that the society—especially the most complex modern society developed since the 19<sup>th</sup> century—could not survive without such elements as parts of its long-term mainstream of political thinking.<sup>351</sup>

## **6.2 Schematic analytics of liberalist, republicanist, and dictatorial-totalitarian understanding of the state**

Before going ahead, we should notice the danger of over-simplification in opposing the liberalist and republicanist views. While outlining the evolvement of political thinking since the Ancient Rome, Sellers remarks that republicanism actually is the “parent of liberalism in Western Europe” and “Liberalism grew out of republican theory”. Republicanism itself means here “the legal theory of republican Rome, revived in Renaissance Italy, restated in commonwealth England, realized in George Washington’s North America, and reanimated by the French revolution”<sup>352</sup>. Liberalism in Western Europe, in turn, “first emerged in the wake of the French revolution to accommodate those partisans of liberty who, having recon-

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<sup>351</sup> We probably should here still consider a little further the liberalist ideal of a little state. Even as the product of consciously and harshly liberalist politics, the state of the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century—even so-called night-watchman state—would be quite big if compared to the states of the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. *Laissez faire* too, in the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century would require structures that are massive if compared to the situation one or two hundred years earlier. In both of these examples the massive size of the state would not necessarily be the result of consciously republicanist view of the state.. There rather can be some kind of authoritarian technocratic bureaucracy. This all, in any case, emphasize relativity and problematic nature of the distinctions between different ‘-isms’ within in political theory and philosophy.

<sup>352</sup> Sellers 1998, 99.

ciled themselves to constitutional monarchy, could no longer be ‘republicans’ in the strictest sense of the term”<sup>353</sup>. Within the history of ideas, it is not so easy to recognize very pure and clear-cut manifestations of some particular views, but for argumentation, some distinctions may be beneficial.

### **6.2.1 Schematic and historical oppositions of republicanism and liberalism**

In Section 1.2.1, I started from Smith’s condensation of four fundamental points of departure or “principles” of liberalism. Filli Kartal’s summary of the opposition between republicanism and liberalism serves here as another similarly tentative and schematic introduction.

- Within liberalism, the “notion of liberty” is “negative”, while in republicanism it is “positive”.
- Within liberalism, the “unit of reference” is “individual”, while in republicanism it is “community”.
- Within liberalism, the “constructive factor” is “rights”, while in republicanism it is “obligations”.
- Within liberalism, the “citizen type” is “passive”, while in republicanism it is “active”.
- Within liberalism, finally, the “core of politics” is “equality before law”, while in republicanism it is “participation”.<sup>354</sup>

As regards the concept of freedom, however, we shall later see that instead of the positive freedom or in addition to it, at least, the notion of freedom characteristic of republicanism could be what Markku Mäki, a Finnish scholar of philosophy, denotes as “autonomous freedom”<sup>355</sup>. I shall address these notions of freedom in a detailed manner in Section 6.3.)

As a further introduction, another way to characterize a little schematically the relationship of republicanist and liberalist views might be helpful. Liberalism emphasizes a ‘small state’ since the assumption is that the less there is the state, the less there are constraints on freedom, and the more of freedom there would be. The republicanist, in turn, favors plenty of the state, which also is the foundation

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<sup>353</sup> Sellers 1998, 101.

<sup>354</sup> Kartal 2001–2002, 128.

<sup>355</sup> Mäki 2013 *passim*.

of a plenty of significant and meaningful freedom. Sellers refers to Benjamin Constant's speech from 1819 that contained a distinction of the "liberty of the ancients" and "liberty of the moderns", the former meaning "actual participation in government", while the latter would be "peaceful enjoyment", "individual" or "private independence", and "individual security". Sellers further writes: "The 'fathers of liberalism,' [John Stuart] Mill and Constant, sought the maximum degree of government non-interference compatible with the minimum demands of social life"<sup>356</sup>. The expression "government non-interference" here would be another way to express the idea of negative freedom characteristic of liberalism.

In addition to his historical outline, Sellers himself also summarizes as follows, on the level of fundamental ideas, the opposition of liberalism and republicanism, "To the extent that republicans and liberals necessarily disagree".

Early liberals wanted everyone unfettered as much as possible in pursuing private projects. Later liberals wanted everyone supported as much as possible to realize private projects. Recent liberals even admit the value of certain public projects. But all liberals have sought to avoid the public search for truth about contentious issues. Liberals think that people will cooperate best by avoiding issues of substance. Republicans think that people will cooperate best when called upon to act together, in pursuit of the common good.<sup>357</sup>

We can see here, in addition to the historical evolution of the liberalism itself, the liberalist avoidance of "contentious issues" related to the claim of neutrality of the state. The republicanist, in turn, could see the state's pursuit of common good without avoiding the "issues of substance". As a kind of a 'label' for this notion, I shall use in continuation the expression of the *'message' of the state*, as opposed to the liberalist doctrine that the state should be neutral.

Pippin makes a distinction between two major categories of possible argumentation for the "state's coercive authority" and the rule of law, which together mean that the individuals would give up, in a sense, their right or desire to follow their own will only in their actions. One set of arguments relies on "a pragmatic and broadly consequentialist form of reasoning". The foundation is that "we will

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<sup>356</sup> Sellers 1998, 108. Especially as far as it concerns the earlier history before the modern prevalence of democratic ideas of government in developed countries at least, republicanism would imply that one stands up for the republic as a formal arrangement of government, typically as opposed to forms of monarchy. The development in the 20<sup>th</sup> century of constitutional monarchies towards government that de facto is like a republic, for instance, made the scenery more complicated. In other discourses of political philosophy, the opposition of republicanism and liberalism is on the level of more fundamental ideas.

<sup>357</sup> Sellers 1998, 121.

all simply be better off—that is, more prosperous, more secure, [etc.]”, if we accept the rule of law, instead of all following our own will in whatever we are doing. Another set of arguments relates to “a robust theory of original *moral* entitlements [...] invoked to justify the moral unacceptability of the state of nature, or [...] to justify the claim that we have a duty to leave the state of nature and to establish a civil order”. Within the former “set of arguments”, the liberalist thinking is paramount, while the latter more typically manifests the republicanist emphases. We should notice, however, that Pippin actually does not use the word republican(ist) or republicanism, but talks about the “liberal version of the state” and about an “alternative” to it.<sup>358</sup>

The important point here is that the view closer to liberalism makes the law an unavoidable evil, so to speak. A law inevitably decreases the otherwise assumingly unlimited freedom of the individuals, even if it simultaneously can add to some other valuable things. The alternative to liberalism—or, we could here say, the republicanist view—in turn, sees the rule of law in itself valuable since the state of nature as such is unacceptable in a moral sense. Only through the law, there could be justice. Pippin further writes about the latter set of arguments.

Such appeals to a ‘rational will’ as the source of the state’s coercive authority (by virtue of its protection of basic entitlements) is often ascribed to Rousseau and to Kant’s position in his ‘Doctrine of Right’, is quite prominent in the rhetoric of the French Revolution and its declaration of the rights of man, and is a major component in quite different ways in the contemporary theories of John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Otfried Höffe and Jürgen Habermas.<sup>359</sup>

Pippin further remarks that the division is most rough and the list of names exemplifying the alternative to the “liberal version of the state”, indeed, contains persons whose thought has emphases that are more or less liberalist. In any case, Pippin then remarks that

[...] the distinctions are stable enough for us to be able to identify an alternative modern tradition [i.e., an alternative to “the liberal version of the state”], which, by being alternative is often just thereby (and too hastily) considered non- or anti-liberal (or anti-individualist).<sup>360</sup>

The latter part of this quotation is most noteworthy and we shall return to it in the course of my reasoning in continuation.

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<sup>358</sup> Pippin 2006, 126–127

<sup>359</sup> Pippin 2006, 126–127.

<sup>360</sup> Pippin 2006, 127.

Returning to the idea of liberalism summarized by Smith, we perhaps could characterize it as the paradigmatic and perhaps an ideological core of liberalism. In this treatise, I shall denote by the notion of liberalism especially this idea. It is a description of liberalism criticized by various liberalism-critical argumentations. Furthermore, while claiming that we could find some liberalist understanding of the society and state behind the userist conceptions of the library, I have in mind a more or less ideological form of liberalism the content of which Smith expresses in those four principles.

### ***6.2.2 Schematically complementing the specter of possible orders of government and the notion of popular sovereignty***

It is useful to complement here the distinction between republicanism and liberalism into a more comprehensive range of potential ways of conceiving of the social order, the state, and particularly, like what they could and/or should be. Both liberalism and republicanism intend to be democratic ideas of the state. Such views, however, would not exhaust the specter of the possible political ideas, let alone the political orders that there actually have been or are in the world.

We saw above how Pippin characterizes the “liberal version of the state” through the ‘ultimacy’ of the individual and republicanism as a critique of this point of departure (see Section 1.2.1). The opposite of the pre-eminence and ultimacy of the individual could be, however, pre-eminence and perhaps even the ultimacy of the whole of the society or the state. It could be true etatism, indeed. It would mean views of society that would not pay so much attention to such matters as the rights and freedom of the individuals, even if fundamentally—or ideologically, at least—even such views of the society and state could be promoting the good of the individual humans. As examples could be the theocratic states or absolute monarchies, but also the modern forms of dictatorship and—as the most relevant option here—the forms of technocratic rule and views legitimizing such rule. For convenience, I shall denote such forms of government comprehensively by the notion of dictatorial-totalitarian since they emphasize the whole and the ultimate say would be dictatorial, in a sense or another

We then could summarize as follows this more comprehensive even if not very balanced ‘map’ of possible views within political theory and philosophy. In a sense—but probably in this most particular sense only—republicanism could

appear as if it were somewhere between those two others, as a ‘compromise’ of them:

- (1) Liberalism understands—or claims to understand, at least—extremely well the significance of an individual and his or her freedom.
- (2) Dictatorial-totalitarian, perhaps in its technocratic form especially, could understand—or claims to understand, at least—extremely well the significance of the whole even in view of advancing the good life of the individuals.
- (3) Republicanism, finally, should understand extremely well the significance of both the individuals and the whole.

Historically, if we accepted Sellers’ account, republicanism as the “parent of liberalism” cannot be a ‘compromise’ of liberalism and the dictatorial-totalitarian views. Rather, if liberalism in the manner described by Sellers “grew out of republican theory”, we might say that liberalism itself became a kind of compromise between republicanism and monarchy.

In addition to and above the matters already mentioned, the most fundamental principle that separates republicanism from such forms of government as monarchy, theocracy, or technocracy—and most importantly though not so sharply, form liberalism—is the notion of *popular sovereignty* as the cornerstone of republicanism. Akhil Reed Amar writes most emphatically as follows about the republicanist view during a little less than hundred first years of the history of the USA.

The central pillar of Republican Government, I claim, is popular sovereignty. In a Republican Government, the people rule. They do not necessarily rule directly, day-to-day. [...] What it does require is that the structure of day-to-day government—the Constitution—be derived from "the People" and be legally alterable by a "majority" of them. These corollaries of popular sovereignty—the people's right to alter or abolish, and popular majority rule in making and changing constitutions—were bedrock principles in the Founding, Antebellum, and Civil War eras.<sup>361</sup>

Sellers depicts as follows the significance of popular sovereignty within republicanism and liberalism.

At a very early period republicans concluded that there could be no liberty or common good without popular sovereignty, constrained by a senate and other restraints on majority despotism. ‘Liberty’ and ‘republicanism’ diverged only when liberals lost faith in popular sovereignty, following Cromwell’s ‘com-

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<sup>361</sup> Amar 1994, 749.

monwealth' and the French revolution.<sup>362</sup>

(Sellers' remark on "majority despotism" expresses a view that is most characteristic of him and his view of the republicanism, and I shall return to it in the beginning of the next section). Continuing with the historical development of the political philosophies and theories, Sellers writes as his own conclusions of the discussion between republicanism and liberalism.

Republicans assert the common good, and the popular sovereignty as the method for finding it. Liberalism asserts fundamental human rights and their universal self-evidence. The law claims to draw a line between right and wrong. At first these three conceptions belonged together. [...] But when democracy lost favor, republicanism, liberalism, and the law came apart, to their mutual detriment and ultimate confusion.<sup>363</sup>

Democracy losing "favor" here refers, among other things, to giving up the idea of popular sovereignty as the foundation of common good while the "Liberal managers sought to regulate conflict, rather than transcend it, in view of what they supposed to be a perpetual pluralism of incommensurable private interests, philosophies, and desires"<sup>364</sup>.

Obviously, the notion of a compromise between liberalism and dictatorial-totalitarian does not do justice to the republicanist thought. We may say, particularly while focusing on the notion of the popular sovereignty, that the republicanist view is fiercely democratic and actually, much more so than liberalism. Keeping as unbiased as I can and drawing from Sellers' formulation above, I would say that while

- the core of liberalism consists particular aspects of liberty and of the rights of individuals,
- the major focus in republicanism is on democracy and the say of the people.

In a sense, however, I assume that the say of the people and the rights of the individuals are not necessarily always quite in harmony but both of them would have some value. For this reason, it is hard to imagine how an acceptable theory of the state could avoid a compromise between them, which also would mean that neither of them could remain entirely untouched. In view of my cultural, social, and political philosophy of L&Lship, particularly, the preferability of options, in addi-

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<sup>362</sup> Sellers 1998, 3.

<sup>363</sup> Sellers 1998, 130.

<sup>364</sup> Sellers 1998, 128.

tion to necessities, would matter and the question of acceptability would be crucial—though, in the case of a metatheory of library research, such politico-ethical questions would not matter so much<sup>365</sup>.

### **6.2.3 Faith in or suspicion of the state and the people: first formulation of agnostic republicanism?**

With Seller above, there is present—as an element of republicanism already—a reservation as regards the notion of popular sovereignty. According to Sellers, the senate with some other elements of the state should constrain “majority despotism”. Even if a part of Sellers’ general characterization of “mixed and balanced government”, this remark has a plenty of resemblance with thematic that is more typically liberalist, in certain respects, at least. Amar as well has a particular interest in what he denotes as the “problem of denominator”, which relates to the majorities and popular sovereignty. We should ask, among other things, which instance should have the power to define the people that would be the denominator of the majority. Quite simply, who has the power to say who can vote and to define the people the majority of which should have, according to the principle of popular sovereignty, such an insurmountable power?

For a particular reason, I should mention still another somewhat schematic contrast between republicanism and liberalism. We perhaps could formulate another quite fundamental opposition between these two views also as follows.

- (1) A liberalist can be even extremely suspicious as regards the state while a republicanist can have more or less trust in this respect and he or she is thus challenging the possibly even extreme suspicion of the liberalists.
- (2) A liberalist more or less categorically proceeds from the assumption that individuals ultimately are aiming at their own good and even enjoyment only. A republicanist, in turn, challenges this—to a degree at least—and trusts in the option that the individuals and the citizens can be pursuing common good as well, thus also assuming that there can be genuine solidarity<sup>366</sup>.

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<sup>365</sup> We could well investigate the role, functions, or history, for instance, of L&Lship in dictatorially governed societies as well.

<sup>366</sup> Particularly this second opposition would bring our reasoning quite concretely to an anthropological level and once applied to conceiving of L&Lship, to the sphere of library anthropology suggested by Kauppi partly as a part of philosophical anthropology (see Section 1.3).



While I would be, on a fundamental level, on the side of the republicanist as regards both (1) and (2), some suspicion as well could be healthy, in my view. Otherwise, the republicanist view could become simply credulous and see the social and political reality as a kind of idyll with neither tensions nor conflicting interests within it. This would be the core of my agnosticism as regards the state and as regards the nobility of the aspirations of the citizens or shortly, my agnostic republicanism my liberal ‘footnotes’ or reminders are the results of this.

Because of this agnosticism, I perhaps should explain shortly my reasons to proceed from republicanist premises in spite of the need to make such footnotes or reminders. I would condense these reasons in the following three remarks.

- The state cannot be neutral in the sense suggested by liberalism since all the structures and institutions that the state contains would have a foundation in some kind of conception of justice or, at least, of the proper order of the state and power.
- Without a state that actually contributes to justice in accordance with the conception of right incorporated in its structures and institutions, no justice could become a reality on any scale that would matter in view of the wider social realities.
- In spite of the doubts that we might have, with a plenty of good reasons, there remains the option that even a republicanist state with its ‘message’ can and should be tolerant and liberal-minded, so to speak.

I believe that through Sellers’ formulation of the republicanist ideal as a “mixed and balanced government”, we could outline a view of the state and the position of citizens, which could retain the most valuable fundamentals of republicanism while also taking into account the possibly healthy doubtfulness that is characteristic of liberalist thought. Such a mixture certainly cannot produce any actual guarantee of or an automaton producing justice. Then again, the case is not at all better with the liberalist, often rather formal and abstract ideals.

Such position could provide us, in any case, with some protection against the danger that a kind of etatism—which one could see particularly with Hegel whose ideas I shall use below to clarify the republicanist position—could turn into a form or another of dictatorial-totalitarian understanding of the state. According to Daniel S. Malachuk’s formulation of the most general republicanist premise, “humans are political beings who realize their full potential through the acts of civic

virtue required to sustain a republic”<sup>367</sup>. Even if I find a plenty of sense in Malachuk’s formulation, I understand that it can raise some suspicion as well. It probably sounds also somewhat strange for a reader of the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Above all, however, Malachuc’s formulation could make republicanism an overly etatist view and particularly in this sense, some agnosticism as regards the state as well could be healthy. As a further introduction here, however, I should say that I would not claim that the Hegelian ideas are necessarily too etatist or totalitarian—though I could be a little cautious, once again, if I were to claim the opposite, i.e. if I were to claim that Hegel *is not* too etatist of totalitarian.<sup>368</sup> In continuation, in any case, Within the Hegelian thought, I shall focus on the ideas that seem to appreciate highly the bourgeois society and the freedom of the citizens.

A reservation is in place here as regards the huge and quite a systematic whole of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit. Mäki writes, “Hegel’s philosophy primarily is neither philosophical theory of these or those particular objects. Rather, as a philosophy of spirit, for instance, it is a theory about various manifestations of the spirit”<sup>369</sup>. Consequently, we probably should not consider what Hegel writes of the state as an actual blueprint for arranging the state. With this reservation, however, Hegel’s argumentation can illustrate here further the foundations of republicanism.<sup>370</sup>

### **6.3 Notions of freedom: from negative and positive to autonomous freedom of obeying only the laws decreed by oneself**

The center of gravity within liberalism, of course, is liberty, especially particular aspects of the freedom of the individuals. We may well claim that the crucial

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<sup>367</sup> Malachuk 1998, 405.

<sup>368</sup> We also should keep in mind that Hegel was writing during the most reactionary era of Restauration after the French Revolution and the Napoleonian wars.

<sup>369</sup> Mäki 2013, 89 (transl. by VS from the following: Hegelin filosofia ei ole myöskään ensi sijassa filosofista teoriaa niistä tai näistä erityisistä kohteista, vaan esimerkiksi hengen filosofiana teoriaa hengestä eri ilmenemismuodoissaan)

<sup>370</sup> We perhaps should think that ultimately the ‘subject’ in the ‘processes’ or ‘happening’ that Hegel talks about is the spirit, a little similarly as Gadamer says that it is the language that talks us, rather than we speaking the language. We perhaps could apply here the model of argumentation of Gadamerian *Bildung* as an educational ideal with a foundation in existential necessities (see Section 3.4.1). Republicanism—as far as we can take Hegel as a representative of it—could be a political ideal with a foundation in the reality of the spirit, so to speak.

difference between liberalism and republicanism, however, is in different ways of conceiving of freedom within political theory and philosophy<sup>371</sup>.

In addition to the negative freedom characteristic of liberalist thought, we should consider also positive and autonomous freedom. Furthermore, the relationships of these notions deserve some attention.

*[a] Freedom as “state non-interference” and even as licentia?*

In a manner similar to what we already saw in Sellers’ account of Constant’s speech, Habermas as well writes about liberties of the “moderns” and “ancients”.

Liberals have stressed the "liberties of the moderns": liberty of belief and conscience, the protection of life, personal liberty, and property—in sum, the core of subjective private rights. Republicanism, by contrast, has defended the ‘liberties of the ancients’: the political rights of participation and communication that make possible the citizens' exercise of self-determination.<sup>372</sup>

Certainly, neither are the “liberties of the moderns” insignificant. All of them—including even the liberty or right of private property in a decent and proper measure<sup>373</sup>—could typically be legitimate rights providing the individual citizen with some protection against too totalitarian emphasis of the whole. Yet, the liberties of the moderns would not provide us with a sufficient conception of freedom.

Sellers depicts as follows the opposition of republicanism and liberalism, both of which “seek liberty through law”. For a republicanist, the law is about “common good, discovered by popular sovereignty under a mixed and balanced constitution”, while liberalists disregard “for the sources of law, so long as citizens were left alone”. The liberalist attitude eventually led “to new conceptions of liberty, first as freedom from government, then as the ability to do what one wants”.<sup>374</sup> Sellers here refers to the notions of liberty,

– either as “negative”, defined in another place as “‘freedom from’ constraints”,

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<sup>371</sup> See for instance Mäki 2013 *passim*.

<sup>372</sup> Habermas 1995, 127

<sup>373</sup> If and when going beyond what we could consider to be decent, of course, the right of private property risks even the political equality of the citizens and even the very freedom of the least prosperous by protecting an unequal distribution of assets, which could matter particularly in view of the positive freedom.

<sup>374</sup> Sellers 1998, 120

– or as “positive”, which would be the “‘freedom to’ realize one’s goals”<sup>375</sup>.

In the latter, the state with its institutions and law can be the foundation and even an asset for liberty as well, instead of constraining it only.

Sellers further makes a somewhat hair-splitting remark on a fundamental problem that we could see within the extreme forms of liberalism at least. He remarks that “even Mill’s notion of liberty limited only by forbidding harm to others requires a definition of ‘harm’”<sup>376</sup>. This leads to another of the fundamental issues between liberalism and republicanism, to the question whether there can be a commonly recognized truth, a commonly recognized common good, etc., which we can see here combined with the question of freedom, even if in a somewhat abstract manner. If making no “harm” to others were the limit of liberty, who should or how we could define the “harm” if we—or the state with its neutrality—could not have a common conception of good? In the republicanist spirit, on the other hand, it might be appropriate to ask whether it was possible that there were no common views of good in a state. In all its abstractness, Sellers’s question actually well illustrates the sense of this latter question. The question of the common good and of the possible, legitimate, and intelligible ‘message’ of the state, however, is most important in view of both republicanist political theory and philosophy and my own argumentation on the possible moment of education as a part of the rationality of L&Lship. Therefore, I shall later deal with it at some length (see Section 6.4). As regards the liberalist demand of a neutrality of the state, in any case, we can think that what Gadamer teaches us about the historicity of our being, already and for example, is enough to make us ask quite seriously whether such neutrality would be possible at all.

A part of a liberalist’s suspicious attitude as regards the state certainly is the result of the position that the notion of negative freedom has in liberalist thinking. Certainly, negative freedom is, in a sense, a clear-cut notion in terms of which we can easily argue on whether there is freedom or not in some particular instance. It also would be easy to appeal to formulations of negative freedom while defending one’s rights and this is not a matter without significance, in my view. Sellers, however, is warning about the dangers of an extreme form of such liberty, the notion of liberty as license (*licentia*)—“as lawless self-direction”<sup>377</sup>.

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<sup>375</sup> Sellers 1998, 107. The distinction is originally from Isaiah Berlin (1958/1971).

<sup>376</sup> Sellers, 1998, 108.

<sup>377</sup> Sellers 1998, 96

The ideal of freedom to live as one wishes, and the pluralism of values connected with it, need not lead to the war of all against all. ‘Liberty’ to be oppressed by one’s neighbor is no liberty at all. Hobbes debased the language when he redefined liberty as unfettered action. Liberals make a profound mistake when they adopt his vocabulary.<sup>378</sup>

Finally, a remark on the relationship between negative and positive freedom is in place. From a formal and logical point of view, we actually could reduce one to the other the notions of positive and negative freedom. Lack of concrete and often in a sense or another material prerequisites of the positive “‘freedom to’ realize one’s goals” would be a constraint and consequently, the presence of those prerequisites would be negative “‘freedom from’ constraints”. In view of concrete political order and institutions, however, their difference is significant, particularly in view of the opposition of the ‘small’ and ‘big’ state. Social policy of a ‘big’ state, for instance, could add to positive freedom, but the liberalist tendency to see freedom in negative terms only could ignore such an option.

*[b] The notion of autonomous freedom*

Mäki defines as autonomous, rather than positive, the idea of freedom characteristic of republicanism. By autonomous freedom—obviously in accordance with the Hegelian thought—Mäki means the freedom of the one who obeys or acts along the laws that one has made for oneself.

That self-governing were possible, there must be the self. This cannot be any casual body carrying desires and opinions, but an identical person who, in addition to the present, has the past and especially the future, which is immediately essential in view of governing. The empathetic meaning of governing namely is in that it is decreeing laws for oneself, not any coincidental briefing. The identity of such person is before all identity of the mind, memory, and ends. Within the social contract of a political community of Rousseau, a common interest determines the identity of a community. An autonomous person as well has an interest: self-realization for which there are the laws that one has decreed for oneself, in both cases. [...] Consequently: free in the

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<sup>378</sup> Sellers 1998, 108.

sense of autonomous freedom is a person who for self-realization decrees laws and commits to obey them.<sup>379</sup>

Mäki positions the options in conceiving freedom so that “the alternative of autonomous freedom is negative freedom”<sup>380</sup>.

Mäki further states, however, that negative freedom should complement autonomous freedom and be a part of it, actually. He doubts whether we should consider as autonomously free “a chained prisoner or a starving person in a desert” only because the prisoner and the one starving perhaps could calm themselves in such a way that they were still able to make “serious commitments” and then live as free in accordance with these commitments. In the case of the chained prisoner, there would be quite concretely present quite concrete constraints. In the case of the one starving, the borderline between positive and negative freedom might not be so clear, but here again, mere self-discipline enabling one to keep calm might not be enough to warrant the claim that he or she is free.<sup>381</sup>

The forms of freedom, then, would constitute a kind of stratification from the most primitive to more substantial ones. Furthermore, some most primitive level liberty might even have the position of a *sine qua non* or the position of a necessary even if not sufficient condition of being actually free, at least.

We certainly can say that the notions of autonomous as well as positive freedom characteristic of republicanism are more significant than the liberalist’s negative freedom. We perhaps should ask, however, if there could be some inconsistency as well between the various freedoms. What adds to positive freedom could restrict negative freedom. An institution that enables the citizens to pursue something in a concrete sense could exclude some other courses of action.

Mäki’s autonomous freedom is clearly a different matter than positive freedom. With its ethos of a kind of disciplined life with laws that one has decreed

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<sup>379</sup> Mäki 2013, 19. Transl. VS from the following: “Jotta itsemäärääminen olisi mahdollista, on sitä varten oltava itse. Tämä ei voi olla mikään satunnaisia haluja tai mielipiteitä kantava keho, vaan identtinen persoona, jolla on nykyhetken lisäksi menneisyys ja etenkin tulevaisuus, joka on välittömästi olennainen määräämisen kannalta. Määräämisen painokas merkitys on näet siinä, että se on lakien säätämistä itselle eikä mitä tahansa satunnaista käskynjakoa. Tällaisen persoonan identtisyys on ennen kaikkea mielen, muistin ja päämäärien identtisyyttä. Rousseau’n yhteiskuntasopimuksessa poliittisen yhteisön identtisyuden määrää yhteinen intressi. Autonomisella persoonallakin on intressi: itsensä toteuttaminen, jota varten ovat itselle säädetyt lait kummassakin tapauksessa. [...] Siis: vapaa autonomisen vapauden merkityksessä on persoona, joka itsensä toteuttaakseen säätää itselleen siihen tarkoitukseen soveliaat lait sitoutuen niitä noudattamaan.”

<sup>380</sup> Mäki 2013, 20. Transl. by VS from the following: “Autonomisen vapauden vaihtohtona on *negatiivien vapaus*”.

<sup>381</sup> Mäki 2013, 21.

oneself, it probably would see the laws and institutions as a positive matter. In quite a practical sense, furthermore, it certainly is not possible that everyone has a law of his or her own, which a somewhat ‘cheeky’ reading of Mäki’s depiction of autonomous freedom could imply. We perhaps could analyze the very notion a little further as follows<sup>382</sup>.

- (1) There is the procedure of decreeing laws and this procedure itself would provide those whom the laws concern with an option to participate in the legislation process in such a manner that they can accept it.
- (2) A person can be autonomously free while obeying a particular law decreed in accordance with these procedures—even if he or she personally did not agree with this particular law and had never made such a law if he or she alone had the authority to decide.

While containing the commitment to the law that one has decreed for oneself in this sense, autonomous freedom obviously excludes some courses of action—even ones that an autonomously free person respecting the law in decreeing of which he or she participated would otherwise willingly have chosen—and consequently decreases negative freedom, let alone *licentia*. In this sense, the stratification of freedoms or combining the notions otherwise would not be without tensions—despite the fact that all of them probably tell us something that we should not ignore while considering the aspects of true and concrete freedom.

#### **6.4 The Hegelian version of the republicanist state: a foundation of significant freedom as well as a fundamental moment of education**

I have suggested that we could see the similarity between the premises behind liberalism, on one hand, and the userist and especially the service-userist conceptions of the library, on the other. I shall here claim that there could be a legitimate moment of education in the state, which also could be the foundation of a possibly similar moment of education in the practice of L&Lship. Hegelian view of the state can illustrate especially well a view of the state that indeed has a message

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<sup>382</sup> With a reference to Hegel, Mäki (2013. 136) writes as follows. “Constitution (Verfassung) is the prerequisite of decreeing the law” (transl. by VS from the following: “Konstituutio (Verfassung) on lain säätämisen edellytys”). Then again, what I suggest here could be a little too formalist. Such formalism, however, could serve in pointing out why I would look at republicanism even in a somewhat ‘agnostic’ manner.

and a say. Accurately enough here, the Hegelian notion of *Sittlichkeit*<sup>383</sup> could denote the ‘message’ of the Hegelian state in this sense. Consequently, *Sittlichkeit* in the Hegelian sense could be a component of the educational content of L&Lship—at least in cases where the state or some other public authority is the maintainer of the library.

A short anticipation of the course of argumentation is in place here due to the complexity of the thematic treated of below.

- (1) The state with even a strong say and message, such as the Hegelian state incorporating *Sittlichkeit*, can be the foundation of meaningful positive and autonomous freedom.
- (2) Citizenship in such a state requires a willingness to take into account and listen to what others, including the state, have to say about “issues of substance”, to use the expression of Sellers. This comes quite close to Gadamer’s suggestion that we should be “open” to what the history has handed down to us.
- (3) Such state further enables and even requires, in Hegelian terms particularly, the freedom of the citizens even in a sense that comes close to and effectively equals with negative freedom of expression and opinion. We could see with Hegel even argumentation that actually is approaching the ban of censorship.

These claims focus partly on the merits of such state and on all the good that it can ‘promise’ and produce, partly on its acceptability in the sense of capacity to retain what we could expect a state to retain.

#### **6.4.1 Quite a strong ‘message’ and ‘say’ of the state: the Hegelian notion of *Sittlichkeit***

With Hegel, we can find the fundamental republicanist ideas of the ‘message’ or the say of the state—as opposed to the liberalist claim of its neutrality—in a somewhat solemn tone.

What is the material in which the Ideal of Reason is wrought out? The primary answer would be—Personality itself—human desires—Subjectivity generally. [...]. But the subjective will has also a substantial life—a reality—

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<sup>383</sup> Expressions used to translate *Sittlichkeit* into English are “morality” or, when needed, specifies as “morality (*Sittlichkeit*)” and still “ethical life”, for instance. Once again, I find the expression of the original language beneficial for conceptual clarity.



in which it moves in the region of *essential* being, and has the essential itself as the object of its existence. This essential being is the union of the *subjective* with the *rational* Will: it is the moral Whole, the *State*, which is that form of reality in which the individual has and enjoys his freedom; but on the condition of his recognizing, believing in, and willing that which is common to the Whole.<sup>384</sup>

The question with Hegel actually is about the condition of the very being and becoming to be of a person that is capable of enjoying and exercising any freedom at all, quite similarly as we already saw in Mäki's introduction to the notion of autonomous freedom: self-governing requires that there is the self. The idea of the state as a moral whole connects to the element of *Sittlichkeit*, related to the fundamental themes of rationality and the constitution of a person even.

And this must not be understood as if the subjective will of the social unit attained its gratification and enjoyment through that common. Will; as if this were a means provided for its benefit; as if the individual, in his relations to other individuals, thus limited his freedom, in order that this universal limitation—the mutual constraint of all—might secure a small space of liberty for each. Rather, we affirm, are Law, Morality [in German text: *Sittlichkeit*], Government, and they alone, the positive reality and completion of Freedom. Freedom of a low and limited order is mere caprice [*Willkür*, which Neuhausser (2000) translates perhaps more accurately as “willfulness”]; which finds its exercise in the sphere of particular and limited desires.<sup>385</sup>

Shortly and simply, other individuals and their rights, or “Law, Morality [*Sittlichkeit*], Government”, do not constitute limitations of freedom but rather its condition, and even the condition of the “Personality” that can be free, actually. One could not more stress that citizenship and even personality are matters of belonging to the state and their constitution through the whole or the state.

We further should notice here that objective morality—or morality that exists more widely than on the level of individuals—or *Sittlichkeit* is, in a sense, the condition of individual morality as well. In a world and society without any *Sittlichkeit*, justice, or morality complied with more widely than by few exceptional individuals, even the actions by any of those exceptional ones motivated by the purest moral principles could lead to most undesirable consequences. One who acts according to highly moral motives can cause most awkward situations and even terrible effects in a world where the motives of acting of most of the people

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<sup>384</sup> Hegel 1837/1956, 38.

<sup>385</sup> Hegel 1837/1956, 38.

are entirely different. The situation is quite different if there is something that we can call *Sittlichkeit* in the Hegelian sense or, more generally, if morality is not only in the minds and in actions of some individuals but somehow more widely and more objectively present in the society and social life.<sup>386</sup> If there were the social conditions of even individual morality, on the other hand, we could say that there would be, in quite a particular sense, also positive freedom or freedom to something. The result of actions motivated by morality would be what the actual and moral aim was and consequently, there would be positive freedom to successful moral activity.

The Hegelian notion of *Sittlichkeit* has its etymological foundation in the German word *Sitte* that means habit or convention, and the conventional, established habits constitute one of the substantial aspects of *Sittlichkeit* (similarly to the etymologies of the Latin-based morality or the Greek-based ethics). According to Hegel, family and bourgeois society are where *Sittlichkeit* dwells. Further, however, *Sittlichkeit* manifest itself most significantly in the state, where it is no more as conventional habits only, but also as rational institutions and laws. The particular feature of *Sittlichkeit*—if compared to morality understood as a possible attribute of an individual—is its objective nature, its being among the humans as common, including its being in the institutions like those of the state.<sup>387</sup>

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<sup>386</sup> One could consider the notion of *Sittlichkeit* with Hegel as criticism of the assumed failure of the Kantian conception of morality, with a foundation within the respect of an individual to the moral law and assumingly consequent ignorance of the conditions of morality on the wider level of social life with Kant. We should notice, however, that Kant actually reaches the level of historically and socially significant morality as well. Kant (1794/1998, 108–109) writes, for instance, as regards how “The human being ought to leave the ethical state of nature in order to become a member of an ethical community” as follows. “Now, here we have a duty *sui generis*, not of human beings toward human beings but of the human race toward itself. For every species of rational beings is objectively- in the idea of reason—destined to a common end, namely the promotion of the highest good as a good common to all. But, since this highest moral good will not be brought about solely through the striving of one individual person for his own moral perfection but requires rather a union of such persons into a whole toward that very end, [i.e.] toward a system of well-disposed human beings in which, and through the unity of which alone, the highest moral good can come to pass, yet the idea of such a whole, as a universal republic based on the laws of virtue, differs entirely from all moral laws (which concern what we know to reside within our power), for it is the idea of working toward a whole of which we cannot know whether as a whole it is also in our power: so the duty in question differs from all others in kind and in principle.

<sup>387</sup> See Hegel, 1820/1967, § 141 ff. In this sense, *Sittlichkeit* probably would be also as somehow exterior even to any individual, which has to do with the problems that I have with the most radical forms of objectivism-critical argumentation as well as with what I call agnosticism as regards republicanism.

At this point, we still should notice that the Hegelian *Sittlichkeit* manifested in the state would not come from some mystic foundation. In its development on the level of an individual person, it has quite a concrete, an even commonplace foundation in education and the interests of the individuals. Two institutions of *Sittlichkeit* especially participate in such education, the family and the bourgeois society.

We might say that the family is an institution of authoritarian solidarity, which also is the foundation of its educational role. Within the family, the parents educate the children as they assume to be good for the children. The bourgeois society, then, is the sphere of private freedom and private interests, a sphere of selfishness even, and there everyone is looking for one's own success.<sup>388</sup> Yet, even in the bourgeois society, most interestingly, the corporations where citizens join with each other to promote their common but still private interests, become a step towards *Sittlichkeit* and recognition of good that already would be a little more than entirely individual selfishness. A private citizen—typically a businessperson, perhaps—in a corporation learns to adjust his or her (business) interests with the common aim, which then becomes a step towards—though certainly not the accomplishment of—*Sittlichkeit* in the genuinely Hegelian sense.

As the family was the first, so the corporation, grounded upon the civic community, constitutes the second ethical root or basis of the state.<sup>389</sup>

In light of the strong state and its strong message, we could have questions about the position and freedom of the citizens. In *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel states as follows, seemingly in quite a 'totalitarian' tone, but all the time referring to the actualization of the freedom of the individuals as well.

The state is absolutely rational inasmuch as it is the actuality of the substantial will which it possesses in the particular self-consciousness once that consciousness has been raised to consciousness of its universality. This substan-

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<sup>388</sup> See, for instance, Neuhauser 2000, 136. Hegel himself expresses the same while remarking that "Individuals in their capacity as burghers in this state are private persons whose end is their own interest (Hegel 1820/1967, § 187) Knox comments on using the expression burgher in translation as follows: "*Bürger—Bourgeois*, burgher of a town as distinct from the citizen (*citoyen*) of a state. Civil society (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) is a society of burghers or civilians, men interested in civil as distinct from political life". (Op. cit., translator's note on p. 355).

<sup>389</sup> Hegel 1820/1967, § 255. Hegel continues soon after this in a way that could suit to describe citizenship even in the beginning of 21<sup>st</sup> century "In our modern states the citizens participate only slightly in the general business. It is, however, needful to provide the ethical man with a universal activity, one above his private ends. This universal, with which the modern state does not always supply him, is given by the corporation.

tial unity is an absolute unmoved end in itself, in which freedom comes into its supreme right. On the other hand, this final end has supreme right against the individual, whose supreme duty is to be a member of the state.<sup>390</sup>

Thereafter Hegel proceeds to consider the ideal of the state as a harmony between the individual—or the particular interests and will—on one hand, and the whole or the state, on the other. The reasoning leads to the following, quite a resolute declaration of the rights and justification of the interests and will of the individual citizens as well in “the modern world”, which would here be the world of early 19<sup>th</sup> century, but also the world that quite recently has testified the French Revolution.

In the state everything depends on the unity of universal and particular. In the states of antiquity, the subjective end simply coincided with the state’s will. In modern times, however, we make claims for private judgment, private willing, and private conscience. The ancients had none of these in the modern sense. Whereas under the despots of Asia the individual had no inner life and no justification in himself, in the modern world man insists on respect being paid to his inner life. The conjunction of duty and right has a twofold aspect: what the state demands from us as a duty is *eo ipso* our right as individuals, since the state is nothing but the articulation of the concept of freedom.<sup>391</sup>

We should remind here, of course, that the freedom thus constituted—as the other side of the duty, we could say—is not the simple negative freedom in the sense of absence of constraints (see Section 6.3[b]).

#### **6.4.2 The Aristotelian practice recognizing common good and the notion of öffentliche Meinung with the say of citizens?**

As regards the common good in and the message of the state, there arises a further question. What kind of foundation of legitimacy there could be behind the ‘message’ of the state or the common conception that the state could have of good? Obviously, the Aristotelian notion of practice—and *phronesis* as politically open and common exercise of practical reason as regards the ends—should be a part of what the republicanist’s answer to this question would and should be. As far as the people who should live according to the law should also be participating in the production of the conception of good manifested in the law, there would be a

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<sup>390</sup> Hegel 1820/1967, § 258.

<sup>391</sup> Hegel 1820/1967, addition to § 261.

logical connection between the Aristotelian practice and such republicanist principles as the notion of autonomous freedom. As Sellers writes (see Section 6.3[a]), the common good is “discovered by popular sovereignty”.

Frederick Neuhouser’s way of summarizing Hegel’s view of the general logic and conditions of the law, the relationship between the citizens and the state, and the “self-consciousness of the rational state” fortifies this further. We should notice how Neuhouser first remarks that “Hegel is clearly committed to the idea that the rational state possesses a collective consciousness (and will) that exist above and beyond the consciousness (and will) of any of its individual members”. Then, however, “there is no need to think of the consciousness as involving some mysterious, superhuman species of awareness”, and further:

[...] the self-consciousness of the rational state consist simply in the fact that its activity is governed by the laws that are (1) publicly known; (2) consciously self-prescribed through the political participation of its members; and (3) (if social freedom is perfectly realized) fully transparent in the sense that that all citizens recognize them as good.<sup>392</sup>

Especially noteworthy is the condition (2) posed to the laws, but we should think about it in the context of the whole with the conditions (1) and (3) as well.

Condition (2), in any case, quite clearly and in a most ‘democratic spirit’, we could say, states that the citizens are the source—in a sense, at least—of the laws and the state. People know the law, they make it—or, at least, somehow participate in making it—and they can see that it is good. Consequently, they voluntarily accept what the law and the state demand. There seems to be a perfect and ideal harmony, and there would be perfect autonomous freedom of the people committed to and obeying only the law that they have made for themselves. The somehow confusing perfectness of this harmony actually will be a part of my argumentation for agnostic republicanism in continuation.

We should notice, in any case, that in particular and quite literary sense, Hegel’s view is ‘republicanist’—even if he did not actually advocate the formally republican view of organizing the government and power in a state in its parliamentary form, for instance. In spite of this, the Hegelian state certainly is a *res publica*, a public matter or a matter of all the citizens. It would be the result of the participation of its members, i.e. the citizens. Further, to be a citizen probably

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<sup>392</sup> Neuhouser 2000, 213

would mean participation in such a public matter or *res publica*, including the justice and *Sittlichkeit*, evolving and manifested there.<sup>393</sup>

A part of this, then, would be an endorsement of the laws by the citizens through rational reflection. In this place, however, a most noteworthy consequence would be that the whole process should serve the promotion of citizens becoming to and developing as rational and moral subjects. This also is ultimately the criterion of goodness of the norms. The ultimate rationality of the Hegelian state as well would relate to the life of the spirit, including the citizens' becoming into and then living as rational moral subjects capable of participating in *Sittlichkeit*.

Even if the Hegelian state would not be a republic in the formal sense in which we typically use the word, Mäki especially accentuates the notion of public opinion (*öffentliche Meinung*, in Finnish *julkinen mielipide*) with Hegel, which would be or, at least, would closely relate to the very "existence of the state"<sup>394</sup>. (In continuation, to avoid false connotations of merely popular and widely shared views or opinions, I shall use the German expression *öffentliche Meinung* to denote this Hegelian notion.) In the context of this notion, Hegel himself writes about the election and the role of deputies in the Estates in a manner that connects formal dimension to the *öffentliche Meinung*.

[...] their relation to their electors is not that of agents with commission or specific instructions. A further bar to their being so is the fact that their assembly is meant to be a living body in which all members deliberate in common and reciprocally instruct and convince each other<sup>395</sup>.

A part of *Öffentliche Meinung* could then be, for instance, the view elaborated by a section in the Estates. In *öffentliche Meinung*, on the other hand, "a field is open to everyone where he can express his purely personal political opinions and make them count"<sup>396</sup>. The role of what Hegel calls *öffentliche Meinung*—even if quite often unrecognized by the scholars of Hegel even<sup>397</sup>—further accentuates the significance of the autonomous freedom in the sense of commitment to laws that

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<sup>393</sup> In reducing the foundation of freedom into *Willkür*, on the other hand, we can see a connection to the conception of freedom as *licentia* or as a mere "license, as lawless self-direction" (Sellers 1998, 96). There also would be a connection to the "narcissistic" alienation that Birdsall sees as a danger in one of the extremes within what he broadly denotes as American liberalism (see Section 6.1).

<sup>394</sup> Mäki 2013, 139–143.

<sup>395</sup> See Hegel 1820/1967, § 309)

<sup>396</sup> Hegel 1820/1967, §308)

<sup>397</sup> See Mäki 2013, 139.

one has decreed for oneself and the position of an individual.<sup>398</sup> The role of the individual citizens within republicanist thinking, however, would ultimately constitute in terms of the Aristotelian practice and *phronesis*.

#### **6.4.3 Popular sovereignty or a measure of *Bildung* and the object of an educational activity?**

In a somewhat banal manner, we could grasp the meaning of *öffentliche Meinung* as related to the existence of the state by saying that the state exists only as far as it exists ‘in the hearts and minds’ of the people. In the Hegelian view, however, it probably would not be enough that the existence of the state is ‘in the hearts and minds’ only. The notion of *öffentliche Meinung* with Hegel, in any case, extends from most unreflected common sense ‘in the hearts’ of people, via elaboration ‘in the minds’, to formal and deliberate speech in the Estates, for instance. Mäki even warns against confusing the public opinion with matters like freedom of the press that Hegel did not regard so highly. Mäki then emphasizes, however, quite categorically, that “the self-consciousness [*itsetietoisuus*] of the citizens with the knowledge and deeds it contains *is* the existence of the state”<sup>399</sup>.

A quotation from an addition to paragraph 316 in Hegel’s *Philosophy of right* would be illustrative here.

Public opinion [*öffentliche Meinung*] is the unorganized way in which a people’s opinions and wishes are made known. What is actually made authoritative in the state must operate in an organized manner as the parts of the constitution do. But at all times public opinion has been a great power and it is particularly so in our day when the principle of subjective freedom has such importance and significance. What is to be the authoritative nowadays derives its authority, not at all from force, only to a small extent from habit and custom, really from insight and argument.<sup>400</sup>

Then again, the value of *öffentliche Meinung* as well seems to be somewhat ambivalent.

Public opinion [*öffentliche Meinung*] [...] deserves to be as much respected as despised—despised for, its concrete expression and for the concrete con-

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<sup>398</sup> See Mäki 2013, 139 ff.

<sup>399</sup> Mäki 2013, 140. Transl. by VS from the following: ”kansalaisten itsetietoisuus tietoineen ja tekoi-neen on valtion eksistenssi”.

<sup>400</sup> Hegel 1820/1967, addition to §316 (p. 294).

sciousness it expresses, respected for its essential basis, a basis which only glimmers more or less dimly in that concrete expression.<sup>401</sup>

Hegels's assessment *öffentliche Meinung* is not always so appreciative. Free speech in the "publicity of Estates Assemblies" would not be a problem because there, "what is voiced [...] is a sound and mature insight into the concerns of the state, with the result that members of the general public are left with nothing of much importance to say". Furthermore, according to Hegel, "it is in the very nature of the thing that abstract thinking should nowhere be so stubborn, so unintelligent, as in the matter of free speech, because what it is considering is the most fleeting, the most contingent, and most personal side of opinion in its infinite diversity of content and tergiversation".<sup>402</sup>

Mäki writes, on the other hand, that at least some parts of *öffentliche Meinung* would be a subject to both modifying activities and change. There would be someone or something that legitimately educates the people towards something better—even while their thought is a part of *öffentliche Meinung*.

The ultimate measure of Bildung-oriented educational activity [*sivistäminen*, which is a transitive verb with the one educated as the object and derived from *sivistys*, the Finnish expression for *Bildung*] is in the *öffentliche Meinung* itself, in its deep and steady stream, hidden behind the surface spatters. Exactly this is sacred and unconditionally justified to rise, in its organic form, into the constitution and into the spirit of its functioning. One should not *touch* it but *interpret* it with piety. The aim is, actually, that *öffentliche Meinung* becomes identical with the constitution of the state as well as general will.<sup>403</sup>

Then again, *öffentliche Meinung* is as a measure as well, the measure for assessing the success of the Bildung-oriented educational activity. The message seems not to be that *öffentliche Meinung* and all that it contains would not be in the position of the instance that has the ultimate say, perhaps not even in the position of being a part of the instance that has the ultimate say. In spite of this, it would be quite categorically the *sine qua non* of the very existence of the state.

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<sup>401</sup> Hegel 1820/1967, § 318.

<sup>402</sup> Hegel 1820/1967, § 319.

<sup>403</sup> Mäki 2013, 143. Transl. by VS from the following Finnish text. "Sivistämisen viimekätinen mitta on julkisessa mielipiteessä itsessään, sen syvässä vakaassa virrassa, joka kätkeytyy pintapärskeiden taakse. Juuri se on pyhä ja ehdottoman oikeutettu kohoamaan orgaanisessa muodossa konstituutioksi ja sen toiminnan hengeksi. Siihen ei pidä *kajota*, vaan *tulkita* pietetillä. Päämäärä on itse asiassa, että julkinen mielipide samaistuu sekä valtion konstituutioon että yleiseen tahtoon."



Hegel, in any case, highly respected *öffentliche Meinung* “for its essential basis”, i.e. for its position in the constitution of and even as the existence of the state.

We could conceive of Hegel’s somewhat paradoxical position in the light of a not so harmonious dialectics resulting from quite reality-aware considerations, on one hand, and reasoning in terms of legitimacy and rationality, on the other. Power is not always legitimate or beneficial, but the lesson that we could learn particularly from Hegel would be that it can be and further, in many cases, it actually is. Neither are the concrete expressions of *öffentliche Meinung* always so enlightened—with all the “infinite diversity of content and tergiversation” that there can be.

Obviously, Hegel’s ideal and fundamental assumption would be that a kind of development or a process of *Bildung* could and should take place within the state. Neuhouser claims that Hegel’s “primary concern” is “to articulate what a complete realization of the ideal of moral subjectivity would look like and to think about how the social order could be constituted in order to make the realization of that ideal more likely”<sup>404</sup>. We indeed can see with Hegel in a quite fundamental sense a moral aspiration towards just social and political order and dignified citizenship. His, in a sense, most reality-aware foundation adds to the respectability of this aspiration. I would say that Hegel’s reality-awareness—even with his rather rude remarks on the popular or “most personal side” of *öffentliche Meinung*, which can be “so stubborn, so unintelligent” and contain “infinite diversity of content and tergiversation”—gives his thought a serious ethos and particular moral strength. The state appears as an actual and concrete option of enhancement of human life, rather than merely as a formal and abstract structure. It may be that Hegel is more eager to remind about the potential of the state than to praise and declare some formal authority of what there is in the minds and hearts of the people—even if the latter in principle deserves respect “for its essential basis”.

Drawing from what we have seen here, we could ask whether Hegel’s view would be actually democratic. Hegel’s position as regards (popular) sovereignty is quite complex and relates to his philosophy of spirit in such a way that I find it

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<sup>404</sup> Neuhouser 2000, 251. For instance Mäki (2013, particularly pp. 143–144), on the other hand, remarks how lecture notes made by Hegel’s students suggest that Hegel in his lectures emphasized more than in his published books the rights and role of the citizens as well. This could be intelligible in the light of suspiciousness of Restoration as regards everything even slightly reminiscent of the ideals of the French Revolution. According to Mäki (op. cit., 143), “It was not proper to make the red cloth of the Enlightenment flutter in front of the soul-mates of Metternich” (transl. by VS. from the following: “Valistuksen punaista vaatetta ei sopinut heiluttaa Metternichin hengenheimolaisten edessä”)

better not even trying to reconstruct it here<sup>405</sup>. What Hegel writes, in any case, is not primarily a blueprint for organizing the state. Then again, we may ask whether any actual state—even if a democracy—could function without some two-fold streams of communication and even power between the people and the state. With Hegel, we could see such double-directedness in the combination of

- the state as a process of *Bildung* could mean—in some respect, at least—that there is an educational power over the people, and
- *öffentliche Meinung* as a manifestation of the say of the people.

Our discussion here, in any case, encourages me to think in terms of agnostic republicanism and the Sellersian “mixed and balanced government”, which could be a foundation of adding quite consciously and explicitly moments of formal justice and democracy to Hegel’s concern about the substance and reality-awareness—all the time understanding that the latter as well is most respectable.

#### **6.4.4 What about those not willing to comply with *Sittlichkeit*, in view of the true conscience, “willfulness” (*Wilkür*) and a moral subject?**

Because of the strong emphasis on the state and its ‘message’ that we can find with Hegel, some remarks are still in place as regards the position of those left in the minority or otherwise in opposition. Notions such as ‘dictatorship of majority’, the “yoke of public opinion” or “moral means of coercion in the form of public opinion”, to use expressions of John Stuart Mill, may well be parts of an ideological defense of the small elites that have privileged positions. The principle of popular sovereignty and the rule of (the majority of) people could pose a threat to their interests and privileges<sup>406</sup>. These notions, in any case, quite directly challenge the very ideal the people should have the say—though with the exception of an unrealistic ideal of all-encompassing consensus as the foundation democracy<sup>407</sup>.

As critical notions, however, the notions like ‘dictatorship of majority’ might have some sustainable and noteworthy content as well. We may have quite a

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<sup>405</sup> See, however, Hegel 1829/1952, §279 and the note to it, for instance.

<sup>406</sup> See Habermas 1962/1991, 129 ff.

<sup>407</sup> In republicanism, as well as in so-called deliberative democracy (see, for instance, Mouffe 2000) there indeed is an orientation towards some substantial consensus. It seems to me quite unrealistic to assume that consensus could cover everyone and everything in actual social life, however.

democratic rule—a rule and government that has its foundation in the will of the people—and still a lack of freedom if the majority in an overly totalitarian manner can define the life and thought of everyone. In *res publica*, the deliberate will of the people, of course, should have the strongest say, but we may ask whether it should have all the say. If it should not, then also the pluralism cherished by the liberals or liberalists, as well as the ideal of tolerance, could have some value.<sup>408</sup> Overly totalitarian democracy could insult the rights that all the citizens—even those in opposition to what is the mainstream—assumingly should have. We actually could see with Hegel as well quite a substantial sympathy to those who disagree.

[a] *Obligated to listen to the state, yet free to disagree*

According to Neuhaus, the problem of the state and the individual citizens with Hegel is in the relationship between the moral subject and *Sittlichkeit*. The moral subject is a subject that follows his or her own conscience while *Sittlichkeit* is something that at least can be exterior to the subject and thus could make problematic the demand of following one's own conscience. Within Neuhaus's reconstruction of Hegel's thought in this respect, we once again encounter the question of what freedom actually could and should mean.

Connected to this, the concept of individual subjects' own conscience as well requires further analysis into "true conscience" and "errant conscience", the latter as alienated striving for self-sufficiency and as flattening the freedom of the moral subject into "willfulness" (*Willkür*).<sup>409</sup> Among the notions of freedom, *licentia* would obviously be the counterpart of such *Willkür*. What Neuhaus writes from the side of and as regards the citizen and the aspirations of his or her "true conscience", on the other hand, accomplishes the impression of an ideal though perhaps somewhat suspect harmony that we already saw in Section 6.4.2.

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<sup>408</sup> Pluralism here would be quite literally the result of tolerance. Tolerance, in turn, is a somewhat controversial notion as well, and one has been criticizing it as patronizing and dividing people to those in the position to tolerate and those in the position where they only can hope that others tolerate them. Wendy Brown (2006, 25) quite incontestably writes: "Like patience, tolerance is necessitated by something one would prefer did not exist. It involves managing the presence of the undesirable, the tasteless, the faulty—even the revolting, repugnant, or vile". If people, however, have ended in a due order and good reasons to something that it assumes right and still wishes to maintain an 'open-minded' and liberal attitude towards other options, it is quite correct to use the notion of tolerance, and being tolerant in this sense also is quite correct and valuable.

<sup>409</sup> See Neuhaus 2000, 247 ff.

Hegel regards the aspirations of conscience as fully realized only when (1) individuals are bound exclusively by the laws and norms they themselves endorse; (2) their endorsement of those laws and norms is grounded in rational reflection; (3) the ethical standards they endorse truly represent the good; and (4) the goodness of those standards derives from the fact that they promote a value internal to the human will (self-determination).<sup>410</sup>

One could ask, of course, whether such an (overly) ideal view of the society, the state, and the position of the citizens were taking into account the interests and conflicts of them that there typically are in actual societies.

The Hegelian true conscience, in any case, seems very much like the Gadamerian *Bildung* with a willingness of the latter to listen to what the history has handed down. Due to this similarity, a lengthy quotation from Neuhouser is in place here, as it helps us to enhance our understanding of both Gadamer and Hegel simultaneously, and even further, a possible foundation of the republicanist political philosophy and theory.

[...] what Hegel calls willfulness [*Willkür*] and self-conceit is an overly individualistic form of conscience that, in attempting to determine the ethical standards it will embrace, give insufficiently weight to the testimony of other moral authorities that have at least an equal claim to knowledge of the good. Among these authorities Hegel includes not only other individuals but also the long-standing norms and practice of one's society (§132N [of Philosophy of right]). Willfulness in moral matters, then, must be the tendency to regard whatever understanding of the good one arrives at entirely on one's own as finally authoritative—that is, as immune to challenges from divergent views of the good that, if taken into account, might provide one with grounds for revising or rejecting one's own private judgment. ... Another way of putting this point is to say that by shutting out the testimony of others and refusing to subject one's own understanding of the good to possible acceptance or rejection by others, the purely private conscience eschews rational insight and thus falls sort of a central aspect of the ideal of moral subjectivity.<sup>411</sup>

We here can read that moral subjectivity with Hegel by definition contains the demand for rationality. A moral subject is willing to know about good and consequently willing to notice arguments on it. *Sittlichkeit* too—manifested within the Hegelian state—contains argumentation about the good. The moral subject with a true conscience would be willing to listen to what the state and *Sittlichkeit* have to say on these matters. The analogy is obvious between the position of Hegel as

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<sup>410</sup> Neuhouser 2000, 251.

<sup>411</sup> Neuhouser 2000, 248–249.

reconstructed here and Gadamer's suggestion that we should be open to tradition in the sense of listening to what it has to say.

Furthermore, we can here see an analogy with the educational rationality of L&Lship suggesting that we perhaps should listen to what *scriptum est* has to say. There is a kind of communicational authority and commitment to serious communication and listening to what the other side is saying, rather than rejecting it right away if it does not seem to suit to what one so far has assumed, what one occasionally wishes to hear and see just now, or what could serve as a resource.

We now can proceed to think about the position of those who actually disagree. The fact that the forms of citizens' participation within the Hegelian thinking might not meet all the requirements that we could have at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is not so essential here<sup>412</sup>. What is essential, however, is that foundation in citizens' participation and assumption of their "true conscience" is perhaps not enough to guarantee all the aspects of freedom of the citizens that the state perhaps should respect. We saw even Mäki remarking that negative freedom as well would be a condition for characterizing a person as free.

Neuhouser's summary of the "consistent Hegelian position" as regards the position of the critical and even firmly dissident citizens, however, should satisfy even many of the most liberal readers of the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century:

The consistent Hegelian position on this issue, then, brings together the following three claims: (1) conscientious dissenters ought to be accorded a right to public criticism of the social order and to noncompliance with laws that violate their understanding of the good; (2) this right is grounded in their dignity as moral subjects rather than in prudential considerations; and (3) this

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<sup>412</sup> Even as regards the modern Western liberal democracies as they have evolved since the time of Hegel, however, some critical comments certainly are in place here. Michael A. Weinstein (1970, 191) depicts as follows some developments that we could see as degenerative: "Given political competition the politics of engineering will eventually negate itself into image politics in which leaders with elite consciousness encounter constituents with mass consciousness and attempt to mobilize support through appeals to adjectival values". The participation in *res publica* and in constitution of its laws and institutions reduces to a choice like the ones we make on the market, to a choice between commodities, we could say. The phenomenon has some striking similarities with what Habermas (1962, 5 ff.) describes as the "representative publicness" that preceded and then again followed the deliberative bourgeois public sphere with its rational conversations, which Habermas claimed to have been there between the mid 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. Within the "representative publicness", if a prince clothed with splendor while riding to a town were handsome enough, everyone with good reason would understand that God has meant this man to rule—especially if the horse as well is strong and beautiful enough.

right can be overridden only when the state's very existence, or some other compelling interests in freedom, is at stake.<sup>413</sup>

*[b] Remarks on the possible foundations of the “consistent Hegelian position”: from ban of censorship to mutual recognition*

The result of Neuhouser's summary above of “the consistent Hegelian position” seems very much like a freedom of expression in the sense of a negative freedom, freedom as non-interference of the state or legal ban of (nearly all) censorship. It could lead to a somewhat liberalist-like recognition of negative freedom, which we could try to guarantee, at least, by some formal even if abstract rules and laws restricting the actions of the state—though I do not assume that any set of such rules or laws could be an automaton guaranteeing the realization of the freedom of expression.

The grounding of the nearly unlimited freedom of expression of the dissenters in “the dignity of moral subjects” deserves a further remark. A person without a freedom of choice cannot make moral choices. Above, we already have seen how important the promotion of the individuals' becoming rational and moral subjects is with Hegel. In view of the Hegelian thought, of course, this makes quite a substantial and serious matter the grounding of the freedom of expression as well in the respect that we and particularly the state should have to the moral subject.

Another, quite a strong argument for the freedom of expression and the right to disagree could have a plausible foundation in the Hegelian idea of mutual recognition, which would be quite a general foundation of all the rights that there

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<sup>413</sup> Neuhouser 2000, 264. We perhaps can pass here claim (3), assuming that it relates to such rather widely at least in some particular and exceptional situations accepted reservations as marshal law based on national security or the need to provide the citizens with some protection—even if in many concrete cases we perhaps should be somewhat dubious as regard such reservations. In few if any state, 8n any case, the freedom of expression is entirely without limits. In the Finnish legislation in 2010's, for instance, the Constitution of Finland first, in a categorical manner, guarantees the freedom of expression (Säädöskokoelma 1999/2011, Chapt. 2, §12). Thereafter, for instance, the Criminal Code (Säädöskokoelma 1889/2016) defines some deeds as crimes that one may make oneself guilty of while producing, publishing, disseminating, etc. particular kinds of materials otherwise protected by the freedom of expressions. These criminalized deeds relate to, for instance, ethnic agitation (op. cit., Chapt. 11, §10), sexually offensive or overly violent materials, especially if in a sense or another related to minors (op. cit., Chapt 17, §17–19), blasphemy (which is a very old part still remaining in the law) and public defamation or desecration of what is considered as sacred by a church or a religious community (which is more intelligible in view of the ideal of so-called secular state even) (op. cit. Chapt 17, § 10), defamation (op. cit. Chapt 24, §9), etc.

can be in a bourgeois society or *societas civilis* of equals, especially according to republicanist thinking. We saw how Pippin culminates the difference between liberalist and views alternative to it in how “ultimacy” of the individual is dominating in the former and challenged by the latter. What ultimately challenges the ultimacy of the individual is “the ultimacy in inter-subjective relations”, because the individual as an individual personality only comes to be in such relations.<sup>414</sup> This happens in what Pippin—following here Hegel—calls the mutual recognition. This fundamentally is a principle wherefrom follows that an individual already in his or her liberty is dependent on the freedom of all the others. Pippin is particularly “interested in” the following formulation of mutual recognition.

[...] being a free agent—an actual or successful agent—is said to depend on being recognized as one by other whose free bestowal of this recognition depends in turn on their being recognized as such free bestowers.<sup>415</sup>

In other words, only the one whose freedom others freely acknowledge can be genuinely free. This, in turn, requires that those others are free to acknowledge or not and if acknowledging, do it voluntarily and by their free will. In the case of freedom in general, the argument contains quite a compelling logic.

We should notice here that mutual recognition is not a variant of so-called ‘Golden rule’ or the suggestion that we should do our fellow-humans what we wish them to do us, especially if we considered the ‘Golden rule’ as a kind of trade-off. The notion of mutual recognition has to do with quite a formal and logical necessity coming from a particular and quite a plausible notion of freedom, from the conception that truly free can be only the one whose freedom the others recognize.<sup>416</sup>

In the case of some particular rights, however, it would not be so clear. Freedom of the bestowers of my freedom could be a logical prerequisite of my freedom, but ‘exchange’ or recognitions of the right to express freely one’s ideas, for instance, could already approach the model of trade-off: if your respect my freedom of expression, I respect yours. Between my right to publish an article or a book—let alone the freedoms to smoke cigarettes or drink alcohol—and the rights

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<sup>414</sup> Pippin 2006, 127.

<sup>415</sup> Pippin 2006, 128.

<sup>416</sup> Were it a sign of realistic foundation or of a foundation that ultimately is perhaps not so genuinely moral, we can recognize even within the principle of mutual recognition a moment of egoism. One would recognize the freedom of the others (only?) because it would be the condition of his or her own freedom.

of the others to act in the same way, there would be no logical connection similar to logic in the fundamental recognition of the freedom in general. Then again, the principle of mutual recognition could concern the freedom of expression as well if we considered the matter in terms of positive freedom containing the actual possibility of free action with whatever it requires. We could claim that a person cannot act freely in this sense if he or she has no freedom of expression.

I shall return to mutual recognition in a slightly different context in Section 8.4. In a sense, but only in a sense, the counterpart of freedom of expression is our possible obligation to have respect to what the others have expressed. Though in quite an intermediate manner, consideration of such obligations will be another step towards my additional and concluding remarks on my agnostic republicanism in Section 9.2.

### **6.5 Further remarks on inevitability of the genuine moment of educational in the state: another reason for some ‘agnosticism’ within republicanism**

It seems to me that we could make the following remarks on the republicanist political thinking, particularly while considered in view of the Hegelian notion of the state.

- (1) A genuinely democratic ideal of government can find there a foundation, combined with the idea of the state could actually be aiming at justice that could be a concrete part of reality,
- (2) The justice advanced by the state could have its foundation ‘in the minds and hearts’ of the citizens, so to speak, which actually would be the very existence of the state. Furthermore, we could see this justice, in a form or another, as the result of citizens’ participation in politics with the nature of the Aristotelian praxis.
- (3) Even the view of the position of those who disagree with the state—or perhaps, with the majority—seems to be quite satisfactory, especially in view of what Neuhausser calls the “consistent Hegelian position” though some parts of what we saw Hegel himself actually writing about freedom of expression and *öffentliche Meinung*, for instance, seem somewhat confusing.
- (4) In all of this, freedom could actualize, not only as negative “state non-interference”, but also in the sense of positive and autonomous freedom.



In spite of these remarks, I shall here suggest some further reasons to add some agnosticism as well to a view of the state that otherwise and ultimately could and, in my view, should be republicanist. My argumentation in the rest of this chapter leads us, once again, closer to the thematic proper of L&Lship.

### **6.5.1 Bildung and education, the state as a structure of power as well, and even the distinction of the minors and adults**

Gadamer as well certainly challenges the primacy of the individual characteristic to “the liberal version of the state”, according to Pippin (see Section 6.2.1). In view of L&Lship, this provided us with a most substantial and forceful argument for challenging the reduction of all of its rationality to the needs, interests, etc., of the individual users only. Gadamer’s view makes most intelligible the rationality of L&Lship on behalf of *scriptum est* as well and in this sense, even on behalf of and for the author. The republicanist political theory and philosophy helps us to add there that L&Lship could intelligibly be also for the society and even the state. I assume that in some respects, we should see the implications of the republicanist political theory and philosophy in a way slightly different from what hermeneutics could teach us, however.

As regards the educational moment in the rationality of the state, a side remark on the difference between minors and adults—as related to citizenship and the state especially—could be illustrative here. Only adults are citizens in the fullest sense of the notion, and we could typically think that education would concern the minors particularly. David Bakhurst, a philosopher of education, is arguing with the views of both Gadamer and what Bakhurst calls “the socio-historical conception” within the philosophy of education. In this sense, his views should come close to my argumentation here.

Bakhurst defines a kind of ideal of the human to which education, as well as the state, would aim, in quite a Hegelian tone, actually. He defines this aim as autonomy and *Bildung* and here most importantly but also problematically, as the “end of education”. “The socio-historical conception to philosophy of education”, according to Bakhurst,

[...] advances a substantive view of *Bildung* as embodying a specific end: namely, the creation of rational agents, autonomous, reflective, critical. This

is what persons are or ought to be. So the picture furnishes us with an ideal of the end of education.<sup>417</sup>

I would take the notion of education, however, even in a more fundamental sense than Bakhurst seems to do. In my view, wherever there is an authority, there is education as well. This would be the case notwithstanding whether the authority is in a way or another ‘forced’—having its foundation in some social structures of authority and power, such as parenthood—or voluntarily accepted. Quite in the spirit of Gadamer’s rehabilitation of tradition and authority, the one who knows better would deserve the position of an authority and consequently, of an educator as well. Cultivating *Bildung*, according to Gadamer, is all the time appealing and subordinating one’s mind to an authority and contesting one’s prejudices in view of the traditions.

In view of the state and its ‘message’, however, the question is no more necessarily only about voluntary listening to and heeding what another has to say. As far as the non-neutrality of the state—recognized and even praised by (particularly the Hegelian-)republicanist view, yet probably present in any state—as well as the very notion of the state itself could actually mean something, we cannot avoid recognizing that the authority of the state could be, even quite legitimately, in some sense coercive as well. In this sense, considering *Bildung* as “the end of education” could simply mean that one is ideologically fading out an inevitable state of affairs. While talking about power and even coercion, we should not make too strong assumptions of harmonies.

We may say that both in hermeneutics and in the life of a state, there is a kind of living consensus, a consensus evolving and now and then challenged by differing views and dissenters, but quite often also re-established in a more or less modified form as the result of the dialogues between the views. We probably should assume, further, that in terms of the republicanist view, the state and *Sittlichkeit* incorporated there would never be ‘ready’. Then, we could ask whether the citizens either—in the constitution of whom the state as well participates—could be ‘ready’ if the state is not. The line of demarcation between the minors and adulthood, in these particular respects, would not be so sharp—though it certainly is most important while considering on a concrete level the formal relationship between the state and the citizens. If being an individual means participa-

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<sup>417</sup> Bakhurst 2011, 123.

tion in the whole, and if the whole evolves, the individual as well should appropriate the evolved say and messages of the whole or the state.

### **6.5.2 Since no state is neutral ...**

The state, we could say, is fundamentally and substantially a process of *Bildung*, for its citizens as well, but it is also a structure of power and even coercion. Consequently, the state as a process of *Bildung* would contain also genuine processes and moments of education.

I could here summarize and simultaneously a little sharpen my argument. Within the state, there obviously is present a dialectics that is not without tensions and in view of such a dialectics, we could reason as follows.

- (1) No state can be neutral, and the liberalist doctrine of neutrality of the state, if taken strictly, is inevitably ideological and ignores what a reality-aware mind recognizes as inevitable.
- (2) With its ‘message’—conceived of as the Hegelian *Sittlichkeit*, for instance—the state contains a legitimate moment of education and can actually have its beneficial role in advancing freedom and moral subjectivity as well, yet only as a process of *Bildung*.
- (3) It would be an illusion, however, to assume that the ‘message’ of the state could advance always in an entirely harmonious manner and without tensions simultaneously among all the citizens as well as on the level of the state.
- (4) Consequently, the state quite legitimately may have something to say, which all the people by no means have been able to endorse so far. As a corollary of this, there would be present a legitimate and genuine moment of education with the educational authority of the state even and going beyond the notion of *Bildung* as the “end of education”.
- (5) A further consequence the remarks (1) to (4) would be that the citizens might have some legitimate doubts as regards the state as well and there would be reasons to protect their rights and liberty against the possibly too strong authority of the state.

The case could be that the citizens had not entirely endorsed what the state as an educational authority concretely ‘tells’—even if they, on a fundamental level, had endorsed the right of a legitimate state to tell its citizens something through the laws, for instance. The case also could be that the state is actually wrong and

some individual citizens have a better understanding, which may become clear for and within the state as well in the course of time and via further dialogues and use of practical reason or *phronesis*—as long as the state does not suffocate such dialogues. This reasoning still proceeds purely in terms of the assumed legitimate moment of education and *Bildung* within the state. In addition to this, of course, the state and its institutions and ‘message’ can and probably quite typically do reflect more or less unjust privileges within the inevitably actual conflicts of interests between different positions that people in the state and society have. The state, of course, is a structure of power as well, not entirely separate from other structures of power. As a structure, the state also creates positions of power and options of misusing it.

The citizens may have, now and then, quite good reasons to be suspicious as regards the state as well. Some formal—even if exactly because of their formality, only abstract—measures to protect the rights of the individual citizens would have value because of the options

- that the state and the individual citizens may (and actually do, I assume) disagree in many cases;
- that the case can be that the state is wrong and some citizens have understood better;
- that there can be, within the state, also interests to maintain private privileges and positions of power

In this respect, the citizens should have something to which they can actually appeal. This can be a most serious matter since states pretending to speak for the public good and justice often tend to repress their citizens who disagree. In any case, the citizens can best appeal to something that is formal—even if it simultaneously inevitably more or less abstract. The ban of censorship can be a rather simple and formal rule providing people’s freedom of expression with some protection as a negative freedom. The distinction of minority and adulthood is in a formal sense quite important—even if in the substantial sense, it cannot be so sharp since the state is a process of *Bildung* and we cannot entirely separate from each other *Bildung* and education. Then, it is only plausible that the formal even if abstract legislation—such as the laws establishing some negative freedoms—establishes the distinction and defines adulthood.

The importance of the formal side of the state is the leitmotiv of my agnostic republicanism and liberal footnotes to republicanism. Taking into account “con-

sistent Hegelian position” as regards the dissenters (see Section 6.4.4), for instance, my liberal footnotes *to* republicanism could eventually be reminders *within* republicanism only. Then again, because of the significance of formal even if abstract legislation that I would emphasize in view of providing the citizens with some protection, there could be some ‘liberal spirit’, at least, in my agnostic republicanism<sup>418</sup>. In Chapter 9 (particularly, in Section 9.2), I shall have the option to elaborate further my view of the rationality of L&Lship in this respect.

## 6.6 Literature, *scriptum est*, and even L&Lship possibly as parts of the *öffentliche Meinung*?

Here once again, we can return concretely to the concrete thematic of L&Lship. We perhaps could consider literature and even the library that is preserving *scriptum est* as institutional forms of or related to the *öffentliche Meinung* or to the existence of the Hegelian state. More specifically, literature that we can see—to a degree, at least—as an institutionalized practice could provide this part of *öffentliche Meinung* with its content. The role of the library then—especially of a library maintained by the public authority—would be to strengthen the institutional frame and status of literature.

We could find some support for this in the library history. The first national libraries as well originate in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, and their connection to the state is clear. As far as they are particular parts of public authority, they also, give literature in general a particular position. The origin of the public libraries as well is around the same time, if we take into account the various forms of the library that approach the public library proper with its breakthrough in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Habermas in his *Structural transformations of public sphere* actually mentions—though as if in passing—the birth of the public library as connected to the “institutions of the bourgeois public sphere”, which could, in some respect, come close to the Hegelian notion of *öffentliche Meinung*<sup>419</sup>. Much more than the library itself, however, Habermas emphasizes literature and the literary public sphere. Then again, this is the part of culture and society where there is the foundation of

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<sup>418</sup> Legislation can advance also positive and autonomous freedom, of course. Social policy and its legislation can advance also the realization of positive freedom and a democratic constitution can advance even autonomous freedom. In both of these cases, however the support for such more concrete and ultimately more significant forms of freedom would not be as direct as in the case of the ban of censorship, for instance.

<sup>419</sup> See Habermas 1962/1991, 51. See also, for instance, Emerik & Ørum 1997 and Vestheim 1997.

the possible significance of the library as well, in my view<sup>420</sup>. Public library, after all, is a library and literature or *scriptum est* for the common people and therefore, once the bourgeois society has evolved, for the citizens as well. Furthermore, this assumption of literature and L&Lship as parts of *öffentliche Meinung* could become even more plausible if we considered literatures in the plural. It would be then easier to see the significance as regards the society and the state of some particular parts of literature, such as scholarly or political literature, which we also can more easily see as particular institutionalized practices.

Genuine perspectives of political theory and philosophy are rare within LID-studies. Particularly outside what we can recognize as the mainstream, however, there actually has been reasoning in quite a noteworthy manner approaching such position of the library as well.

With Birdsall, however, as I already anticipated, conservatism, socialism, as well as particular trends within what he denotes by the broad notion of “American liberalism” contain some elements of what we could consider as properly republicanist thought (See Section 6.1). With Birdsall, autonomous liberalism is the notion that comes close to so-called neo-liberalism. One of the major arguments in Birdsall’s account of the new views challenging the traditional ideas of L&Lship is that “post-industrial information society” has dramatically increased the value of information as a resource. Thus, neo-liberalist thought further strengthens the idea of information—or whatever notion we should use to denote what the library as well contains—as a resource. Birdsall characterizes this new policy as “productivity-oriented” and “utilitarian”<sup>421</sup>, which ultimately could mean reducing the society into one organization among others with predetermined and often ultimately and in a fundamental sense economic objectives. The Aristotelian notion of practice disappears as well as issues of genuine *Bildung* related to the constitution of the self, which Mäki’s “self-governing” (see Section 6.3[b]) —or, as we perhaps could say, any in a fundamental sense democratic mode of governing—logically and in quite a substantial sense demands. The constitution of the state would disappear simultaneously.

Buschman’s summary of the library as a “public sphere agent” as well could illustrate a possible role of L&Lship as a part of *öffentliche Meinung*. We may well

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<sup>420</sup> See Habermas 1962/1991, 31 ff. Yet, we should notice that with Habermas, the notion of literature has a considerably narrower scope than my notion of the instance where works and documentation combine

<sup>421</sup> See Birdsall 1994, 129

say that his argument is going on in the spirit of republicanism—or, at least, in the spirit of the collective liberalism as the ‘leftish’ side within what Birdsall denotes as the American liberalism. With a reference to Habermas and ultimately arguing against the current of political thought recognized as neo-liberalism, Buschman depicts the library as a “public sphere agent”. His account serves here as an excellent example of the cultural, social, and political role that the library could have in view of the republicanist political theory and philosophy. Buschman enumerates the following remarks where “the public sphere concept has immediate and clear relevance to librarianship”:

- Libraries embody and enact a rational discourse through the organization of collections.
- Librarianship enacts the principle of unfettered information and transparency in concrete ways (collections and services)
- Librarianship enacts the principle of critique and argumentation to rationally arrive at values and conclusions (primarily) through the commitment to balanced collections, preserving them over time, and making the breadth of resources available.
- Librarianship enacts the principle of extending and furthering inclusion in the democratic public through active attempts to make collections and resources reflect historical and current intellectual diversity and in the field’s outreach and extension of services to various groups and communities, thus extending the parameters of discourse and affecting the resulting normative conclusions.
- Libraries “act” to verify (or refute) rational validity claims in making current and retrospective organized resources available to check basis of a thesis, law, book, article, or proposal and thus aiding and continuing the rational communicative process of critique and argumentation.
- Libraries contain within their collections the potential for rational critique and individual/community self-realization, thus grounding the communicative process and the possibility to re-establish democratic processes.<sup>422</sup>

Buschman’s view of what the library ideally could be is richer than the fundamental notion of the library in terms of which I am reasoning here, but with Buschman, too, the first remark concerns collections, which I would consider as consisting of *scriptum est*. In view of my agnostic republicanism, Buschman’s particular way to deal with the library’s role related to criticism is noteworthy. While elaborating the thematic of agnostic republicanism in Chapter 9, I can also specify further the role and part of L&Lship as—or in view of—*öffentliche Meinung*

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<sup>422</sup> Buschman 2003, 46–47.

(particularly Section 9.2.2). In view of the social division of (politico-) cultural labor, this role could plausibly be on the side of maintaining plurality and divergence of the views that participate in the politics as a common exercise of the Aristotelian *phronesis*.

Furthermore, we find with Buschman a substantial moment of education and an emphasis of rationality, which give a ‘serious tone’ to what he says about criticism. My claim about the liberalist premises of userism approaches another remark made by Buschman, with the notion of “customer-driven librarianship”, which he combines with the “new public philosophy” in thinking about “public institutions”, including the library.<sup>423</sup> As symptoms of such thinking about the library, Buschman mentions

- “accountability” so that one can respond “to conservative questions concerning the value [...] received for the tax dollars spent”;
- taking the model for the logic of the library from the “Starbucks model”, thus simply paralleling the library and a commercial service, and finally, as an obvious consequence of these
- emphasis on “public relations/marketing in libraries”.<sup>424</sup>

Among other things, Buschman’s remarks well illustrate the connection between userist conceptions of the library and the liberalist political theory and philosophy.

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<sup>423</sup> See Buschman 2003, 57 ff. and 109 ff.

<sup>424</sup> Buschman 2003, 109.





## 7 Introductory remarks on historical objectivity and particular practices in view of a wider sphere of rationalities

Here and in my consequent argumentation in the rest of this treatise, I shall use the notion of objectivities of and around *scriptum est*, in addition to the Ricoeurian notion of *l'objectivité du sens*. The Ricoeurian *l'objectivité du sens*, of course, is a part, but not all of this. Not only the worlds opened in front of the texts or *l'objectivité du sens* proper, but also worlds behind the texts can belong to the objectivities of and around *scriptum est*.

In Chapter 5, I responded to what I would see the strongest argument that that we could see behind Gadamer's criticism of historical objectivism. Through the notion of explication, we perhaps could reconcile the rationality proper of the humanities and objectifying approach to realities of *scriptum est* out there in the past. Then again, another question would remain open even if we had an answer to the question of *how*. *Why* should we mind, after all, about the past realities and objectivities of and around *scriptum est*?

### 7.1 Universal claims about objectivism or focusing on particular practices with rationalities and 'stepping-orders' of their own?

Rather than considering the thematic of objectivism as a question related universally to all our knowledge and understanding, I would think that we should subordinate the whole question of what significance objectivity in a sense or another might have to the rationalities of particular practices. Ricoeurian 'regionalism' on its part has inspired this point of departure (See Section 4.1).

Rafael Capurro, still another LID-scholar inspired by hermeneutics, insightfully and quite in the spirit of Gadamer writes as follows.

Gadamer refers to the founding dimension of our 'being-in-the-world-with-others', in the sense of a historical dimension of disclose of meaning, which conditions our understanding of the world. Being prior to our theoretical and/or practical projects, this dimension is called 'pre-understanding'.<sup>425</sup>

I wish not to undermine in any way the perspective that Capurro is here suggesting. Then again, even if pre-understanding of "being-in-the-world-with-others"

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<sup>425</sup> Capurro 1992, 88.

inevitably is prior, there actually are still quite legitimate and noteworthy, even if in a sense as secondary “theoretical and/or practical projects” as well in the being of the humans.<sup>426</sup> The practice of L&Lship certainly is a particular practical project.

My suggestion that we should consider the question of objectivity and objectivism as subordinated to particular practices would be in quite a literary sense ‘pragmatist’. A particular feature of this ‘pragmatism’ would be that the practices would in a sense dominate, rather than destroy, epistemology<sup>427</sup>. A part of Ger-gen’s argument even was the criticism of assuming that there would be “universal mechanisms” in the “constitution of the human beings” (see Section 4.2.2). We perhaps should apply this criticism to universal claims about, against, or for objectivism as well. Instead of or, at least, in addition to such universal claims, we perhaps should pay attention to what is particular or “regional”.

As regards the possible variation of the significance of objectivity within the rationalities characteristic of fundamentally different practices, the already classical differentiation of the interests of knowledge by Habermas serves as a good illustration. We could well think that objectivity as well should have a different significance depending on whether we are talking

- about the technical interest of what Habermas calls analytical-empirical sciences, related to technical practices,
- about the practical interest of hermeneutical sciences related to history and language, or
- about the emancipatory and critical interest related to philosophy and politics.<sup>428</sup>

In view of the technical interest, it is hard to imagine how the truth aimed at ultimately could be anything else but correspondence. A bridge engineer should know actual properties of the actual materials that he or she is using. Undeniably, on the other hand, he or she actually has only interpretations in terms of which his

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<sup>426</sup> In view of what I have denoted as the Ricoeurian cut-off, further, we could think that in large extent the being of humans consists of those particularities and the whole of the “historical dimension of disclosure of meaning” in many practical pursuits and perhaps even ultimately may remain beyond the reach of humans. This actually approaches the question, which I shall discuss in Chapter 9. This could relate to quite a substantial difference between Gadamer and Ricoeur, after all.

<sup>427</sup> See, for instance, Rorty’s views in Section 4.2.2. With Frohmann (2004, 92 ff.) as well, practice and epistemology appear very much as alternatives.

<sup>428</sup> See Habermas 1965/1971, 308 ff.

or her knowledge is constituted. Such meanings and interpretations as such are not “out there” in the steel. What this objectivism-critical argument here could actually mean, however, would have the status of a methodological reservation only. The aim of the bridge engineer would be to know about the steel, not about his or her own interpretations. For a critic of ideologies or a historian of art, for instance, the significance of interpretations could be quite different. Within criticism of ideologies, for instance, the interpretations themselves could have an ideology-critical potential.

With a reference to the notion of practice with Aristotle as well, we could derive from Habermas’ differentiation of interests of knowledge a foundation for a broad classification of practices.

- (1) *Technical practices* actually and even by definition would be the alternative of and in this sense, directly opposed to the Aristotelian practice. In Aristotelian concepts, the very notion of technical practice would be a conceptual contradiction even.
- (2) Within *hermeneutical or communicative practices*, we already could find the features of a practice in the Aristotelian sense as well. The fundamentally hermeneutical logic as well plausibly combines with the constitution of genuinely political rationalities.
- (3) *Emancipatory, political, or critical practices*, then, would already come quite close to the Aristotelian notion of practice as well.

It would be somehow plausible to think that technical practices (1) with their ends ‘from outside’ would be more dependent on knowledge about states of affairs “out there”. Hermeneutical or communicative (2) and emancipatory or critical practices (3), in turn, could be more—even if probably not entirely—‘self-contained’, and we should notice there some significant inner circularity, so to speak.

Real and actual practices in actual social and cultural reality tend to be complex, however. Consequently, the particular rationalities of cultural and social practices as well may be complex. In my view, it would be illustrative as well as conceptually justified to think in terms of dominating rationalities and moments subordinated to those dominating rationalities within particular practices. We perhaps should think about particular ‘*stepping orders*’ of the dominating rationalities and subordinate moments while thinking about particular rationalities of particular practices, which in themselves can be complex.

Even within communicative practices, while ultimately producing and appro-

priating common meanings to create community and common understanding, we perhaps should take care of making the messages to reach the interlocutors as well. We perhaps have to speak loud enough, to take quite a trivial example. Perhaps we should choose words that the interlocutor understands, which also would be a rather technical choice. Thus, a practice dominated by the rationality of communication may have moments of technical nature. Furthermore, the means that we use for this may have consequences of political nature and give privileged positions for some of the participants in a communication while leaving some others in the shadow. It may be that only a few among the people in a given community can use loudspeakers.

Further, we could also see just social order as the ultimate rational aim of the legislation, but there could be linguistic problems as well and they could be in a particular sense technical by nature. Updating drug legislation requires that new drugs have names since otherwise the law could not say anything about them. Naming the drugs—belonging as such to the constitution of communication and in this sense, to the communicative practice. Here, however, it would become a technical problem of terminology, which actually could be quite challenging even. Eventually here, however, this technical problem would be subordinate to the rationality and aims of legislation,

Within the thought of Ricoeur, we can see a kind of stepping-order of analytical, objectifying, or structured approach and a purely hermeneutical—or, we could say, the Gadamerian-hermeneutical—rationality of appropriation, the former being in the service of the latter. In such subordination, we could have reasons to avoid ‘ruining’ the practical and hermeneutical rationality or making it disappear behind the subordinate, analytical moment. This was exactly the aim of my reasoning on explanation and explication in Chapter 5.

Already here, we could see within my agnostic republicanism as well a stepping order of

- the state conceived of fundamentally in the republicanist and partly even in the Hegelian sense
- and of the liberal footnotes or reminders ‘under’ it, as subordinate moments of and additions to such a notion of the state.<sup>429</sup>

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<sup>429</sup> We actually have seen some stepping orders already. In view of my thematic in this treatise, the most important could be the one consisting of appropriation and structural analysis as an intermediate phase, the former then being the dominant rationality

## **7.2 History meaningless without a communicational continuity, reckless without minding about what actually has been there?**

A particular practice that would be particularly relevant to my thematic in this treatise is the practice of historical investigation—or, a particular practice related to and derived from it. Due to the emphasis of what the library contains according to the notion of the library that I am suggesting, views of literary history within literary studies particularly would have relevance here—even if my notion of literature were wider than the literature typically treated of in literary studies<sup>430</sup>. Within this sphere, in any case, we can find emphases some of which come close to Gadamer while others have at least something in common with the Ricoeurian views. In addition to literary studies, I shall shortly mention some remarks by representatives of the study of history in general.

The discussion below will be going on between two poles,

- the one of the meaningfulness of history and of a kind of communicational community with history, and
- another of knowledge about history.

I shall start, however, with a short reminder of Gadamer’s position and in Sections 7.3.1 to 7.4, I shall continue with some reasoning around Ricoeur’s views on this matter.

### ***7.2.1 In the spirit of the Gadamerian communicational continuity***

History and historicity of our being are most fundamental elements of the Gadamerian thought. Consistently with what we have seen, however, what Gadamer means by historical reality does not mean the past states of affairs, nor the reality of historical facts, events, objects produced, etc. “out there” in the past, to apply Bernstein’s expression (see Section 4.2.1). As Gander remarks, “reconstructing the intentions of the author out of a text, as something transcending the text, is for Gadamer neither reasonable nor possible”<sup>431</sup>.

With Gadamer, rather, historical reality is the temporal distance or spin, a continuum since the past, existing over time and in all the moments of time, in-

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<sup>430</sup> Not by definition, but typically the notion of literature in literary studies means fiction, poetry, etc., while my notion of literature does not have such preferences.

<sup>431</sup> Gander 2004, 133.

cluding our present where we orient towards the future. When Gadamer insists, quite emphatically, that we should not ignore the historicity of our being, it means this temporal distance, spin, and continuity over time. While minding about the past facts would be mere romantic historicism, Gadamer's notion of historicity means exactly that humans living in present participate in this spin over a temporal distance.

According to Gadamer, the true meanings of the texts as well only appear in the course of the time, in interpretations that follow one another. Further, the interpretations of some text that we may have now—after a sequence of interpretations since the original creation of the text—are “superior” to the original meaning—or, at least different, but obviously also in a legitimate manner different from what the author had meant by his text.

[...] an author does not need to know the real meaning of what he has written, and hence the interpreter can, and must, often understand more than he. But this is of fundamental importance. Not occasionally, but always, the meaning of a text goes beyond its author. That is why understanding is not merely a reproductive, but always a productive attitude as well<sup>432</sup>

Here, of course, we should realize that the earlier interpretations as such are events in the past and consequently, a part of the history in the sense of what actually has been there. In a strictly Gadamerian spirit, however, we probably should not be interested in them as such either. They also would belong to our present only as present interpretations of interpretations that have taken place in the past.

Hans Robert Jauss—a German theorist of literature—proceeds in the spirit of Gadamer. We can summarize as follows how Jauss outlines the history of the

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<sup>432</sup> Gadamer 1960/1992, 264. Gadamer, however, doubts whether it is correct to refer this later understanding as “superior”, but then ends the reasoning as follows: “It is enough to say that we understand in a different way, if we understand at all”. Another aspect of historical reality as temporal distance is that only time can ‘pick up the pearls’, so to speak, and get rid of what is not so valuable, after all: “it is hard to recognize in a contemporary text what is of some permanent value. Any contemporary text, document, work, or a piece of *scriptum est* typically is both produced and received with a mind oriented towards the possibly quite passing interests of that era. Only in the course of time, it is possible to see if something in the text might maintain its value over time. Gadamer expresses this ‘picking up the pearls’ function of history first as “the idea in historical studies that objective knowledge can be arrived at only when there has been a certain historical distance”, and then continuing: “[...] the permanent significance of something can first be known objectively only when it belongs within a self-contained context. In other words, when it is dead enough to have only historical interest.” (Op. cit., 265). Still, in other words, Gadamer writes: “It is only the temporal distance that can solve the really critical question of hermeneutics, namely of distinguishing the true prejudices, by which we understand, from the false ones by which we misunderstand.” (Op. cit., 266.)

history of literature within literary studies. The sequence of phases there illustrates well the Gadamerian talk about historicity and historicism as well. *Grosso modo*, the phases were as follows until the earlier 20<sup>th</sup> century<sup>433</sup>.

- (1) In the early phase, the literary history, while trying “to escape from the dilemma of mere annal-like lining-up of the facts”, arranges the materials in terms of tendencies, genres, etc., then proceeding as a chronology of “life and works” of the “great authors”. With such a form of literary history, of course, there is genuine respect for the great spirits, and these spirits, then, would address the investigation, investigator, and reader of literature as well. Literature of the past would say something to us here and now.
- (2) The Enlightenment, however, produced an objectivist view of history, and even in a historical sense, this corresponds to what Gadamer means by his notion of historicism. Learning to know what actually happened became the aim. This line of thought culminates in the Rankean conception of history, reflected within the views of literary history as well in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, with the ideal of the historian vanishing as much as possibly from the results of investigation thus making them objective and scientific.
- (3) Then, however, the 19<sup>th</sup> century gave birth to another kind of studies on literary history as well, with inspiration from the teleological way of thinking within the German Idealism. The manifestation of this was that one focused on national literatures in view of the formation of nations, which—in turn—was the *telos* in the light of which literature had its meaning. Once again, the present of the study itself as a part of the life of a nation was present in the ways in which one looked at the literary history. Consequently, the literature itself once again had its meaning in the present and addressed the people in their present. The limitation of this approach was that it tended to lead to the dead end of building national mythologies.
- (4) Jauss further makes comments on how “orthodox” Marxist studies of literature—in spite of the dialectical moment that should be a substantially present in Marxism—tended to simply explain phenomena in literature. They would be parts of the superstructure of society and thus reflecting the relationships of production in the infrastructure. The potential of literature history as a foundation for a genuine criticism of ideologies, for instance, was lost within this kind of Marxism.

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<sup>433</sup> Se Jauss 1969/1982 , 4 ff.



- (5) According to Jauss, further, the formalist view approached restoring the view of the history of literature with significance in our present, already before some more dialectical approaches within late Marxism. This was the case especially after structuralism had to abandon the classical sticking to synchrony and accept the diachronic dimension as well where the works had their life, including the successive receptions.<sup>434</sup>

Jauss then proceeds to state his own conclusion.

The historicity of literature as well as its communicative character presupposes a dialogical and at once processlike relationship between work, audience, and new work that can be conceived in relations between message and receiver as well as between question and answer, problem and solution.<sup>435</sup>

The Gadamerian moment in the reception aesthetics to which Jauss ends is that “the understanding [...] is enriched in a chain of receptions from generation to generation” and consequently, “the historical significance of a work will be decided and its aesthetic value made evident”<sup>436</sup>. Logically and in accordance with the Gadamerian thought and even ethos, we could say, literary studies as literary history would be still another reception in the “chain of receptions” and in this sense, quite genuinely a part of the humanities as Gadamer conceives of their rationality. In a sense, this would be also in accordance with Barthes’ claim that there is no “technical difference” between literature and “scholarly structuralism” (see Section 5.5).

### ***7.2.2 Dualities of participation vs. observation and reconstruction, in spite of “all the consequences of the linguistic turn”***

Within literary studies as well as with historians proper, we can find also views that approach the kind dualities that are characteristic of Ricoeurian thought. Eric Donald Hirsch Jr. criticizes Gadamer quite explicitly and illustratively, making two interrelated conceptual distinctions, one between “historicity” and “historicality”, and another between “meaning” and “significance”. With Hirsch, the notion of significance that contains the moment of application approaches the Gad-

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<sup>434</sup> Jauss 1969/1982, 9–18.

<sup>435</sup> Jauss 1969/1982, 19.

<sup>436</sup> Jauss 1969/1982, 20.

merican line of thought, while the notion of meaning with Hirsch denotes the original intentions of the text:

We may set against this principle of historicity the principle of historicality, which asserts that a historical event, that is to say, an original communicative intent, can determine forever the permanent, unchanging features of meaning. The doctrine of historicality has a different scope from that of historicity. Gadamer's historicity implies that meaning must change over time; but historicality maintains that meaning can stay the same if we choose to regard meaning as a historically determined object. Historicality concedes that we can, if we prefer, treat meaning in a Gadamerian way, but it assumes that no necessity compels either choice.<sup>437</sup>

The way in which Elrud Ibsch—very much in the vein of Hirsch—outlines teaching of literature in terms of the aims of “participation” and “observation” serves here as a concise explication of what the library with its bibliographically educational rationality as well could be promoting:

[...] students, too, should be made familiar with both stand-points dealt with here: as a participant in literary communication, the student learns to produce his own determination of meaning and to make it plausible to others and, as an observer, he learns to describe, explain and respect the constitutions of meaning by others.<sup>438</sup>

Proceeding from Ibsch's distinction of observing and participating, the library in itself would be an observer primarily, rather than a participant. This would be the bibliographic side. Then again, the line of demarcation between observation and participation cannot be very sharp. While observing, the library itself cannot entirely avoid participation either—in its explicative practice, for instance (see Section 5.4.2)—and this unavoidable participation could be a part of the foundation of the educational potential of the library and librarian as well. While observing, the librarian also inevitably appropriates and participates, which would be a part of what Ibsch's students as well as other readers are and should be doing.

At this point, I would claim that there is a sense in both views. History without the communicational continuity would be meaningless. Jauss, among many

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<sup>437</sup> Hirsch (1984, 216) writes: The following passage still clarifies his view: “I shall confine my dissent here to just one of Gadamer's claims—his view that, since application is part of meaning, and since application changes with each historical moment, meaning must always be different in each interpretation. This idea, if true, would make meaning and significance inseparable and, thus, progressive historical knowledge impossible.” (Hirsch 1984, 212)

<sup>438</sup> Ibsch 1988, 525.

others, is stressing this. Yet, history without minding about what there actually has been there would be reckless, which Hirsch's notion of historicity—with its explicit opposition to the Gadamerian historicity—suggests in quite a sharp manner.

Jorma Kalela, a Finnish historian, formulates in terms of the opposition of reconstruction and construction an argument, which also would have relevance here. Reconstruction as the task of historical investigation appears with Kalela as a part of the prevailing self-understanding of the historians, while replacing it with construction would be a critical view that Kalela characterizes as “postmodern”. According to Kalela, however, “all the consequences of the linguistic turn notwithstanding [...] there is no reason to give up the objective of reconstruction”. Thereafter, Kalela lists the damages that could follow from such giving up:

Being unfair to the people studied results in at least one, but in many cases two, scenarios. One possibility is the spreading of propaganda, where those studied have become the historian's pawns, their views and actions misrepresented to serve the historian's message. The other is where historians have deceived not only themselves but also their audience by strengthening prevailing prejudices. Failure to produce a fair description is really to lose the very point of historical research.<sup>439</sup>

Kalela avoids using the attribute ‘objective’—somewhat unnecessarily, in my view. Yet, he uses other expressions like “sound” or being “fair” to people studied or treating them “on their own terms”. With an explicit reference to Ricoeur, Kalela as well uses the expression of doing justice. In all of these expressions, there is present a moment of objectivity as correspondence, with some kind of obligation to the people investigated as well.<sup>440</sup>

We earlier (Chapter 4.2.3) saw how there are two kinds of questions that are crucial in Collingwood's thinking about history,

- the questions of the historian in his or her present and
- the questions and problems that the texts, which a historian is dealing with, for instance, had answered “out there” in the past.

That history consists of answers to the questions of the historian leads to a conclusion of the subjectivity of history. Collingwood's somewhat peculiar idea, however, is that even if questioning is temporal, the question itself is eternal. Within

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<sup>439</sup> Kalela 2012, 35.

<sup>440</sup> See also Kalela 2012, 42–47.

this frame, the historian as well could consider the ‘original question’, though not participate in the original questioning. Collingwood writes, for instance, of what might have been in the mind of Plato, as follows.

[...] the argument as it can be developed in either Plato's mind or mine or anyone else's is what I call the thought in its mediation. [...] Because it is a thought and not a mere feeling or sensation, it can exist in both these contexts without losing its identity, although without some appropriate context it could never exist.[...] even if I refuted it, it would still be the same argument and the act of following its logical structure would be the same act.<sup>441</sup>

Without going further with foundations of this claim, the result would be that there could be reconciliation between the subjective moment and objectivity in history.<sup>442</sup> In this respect, Collingwood's formulation of the general rationality of history as a field of scholarship as well has relevance. Collingwood writes that “history is ‘for’ human self-knowledge”<sup>443</sup>, thus making the fundamental rationality of the history rather philosophical and actually close to the fundamentals of hermeneutics as we saw. Collingwood further defines history as a “peculiar kind of memory”,

[...] where the object of present thought is past thought, the gap between present and past being bridged not only by the power of present thought to think of the past, but also by the power of past thought to reawaken itself in the present.<sup>444</sup>

Consequently, the past thought—containing questions that are eternal in some sense, in spite of the temporally restricted nature of questioning—could have something to add to the self-knowledge of the humans.

### **7.2.3 The double interest with Ricoeur in knowledge about and in communication with history, with Thucydides questioning: “Why war?”**

We here should notice, once again, that there is a plenty of similarities as well between Ricoeur and Gadamer. Neither of them is interested in so-called authorial

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<sup>441</sup> Collingwood 1946/1976. 301–302. Cf. also Kusch's remark in Section 4.2.3 on Gadamer parting “company with Collingwood”, after all, in spite of referring to him as well in the context of “the hermeneutical primacy of question”.

<sup>442</sup> See Collingwood 1946/1976, 289 ff.

<sup>443</sup> Collingwood 1946/1976, 10.

<sup>444</sup> Collingwood 1946/1976, 294.

meanings. Ricoeur as well, furthermore, is stressing that interpretation is always here and now. “Above all, the characterisation of interpretation as appropriation is meant to underline the ‘present’ character of interpretation”<sup>445</sup>. I find it reasonable to concentrate here on what separates Ricoeur from Gadamer, however.

In his article *History and hermeneutics*, Ricoeur is explicitly addressing views of Gadamer and aiming to complement—rather than overthrow—them. He writes as follows about history with its “double interest”, first, in terms of the “ascending” and “descending” paths. The latter actually means the objectifying function of the text telling about history—rather than, or at least in addition to meaning merely, the objectivity of history in the sense of the past realities. This makes Ricoeur’s thought rather complicated<sup>446</sup>.

The ascending argument says that historical transmission requires other categories than those which rule physical succession. It says, furthermore, that the underlying interest for communication cannot be reduced to the interest for objective knowledge.

The descending argument says that historical transmission cannot gain access to understanding unless it is objectified in the form of a text to be read. It says further that the interest for communication plays its transcendental role as regards the possibility of historical understanding only by means of a distanciation which is both methodological and critical and which legitimates the process of objectification.

The algebraic sum of these arguments is not zero. Its result is exhibited by the very paradox of historical methodology. The background of this paradox is history's being founded upon a double interest.<sup>447</sup>

The double interest means also “history's double allegiance to two distinct systems of interests: an interest for knowledge and an interest for communication”. Ricoeur pays some attention to the question of the relationship between history and natural science raised by the interest in knowledge with its methodological and objectifying approach. Finally, however, “The parallels in method cannot efface the foundational differences”<sup>448</sup>.

Ricoeur’s argumentation goes on in terms of the opposition and mutual complementarity and dialectics of historical method and belonging-to, the latter

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<sup>445</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 159.

<sup>446</sup> We could see here the reason because of which Kalela has interest in Ricoeur. The overall thematic of Kalela’s book, after all, is the role of writing history as a part of the scholarly practice of history.

<sup>447</sup> Ricoeur 1976, 694.

<sup>448</sup> Ricoeur 1976, 695.

indicating the moment that is common to Gadamer and Ricoeur. Here, in any case, the method actually becomes a fundamental part of being—or of a civilized being, culture, or *Bildung*, at least and especially. Then again, the method here appears as a method of reading texts telling about history, rather than as the method of actually investigating the past states of affairs. *Bildung* with Ricoeur as well grows up from more primitive and fundamental phases of our being.

[...] externalization and objectification are as primitive and radical as possible. [...]

It is this originary putting at a distance which historical inquiry takes up in a deliberate, methodological use of distancing. This act is methodological in the same way Cartesian doubt is. Coming back to our earlier reflections on the transmission of a tradition, we will say that a tradition may be transmitted when we do not limit ourselves to living within it, but begin to consider it as an object at a distance even though this distancing may one day serve as the foundation for a repetition that will take place in every way on another level than that of first naiveté.<sup>449</sup>

and then further:

Such methodological doubt sometimes prolongs skeptical, nondeliberate doubt which consciousness may experience as an existential crisis. Hegel called this crisis with regard to tradition alienation in the famous chapter VI in his *Phenomenology* entitled "Spirit" (*Geist*). Culture (*Bildung*) is there identified with the pain of becoming a stranger to one's own past as it had been conveyed by tradition during the stage of taken-for-granted customs. This alienation is the price paid in order that ethical substance (*die Sittlichkeit*) may become 'subject.'

Methodological doubt is the same sort of doubt, but willingly assumed. In fact, the birth of history seems to have been linked to such a "work of negation" (Hegel) arising out of the pain of alienation. In this way our relation to the past becomes a question. The Greek historian Thucydides asked, "Why war?" [...]

A bridge is thereby established between the truth of belonging-to history and historical method. The former requires the latter to the extent that skeptical doubt is transformed into methodical doubt and where an objective response is sought to a question possibly born out of anxiety.<sup>450</sup>

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<sup>449</sup> Ricoeur 1976, 693

<sup>450</sup> Ricoeur 1976, 693–694.

### 7.3 A 'gridlock' with Ricoeur as well, if not necessarily an actual cul-de-sac?

Ricoeur remarks “that historical transmission cannot gain access to understanding unless it is objectified in the form of a text to be read”. Consequently, we would pay attention to the objectivity of the text telling about history, instead of or in addition to the possible objectivity of the history itself in the sense of what there actually have been, which a historical text can tell something about. Ricoeur seems to focus on the functionalities of the written history generated by the historian as a text—and its functionality particularly in enhancing our understanding of temporality.<sup>451</sup> The interest in historical knowledge with Ricoeur seems to be, in a particular sense, an interest in knowledge about the written history and *l'objectivité du sens* of the texts within this written history.

It seems to me that Ricoeurian notion of *l'objectivité du sens* neither would answer directly my simple question of why we should mind about the past objectivities of or around *scriptum est* “out there” in the past. In the somewhat technical concepts of Ricoeur, my idea of the bibliographic rationality of L&Lship could mean minding about the worlds behind the text as well, in addition to the quasi-worlds opened in front of the texts—or *l'objectivité du sens* proper. The actual Ricoeurian *l'objectivité du sens*, of course, would be a part of the historical reality of and around *scriptum est* in which I am interested here—but only a part. *L'objectivité du sens* could be the primary object of CHB but I would see no reason to exclude the worlds behind the text either from bibliographic scholarship.

If we still think about the question that Thucydides made (*Why war?*), in Ricoeurian terms, it actually seems to me as something that belongs to the world behind the text. It even seems as a psychological motive that made Thucydides make questions about what there actually had been. It certainly is not *l'objectivité du sens* of his text, in the Ricoeurian sense. Then again, we should also assume that what Thucydides wrote opens in front of itself—as its quasi-world of refer-

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<sup>451</sup> We should notice that Ricoeur's view, while focusing on the function of texts and reading, contains interesting and seemingly most consistent veins of thought. The rationalities around the texts and history reach even something that we could see as an existential dimension, since the starting point is temporality as a fundamental our being as humans and as the most characteristic constituent of history. We could say that history and writing history, for instance, appear as ‘instances of exercising our own temporality’. According to Ricoeur (1976, 686) himself, history “presents a temporality not unlike my own. My temporality is primordially ‘paired’ (Husserl) to another temporal field which I apprehend in so far as the other is also a subject like me, a subject in a manner analogous to the way I am a subject”.

ence—some view of the Ancient Greek as well, which *would* be the actual Ricoeurian *l'objectivité du sens*.

We should be particularly careful here. We actually can see here even three histories, at least:

- (1) There is the history where there were those wars that made Thucydides anxious. This history as well would be a part of discourse, yet eclipsed temporarily in writing.
- (2) There is the history of writing history to which Thucydides himself with his anxiety actually belonged. Related to this history—and of same nature with it, so to speak—would be the later as well as present readings of the texts written by Thucydides. Obviously, such readings also are the instances where Ricoeur sees the emergence of our understanding of temporality or out being.
- (3) Finally, because of the eclipse in (1), there is the cultural and consequently, the historical reality or history of *l'objectivité du sens* to which belong the worlds in front of the texts of Thucydides as well, the view of the reality of the Ancient Greece. Reaching this would be the particular task of structural analysis as an intermediate moment of the readings mentioned in (2).

It might be that Ricoeur is breaking a little his own rule of not going beyond *l'objectivité du sens* while mentioning the anxiety of Thucydides—which so clearly, furthermore, is a psychological matter. Could we not think that this violation, in any case, produces a legitimate answer to my question? We perhaps should mind about the past realities of and around, not only in front of *scriptum est*,

- not only because we could be confused or even anxious as regards some particular matter,
- but also because we might be interested in and even anxious as regards the origin of some text or piece of *scriptum est*, which actually would be a special case of being interested in and even anxious as regards something in the past.

If we may legitimately reason in this way from the Ricoeurian view, the 'grid-lock' caused by Ricoeur's reluctance to consider the worlds behind the texts and literature would not be, after all, an actual cul-de-sac.

A further option opened by focusing on the worlds behind the texts as well could be that the explication of the actual Ricoeurian quasi-words or *l'objectivité*



*du sens*, once explicated, could be phenomena that the worlds behind the text could explain. In the case of Thucydides, we perhaps could explain some remarks that he makes by his anxiety caused by the disastrous wars. We even could imagine some continuation to the chain of explanations and assume that there actually were some quite hostile texts that made the small polis-states in Ancient Greek attack each other (notwithstanding whether there was any sense in such an assumption in view of the actual history “out there” in the Ancient Greek). In the case of the war-triggering texts, we could think about the following stepping order.

- Thucydides could have been looking for an explanation for the fact that there was a war.
- For this reason, he might have had a reason to explicate the worlds opened in front of some contemporary texts since particularly those worlds in front of the could be relevant in view of the assumption that those texts had raised such hate among the people.
- The result of explication could then require some explanation. He even might have asked why some people were wicked enough to write such hostile texts, etc.

The dominant rationality here would be that of explaining the war while explication and the explanation of the result of explication would be subordinate to this primary and dominant rationality. A condition of intelligibility and rationality of this kind of stepping order would be, of course, that there is some sense in approaching history with the aim of explanation as the primary interest<sup>452</sup>. Provided that there is, this all could enhance our bibliographic *Bildung*—even if the primary focus in CHB particularly would be the Ricoeurian *l’objectivité du sens*. And even if we must ask how far bibliographic scholarship could go with such explanatory pursuits.<sup>453</sup> In continuation (Section 8.3.2), while we shall discuss ideological criticism characteristic of Marxism, for instance, a somewhat similar reasoning could be appropriate. There we could plausibly consider such moment of explanation as well though a genuinely Marxist criticism of ideologies should probably not remain entirely on the sociologist level of explanation. In any case,

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<sup>452</sup> In some cases but not generally, the idea of ‘avoiding the same mistakes’ could perhaps be—though with serious reservations only—somehow rational. .

<sup>453</sup> Here, in any case, we should think about bibliographic scholarship in the spirit of book history and even approaching the history of ideas, rather than about simple catalogs.

we would have here still another example of what I denoted as stepping orders or of particular ‘chainings’ or rationalities within some particular context.


#### **7.4 Particularities of scholarship around the communicational and knowledge-related and the questions of objectivity and objectivism**

In Figure 9, I outline a kind of common sense ontology of such studies with two-levels where we can think about the question of objectivities and objectivism in the context of scholarship related to communication and phenomena of knowledge. This is the result of an option to conceive of scholarly work as such as knowledge-related, perhaps as knowledge-producing, and even as communicative practice. We could see scholarship and research as ‘talking about the object of research’, for instance. This way to seeing research and scholarship, however, makes the problematic of objectivities and objectivism somewhat complicated if the object of investigation as well is ‘talking’. Formulations here become somewhat difficult since the very notion of the ‘object of research’ already could manifest a kind of objectivism.

Quite radically challenging the common sense ontology, we could now express as follows—though in a slightly exaggerated form, perhaps—the Gadamerian view of our linguistic relationship to the world (see Section 3.3.3). Level (III) would ‘speak’ (II) and our task and fate would be to listen to it and let it speak. Between the levels (II) and (I), then, we would have exactly the same situation, and a radically objectivism-critical maxim could be all the time: *let it speak*. On a general level, I would think that once we start making questions about something, we already are objectifying. A radically objectivism-critical view, in any case, would all the time stick to communicational continuities (combining [2] with [b]) and thus, exclude all the instance of objectifying ‘abouts’.

Reminding the moment application as well with Gadamer, we could modify the maxim into a suggestion that we must all the time, in our social and cultural being and practices as well as within scholarship, listen to and cultivate what the world and the language are saying. This would already represent or at least approach combination of options [3] and [c]—though in a Gadamerian view, there could be a bias to the objectivism-critical side in the mixture. Even here, we may ask whether there were actual levels of scholarship and phenomena investigated or perhaps only a single communicational continuum. Finally, we could see the combination of [1] and [a] as a throughout positivist option and in such a view,

we would have no problems in talking about the levels of the scholarly work, of investigated phenomena, and of the realities that the knowledge, knowing, and communication investigated are about.



**Fig. 9. Options of objectivity and communicational continuity within communicational and knowledge-related studies**

In addition to those ‘pure’ and, in a sense, consistent positions, we could have a variety of other possible as well as quite warranted combinations. Related to my reasoning here is Joacim Hansson’s insightful remark on hermeneutics within LID-studies. Hansson’s questioning can also illustrate in a wider perspective the problematic that we are discussing.

There seems to be confusion over the very object of hermeneutics. Although a general understanding of the concept implies interpretation as a way of scientific discovery and analysis, the majority of LIS scholars speak of the very practice we study as hermeneutics. Librarianship is hermeneutic, information (or, rather, document) retrieval is hermeneutic, information management is hermeneutic, but the study of these practices—that what righteously should be called LIS—is what?<sup>454</sup>

What Hansson seems to allude to by the question at the end of the quotation could be the combination of [1] and [b] in Figure 9. LIS would be an objectifying, soci-

<sup>454</sup> Hansson 2005, 108.

ologist—perhaps even positivist—look at a communicational continuum. Tarmo Malmberg—a Finnish media scholar—while outlining the disciplinary history of his own field, illustrates such perspective quite accurately by the notion of “hermeneutical empiricism” (*hermeneuttinen empirismi*)<sup>455</sup>.

Once again, we should consider Gadamer’s claim about “ontological prejudice that is contained in the ideal of scientific objectivity” (see Sections 3.3.3[a] and 4.2.1). It is one thing to investigate as an object what one is investigating and to exclude objectivities from the phenomena investigated and overcome “ontological prejudice” in this sense—but in this sense only. Another thing, then, would be that a scholar may conceive of his or her own relationship to those phenomena as communicative and in this sense, perhaps excludes from his or her own situation an (at least purely) objectifying ‘look from outside’, so to speak.<sup>456</sup>

There would be some logic, of course, in conceiving of objectivities or absence of them similarly on these two levels of scholarship itself and of the phenomena investigated. The combination of [1] and [b] as well—the combination that I characterized as sociologist—could have some quite intelligible logic and rationality. Excluding the objectivities from the communicational or knowledge-related phenomena investigated (perhaps otherwise in quite a positivist manner) could be the result of sophisticated theoretical understanding or metatheory. The more sophisticated our understanding of an object is, the better and more accurate our knowledge about it could become, and the better we could apply it in advancing various pursuits that we might have, such as making communication more effective by means of using some technologies<sup>457</sup>. Our study could indeed add to

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<sup>455</sup> Malmberg 1997, 28.

<sup>456</sup> Talja, Heidi Keso, and Tarja Pietiläinen (1999) are quite carefully analyzing how we can make a distinction “between objectified and interpretative approaches” (op. cit., 758) to research data. Malmberg (1997., 28) depicts hermeneutical empiricism in a manner that comes close to this. “It does not take hermeneutics to its extremity but tries to reconcile it with empirical social and textual studies. The way to this is that one interprets empirical study in a non-positivist manner as regards observations”. (Transl. by VS from the following: “Se ei vie hermeneutiikkaa ääri rajoilleen, vaan yrittää sovittaa sitä yhteen empiirisen sosiaali- ja tekstitutkimuksen kanssa. Tie tähän käy sitä kautta, että empiirinen tutkimus tulkitaan havaintotiedon osalta ei-positivistisesti”). Beyond this, of course, the fundamental rationality of scholarship could remain purely positivistic. In my view, even a communicational or hermeneutical approach to research data would not necessarily mean that the overall rationality of scholarship would be participation in and within the communication of which consists the reality to which investigation relates in a way or another. The very notion of hermeneuttinen empirismi turns somewhat ironical.

<sup>457</sup> I have some doubts, however, as regards our possibilities to take into account in technologies the subtleties that hermeneutics, for instance, deals with.

‘understanding’ of the phenomenon in quite a useful manner, but not primarily in a hermeneutical sense of the notion of understanding. On the contrary, there could remain a most indisputably positivist fundamental rationality. It even can happen that a very sophisticated conception of the object of research distanciates the scholarly practice and the reality investigated from each other. The view of what one is investigating will become even more strongly objectifying if the researcher assumes for him/herself the position of a subject investigating an object while denying the same option from those under investigation.

### **7.5 Stepping orders within and related to L&Lship primarily about, then plausibly on behalf of *scriptum est* as well**

We finally should notice that the sharp distinction between the scholarly practice and the object of research as hermeneutics mentioned by Hansson disappears within my own (neo)-bibliographic perspective, in a sense. What I have been developing in this treatise, obviously, would be a ‘half-way’ position (combination of the mixed options [3] and [c] in Figure 9). Then again, there would not be any very sharp difference between the knowledge constituting the content of the library—if we, for a while, can talk about it as knowledge—and the knowledge that scholarship related to librarianship should produce. Because of my ‘half-way’ position, however, some relative cut-offs would remain.

Within my idea of bibliographic scholarship as the core of the scholarly basis of the practice of L&Lship, the unifying perspective would be knowledge about *scriptum est* that constitutes the content of the library. Furthermore, knowing about books would or, at least, could contain knowledge about the contents of the books, or—simplifying a little—some knowledge that the book in itself contains. Consequently, the professional knowledge of a librarian that scholarship of the field should produce, on one hand, and the knowledge or some other kind of cultural content, which constitutes the content of the library and which also is a part

of the cultural life around the library, on the other, would not be so separate.<sup>458</sup> This all culminates in my notions of bibliographic parallelism and continuum (see Section 5.5).<sup>459</sup>

These continuums and parallelisms have some affinity with the relationship that there would be between the two sides of the particular rationality of the particular practice of L&Lship, which are present already in the main title of this treatise. The library would be primarily *about* and then plausibly, on behalf of *scriptum est* as well. With this claim of primacy, I would be appealing

- partly to my minimalist-phenomenal notion of the library (see Section 1.1.1) or to what the libraries have been doing for hundreds and thousands of years,
- partly to the variety of further rationalities or the variety of ‘fors’, which such conception of the rationality of L&Lship can open (summarized below in Section 10.2).

While being primarily about *scriptum est*, the library can be simultaneously for many other valuable ends, all the time maintaining about *scriptum est*—as a foundation and indicator of the spheres of

- of some noteworthy competence that L&Lship can develop, on one hand, and
- of a reasonable field of responsibility of which L&Lship can actually and realistically take some responsibility, on the other.

The rationality of L&Lship on behalf of *scriptum est*, in my view, would then be a particularly plausible companion of L&Lship about *scriptum est*, particularly because of the Gadamerian view of the substantial significance of what history has handed down to us. What the library contains—and, in this sense, what the library is—after all, relates to what the history has handed down to us and is a part of it even, though not necessarily in the Gadamerian sense only.

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<sup>458</sup> This contains a certain parallelism and continuity that we can extend even to the customer or user of the library. Ultimately, the librarian might be best equipped to help even his or her client, a user of the library, if he or she knew about the matters that even the client or the user is interested in. Even here, we could recognize a kind of userism or user-orientation. Yet, instead of orientation towards the user, it would be orientation with or along the user, an orientation shared with the user. I could call ‘hermeneutical userism’ this kind of userism, due to the emphasis of sharing the interests and horizons in it. A result of this would be that the librarian and even the library should know about the matters that the users of the library are interested in. Obviously, there would be difference between the professional knowledge about the librarian and the knowledge that a user of the library might be pursuing.

<sup>459</sup> To make this particularly clear, I perhaps should add that this treatise of mine *is not hermeneutics* though it ‘tells about’ hermeneutics and about the possible significance of hermeneutics as regards *L&Lship and bibliography as far as they would be hermeneutics*, among other matters.

If starting with the Gadamerian notion of *Bildung*, we could see, once again, another stepping order. Proceeding from the thought of Gadamer, the history in the sense of what there actually has been in the past would be, at best, a possible subordinate moment of the properly Gadamerian *Bildung*—though this seems not to be the view of Gadamer himself. Then again, exactly this kind of stepping order could be one of the fundamental ideas within the Ricoeurian hermeneutics. The dominant part of such a stepping order would be either the Gadamerian, the Ricoeurian, or the common idea(l) of *Bildung*, which, however, could benefit from the subordinate moments of focusing on what actually have been.<sup>460</sup>

Returning to the rationality of L&Lship as I conceive of it, however, we should make some specifying remark as regards the stepping order that we find there. Gadamer's emphasis of what the history has handed down to us could not be exactly a subordinate moment to what there actually has been. Subordinating Gadamer's idea to the pursuit of somewhat abstract knowledge about actual states of affairs "out there" in the past would be rather problematic. Rather, I would say that the Gadamerian idea(l) of *Bildung* and consequently L&Lship on behalf of *scriptum est* would become a part of the rationality of L&Lship as only a possible but also quite a plausible and most valuable additional element. It would not be so much an element that the primary rationality of L&Lship. The Gadamerian (and/Ricoeurian) *Bildung* rather would be something to which the library with its primary rationality gives a good and plausible foundation. For this reason, I would not apply the notion of stepping order to depict the relationship between about and on behalf of *scriptum est* as the moments of the rationality of L&Lship.

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<sup>460</sup> As arguments for this in Chapter 8, I shall appeal partly to ideas in Ricoeurian thought. Examples could be Ricoeur's suggestion of structural analysis as an intermediate phase on the long detour of mature hermeneutics and arguments related to this. Partly, however, I have to go even beyond the Ricoeurian thought in this respect.

## 8 Reasons to mind about past objectivities of and around *scriptum est*

In this chapter—having already in use the notion of explication an answer to the question of how the humanities could combine with an objectifying perspective to texts of the past—I would give some answers to the question of why we should mind about the past realities of *scriptum est*. I shall suggest some reasons for which we actually should mind about not only the Ricoeurian *l'objectivité du sens* but even more widely the past realities and objectivities of and around *scriptum est* (Sections 8.2 to 8.4).

Thereafter, I shall make some remarks on LID-studies in view of those reasons (Sections 8.6 and 8.7). First, however, an anticipation of the reasons that I shall suggest as well as some introductory remarks on the rationality of L&Lship as a particular practice would be useful.

### 8.1 Introductory remarks on the actual reasons to mind about past objectivities of and around *scriptum est* and on the role of L&Lship

I have collected and analyzed in a particular respect in Figure 10 the reasons to mind about past realities of and around *scriptum est* the content of which I anticipate as follows (attaching there also the notation by which we can in continuation identify the arguments).

- Already while wishing to learn something from texts, we may have reasons to pay attention to some instances of objectivity related to the text. (Reasons to mind ...[1]).
- An aspect of criticism of ideologies that Ricoeur himself particularly brings out is that texts themselves and *l'objectivité du sens* or the quasi-worlds opened in front of them can contest our conceptions of what is real or possible (Reasons to mind ...[2a]).
- Another, characteristically and classically Marxist aspect of ideology-critical thought is the question whether we can trust in a text or whether there could be, behind and in it, some ideological distortion (Reasons to mind ...[2b]).
- The last—and in my perspective, the most significant—reason to mind about the objectivities of *scriptum est* “out there” in the past has its foundation in



the obligations that we might have to the authors “out there” in the past.  
(Reasons to mind ...[3])

All the arguments that I am suggesting relate, in a way of another, to doubts that we could have as regards our own understanding of the pieces of *scriptum est* or to reasons for which we should try to be careful in this respect (see Figure 10). This is present in Reasons to mind ... [1] and [3] particularly, motivated by our interest in learning in the former and by the obligations to the others that we perhaps should recognize.

<b>Reasons to mind ...</b>	<b>requiring doubtful contesting of</b>	<b>by criterion in</b>
[1], Section 8.2	our own understanding and interpretation of the text	<i>l'objectivité du sens</i> within the texts behind the text
[2a], Section 8.3.1	our assumptions as regards what is real or possible	<i>l'objectivité du sens</i> within the text
[2b], Section 8.3.2	what the text brings out as real or possible, perhaps reflecting ideological views that we share with the text	what is real or possible (as far as we can know otherwise about it)
[3], Section 8.4	our own understanding and interpretation of the text	<i>l'objectivité du sens</i> within the text

**Fig. 10. Summary of reasons to mind about past objectivities of and around *scriptum est* with**

Among the reasons related to criticism of ideologies as well, Reasons to mind ... [2a] relate to doubts, which the text can arise as regards the actual states of affairs in the society, for instance, or as regards possibilities and necessities of such states of affairs. The doubt of one’s own understanding of the text is here present in the sense that the better we understand what a text may be saying, including even what the author wished to say, the better the text can function as a criticism of ideologies. Ultimately, this would return to the interest of learning in Reasons to mind ... [1].

Reason to mind ... [2b], the other side of the ideology-critical questioning, actually is the only argument based on the quite concrete question whether we should trust in a text—though exactly this question probably first comes to mind while considering criticism related to *scriptum est* , the idea of critical reading,

etc. The doubt of one's own understanding, however, is even here present, in the sense that especially while being critical, we perhaps should be most sensitive to what the text and probably the author of it as well is saying and even wishing to say, to avoid accusing it, him, or her falsely. Furthermore, criticism of ideologies as such tends to be self-criticism as well since ideologies typically function through our own understanding.

Finally, however, concluding from the reasons to mind about past objectivities of and around *scriptum est*, which I am suggesting here, to the rationality of L&Lship requires some specifications. Reading or otherwise receiving and appropriating the contents of *scriptum est*—with more or less hermeneutical mind, critically in general or ideology-critically in particular, with more or less respect for the rights of the authors, etc.—is one thing. It is another thing, then, that the library collects *scriptum est*, preserves it as a collection, and through bibliographic work produces knowledge about it. The library itself is neither a critic of the traditions nor the actual or primary 'appropriator' of them. We could specify the role of L&Lship quite shortly as participation in civilized practices and activities of people around it. Ideally, L&Lship could contribute, on its part, to the maintenance of and advancing erudite reading, (ideology-)critical awareness and disposition, and appropriate respect to the rights that we perhaps should respect.

## **8.2 Reasons to mind ... [1]: critical as regards one's own understanding while simply wishing to learn something**

I start the discussion of the reasons to mind about the past objectivities of and around *scriptum est* from an argument related quite directly to our possible critical questioning of our own understanding. Ultimately, such questions relate to learning, be it learning about *scriptum est* or learning about some other matter, such as the Gadamerian aim of understanding *die Sache*, through tradition and *scriptum est*. In both cases, the validity of one's own understanding would be what one is questioning.

My first argument for the possible significance that historical objectivities of and around *scriptum est* might have, after all, is probably one against which neither Gadamer would argue. Here, however, I find it useful to put forward an argument challenging even views to which a very formal, literary, and rigid reading of Gadamer's argumentation could lead. The ultimate question here, after all, is not Gadamer's view as such. His thought, rather, is here a representative of possi-

ble wider currents of thought, which within LID-studies, for instance, have also found premises from theoretical and philosophical sources other than the Gadamerian thought (see Section 4.2.2). With Ricoeur, what I am suggesting here comes close to what he calls textual criticism. Ricoeur's claim here is that in the meaning of a text, "far from the objective and the existential being contraries", they combine and further, "Without such a conception of meaning, of its objectivity and even of its ideality, no textual criticism is possible.<sup>461</sup>"

We may approach the possible significance of historical objectivity of and around *scriptum est*—and here particularly, the significance of *l'objectivité du sens* as well—by imagining a situation where a reader has read some inspiring work. As the work inspires the reader, the work certainly would be meaningful for him or her in his or her present situation. Thus, there could be understanding in the basic Gadamerian sense as well. The history would have "handed down to us" something.

Let us then assume that the text that the reader is reading at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is from the 14<sup>th</sup> century. We can also assume that some possible further way to understand the text being read now opens only through taking into account some other texts from the 14<sup>th</sup> century or even texts that were influential then albeit written earlier. Such texts might have provided with some concepts the author of the text that our reader actually is reading here and now, and taking into account such concepts could open a new way to interpret the text. Then, one probably should try to conceive of these concepts in the sense in which one understood them in the 14<sup>th</sup> century, rather than in the sense that they might have in our present. What they meant in the 14<sup>th</sup> century, after all, is what might have had an impact on the text that our reader now is primarily reading. The question then would be about states of affairs that once were there and as such as they once were or, in other words about historical objectivities of and around *scriptum est*, even if our reader's final pursuit could still be the application of what he or she reads in his or her present situation.

Neither is Ricoeur interested in the original or authorial meanings or intentions "behind the text". Here, however, the concepts of the 14<sup>th</sup> century could constitute a Ricoeurian quasi-world *in front of the earlier, assumingly influential texts* and the actual *l'objectivité du sens* that once was there—even if they simultaneously and inevitably were a part of *the world behind the text* that our reader is

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<sup>461</sup> Ricoeur, 1969/1974, 397.

reading here and now. Already in this sense, the general logic in terms of which textual criticism requires that we should recognize some *l'objectivité du sens* could imply that we also pay some attention to the worlds behind the text as well, in a sense. We should go beyond even the Ricoeurian notion of *l'objectivité du sens of the text that we are reading*.

Trying to answer questions arising here would typically be the work done by the historians of philosophy, for instance. Fundamentally, however, we would not even here give any specific significance to what the author of the text that our reader now is primarily reading originally meant to say. All the time, the question could be only about further possible meanings in our presence for us of what the history has handed down to us. The question could be about becoming able to have any understanding at all about the text or about looking for another, possibly better understanding. It further could be about an option to see a wider range of potential interpretations and consequently about an option of 'making a choice' within a wider specter of alternatives. One could then have a better option to find an interpretation and understanding that one can apply in one's present situation.

Here we can return to Gadamer's reference to the Collingwoodian history of questions in the context of the hermeneutical primacy of question (see Section 3.3.2[b]) and to reasoning on what Gadamer's position actually might have been (see Section 4.2.3[a]). As we already saw, Collingwood's thought is that events in history are answers to questions and that we can know and properly understand an event only if we know the question to which it is an answer. We can quite plausibly extend this to the understanding of texts and instances of *scriptum est*: to understand a text requires that we know the question that the text answers. There arose a question, however. Whose questions should we actually be considering, the questions of the authors "out there" in the past or of the present readers, or perhaps, the great question of history and tradition? As I already suggested, it could be a most educating exercise to listen to the questions of others, instead of only looking for answers to the questions of one's own. Our discussion here could concretize the educational significance of such an exercise.

### **8.3 Reasons to mind ... [2a] and [2b]: aspects of criticism of ideologies**

With Ricoeur, we can find an argument for minding about *l'objectivité du sens* related to an aspect of criticism of ideologies. We may ask whether this argument

would be an actual argument for minding about *l'objectivité du sens* “out there” in the past actually, but for a complete view of the problematic, it is useful to discuss here shortly this view as well.

Thereafter, however, we should discuss even another kind of ideology-critical rationality, which is perhaps particularly characteristic of Marxist thought. With Ricoeur already, but much more manifestly with the latter aspects of criticism of ideologies, there are moments challenging the Gadamerian ideas. While considering the reasons to mind about past objectivities of *scriptum est* and even around it related to criticism of ideologies, we eventually are approaching and even crossing the limits of the sphere proper to hermeneutics.

### **8.3.1 Reasons to mind ... [2a]: a text or work itself as ideological criticism**

Retaining faithfulness to his commitment to “regional” hermeneutics, Ricoeur deals with the question of hermeneutics and criticism of ideologies too as one of mutual penetration and dialectics of them, rather than as subordination of one to another. He poses the following double-question:

(1) Can hermeneutic philosophy account for the legitimate demand of the critique of ideology, and if so at what price? [ ... ] (2) On what condition is the critique of ideology possible? Can it, in the last analysis, be detached from hermeneutic presuppositions?<sup>462</sup>

In his claim for the need of the descending path, as we already saw (Section 4.1), Ricoeur also appeals to Plato. Here, however, we shall see him taking a distance from Plato’s view of writing as inferior to living oral dialogue. As reconstructed by Francisco J. Gonzales, Plato’s argument consists of four remarks. A written text (i) “hinders rather than promotes genuine recollection”; (ii) “provides only the semblance of wisdom as opposed to true wisdom”; (iii) “is unable to respond to questions, always only repeating the same thing”; and finally, (iv) “cannot choose its auditors or readers”. Ultimately, the result would be that while the text “needs the help of its father to defend itself against misunderstanding and blame, the father is absent and thus unable to provide this help”.<sup>463</sup>

Neither would Ricoeur deny Plato’s claims. The case could be, however, that

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<sup>462</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 64.

<sup>463</sup> Gonzales 2006, 317.

the “father is [...] unable to provide this help” simply because he might have died already or is otherwise far away. Even in such quite a banal sense, the writing with distanciations that it not only overcomes but also brings along, would connect to most fundamental features of our being as humans.

More important here, however, is that Ricoeur turns positive, in a sense, the characteristics that Plato considers as weaknesses only within written text. For Plato, the vanishing of the living connection between the interlocutors in writing is a loss only. According to Ricoeur, however, it is the foundation of possible critical distance that we can take and consequently the foundation of the valuable moment of criticism in our thinking. With Ricoeur, the instance where criticism and critical questions have their foundation is the distanciation, the decontextualization of discourse in writing, which then is the basis of the need to distanciate also while reading.<sup>464</sup>

According to Ricoeur, “The power of the text to open a dimension of reality implies in principle a recourse against any given reality and thereby the possibility of a critique of the real”<sup>465</sup>. We perhaps may say—in a little simplifying manner—that text’s capacity to create its own worlds protects us from taking as too self-evident some other assumptions of what is real and what is possible. Ricoeur’s reasoning goes on as follows, actually with a plenty of similarity with some Gadamerian arguments as well:

To understand is not to project oneself into the text but to expose oneself to it: it is to receive a self enlarged by the appropriation of the proposed worlds which interpretation unfolds. In sum, it is the matter of the text which gives the reader his dimension of subjectivity; understanding is thus no longer a constitution of which the subject possesses the key.<sup>466</sup>

This leads Ricoeur to argue in terms of “imaginative variation of the ego”, even a “playful metamorphosis of the ego”. Ricoeur continues: “The critique of false consciousness can thus become an integral part of hermeneutics, conferring upon

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<sup>464</sup> An aspect of the critical potential of writing with Ricoeur is that while writing, we have some space to develop our thought, to formulate it shortly. Gonzales (2006, 321), however, makes quite an insightful remark on this. Even oral conversation can contain thoughtful contributions an example of which is the Socratic dialogue as it appears with Plato. Such dialogues certainly provide us with an option of analytical thought as well. In the ‘real life’ as well, of course, we can have such thoughtful oral dialogues. Furthermore, a written text is not necessarily so thoughtful, which should be apparent in the time of social media, mobile phone text messages, etc.

<sup>465</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 93.

<sup>466</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 94.

the critique of ideology that meta-hermeneutical dimension which Habermas assigns to it<sup>467</sup>. As preconditions for such a result, Ricoeur mentions

- recognizing the distanciation connected to text, both in writing and in reading, and
- overcoming the “ruinous dichotomy, inherited from Dilthey, between ‘explanation’ and ‘understanding’”.

We could see a further foundation behind this ideology-critical function of the text itself while Ricoeur in another place, once again, is appealing to Heidegger even.

Here we rejoin one of Heidegger’s suggestions concerning the notion of *Verstehen*. Recall that, in *Being and Time*, the theory of ‘understanding’ is no longer tied to the understanding of other, but becomes a structure of being-in-the-world. [...] The moment of ‘understanding’ [...] is a projection of our ownmost possibilities at the very heart of the situation in which we find ourselves. I want to retain from this analysis the idea of ‘the projection of our ownmost possibilities’ [...]. For what must be interpreted in a text is a *proposed world* which I could inhabit and wherein I could project one of my ownmost possibilities. That is what I call the world of the text, the world proper to *this* unique text.

The world of the text is therefore not the world of everyday language. [...] We said that the narrative, folktales and poems are not without referent: but this referent is discontinuous with that of everyday language.<sup>468</sup>

It seems as if Ricoeur were outlining something that we could call *Dasein within the literary culture*, which would be a special and concretely historical case of our being, even if a special case with quite a long history and touching a rather large portion of the population within the modern world particularly and in this sense, nearly universal. I wonder, in any case, if we could see here still another instance of the Ricoeurian ‘regionalism’. We perhaps could consider as a Ricoeurian ‘regionality’ also such literary culture that has existed nearly forever and then, in the course of time, widened to new spheres of populations. As such, the literary culture as well would condition, but not annihilate, the fundamental aspects of our being as humans. Distanciation is an inevitable and more and more noteworthy part of such literary culture, which contests the immediacies of and within our being, so to speak. A major message with Ricoeur, however, seems to be that

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<sup>467</sup>Ricoeur 1970/1981, 94–95.

<sup>468</sup>Ricoeur 1970/1981, 142.

distanciations, which literary culture brings along or—at least—fortifies, could increase and enhance our potential of critical thought.

### ***8.3.2 Reasons to mind ... [2b]: properly ideology-critical questioning about the text itself, definitely going beyond the sphere of hermeneutics***

The edge or focus of criticism of ideologies as a form of criticism is twofold. It certainly is about questioning our own understanding, and the ideology-critical function of a text as we above saw Ricoeur depicting it would be one way in which such questioning can be going on.

We actually could think, on the other hand, that once ideology-critical awareness has awakened in our mind, the ideology will also be—in quite a concrete sense—“out there” and we can start to look at various phenomena in our environment as possibly ideological. In addition to this, however, genuinely ideology-critical questioning would always be an instance of self-criticism as well, either on the level of an individual or, perhaps more typically, on the level of communities. Ideologies tend to have their foundation and effect in and through our minds. Ideology as a form of power rests on an, at least, semi-voluntary acceptance on the side of those over whom such power functions. Then again, while reading a text, we might be questioning whether the text is ideologically twisted—if only an ideology-critical awareness has waked in our minds. In such a case, criticism of ideologies would focus on a text and critically question the validity of what the text claims. Then, there would be even two dimensions of objectivities, one of the texts themselves and another of the criteria of the possible ‘twistedness’ of the texts.

Returning to literary studies, we still should notice how Raymond Williams, a Marxist sociologist of literature, sees the significance of traditions in a vein at least seemingly quite opposed to Gadamer. His view quite incontestably indicates an instance where we perhaps should go beyond the Ricoeurian ‘gridlock’ as well and pay attention to worlds behind the texts, indeed. According to Williams, Marxist thinking has tended to consider tradition only as a part of the secondary level of the society, of the so-called superstructure, and as only an inert element of the “surviving past”. Marxism thus has not paid much attention to the notion of tradition. According to Williams, however, tradition is “the most evident expression of the dominant and hegemonic pressures and limits”. Tradition itself here is



what Williams calls “selective tradition”, a tradition that selects and emphasizes “certain meanings and practices” while neglects and excludes some others.

[...] within a particular hegemony, and as one of its decisive processes, this selection is presented and usually successfully passed off as ‘the tradition’, ‘the significant past. What has then to be said about any tradition is that it is in this sense an aspect of contemporary social and cultural organization, in the interest of the dominance of a specific class.<sup>469</sup>

In a Marxist spirit similar to Williams, a remark by Albrecht Wellmer—a Frankfurt School sociologist—also expresses in a crystallized form an ideology-critical point of departure, which Wellmer quite explicitly claims to be missing from Gadamer.

The Enlightenment consciousness viewed the experience of a loss of authority on the part of traditions as the experience of force: that is, the experience of a claim to authority which, insofar as it did not meet the voluntary acknowledgment, was able to gain currency only by coercion. [...] This tendency of the Enlightenment cannot be separated from the political movements of emancipation in modern times; this connection, however, emphasizes what the Enlightenment knew and hermeneutics forgets: that the “dialogue” which (according to Gadamer) we “are”, is *also* a relationship of coercion and, for this very reason, *no* dialogue at all.<sup>470</sup>

Here, however, we should notice that within Gadamerian thought as well, there actually is a moment containing an option of being even ideology-critically suspicious as regards traditions. Within the hermeneutical process, as conceived of by Gadamer, logically, the moment of the application as such could create some criteria for applicability of some particular readings of a text in one’s present situation. This situation, in turn, could quite well contain a pursuit of getting rid of ideological biases and fallacies. We probably could say, however, that this is not the center of gravity of the Gadamerian thought.

Once again, however, the Ricoeurian quasi-worlds of literature or *l’objectivité du sens* could even better reflect a concrete recognition of the instance in and around which criticism of ideologies, in particular, takes place. While reading, we may and perhaps often should have doubtful questions about the ‘worldviews’ of the works that we are reading and the Ricoeurian *l’objectivité du sens* obviously would be the place where such twistedness also could manifest

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<sup>469</sup> Williams 1977, 115–116.

<sup>470</sup> Wellmer 1969/1971, 47

itself. For this reason as well, we perhaps should make some structural analysis to see how these worldviews or quasi-worlds of texts unfold and whether there is some ideological distortion in the text itself.

Using the Ricoeurian distinction of “in front of” and “behind”, in any case, helps us to accentuate some problems as regards the Williamsian and Wellmerian kind of criticism of ideologies, particularly in view of Ricoeur’s own premises. Ideology-critical questioning that we can see opened by Williams and Wellmer would typically have—in two respects even—a reference to what we could characterize as the worlds behind the text. In some sense, at least, ideology-critical questioning of this kind suggests some moment of so-called epistemological realism. It would be somewhat problematic—even if obviously not entirely impossible—to think about ideological twistedness and distortion within a text without assuming that an untwisted or undistorted text should ‘tell the truth’ of some reality in some sense of correspondence. Another part of the worlds behind the text would be even more specifically what Ricoeur himself means by this notion and seems to be excluding, namely the reality of the authors, their social life, possible ideological environments, and perhaps even their psychology—which Ricoeur particularly wants to exclude from hermeneutics. The latter part of the world behind the text could actually be even a foundation of explaining particular features of the world in front of the text or *l’objectivité du sens*.

Finally, in quite a particular sense, there would be a tension between the kind of ideology-critical questioning to which Wellmer refers, on one hand, and the hermeneutical rationality in a wide sense, on the other. A rational dialogue in a hermeneutical spirit, however, contains a kind of an assumption of sincerity.<sup>471</sup> That each of the partners in conversation should take the arguments of the interlocutors as sincere would be a prerequisite for appealing honestly and convincingly to the premises that the interlocutors together are recognizing and respecting. Eventually, this would be the condition of reaching a genuine and rational agree-

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<sup>471</sup> The remarks that I shall make would concern also the suggestion according to which we should pay particular attentions to “the fact that language is always ‘dirty,’ suffused with rhetorics and power interests”, which the “sanitary” notion of information conceals, according to the constructionist view of Tuominen, Talja, and Savolainen within LID-studies. Tuominen in another place widely discusses the importance of analyzing the “reliability rhetorics” that texts contain. (See Tuominen, Talja & Savolainen 2003, 563 and Tuominen 2001, 130 ff. and 210) We earlier (in Section 4.2.2) saw how the constructionists with some similarity to Gadamer focus on language, but the suggestion of analyzing rhetoric strategies could be even opposite to what we could see as the dominant ethos with Gadamer in particular or in hermeneutics in general.

ment in a hermeneutical spirit<sup>472</sup>. While taking what some other claims as sincerely aiming at the truth of the matter under discussion, one can counter-argue, of course, the claims as regards the subject matter of the discussion. Yet, one should not question the motives of the other, because such questioning would violate the sincerity assumption required in the common pursuit of the truth about the matter discussed. Instead of talking about each other, the interlocutors should at least primarily focus on and share the interest in *die Sache*, as an allusion to Gadamer that would be most appropriate here.

Even in a rational dialogue, certainly, one could and sometimes perhaps should make the following kind of questions. ‘*Dear tovarish, do you not see that your bourgeois social background is speaking now—rather than your own, by the Marxist theory enlightened good reason and judgment?*’ It may happen that the ‘dear tovarish’ right away—or after a while—realizes that the case is as suggested, and the common pursuit of the truth may continue. The genuine and ideal rational dialogue, in any case, would have ceased for a while at least, perhaps even ends for good. Then again, there could be quite legitimate reasons to make such questions and they could be inevitable in some phases of even most friendly and rational dialogues. In view of my thematic here, the important matter is that there obviously could be even this kind of quite legitimate moments of objectivity—or moments of recognizing objectivities even behind the text or speech.

### **8.3.3 On “hermeneutics of suspicion” and “positivism” of “external critical checks” with Ricoeur?**

Still at least partly related to the ideal of rational dialogue with the sincerity assumption, some words are in place here about Gadamer’s own remarks explicitly on Ricoeur, connected to the notion of the “hermeneutics of suspicion”. Gadamer opens his argument with a general remark that quite accurately—it seems to me—and even a little ironically illustrates Ricoeur’s style of philosophizing.

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<sup>472</sup> A noteworthy formulation of this is, of course, Habermas’s (1981/1984, 286 ff.) distinction of strategic and communicative rationalities, with his opposition “Orientation to Success versus Orientation to Reaching Understanding”. (See also Niemi 2008). We can see here how fine the lines of demarcation can be. If I say a word, I am causing an effect as well on the side my interlocutor. Something would come into his or her mind as an effect of my saying, or at least, I could and even should hope so. This emphasizes that we should pay particular attention to the fundamental rationalities, and rhetorical affecting, in my view, is not the fundamental rationality of communication, even if it can be an irreducible companion of any actual act of communicating.

Ricoeur who never opposes without somehow reconciling, could not avoid opposing—at least in a first approach—hermeneutics in the classic sense, of interpreting the meaning of texts, to the radical critique of and suspicion against understanding and interpreting.<sup>473</sup>

According to Gadamer, however, Ricoeur would encounter an impossible task of reconciling. Gadamer first prepares the case by referring to “the dichotomy between the belief in the integrity of texts and the intelligibility of their meaning, and the opposed effort to unmask the pretensions hidden behind so-called objectivity (Ricoeur’s ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’),” the latter manifested “in the critique of ideology, in psychoanalysis”, etc. Thereafter, Gadamer continues:

I think even Paul Ricoeur must in the end give up attempts to bring them together, because we have here a basic difference involving the whole philosophical role of hermeneutics.<sup>474</sup>

Gadamer’s argument here well illustrates his general line of argumentation as well as what we could characterize as his philosophical mentality even. Furthermore, it is in line with the sincerity assumption within a rational dialogue.

We should notice, however, that Ricoeur as well seems to be very much aware of the problems and the dilemma mentioned by Gadamer. He writes as follows about the sharp contrast from which he started between hermeneutics and criticism of ideologies—or, more exactly, the critical social science a core of which ideological criticism is.

We have sharply contrasted the positions of the critical social sciences and the historical-hermeneutical sciences, the latter inclining towards recognition of authority of traditions rather than towards revolutionary action against oppression.<sup>475</sup>

In spite of analyzing the possible relationship of mutual penetration between these modes of thought, we should be aware of the tension and not merge either of them into the other. In my view—and perhaps in view of Ricoeur as well—the question is not whether we *can or not* combine and in some sense reconcile the moments of objectification and appropriation. The issue rather is that *we have to do so*, as our being as a whole perhaps consists of varying practical and quite intelligible interests that require different views as regards the texts and *l’objectivité du sens* as well.

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<sup>473</sup> Gadamer 1984, 313.

<sup>474</sup> Gadamer 1984, 317.

<sup>475</sup> Ricoeur 1970/1981, 96.

We should still return to Gonzales' remarks on Ricoeur's arguments on what we could denote shortly as the hermeneutics of suspicion. I perhaps dared to say that conceiving of certain aspects of critical thought is indeed the weak point with Gadamer—in spite of my remark on the significance of traditions in view of substantial criticism (see Section 3.4.3). Gonzales, however, while answering the Ricoeurian critical remarks on Gadamer, remarks that the Socratic dialogue is the place where we could find the moment of critical questioning with Gadamer as well.

Thus the “critical instance” that enables us to distinguish between false and true presuppositions is the *Abstand* [distance] essential to dialogue itself.

We are thus back to dialogue, but dialogue not as an expression of consensus and shared understanding, which is what Ricoeur, and sometimes Gadamer himself, takes it to be, but rather dialogue as a confrontation with the other and thus as an opening of critical distance.<sup>476</sup>

Gonzales then asks, why Ricoeur so insistently refuses to accept the solution of Gadamer to the problem. He concludes: “Ricoeur cannot give up a ‘positivistic’ conception of experience because he cannot give up an objectifying attitude to experience”, while “By rejecting such objectification and thus the scientific model of experience, however, Gadamer is able to show the *inherently critical* character of experience”.<sup>477</sup> Rodriguez summarizes Gadamer's view of the structure of experience as follows:

Experience in general, and hermeneutical experience in particular, is not primarily and inherently assimilation, appropriation, and confirmation, so as to need the external critical check of some kind of objectification; on the contrary, as the experience of limits, checks, and obstacles, experience is inherently a confrontation with otherness. To experience is to be open to something other and opposed to oneself. To experience is to suffer critique.<sup>478</sup>

Quite in accordance with Gadamer's thought, Gonzales then emphasizes the positive side of the experience and the dialectical character of experience as “productive negativity”.

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<sup>476</sup> Gonzales 2006, 330

<sup>477</sup> Gonzales 2006, 333. Later in his article (p. 340), Gonzales writes in a way that we perhaps could consider as a possible and possibly even a noteworthy and intelligible answer his own question. “Though Ricoeur does not himself make this point, one may ask: is it not this obsessive concern with radicality, this drive for pure understanding and for a pure belonging more ultimate than any objective distancing, that explains Heidegger's disastrous political involvement in the 1930s?”

<sup>478</sup> Gonzales 2006, 333

The ‘not’ that we experience *produces* a better understanding of the universal we brought to experience. Further, as there is in experience both the side of critique or the ‘not’ that then, after all, leads to better understanding (could we say, the ‘yes’), experience as such is ‘*inherently dialectical*’.<sup>479</sup>

With Gadamer, the experience starts with a question, rather than from a ‘clear table’, indeed.

Still quite in the spirit of Gadamer, Gonzales tells that the question and answer assume each other. The meaning of the answer is in the question—or rather, the meaning of a proposition is in the question that it answers. In my view, however, it would not be enough for the conclusions that Gonzales makes. As regards Gadamer and Ricoeur, Gonzales claims their opposition to culminate as follows. The former thinks totally in terms of the logic of questions and answers, while for the latter, ultimately, the texts are sets of propositions. Eventually, Gonzales can declare the final verdict:

If Ricoeur, as has been seen, maintains the opposite, i.e., that interpretation encompasses dialectic and not vice versa, this is because he has a more positivistic and objectifying conception of interpretation.<sup>480</sup>

I would think that in some respects, at least, Gonzales’s verdict is not fair. Among other things, what Ricoeur says about the possible ideology-critical functioning of texts seems to me exactly as a claim that the reader is “suffering criticism”. The reader would “suffer criticism” consisting of the world opened in front of a text since criticism of ideologies would be a collective exercise of self-criticism that would be challenging the commonly assumed views. It seems that Gonzales does not realize that Ricoeur indeed is talking about the worlds in front of the text, not behind it—even if I would see some sense in the latter as well.

As regards to the “external checks”, finally, we should notice that externality is quite a relative notion, of course. What is inside some wider whole could be external to some part of this whole. In this respect, we could see how talking about “confrontation”—or about something being “opposed” to something, and even of being “open” to something—would be somewhat confusing if we were not to accept any moment of externality. Furthermore, Ricoeur’s arguments of the ideology-critical function of a text as we saw it above would not refer to any “critical check” external to the text or another kind of presentation and its reader

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<sup>479</sup> Gonzales 2006, 333.

<sup>480</sup> Gonzales 2006, 338.

or another kind of receiver. In my view, once again, this could be even a shortcoming with Ricoeur.

#### **8.4 Reasons to mind ... [3]: (quasi-)rights of and obligations to the authors—including the dead ones even?**

As librarians, we might feel that we should have some respect for Aristotle, for instance, who in this respect would have a kind of (quasi-)rights even. We might even feel somehow obliged to try to reach what Aristotle actually wanted to say. In a concrete practice of L&Lship, we perhaps try to acquire into collection editions that we could assume to be truthful to the original texts. In a large collection of a library of the humanities, further, we might try to acquire his works as comprehensively as possible, instead of being satisfied with those few texts or even fragments that seem to be most useful in view of the present needs of some assumed user or client.

The foundation of my third suggestion for a reason to mind about the past objectivities of and around *scriptum est* is the possible obligations that we might have to the authors particularly. While related to so-called authorial meanings particularly, this argument would be somewhat controversial even. The arguments that I shall develop in the following subsections, in any case, would be the most crucial ones among the arguments establishing the rationality *sui generis* of L&Lship and contrasting it with the resource-userist rationality of IM/KM.

Some arguments that we could have here would also be indirect in the sense that the ultimate foundation of them could be respecting the rights of someone else than the actual author. Furthermore, if the author were already dead, it would be difficult to talk about his or her actual rights. The result will be that the most fundamental arguments here will have as their foundation some demands of general rationality, rather than or in addition to the actual rights of persons, which we perhaps should recognize.

##### **8.4.1 From introductory remarks on avoiding unjust sentencing via recognizing proprietary rights to the notion of mutual recognition**

According to Gadamer, legal hermeneutics is an instance where we can find the model of the hermeneutical process (see Section 3.3.2 [c]). Thus, it perhaps is appropriate for me as well to use an example of the same context—a situation

where the question is about liabilities of some past deed—to illustrate how a state of affairs in the past could matter. In a concrete juridical case, of course, there is not only the law—on the interpretation of which Gadamer is focusing—but also what actually has happened and the deeds of which someone could be liable. I shall start by remarks on the need to be careful to avoid condemning as guilty an innocent person. It actually is the counterpart of recognizing the rights. Starting with liabilities, however, make the argument particularly sharp.

Within the domain of law and judging, we may have quite trivial but inevitable questions about the states of past affairs or events “out there”. Let us assume that someone has broken a window. It is a relatively simple fact, an event that has happened. For a while at least, we can assume that we can establish it as such without much of interpretational problems. Then, the relevant question is, who broke it. Was it Max, or perhaps Moritz—or someone else, after all? We can answer the question correctly only if we try to reach and represent the objective state of affairs that was there. We are obliged to this because otherwise we could condemn an innocent person. The interest of avoiding this would be, in my view, a most noteworthy practical reason to mind about the past states of affairs. Further, this interest in the objective state of affairs comes from a particular practice, the practice of litigating. This would be consistent with my claim earlier (Section 7.1) that perhaps we should consider the whole question of objectification in terms of particular practices, rather than as a question to which we could have in a sense or another, universal answers.

We might have, of course, open questions as regards the actual deed itself. What actually happened? Especially difficult and interpretational could be to decide whether it was an intended deed or a merely an unfortunate sequence of a swinging a hand, flight of a stone, and breaking down of the window. Here, we already could have some questions about the intentions, at least. With deeds such as slandering someone, for instance, the question starts to contain truly and actually hermeneutical problematic as well. Here again, the just decision on the case requires that one takes as a criterion what really happened and what there was in the mind of the person. This time, however, our questioning certainly would include questions about the meanings and intentions as well.

Particularly with deeds like slandering, further, what really happened depends on social norms that were there when the assumed deed took place and they would contain a plenty of meanings, which in the time of the event could have been different than they are now. Someone might have written a book that alleg-



edly insults someone, for instance. Would it not be appropriate—in view of justice—to judge it as a deed in terms of the social norms of the time when he or she published the book, instead of the meanings that it might have here and now for us? Even intentions of the author that both Gadamer and Ricoeur exclude from the hermeneutical interest might have relevance in such a case, of course.

Furthermore, one perhaps should ask, what the expression ‘to insult’ did mean in the law in those days. Then already, the need to know a past state of affairs of meanings would come inside the sphere of questions that Gadamer seems to be thinking about, the question of what the law actually means and how we should interpret it. Here, however, we probably should ask what the law did mean—instead of what it means here and now—and it would be, once again, a piece of knowledge about a historical fact or a state of affairs in the past. Would it be correct to apply our present concept of insulting to a deed that no one did consider as an insult in the time in which it took place? Such questions might have particular significance if the law and its interpretation or the cultural climate, so to speak, had become more severe since the assumed insulting took place. Particularly, we should notice that here all the time, the question is about the meanings that once were there, i.e. of original meanings, in this sense, and these meanings would matter—as far as we think that one should not condemn innocent persons.

In the context of judging liabilities and possibly deciding about sanctions, the question of the rights of the authors become especially sharp, as the idea of punishing a person unjustly would quite sharply offend our sense of justice. In any case, the counter-side for sanctioning those who have made something wrong would be appreciating and rewarding the ones who have done something valuable.

The right of an author to appreciation for his or her merits comes also close to the obligation that we have in scholarly writing to refer to those whose ideas we are representing. While appreciating the merits, the cultural and, for instance, scholarly context of the assumingly meritorious action could matter. It would be particularly laudable to be ahead of one’s time with some idea. Even the intentions of the author could matter. Some not so meritorious aspects of what a person has written—such as overly moderated conclusions—could come from mere ‘political correctness’ in the environment where he or she was writing, and perhaps

we should pay attention to what he or she actually wished to say.<sup>481</sup> We could also consider the foundation of the obligations that we have to the authors as instances of proprietary rights, for instance. Using the ideas of another person without a reference—or using them ‘as one’s own’, so to speak—would be a kind of theft.

We could and perhaps should try to find even further argumentation for the possible intelligibility of the rights of the authors that the practice of L&Lship as well with its obligation of *scriptum est* would serve<sup>482</sup>. Logically and in view of morality, a rather strong argument for our obligation of recognizing the merits and rights of the authors as well could have a plausible foundation in the Hegelian idea of mutual recognition (see Section 6.4.4[b]). This, as we saw, would be quite a general foundation of all the rights that there can be in a bourgeois society or *societas civilis* of equals, especially according to the republicanist thought. In this sense particularly, the issue that we are discussing here comes quite close to the freedom of expression, and consequently, somewhat similar argumentation could be relevant.

We perhaps should here take into account one further possible aspect of freedom of expression. A person who has such a freedom should perhaps have, as a part of it, also the right to expect that the others

- listen to and consider what he or she says, and
- pay attention to what he or she actually wishes to say.

This, of course, could be a part of good and civilized conversational disposition, and furthermore, we could see even this as a part of freedom of expression conceived of as a positive freedom holistically and concretely (cf. Section 6.3). Without a right to be heard and even understood as one wish one’s say to be understood, the freedom of expression would not be a concrete freedom to have a say. No law, of course, could guarantee such a freedom, but I could see it as a condi-

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<sup>481</sup> We actually had in Chapter 6 some considerations of this kind as regards the situation in which Hegel was writing.

<sup>482</sup> We could challenge the moral foundation of proprietary rights, for instance—even if they clearly are highly estimated in many societies—and consequently, the rights of the authors as well, if deduced from the proprietary rights only. Appealing to the proprietary rights only could also be, in any case, a narrowly liberalist approach.

tion of maintaining general rationality in cultural, social, and even political practices and life.<sup>483</sup>

#### **8.4.2 The tricky question of the (quasi-)rights of the dead persons and the maxim of general rationality within *res publica literaria*?**

I started by a question about the possible [quasi-)rights that Aristotle might have or about the obligations to him that we might have. This already anticipated a further problem, which relates to the intelligibility of the possible rights of those who already died—or, at least, to the intelligibility of our possible obligations to them. ‘Good manners’ and decency certainly suggest that we should respect the dead. In purely juridical terms, one does not generally assume the dead to have rights<sup>484</sup>. On the other hand, there have been, even on the legal level, rehabilitations of the dead persons unjustly condemned while still alive, then perhaps even executed. We certainly can think that such rehabilitation is doing justice to and thus recognizing, in a sense, the rights of a dead person. Then again, we also must notice that this concerns only some special cases and that such processes have taken place only in some particular countries, connected to the particular histories of these countries.

Reducing the rights of the authors to proprietary rights neither would solve entirely the problems with the rights of the dead authors. Through a somewhat complicated reasoning, however, we could conceive of a kind of ‘as if’ rights of the dead. We could say that if someone uses without a reference and ‘as one’s own’ in his or her publication something that he or she learned from a text written by some dead person, he or she would actually be stealing from the other persons

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<sup>483</sup> In the actual cultural, social, and political reality, the ideal that every contribution were noticed—let alone the ideal of paying attention to what the contributor wished to say—is, of course, unrealistic. There are huge amounts of literary contributions or pieces of *scriptum est* that remain un-noticed for ever. In particular instances of discourses and conversation, however, one actually could and perhaps should try to live up to it, at least. The ethics of scholarly writing, once again, could be an example since scholars often probably at least try to act according to its demands while dealing with earlier literature related to their own study.

<sup>484</sup> See for instance Smolensky 2009. I should mention here that Smolensky herself writes about the rights of the dead in contexts like testamentary power or medical records of deceased. Her overall conclusion is as follows. “While posthumous rights might be explained simply as a way to control the behaviors of the living, this theory ignores the innate human desire to treat the wishes of once-living persons with respect. The role of dignity and autonomy can be seen in the consistent use of rights language throughout the law, and these principles have played an important part in the development of posthumous rights”. (Op. cit. 802.)

still alive. The ‘property’ like the merits of authors is typically a relative matter. What matters within the field of scientific work, for instance, is who in a relative sense has the best merits—or better merits than some others—and is for this reason superior to others as a scientist. In this sense, we could think that a person neglecting his or her duty to refer would be pursuing in a fraudulent way some relative merit among his or her colleagues. This could apply to the obligation to refer appropriately to the dead authors as well.

Neither would the reasoning above create directly any duty to pay attention to the content-level state of affairs in the past or to what the original author—the ‘father’ (‘mother’) of the idea—actually wished to say, however. Then again, we may think further that the one using an idea of a dead person—particularly while making the appropriate references—would get some merit of having familiarized with the ideas of a possibly most distinguished past author and classic. Yet, if he or she takes the merits and appreciation without actually understanding properly or at all what the classic meant to say or what the classic’s text could mean, this once again could be a kind of theft from the fellow scholars here and now, within the scholarly ‘stock-market’ of relative merits. It is noteworthy that I appealed neither in this reasoning to the actual rights of the past authors, even if we could see here a reason to deal with them as if they had rights that we should respect.

With another kind of fundamental justification, quite directly content-directed could be the position of classics with particular cultural significance. Neither would this necessarily be a matter of decency only. On the formal level of law in the Finnish legislation, for instance, there is a paragraph called “Classic protection”. In the Finnish Copyright Act (*Tekijänoikeuslaki*), paragraph 53 tells that in the cases where someone “publicly acts as regards a literary or artistic work after the death of the author in a manner that insults educational and cultural [*sivistyksellisiä*] interests”, an authority defined by a lower statute can forbid such an action. This is possible even if “the copyright had expired or there had been no copyright”.<sup>485</sup> This, of course, gives some works a juridical status, which does not disappear, once the author dies or the actual copyright expires. Then again, there

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<sup>485</sup> If unsatisfied, the one that such forbiddance concerns can have the matter decided in a court of law. (See Säädoskokoelma 1961/2015; transl. by VS from the original Finnish text of “53 § Klassikkosuoja (22.5.2015/607)” is as follows: ”Jos kirjallisen tai taiteellisen teoksen suhteen tekijän kuoltua menetellään julkisesti sivistyksellisiä etuja loukkaavalla tavalla, on asetuksella määrättävällä viranomaisella valta, vaikka tekijänoikeus on lakannut tai sitä ei ole ollut, kieltää sellainen menettely.”) The Finnish words *sivistys* and *sivistyksellinen* refer to the German notion of *Bildung*, but have also reference to wider meanings of educational and cultural. I consider the latter translation more appropriate here.

actually has been until now (in the course of fifty-five years) only one instance where One has applied this law.<sup>486</sup> Obviously, “Classic protection”—like rehabilitations of unjustly treated and perhaps even executed persons—would concern only a very small portion of *scriptum est* and authors.

Especially in view of the notion of mutual recognition, it would be quite hard to imagine how a dead person could do his or her part of this mutuality. In the case of dead authors, we perhaps should talk about our obligations that we have, rather than the actual right of the authors. Then again, what would we be as recognizers of rights of others if we took the right to twist a person’s words and intentions immediately once he or she dies? This, however, could bring us back to ‘good manners’ and general decency only.

While applying the idea of mutual recognition to our assumed obligations to dead authors, we probably should think more about maintenance of general rationality than about the formal rights that we should respect. The demand of maintaining rationality could be that we have some obligation to respect such rights of individuals exactly in the sense of quasi-rights or ‘as if rights’. Instead of the *res publica* as the bourgeois society or *societas civilis*, we here could be talking about something that could deserve the name *res publica literaria*<sup>487</sup>. Like the ideal *res publica* proper, *res publica literaria* too should perhaps be a sphere of rational communication, conversations, and dialogues. Within such sphere, everyone’s respect to every other’s rights and even say would be an indispensable maxim. Otherwise, there could be no genuine pursuit of a common understanding, which should be, however, the aim of rational communication. We can see here some affinity with the sincerity assumption of rational dialogue.

A particular and even a little peculiar further feature of *res publica literaria* could be that it would be a *res publica* where no person dies. Since all the contributions, at least in principle, would be similarly present there<sup>488</sup>, it would plausible to treat all the ‘citizens’ of this *res publica* similarly, regardless the fact that

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<sup>486</sup> See, for instance, Leppämäki 2006, 37.

<sup>487</sup> Dorothea von Mücke (2010, 62) describes as follows the meaning that the expression has had historically: “Late into the eighteenth century the *res publica literaria*, the commonwealth of learning, referred to everybody who participated in the world of scholarship, science, and learning by way of publishing, being in touch, exchanging letters, and visiting one another.” Even if, in a sense, only remotely in accordance with this, I perhaps can use the expression here since it illustrates what I have in mind, especially if we take the “*res publica*” in a genuinely republicanist sense.

<sup>488</sup> Practically, of course, some works become classical, while others we forget. It also happens, however, that an earlier already forgotten work becomes a classic, and in this sense, we could say that it is in principle present similarly than already recognized parts of canon.

some of them are already dead and some others still alive. Thus, we perhaps should have a general obligation to respect the rights of the dead authors—even if they were only quasi-rights or ‘as if rights’. Otherwise, the ideal of rational communication would not realize. This could even be the practical demand of maintaining some rational order within *res publica literaria*, which certainly would be much more than merely the demand of decency or ‘good manners’.<sup>489</sup>

### **8.5 Contrasting the rationalities of L&Lship and IM/KM: respect to the say of the authors vs resource-userist technocracy**

Based on the reasons to mind about the past objectivities of *scriptum est* suggested above, we now could specify further the rationality of L&Lship about *scriptum est* through contrasting it with the resource-userist rationality, which we can consider as the most fundamental form of userism and which manifests itself, particularly, in IM/KM. We shall see here how the objectivism-critical currents of thought can make sense quite well as far as we think about issues related to how knowledge can become a resource. Then again, if we think about the wider sphere of rationalities within which the fundamental rationality of L&Lship about *scriptum est* could become intelligible, radically objectivism-critical views would become problematic. The line of demarcation that I shall indicate between the rationalities will be somewhat fine, yet quite decisive as well, in my view.

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<sup>489</sup> The relationship between my reasoning here and the Gadamerian criticism of historical objectivism is somewhat confusing. We could consider as a republic also the tradition that is the foundation of our community, in the broadest sense the human culture in general. Then, we also could consider the literary level of the tradition as *res publica literaria*, respecting and treating as its citizens all within it. In a sense, however, I am here arguing ultimately against Gadamer and his criticism of historical objectivism. We still could see, however, the question of how we perhaps should deal with the texts of the dead in view of Gadamer’s conception of reading as a dialogue with the text. We further could think that what Gadamer calls the fusion of horizons would be most manifestly present in such a dialogue-like situation between persons presently living and another who died already hundreds—or perhaps even thousands—of years ago. A plausible consequence then could be that we should treat what a dead person has said as if he or she were our contemporary under the fused Great Horizon of History, we perhaps could say. We further could assume that without such a condition, there actually could be no genuine dialogue at all between this person and us. In this sense, the obligations to the dead contributors would not differ from the way in which we treat the living ones. Then again, it remains somewhat obscure whether we should mind about what the interlocutor actually wishes to say either while having a conversation with a living person.

### **8.5.1 Obligations to history and the resource-userist rationality manifested within IM/KM with a 'useful' history**

We actually have here the option to penetrate into the core—the rational core, I would say—of userist thinking as well, even in its most fundamental form of resource-userism. The fundamental question that matters within the resource-userist rationality of IM/KM is how knowledge could become a resource. We also could have some important and quite justified further questions. Where can one achieve such knowledge? How emerges such knowledge? How could it develop into a resource? The interest within IM/KM is ultimately a technical one of producing something that can contribute to the realization of the objectives of an organization, for instance and typically, by advancing the evolvement of knowledge into a resource.

If our aim were to develop some resource, then it is only natural to pay attention especially to the emergence and enhancement of the resource and its use in our present, rather than to some cultural and historical realities as such. In this sense, Cornelius' position (see Section 3) is quite clear and rational. The again, if we assume the rationality of L&Lship to come from the wide sphere of the possible intelligible relationships that we may have to literature and *scriptum est*, the ultimately technical rationality of IM/KM is simply not enough.

In view of research related to IM/KM, objectivism-critical argumentation in some cases, at least, might be sociologist theorizing about the constitution of knowledge, knowing, becoming to know, etc. as an object of research, instead of being a reflection on rationality within the being of one's own. Even in the philosophical perspective and 'within our being', however, we certainly may have quite an intelligible criticism of objectivism in view of the rationality of IM/KM. I could imagine myself as an IM/KM-aware employee in an enterprise organization, for instance. Then, I probably could and should consider how I could here and now develop my understanding as and into a part of the common understanding within the organization because probably the common understanding only could be a real resource for the organization.

To a degree, at least, I would then 'forget myself', since enhancing the performance of the organization would demand it. I further could understand that what really can constitute common understanding as the resource for the organization is something that evolves over the course of time within common activities and discourses—in traditions, we could say, in Gadamerian terms. A remark by Anna

Suorsa and Maija-Leena Huotari is quite clear:

The basis for all KC [knowledge creation] in an organization is tradition, in other words, the entity of everything already known in the community. This means that the crucial question in developing interaction in the KC process is how well the new information and knowledge are combined with the previously known.<sup>490</sup>

Thus, quite in the spirit of Gadamer, I could make an effort to appropriate the common understanding evolving as traditions and develop my own ideas as well in terms of it, to cultivate it, and perhaps to enhance it even, in the spirit of the Gadamerian notion of effective history. The important matter is that here the question already would be about reflection within the being of one's own, rather than an 'outsider's' sociologist theorizing. Probably I should also exercise critical thinking as regards the traditions of the organization. A critical attitude while applying in the present situation what the history or the traditions has handed down to us would be appropriate.

In view of IM/KM, however, ideological criticism proper would perhaps not be so significant. As an employee within an organization, further, I perhaps should not mind so much about the accuracy of my way of reconstructing the ideas of some author. I should not feel any obligations to Aristotle, Hegel, or Leo Tolstoy, for instance. If the idea of some author as we can understand it here and now contributes to the successful functioning of the organization, then it is good enough. Only if we assumed that some other meaning, interpretation, and understanding of the text—possibly including even what the author had wished to say—could contribute better to the successful functioning, we perhaps tried to reach it. This, in turn, would lead us back to my argument [1] for minding about the instances of *l'objectivité du sens* of *scriptum est* with its foundation in the demands of simple learning (see Section 8.2). Our motive for this, however, would be neither respecting the (quasi-)rights of the authors nor our obligations to them. In Figure 11, I have contrasted my concept of the library to the logic of IM/KM that Bob Taylor condenses in the “value added spectrum” from “data” to “productive knowledge” and “action” (see Section 2.6.1).


We could express quite concisely my view of the opposition of the rationalities of L&Lship and IM/KM as follows: while IM/KM aims ahead, L&Lship would be 'looking backward'. 'Looking forward' could have a particularly ap-

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<sup>490</sup> Suorsa & Huotari 2014, 1047.



pealing dynamicity but there certainly is a justification for both of those orientations. Consequently, we can see the both of them as intelligible and rational, especially if we do not assume that one institution and practice, such as L&Lship, should or could take care of everything in the life of the society and of the humans.



**Fig. 11. The rationalities of L&Lship and of IM/KM**

Much of the content of this treatise has been an attempt to analyze and clarify the intelligibility and rationality of 'looking backward', as one part of the general division of labor in our historical, cultural, social, and even political existence. Further, there are certainly some contact points as well. I illustrate this in Figure 11 especially by the remark of the possibly 'useful' history as a part of the wider history of *scriptum est* or the 'useful' history extracted out from *scriptum est*. In any case, there is a clear and decisive difference as well, a fine but decisive line of demarcation.

Still further, proceeding from the claim that we cannot escape interpretation—which, in my view, is quite a plausible assumption—we could assume, in any case, that interpretations can have different orientations depending on the

<sup>491</sup> Formulation from Elizabeth Orna (1990, 86) who formulates into a little simpler chain of notions the idea that we have seen as Taylor's "value added spectrum".

particular practices and their rationalities within which we are interpreting. In Figure 11, I indicate this by the notions of low and high profile interpretations, the former meaning what we also could denote as a fact-oriented interpretation.

At this point, we can return to the Gadamerian premises and especially their possible relevance as regards the rationality of IM/KM. Somewhat provocatively, once again (cf. Section 3.5.1), we could talk here about another option of the ‘Gadamerian userism’. It could consist of an awareness of the role of historicity in the emergence of knowledge that can become a resource, all the time, however, holding to the assumption that the only intelligible serious interest is in enhancing the resources for whatever we are aiming at, here and now. If we were thinking only about how a common understanding as a resource emerges, we had no need to pay attention to the (quasi-)right of the authors, for instance. Then again, we perhaps should notice that in such an attitude, there would not be very much of the Gadamerian ethos of encountering the other respectfully.

### ***8.5.2 Advancing social capital as IM/KM within social and political life by large: an instance with quite a fine line of demarcation***

We can summarize a piece of argumentation here as follows. If we take the conservatism in Birdsall’s politics of librarianship as a manifestation of a view that had similarities with the Gadamerian rehabilitation of authority and tradition, in both the cases we would see the rationality of producing a resource for the community, i.e. for us here and now. It would be the condition of a successful community and society, similarly to the need of sufficiently common understanding as the prerequisite of successful functioning of an organization.

We also can formulate the contrast of the rationalities of L&Lship and IM/KM in terms of the notions of instrumental for ends and constitutive of ends. Within the society and state, further, we should not ignore the questions about the ends, i.e. politics in the sense of an Aristotelian practice, if we wished to avoid technocracy. In this sense, making the society or the state merely another organization would be a most suspect effort. The common understanding aimed at IM/KM within an organization, as a whole and ultimately, in any case, would have an instrumental value. It ultimately would be subordinate to the ends and objectivities that already are there, since organizations do exist for some objectives. The ultimate objective of a business organization, for instance, is a successful business, measured typically in terms of profit. In this sense, there is no

politics in the fullest sense of the Aristotelian notions of *phronesis* and practice, neither would be the primary end of such organizations to produce justice and respect the rights.<sup>492</sup>

Then again, we could think about an organization the objectives and tasks of which are particularly general and open. The resource that we could be developing within such an organization could be a resource for ‘something’, indeed. In the widest and most open possible sense, we might be developing resources for the Aristotelian practice of asking about and then outlining or specifying the ends. The question of the resources of democracy itself, of course, could be a most serious one.

In Section 2.7[d], I mentioned attempts to conceive of L&Lship in terms of the notion of social capital as one instance of conceiving of L&Lship as an instance of IM/KM with a resource-userist legitimation. The very expression capital, as a part of the notion, would suggest—metaphorically, at least—that there is an idea of a resource or an asset for something. Connected to this notion, on the other hand, we can see even quite general social and political pursuits. One obviously could consider, and one now and then actually considers, social capital—and perhaps even the library that advances social capital—as a potential asset for both economic growth and democracy<sup>493</sup>.

In view of the notion of social capital, the line of demarcation between the resource-userist rationality of IM/KM and the rationality of L&Lship in general as I see it would become here extremely fine. Republicanism especially—better than liberalism, I assume—could understand that even democracy and self-determination of the society and state require resources for forming the common understanding. Our problem here actually reminds the dialectics around the Hegelian notions of *öffentliche Meinung* as well as “true conscience”, as opposed to mere *Willkür* (see Sections 6.4.2 to 6.4.4). Even the problems related to these that we already discussed would be present here, once again.

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<sup>492</sup> Even the primary issue within administrative organizations would be the effective performance of their tasks, such as taxation or health care although, in the case of them, justice and respect for the rights of citizens could be a substantial part of legislation possibly stating their tasks. A public servant in an administrative organization, furthermore, could have even independent discretion and a particular duty to use it for advancing justice and reasonability. Obviously, on the other hand, neither business organizations should insult the rights of anyone. In this sense, there would be a subordinate or additional moment of justice ‘inside’ or ‘behind’ the practices, so to speak. In view of an organization itself, however, performance for its end is what matters.

<sup>493</sup> See, for instance, O’Neil 2002, Vårheim 2014, and Gerring, Barndt & Moreno 2005.

In any case, without some community in understanding—or some common tradition and authority, in Gadamerian concepts—and without cultivating such traditions of understanding, there can be no rational intercourse and dialogues between the citizens and within the society and state. The common understanding, its traditions, and people’s participation in them must have some positive, institutional, and even material foundation. They would be matters of education in a wide sense, which also requires resources. In this sense, the resource-userist rationality of IM/KM in some cases—in such instances as the idea of L&Lship as a promoter of social capital, for instance—could have some compatibility, perhaps even substantial affinity with the republicanist political theory and philosophy.

If we considered the possible social and political role of *scriptum est* and the library as enhancing the resources of democracy in view of the notion of social capital, however, we could still be ignoring other substantial matters. It is one thing to provide democracy with even the most constitutive and even necessary prerequisites, such as the social capital as a resource for citizens and the bourgeois society or *societas civilis* and as a resource for advancing necessary common understanding. Then, it is another thing to take into account the obligations, for instance, that belong to democracy or *societas civilis* as such, as constitutive elements. Thus, we here have an opposition of (i) enhancing the resource for and (ii) recognition of obligation within democracy and *societas civilis*. Viewing such opposition as a dialectics has certainly a justification.

In spite of the fineness of the lines of demarcation discussed above, in any case, we could formulate the following options.

- (1) We could be ‘using’—rather literally—the traditions for, and perhaps even ‘orchestrating’ them to serve, the development of social capital conceived of as a resource that has its justification particularly as a resource and asset—even if as a resource and asset for democracy.
- (2) We also can merely let the tradition and those belonging to it, as a kind of a flow of *phronesis*, to have a say—on the rights of its own, I would say, since we should respect the right of the others to have a say. We could assume further that at least a part of the actual social capital directly belongs to the very existence of this flow of *phronesis* and to people’s participation in it.

Option (2) particularly, in my view, would be an option to express within a political frame the primary rationality of L&Lship primarily *about scriptum est* with

the truth criterion of *scriptum est* as its fundamental maxim. It would also be consistent with the actual demand that we view as objects as well what we call information, knowledge, documentation or *scriptum est*, or how ever we were to denote what the library as well can contain. It seems to me, further, that some radically objectivism-critical views could lose this option, and I shall return to this still shortly in Section 8.6.3.

Still further, we could here pay attention to the distinction that I made between L&Lship in general and the broad category of special-purpose libraries. Once we start to think about special-purpose libraries, the resource-userist rationality of IM/KM as well can find a justification. On the other hand, even the public library could ultimately be a special-purpose library. A part of its rationality, at least, could be to be a library for citizenship in *res publica* or the library of *societas civilis* or bourgeois society. In this respect, we could think about even what we saw Buschman suggesting—with an obvious reference to public library—about building balanced collections (see Section 6.6). We could see it as building up resources for democracy. The balanced collection suggested by Buschman would certainly be, in a sense, an ‘orchestrated’ collection as well. Then again, balancing could have as its motivation the ideal of giving various views and voices their due part in the whole in a situation where one cannot include all of *scriptum est* in the collection. The motivation, then, would be in attempts to do justice, rather than in attempts to produce some other kind of particular effects that someone would prefer. In a particular respect, the public library as a special-purpose library would here come quite close to the library in general—while in some other cases, the distinction between the library in general and the special-purpose libraries could be sharper.<sup>494</sup>

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<sup>494</sup> A good further example here is what we saw Madsen writing about the library in a scholarly environment (see Section 2.7[d]). We would assume that the libraries of educational institutions are quite clearly special-purpose libraries. Even within scholarly libraries in general and particularly within the libraries of the universities, however, we also could intelligibly see how the widest possible sphere of rationalities could be particularly noteworthy because of the particular rationality of a particular kind of scholarly and academic practice and the institution concerned. In the case of the libraries of universities, such view could be most justifiable because of the idea of a “republic of scholars”, which could and perhaps should be the very idea of the university (See, for instance, Brubacher 1967). In such a *res publica*, as well as in the Aristotelian practice and *phronesis*, furthermore, the fundamental question would be that of the ends, which probably should contain the question of justice as well. The task of the library of a university, then, could be to retain and do justice to the past contributions and to the ‘citizens’ of the “republic of scholars” and in this sense, actually, to let the *phronesis* go on, rather than direct it.

## 8.6 Ideology-critical awareness and the recognition of objectivities of and around *scriptum est* within LID-studies

Here finally, we should discuss shortly LID-studies in view of the problematic of criticism in general and particularly, in view of ideological criticism. We perhaps should notice here that the kind of ideology-critical awareness that Williams and Wellmer, for instance, are emphasizing is quite rare within LID-studies. What relates to *scriptum est* or the possible content of the library defined by some other notion, however, is not necessarily and always beneficial only. Parts of it can be problematic or even harmful, in a sense or another.

Alistair Black and Dave Muddiman make an insightful remark on the lack of ideology-critical awareness within LID-studies—on a kind of blindness as regards the political aspects of the phenomena dealt with there.

The ‘information and society’ paradigm has been concerned with what information and information systems do to society. ... However, of equal importance, we would suggest, is the need to examine the causes of information.<sup>495</sup>

### 8.6.1 Rare instances of genuinely ideology-critical awareness within LID-studies

Reformulating a little Black’s and Muddiman’s phrasing, we can have an illustratively symmetric pair of questions:

- why is there so much interest in the question of what the information (or the library and what it contains) does to the society,
- yet so little of interest in the question of what the society does to information (or to the library and to what it contains)?<sup>496</sup>

The discourse within LID-studies tends to proceed in terms of an ethos where knowledge is good, information is good, and information society is even better. Such would be the evangel of the triumphant resource-userism, particularly. This

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<sup>495</sup> Black & Muddiman 1997, 205.

<sup>496</sup> We could understand this, of course, in view of some characteristics of L&Lship through comparing it with journalism, for instance. Journalism much more concretely connects to and even has its origin in the bourgeois society and its politics and even the political parties there. On the side of L&Lship, even the public library that comes closest to this has had rather unpolitical role—though some origin of it, such as the libraries of labor movement (see, for instance, Mäkinen 2009, 208 ff.), have been more political by their nature.

is, of course, very useful while practitioners and researchers within the field are looking for appreciation. There are, however, some exceptions as well.

The aspects of politics and its impact on the library are present typically in historical accounts, like Hansson's treatise on the impact of the major currents of the Swedish political field in the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century on the classification system in the Swedish libraries<sup>497</sup>. A noteworthy feature of Hansson's work is approaching a contentious element of the Swedish library field—the scheme of classification—in view of what we could see as a tension between major currents of thought within the actual political life in Sweden. I already mentioned above the constructionist, discourse-analytical approaches suggesting that we should pay attention to “rhetoric strategies” and issues of power in this context (see Section 8.3.2). As opposed to the thematic of Hansson, however, here we could remain on the level of what we could denote as micro-politics only. The point of departure of a compilation *Critical theory for library and information science* from the year 2010—a kind of a reader consisting of texts introducing various points of departure within social and political sciences and then applying them to some thematic within LID—is as follows.

We argue that an understanding of critical theory is important to scholarship in LIS for a number of reasons, not least of which is reading much of our own scholarship against the grain”<sup>498</sup>.

Here, however, I would pay particular attention to an earlier contribution with a reference to quite classical—partly even to classically Marxist—points of departure of ideology-critical thought. Michael Harris' extensive article *State, class, and cultural reproduction: Toward a theory of library service in the United States* is a kind of classical manifestation of exceptional ideology-critical awareness within LID-studies.

Harris puts forward argumentation against what he calls the “pluralist paradigm” within the theory of the library by which he actually means a particular, ‘engineering-like’ view of collection work and choice of materials to be included in the collection. Harris' argumentation reconstructs, among others, Antonio Gramsci's view of hegemony and Pierre Bourdieu's views of cultural reproduction. He then proceeds to claim that there are, in a society, power-related

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<sup>497</sup> Hansson 1999.

<sup>498</sup> Leckie & Given & Buschman (eds.) 2010, xi.

structures of what is good, what is quality, etc., which neither the librarians can escape.

As opposed to the “pluralist paradigm”, he formulates his conclusions as a “theory of library services in the United States”, which he characterizes as “a sort of political economy of library service, one that will recognize the reproductive functions of library service”. He concludes with twenty-six rather provocative claims the general message of which is that a librarian while building collections cannot avoid following the appreciations and tastes of the upper social classes. The following claims are illustrative:

5. High culture creators and producers expect libraries to consume their symbolic product without consideration of whether that symbolic product will ever be used.

[...]

8. The power to define the canon—the Book—is asymmetrically distributed among those who create and produce the high culture.

9. Libraries are directly linked to, and dependent upon, the creators and producers of high culture.<sup>499</sup>

Harris further writes, “[claim] 20. Literacy in America is stratified by class”, “[claim] 25. Library use and nonuse is stratified by class”, and as the final gloomy conclusion, “[claim] 26. Libraries reproduce these class relationships”. The result of this is that the “pluralist paradigm” cannot be adequate. It actually appears as somewhat naïve.<sup>500</sup>

We may characterize the argumentation by Harris as one belonging to the sociology of politics and L&Lship. It would be an argumentation about what happens necessarily and in any case or—in a slightly weaker form—what strongly tends to happen. The latter formulation would leave some space for the purposeful political actions of the humans as well.

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<sup>499</sup> Harris 1986, 243.

<sup>500</sup> Harris 1986, 243–244.



### **8.6.2 Stepping order of recognizing the ideological foundations of power as a subordinate moment**

As regards the argumentation of Harris, we could ask how unconditionally valid it would be in varying societies<sup>501</sup>. Yet, we can here take, for a while and for argumentation, the claims and conclusions by Harris as such. We could see with Harris a kind of sociologist pessimism as opposed to the (quasi-)sociologist resource-userist optimism claiming that information, knowledge, etc. are becoming increasingly important resources in the so-called information society.

Buschman proceeds from Habermas and particularly from the notion of the public sphere as we already saw in Section 6.6. He also comments on the kind of determinism that we could find with Harris.

Utilizing Habermas does not ‘solve’ this controversy, accepting neither determinism nor the simplistic ‘it somehow came to pass’ as historical explanation. The means of self-actualization, critique, and will formation is best captured in Habermas’s exploration of the public sphere. Libraries, it has been argued, enact and embody crucial aspects of the public sphere and came about in a societally significant way during the period of democratic cultural institution building. For instance, the principle of critique and argumentation to rationally arrive at values and conclusions is supported through the commitment to balanced collections, preserving them over time, and making a breadth of resources available.<sup>502</sup>

Buschman asks, however, what the libraries do to escape the fatalist situation that we can see Harris, for instance, depicting. What can we do in the situation of being largely “shaped by media capitalism [...] versus the historical role of enacting and embodying the public sphere”? According to Buschman, in any case, “A Habermasian framework connects the means of historical changes to current pos-

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<sup>501</sup> We might ask, for instance, whether Bourdieu’s results based on materials collected in the big French society would persist in the smaller social circles of smaller societies and their smaller communities where the upper and lower class youth, for instance, go to the same school and share similar hobbies and tastes.

<sup>502</sup> Buschman 2006, 292. Buschman’s rather plausible use of the notion of resource indicates how fine the line of demarcation between resource-userist rationality and aspects of L&Lship related to democracy and evolvement of people’s will within the Habermasian public sphere, which actually would be the bourgeois society or *societas civilis*, can become. Then again, there would be no problems, in my view, in complementing what Buschman says here with the respect to the say and rights of fellow-citizens—perhaps even the dead ones as far as we are considering the rationality of civil dialogue as a constituent of democracy particularly.

sibilities, making such questions central to librarianship's research, practice, and public language”<sup>503</sup>.

We can see here Buschman quite openly recognizing the inevitable dialectics that there is around ideology-critical thought and thematic. There would be a dialectics and even incompatibility between

- the objectivities that there are in the ideological foundation of power—in spite of the fact that such power is in ‘our minds’, in a sense, i.e. in the common and shared understanding—and
- our possible pursuits to overcome such power.

Harris’ somewhat pessimist sociologism, in any case, could be a valuable part in a stepping-order starting from the properly hermeneutical interest in appropriation, proceeding through recognition of the objectivities and realities of and around *scriptum est*, and finally ending to awareness of the socio-political conditions of our understandings. These conditions could explain, indeed, *l’objectivité du sens*, and such explanation as well could be a part of the ideology-critical appropriation. Within criticism of ideologies, in any case, there is no reason to avoid even explanations. The very rationality of explanation above already goes well beyond the hermeneutical rationality as conceived of by Gadamer—yet in a different way than the rationality of explanation in what Gadamer denotes as the modern science.

### **8.6.3 Problems within objectivism-critical sociologism possibly excluding all actual and genuine normativity and obligation**

A major concern of mine—partly related also to the sociologist pessimism with Harris—is that while stressing in a less than profoundly reflected manner the social factor, one may result in viewing knowledge, meanings, various obligations in general, etc. merely as social phenomena. John Budd makes a most insightful remark while warning about the dangers within the views where all is “reduced to the social, and the ontological and epistemological (that is, anything normative) are dismissed”.

[...] these positions are highly reductionist; [...] The positions also attempt to propound methodological monism; there is only one way to examine any

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<sup>503</sup> Buschman 2006, 293.

question. For these reasons, we have to reject any *strong* relativist or constructivist stance.<sup>504</sup>

Somewhat ironically, while typically pretending to be strongly positivism-critical, such strong stances could combine with a strongly positivist conception of science. I believe that we could extend Budd's criticism to a wide sphere of various argumentations stressing the social and cultural, in spite of the claimed, yet only seemingly rich variety of methodologies used within such currents. This has to do with the options of conceiving of objectivity and objectivism, which I analyzed in Section 7.4.

I finally wish to comment on a fragment of both ideology-critical and—as it seems to me—in quite a radical sense objectivism-critical argument within LID-studies by Ronald E. Day. He writes about “reification” and “commodification” of information. Such criticism as well would obviously be an instance of criticism of objectivism and, in view of my thematic here, a particularly noteworthy instance. It would be about what could be the content of the library as well. He is “concerned with the social production and history of the term ‘information’” and his starting point is that “For us late moderns, however, information has now become a thing, and not only that but also an economically valuable thing.” A question then arises: “How did we arrive at this reified and commodified notion of knowledge or of becoming informed? And what have we forgotten in this historical process?”<sup>505</sup> While commenting on information theory's impact on the notion of information, Day gives us a part of the answer, at least:

Analogous to theories of production and exchange in liberal capitalism, information, here, is understood as created by the ‘free’ will of one person and is then transferred through the “medium” or market of public language into the ear and mind of another person [...] Implicit in this standard model for communication and information are such notions as the intentionality of the

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<sup>504</sup> Budd 2001, 131. Here again, however, while my concern is particularly the knowledge about *scriptum est* that the bibliographic scholarship and practice of L&Lship could produce, Budd talks about conditions of the knowledge that LID-studies (or “library and information science”) in general could produce. While Budd talks about knowledge that could inform practice (or “praxis”), what I have in mind is knowledge that actually would be about the substance dealt with within the practice and—as we shall see later even more particularly—the relationship that our cultural and social being and we could have to *scriptum est*. Budd comes, however, even more concretely close to my intentions here while writing as follows. “The criteria for knowledge that have been presented here, and especially phenomenology as a path to knowledge, provide us with ways to inform praxis and to ensure that praxis is not only efficient in the technical sense, but also effective in the ethical sense” (Budd 2001, 328).

<sup>505</sup> Day 2001, 1.

speaker, the self-evident “presence” of that intention in his or her words, a set of hearers or “users” who receive the information and who demonstrate the correctness of that reception in action or use, and the freedom of choice in regard to the speaker’s ability to say one thing rather than another, as well as even the receiver’s freedom to choose to receive one message rather than another in the marketplace of ideas.<sup>506</sup>

While criticizing “reification” and especially “commodification” of culture and language and its impact on the notion of information, Day comes quite close to my own criticism of the possible rationalities of L&Lship restricted within mainstream LID-studies into the service-userist frame opened by liberalist, market-like fundamental assumptions.

I would claim, however, that the rationality of viewing information—or *scriptum est*—as something objective or “reification” of it is not only in making it a commodity or even a merchandise. The reasons to mind about the past objectivities of and around *scriptum est* that I suggested should specify what other reasons we could have to see information or *scriptum est* as an object and as a thing as well. Recognition of the rights of the authors and at least some forms of criticism of ideologies require that we view information or *scriptum est* exactly as an objectivity or as a part of our cultural, social, and political reality. Using the notion of Gadamer related to his criticism of historical objectivism, we perhaps should see information and *scriptum est* as “expressions of life” as well.

As a final allusion here to Budd’s remark above, these reasons of minding about the objectivities of *scriptum est* become intelligible only if we go beyond looking at our possible obligations as well as our aspirations to overcome ideological restrictions as social phenomena only. A sociologist perspective can be a most valuable subordinate moment in genuinely philosophical and normative reasoning about rationalities, politics, and morality. Then again, if one takes it self-evidently as the dominant perspective, one can lose entirely the option to make genuine questions in view of rationality.

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<sup>506</sup> Day 2001, 38–39.



## 9 Further remarks on maintaining particular rationalities with some *Meditationes de prima philosophia*

What we discussed in Chapters 6 to 8 and the remarks that I shall make in this chapter should mutually fortify each other. Below, we shall continue with some further reasoning on the Ricoeurian premises. A particular emphasis with Ricoeur is that we should pay attention to the particular rationalities, which we actually can reach and which would have some significance—even if perhaps only ‘regionally’. We could well think that certain kind of agnosticism is characteristic of thinking of Ricoeur as well<sup>507</sup>. Then again, it would be most mistaken to consider Ricoeur as a representative of some kind of extreme skepticism. In Section 7.2.3, we saw Ricoeur’s emphasis on temporary nature of the Cartesian doubt as a part of *Bildung*. In Section 9.4, I shall continue a little further with this Cartesian thematic and particularly with an agnosticism that we can find even there. This will lead us to the rehabilitation of a kind of ‘positivism’ even—though only as a moment subordinate to the fundamental aspects of our being as humans, manifested also in the fundamental hermeneutical rationality that we can find with both Gadamer and Ricoeur.

In addition to the Ricoeurian and even Cartesian thematic, we shall discuss further the liberal footnotes to or reminders within republicanism—or shortly, my agnostic republicanism (Section 9.2). Partly, this reasoning should add to the political acceptability of the political side of the cultural, social, and political philosophy of L&Lship that I am elaborating here. In view of my fundamental line of argumentation, what matters is the republicanist and even Hegelian view that the state necessarily has and quite legitimately can have a ‘message’, since it connects to the educational rationality of L&Lship. If this can combine with some liberal ideals it only strengthens my argument, actually, by making it better acceptable for even persons who could have some doubts about the somewhat strict views of Hegel. In spite of this remark that could be even a little cynical, I actually would think quite sincerely about the foundations of a good political order according to the lines of thought that I have suggested in Chapter 6 and shall elaborate here.

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<sup>507</sup> There is some irony when Ricoeur, the man of faith, must teach Gadamer, the humanist, about the significance of critical thought as we saw above. This might become even more ironical once we could see as the foundation of this a kind of agnosticism with this man of faith.

## 9.1 Ricoeurian kind of dialectics as a response to an “odd kind of irrelevance” with Gadamer?

I have claimed that there is an affinity between the Gadamerian thought and republicanism. We can now proceed to the final remarks on the tension between the Gadamerian universalism and Ricoeurian ‘regionalism’ of hermeneutics. The philosophical notion of dialectics certainly is not among the easiest ones, but at this phase, it would be one of the cornerstones of my argumentation, and it is useful to quote here what Goncalo Marcelo tells about the notion of dialectics with Ricoeur.

If we extrapolate this theoretical framework to the entirety of Ricoeur’s works, what we find is a philosophy that is fragmentary but that proceeds by thoroughly mediating the conflicts that take place within it and *rethinking them together*. So, the creative procedures of Ricoeur’s method do not stop at an antithetic, but produce a certain *dialectic*, even if it is to be a very different from the most famous of dialectics, the Hegelian one. Indeed, this dialectic does not produce a synthesis, but endless passages from one pole to another. These passages or mediations are, in my opinion, Ricoeur’s own hypotheses of conciliation between theories that are totally different but that gain in insight if they come together and explain successfully what is at stake on each of the many philosophical domains upon which Ricoeur conducted his investigations.<sup>508</sup>

We actually could characterize it as dialectics leaving the tensions and even conflicts open, in a sense, or as a ‘weak’ dialectics without any strong synthesis or *Aufhebung*. The only synthesis could be the actual action and practices with all the heterogeneity and tensions of fundamentally different rationalities, which such a ‘weak’ synthesis could not annihilate

I perhaps should remark here that the notion of dialectics that I find intelligible would be in line with what Marcello depicts here. It would be dialectics with a foundation ultimately in our being as subjects and at the same time, as the ‘prod-

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<sup>508</sup> Marcelo (2010, 354). Once again, I have to remark that I take no responsibility of understanding of Hegel with Marcello either. According to Neuhauser, we should conceive of the Hegelian dialectics as well this way. Neuhauser (2000, 242) writes as the “fundamental doctrine of the dialectical method” that “[...] earlier concepts (here the elements of ‘Morality’) are never simply discarded as the system progresses but are instead preserved in the stage that follows (*Sittlichkeit*) as components of a more comprehensive whole.” How could this—or should this—happen without also preserving the tension, even incompatibility? A matter that one had to take seriously before the *Aufhebung* might be a serious matter even after it. In view of our active involvements, perhaps the best that we can learn is that we must take into account several matters of significance and look for a balance between them.

ucts’ of social and political realities, history, and incontestably of even more profound levels of being, such as biology.<sup>509</sup>

It would be the dialectics of freedom connected to the ‘shoulds’ and our pursuits in general, on one hand, and of the necessities in our biological, historical, psychological, and cultural, in our social, and even political being, on the other. The notion of dialectics would particularly connect to conceiving of one’s own morality and conceiving of our common morality or *Sittlichkeit* would make it even sharper. We have here modes of intelligence that are in a fundamental sense incompatible with each other and still, mature morality particularly could not ignore the connections between them. We cannot lead ‘ought’ from ‘is’, but an ‘ought’ ignoring ‘is’ would be blind and even against what morality could demand, in a sense. Dialectics conceived of in this way would also connect to the specification that I made as regards my (quasi-)Kantian question in terms of the existential necessities and options as well as of the question of the preferable options (see Section 1.4). Furthermore, we may see this kind of dialectics between the Gadamerian belonging-to and the Ricoeurian emphasis of distances even.

As a dialectics of the fundamentally republicanist political theory and philosophy and the liberal footnotes or reminders that I wish to make, it would also be a dialectics of

- substantial and organic<sup>510</sup>, related to how things actually are—or how we may assume them actually being, and
- formal and normative, related to our pursuits and attempts to deal with how things should be and to the concrete level of political life, to legislation, for instance.

The figure becomes even more complicated if we consider the dialectics between this duality and the fact that we must also overcome it, which was present above

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<sup>509</sup> This would exclude such notions as the Engelsian dialectics of nature or viewing the ‘drama of history’ in terms of some notions of dialectics. The latter, particularly, would be a manifestation of the romantic spirit, rather than of analytical thought. The dialectics of history in this sense can be exciting and fascinating, even beautiful, but it would not add to analytical rationality though in some cases, such dramas could be illustrative of moral dilemmas and in this sense, even educationally elevating.

<sup>510</sup> Not necessarily quite in the sense in which Hegel (1820/1952, a note to §279) uses the notion while writing about the people represented as “neither as a patriarchal clan, [...] nor as living under some other unorganized and haphazard condition, but instead as an inwardly developed, genuinely organic, totality [...]”.



already in my claim that morality, which we cannot deduce from what is, can still require that we pay attention to the actual realities as well.<sup>511</sup>

It seems appropriate to notice still a remark by Lawrence M. Hinman. In a sense, in terms of *quid facti, quid juris*, it summarizes a bundle of problems that we may have while considering what Gadamer actually is wishing to claim. Hinman's own result is rather stunning:

If Gadamer's understanding of hermeneutics is to escape the resignation implicit in its play model of understanding and truth, and if it is to avoid undermining its own distinctive claim to truth, it must begin with a recognition of the necessity of asking the *quaestio juris* as the question of what understanding, interpretation, and application ought to be. To fail to do this is, in Heideggerian terms, to reduce Dasein to its facticity and to ignore the fact that Dasein is in each case the kind of being for whom its own being is an issue. The question of how we understand is for us always simultaneously the question of how we ought to understand insofar as we are concerned with the question of truth.<sup>512</sup>

Even if the case were that “Truth is an event which plays itself out in human history” and that truth thus “becomes something which we cannot determine”, since “it determines us”—to use Hinman's own expressions<sup>513</sup>—we might have reasons at least to try take some analytical steps. We could have some analyzed criteria of the truth even within the history that made both us and the truth, and thus, we could have an option of ‘cross-checking’ to see if there is some coherence, at least—all the time within the history that made us and the truth. Such crosschecking could be the medicine to the “odd kind of irrelevance”, which otherwise could be the result of the Gadamerian premises, especially in view of the most radical readings of them.

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<sup>511</sup> A further, most dramatic illustration of the dangers of missing the actual realities with their possibly even organic substantiality could be Hegel's comment on Maximilien de Robespierre—the most influential leader of the French Revolution since autumn 1792 until July 1794 and the end of la *Grande Terreur*—on an even notoriously virtuous person called *l'incorruptible* by his supporters. According to Hegel, “... with this man Virtue was an earnest matter. Virtue and Terror are the order of the day; for Subjective Virtue, whose sway is based on disposition only, brings with it the most fearful tyranny. It exercises its power without legal formalities, and the punishment if inflicts is equally simple—Death. This tyranny could not last; for all inclinations, all interests, reason itself revolted against this terribly consistent Liberty, which in its concentrated intensity exhibited so fanatical a shape”. (Hegel 1837/1956, 450–451.) Hegel's remark here implies that even what Smith means by the “principle of psychological hedonism” (see Section 1.2.1) could matter, but not as the only foundation of the ends that there rationally can be in a society.

<sup>512</sup> Hinman 1980, 535.

<sup>513</sup> See Hinman 1980, 534

If asking whether we can trust in a text, quite a plausible criterion would be the reality, state of affairs, or matter that the text or another form of presentation treats of, quite in the sense of the correspondence theory of truth. Practically, however, it could be enough if we can distinguish something in the sense that we can compare it to something else in a sense or another. In both sides of the comparison, there can be historical change—instead of an eternal and “permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework”, to use Bernstein’s expression (see Section 4.2.1)—but there can be also differences between the historical spans, for instance. What we should distinguish in this sense depends on what our particular critical interest is in the particular case. In the case of the empirical claims about some objective state of affairs, of course, we may have a set of observations and we can cross-check them, one against another. In the cases related to moral judgments, we can appeal to other maxims while reflecting on our here and now insights of what could be right or wrong—and there can be a plenty of problematic related to the historicity of our being and understandings.

What Bernstein writes about the Gadamerian thought and necessity of criteria in criticism seems to me quite valid, in any case.

All criticism appeals to some principles, standards, or criteria. Gadamer is extremely incisive in exposing the fallacy of thinking that such principles, standards, or criteria can be removed from our own historicity and in showing that there is an essential openness and indeterminacy about them. (This parallels Kuhn’s effort to elucidate the criteria for evaluating competing scientific theories.) But even if we grant Gadamer everything that he wants to say about human finitude rooted in historicity, this does not lessen the burden of answering the question of what is and what ought to be the basis for the critical evaluation of the problems of modernity.<sup>514</sup>

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<sup>514</sup> See Bernstein 1983/1985, 155. We should notice here, however, that Bernstein builds up his argumentation as a whole on a kind of synthesis of particular, chosen themes. As opposed to a chain that is as strong as its weakest link, Bernstein characterizes his synthesis as a cable where the fibers strengthen one another, however weak and slender each of them separately might be. Bernstein builds up the whole of his argumentation on a kind of synthesis of particular, chosen themes, not only with Gadamer, but also with Habermas, Rorty, and Hannah Arendt. He remarks that a common feature with all of them is that we should find in what there already is common rationality, solidarity, undistorted communication, etc., which could provide us with a basis for critical evaluation. The common exercise of practical reason, or *phronesis*, would provide us with reasons and criteria and thus ‘carry on’ even critical thinking.

## 9.2 Additional reasoning on agnostic republicanism: between the formally secured say of everyone and the people's deliberate will

The autonomous freedom as conceived of by Mäki (see Section 6.3[b]) can be the fullest form of liberty as well as the Hegelian harmony between the state and the citizens (see Section 6.4.1) could be the best that we could imagine. In many cases, however, what we most concretely and practically can do is to provide the negative and abstract freedom of citizens with some protection. This could mean that some legislation—only formal, perhaps, but for this very reason such that the citizens can actually appeal to it—would and perhaps should restrict the options to misuse power.

We earlier have seen how there is some quite fundamental affinity between republicanist political theory and philosophy, on one hand, and hermeneutics—perhaps particularly in its Gadamerian form—on the other. In some respect, we could see a similar affinity between liberalism or the possibly beneficial liberal footnotes to or reminders within republicanism that I am suggesting and some features of Ricoeurian hermeneutics. Pierre-Olivier Monteil summarizes as follows what he claims to be the political ideas with Ricoeur.

Liberalism affirms the autonomy of civil society. [...] The autonomy of civil society situate its members opposed to apolitism, inviting them to understand themselves as responsible of their citizenship that they have reached because of the society. The power exists once the people act together: the power vanishes once the citizens disperse, giving the space for violence then exercised by the vertical power to the degree that it lacks confidence. We find here the second formulation of the 'political paradox' combining the horizontal power to act together and the vertical axis of domination. This paradox explains the complementarity between the state and civil society and establishes the tension that unites liberalism and democracy in the double demand of limiting and distributing power.<sup>515</sup>

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<sup>515</sup> Monteil 2013, 176. Transl. by VS. from the following: “Le libéralisme affirme l’autonomie de la société civile. [...] L’autonomie de la société civile situe ses membres à l’opposé d’un apolitisme en les invitant à se comprendre comme responsables de la Cité et en devenir grâce à elle. Le pouvoir existe quand les hommes agissent ensemble; il s’évanouit quand ils se dispersent, cédant la place à la violence qu’exerce alors le pouvoir vertical à proportion de la confiance qui lui manque. On retrouve ici la deuxième formulation du ‘paradoxe politique’ qui associe pouvoir horizontal de l’agir en commun et axe vertical de la domination. Elle explicite la complémentarité entre Etat et société civile en établissant la tension qui unit libéralisme et démocratie dans la double exigence de limiter le pouvoir et de le distribuer”.

In Monteil’s account, we can recognize much of the republicanist ethos of citizenship as belonging to and participation in the society and state. Then again, there is even a sharp opposition of power of the state and the autonomy of the civil society and citizens. We approach the idea of “mixed and balanced government” with Sellers.

### **9.2.1 Operationalizing the Hegelian harmony as balances**

My notion of agnostic republicanism had its origin in some suspicions that we might have

- (1) as regards the assumption that the state is just and advances justice, and
- (2) as regards the degree to which we can assume that the citizens can be willing to pursue common good as well, thus also being capable of genuine solidarity.

My ‘agnosticism’ as regards republicanism came from sharing some of the suspicious with a liberalist. My intention, however, was not to deny entirely either of the assumptions subjected to doubt.

As regards remark (2) above particularly, my suspicion concerns the fact that it is so easy to see justice and the common good in ideas that somehow serve one’s own, egoist interests. One consequence of this suspicion could be that we should see—to a degree and in some sense, at least—the educational role of the state in a rather concrete manner as well. The state perhaps would and even should actually ‘tell’ or, at least, remind the citizens about matters that go beyond their private interests. The schools, public-service broadcasting and other forms of communication, universities, and perhaps even the library maintained by public authority could be parts of this reminding activity—each in the manner and style appropriate to it.

Once again, the authority constituting the educational rationality particularly in institutions and practices other than the directly educational ones could be an authority in the sense of having a say that people should listen to, rather than actual dictatorial power to which one should obey and with which one should agree. Such educational side of the state, in any case, would also add to the reasons to be suspicious as regards the state. We perhaps should think particularly about the possible liberal suspicion formulated by Neuhausser in the context of willfulness and true conscience (see Section 6.4.4[a]). As Neuhausser writes, it

could be “too easy for the Hegelian state to dismiss any disagreement with conventional norms, any criticism of existing social reality, as an expression of willfulness rather than the legitimate exercise of moral subjectivity”<sup>516</sup>.

According to Hegel, there should be a harmony between the individual citizens and the state. Sellers, as we saw, defined republicanism as “mixed and balanced government”. In my view, such balanced mixture with even some institutional structures could be a foundation for ‘operationalizing’ the harmony—as far as we can assume some actual difference between the notions. With the notion of balance, Sellers summarizes the essentials of republicanism as follows.

Essential elements of republican legal system include (in approximate order of importance): (1) pursuit of common good, through (2) popular sovereignty, and (3) the rule of law, under (4) a mixed and balanced government, comprising (5) a deliberative senate, (6) an elected executive, and (7) a popular assembly of representative lower house in the legislature. This secures “liberty”, a word that entered western political vocabulary to describe the status of citizens, protected by the republican institutions. Republican liberty signifies government in pursuit of the common good, when no citizen is subject to unfettered will of another.<sup>517</sup>

As opposed to liberalism, neither means this formulation of republicanism that the state is neutral. The state—in republicanist terms, according to Sellers as well—necessarily has a ‘message’ and represents some particular views of the common good, right and wrong, etc., incorporated in its institutions already, in the spirit of popular sovereignty. Then again, we might see with Sellers’ emphases that are particularly characteristic of what we could denote as the American republicanism of the “Founding Fathers” and the constitutional parlance of ‘checks and balances’<sup>518</sup>. Among the essential elements of republicanism with Sellers, the idea of balance manifests itself perhaps most concretely in the need of the “deliberative

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<sup>516</sup> Neuhauser 2000, 250.

<sup>517</sup> Sellers 1998, 99.

<sup>518</sup> Sellers’ characterization of republicanism as an idea of a “mixed and balanced government” probably echoes—to a degree, at least—the constitutional parlance and thinking in USA in terms of “checks and balances”. This, however, would not be very much in the spirit of republicanism as it could shape in view of the Hegelian premises and with a strong emphasis of popular sovereignty. (See, for instance, Kramnick 1988). In Sellers’ configuration, we actually can see the major bodies of the political system in USA, the Senate (5), the House of Representatives (7), and the President (6).

senate” that “moderates the swings of popular emotions”<sup>519</sup>. I would accentuate that neither would this role of the senate be necessarily undemocratic<sup>520</sup>.

We may well think that the core of democracy, particularly in a republicanist view, is the realization of people’s deliberate will, which can be a different matter than some swinging “popular emotions”. This would actually be a most illustrative example of a fundamental dialectics that necessarily is present within the state and particularly in the idea of popular sovereignty. Especially the Hegelian “rational state” incorporating *Sittlichkeit* should probably go beyond the swinging emotions. Related to this, of course, would be that the state indeed should be a process of *Bildung* that enables the citizens to deliberate and form a deliberate will. In concrete political practice, however, the result of a vote, for instance, should matter as such, even in cases where there might be reasons to assume that it does not reflect very deliberate views of the people. There must be formal rules according to which politics and administration functions. Even if those rules were only abstract, they would be rules to which the citizens can actually appeal.

I could not imagine a just state ruled by the people and actually advancing justice

- (1) without the substantial ‘message’ of the state, such as the Hegelian *Sittlichkeit*, dictated in the spirit of popular sovereignty by the will of the people or the “General Will” (*volonté générale*), as an allusion to Rousseau<sup>521</sup>,
- (2) without the foundation of formal legitimacy to which the citizens can actually appeal and which could contain some formal restrictions to the power of government and the state.

We even could say that the restrictions on the power of an assumingly democratic state in (2) could decrease—in some instances, at least—the democracy itself or weaken the actual say of the people and popular sovereignty. As such, this obviously would not be a very positive result. Then again, we could consider it as a

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<sup>519</sup> Sellers 1998, 100..

<sup>520</sup> The upper halls in many cases may have their historical origin in safeguarding the privileges of upper classes of the society, which as such, however, is not enough to make them categorically undemocratic.

<sup>521</sup> See, for instance, Rousseau 1762/s.a., 113 [Livre quatrième, Chapitre I].

‘price paid’ for some other good and justified aims. The ‘price paid’, then, would be an expression well illustrating the idea of balances.<sup>522</sup>

In any case, it would seem justified and plausible to consider republicanism itself as a view the essence of which even is the recognition of the necessity to reconcile and balance several possibly even sharply opposite rationalities any of which, however, we neither could nor should ignore. Such a view would quite clearly differ from reducing all to the interests and wishes of individuals in a liberalist vein, where the only remaining tension would be between the liberty of individuals—nearly as a mere *licentia*—and the fact that some amount of legislation, after all, is necessary.

In the spirit of the “mixed and balanced government, we could think that there perhaps should be a mixture and balance of the formal and even ‘sanctified’ principles and institutions each of which represents some particular good or right. The good or right represented in this way would remain only abstract—very much as the negative freedom is only an abstract form of liberty—and ultimately could become relative once one has to weight principles one against another in the context of concrete cases in the court of law or in administration, for instance.

One among the particular rights and freedoms coming very close to the rationality of L&Lship and possibly requiring such ‘sanctification’ could be the freedom of expression, which would connect to the idea of the library being for the authors as well. We could see it as a right that deserves some guarantee already as an abstract and negative freedom in the sense of a ban of censorship, though there often would be some restrictions to this even. This could be important—even if we should notice that because of economic inequality, for instance, the ban of censorship is not enough for guaranteeing an equally supported say to all the citizens.

In view of L&Lship, in any case, the republicanist view of the ‘message’ of the state, as opposed to the liberalist doctrine of neutrality of the state, is what matters in view of the intelligibility of the possible educational rationality of L&Lship in a politico-ethical perspective. The bibliographic rationality about *scriptum est*, in turn, would find at least a part of its foundation in formal princi-

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<sup>522</sup> Such restrictions could be beneficial and even necessary tools, but certainly not an automaton that could actually guarantee the common good, justice, or the rights of the citizens. Then again, neither could the liberalist principles actually guarantee anything like this—in spite of a possible opposite pretension.

ples such as the negative freedom of expression in the sense of the ban of censorship, for instance (pole 2).

### **9.2.2 An inevitable and valuable mixture of consensus and plurality, with L&Lship about scriptum est advancing the latter?**

A logical consequence of the republicanist premises is that consensus is quite a fundamental element in the logic and rationality of the state. The Hegelian *Sittlichkeit*, and even the Hegelian state with *öffentliche Meinung* as its existence, for instance, can exist only as far as there is some substantial consensus. Liberalism, in turn, cherishes the idea of pluralism. I would see some sense in both of these emphases.

If we think about the opposition of plurality of views and consensus on a quite practical or even functional level of social and political life—in socio-technological terms, we even could say—it is obvious that some reasonable amount of both of them should be present. A plurality of views and presence of alternatives probably serves change and development—which in some cases can be necessary even—as well as avoiding stagnation into some perhaps no more so adequate views and structures. On the other hand, no society or social system can survive without some consensus. Neither can any actual and intended change take place without some consensus. After the first phases of a plurality of views about the options that there are, a change requires decisions and acts. If the change should be somehow substantial, probably more than a single person should be acting for it, and this requires some consensus.

That there can be no community, society, or state totally without some consensus on some fundamental matters at least, in turn, would also be a strong argument against the liberalist claim of the neutrality of the state. There are also representatives of liberalism who are emphasizing this, to a degree, at least. John Rawls, among the most outstanding ones, talks about “overlapping consensus” consisting of agreement on “the basic structure of society”<sup>523</sup>. Based on this, then, pluralism could flourish. John S. Dryzek and Simon Niemeyer, in turn, talk about “meta-consensus” within *grosso modo* the same general frame of recognizing the

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<sup>523</sup> Rawls 1985. A fundamental question that Rawls is pondering is: “how is social unity to be understood, given that there can be no public agreement on the one rational good, and a plurality of opposing and incommensurable conceptions must be taken as given?” (Op. cit. 249.)



necessity of some fundamental consensus<sup>524</sup>. Within republicanist and particularly within Hegelian-republicanist thinking, however, the significance of consensus—an instance of which could be the Hegelian *Sittlichkeit*—could go far beyond this. In the Hegelian concepts, we actually could consider consensus as a moment of the notion of *Sittlichkeit*, which would be, in turn, the condition of the option of the successful morality of the individual moral subjects even, for instance (see Section 6.4.4[a]). The remarks here suggest that we probably should not think that there is an exclusive and sharp opposition between consensus and a plurality of views or pluralism.

Within the rationality of L&Lship, I would see particularly the bibliographically literary side with the truth criterion of *scriptum est* as the moment advancing the plurality of views. We could recognize the instances of *scriptum est* that there have been and their rights simply because they have been there as parts of the cultural, social, and political reality. We certainly could characterize as ‘objectivist’ this position. In spite of this, or even, because of this, it would add to the plurality of views if compared, for instance, to cultural ethos consisting of strict canons containing only what seems to be most valuable.

We could here shortly return to the views of Williams (see Section 8.3.2). His view of the hegemonic function of the “selective” traditions was that “within a particular hegemony, and as one of its decisive processes, this selection is presented and usually successfully passed off as ‘the tradition’, ‘the significant past’”. The obligation of *scriptum est* as the maxim of L&Lship and the library maintained in accordance with it, of course, and even in a rather banal sense, would provide us with the option to see also what the prevailing hegemony considers as insignificant and to consider whether such assumingly non-significant history as well, after all, might have some significance.<sup>525</sup>

Then again, an objectivism-critical view, which perhaps could even deny any status of the views that exists or has existed as parts of our reality, could add to plurality by encouraging us to interpret freely and by recognizing the justification

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<sup>524</sup> See for instance Dryzek & Niemeyer 2006, 635. The expression that they use is “meta-consensus”.

<sup>525</sup> While Marxist thought now and then tends to consider traditions as a form or hegemony only and, we actually can see here, once again, a possible beneficial ‘in-between’ position, which would no more be so banal. Even if Gadamer might be somewhat blind as regards the possible and often actual ideological twistedness of traditions, similarly ‘blind’ could be rigidly ‘class-aware’ ethos of developing ‘counter-cultures’. The only realistic as well as effective position would be, of course, somewhere in the middle and see the significance of both the ideological twistedness and common traditions as the foundation of rationality and rational and substantial criticism (cf. Section 3.4.3).

of all the different interpretations and understandings—possibly even as equally worthy. If we were interested merely in the number of views, we perhaps should go both ways, i.e. recognize carefully all said, written, or otherwise expressed in *scriptum est*, and in addition, all the interpretations of all of this. Then indeed, a plurality of views would flourish and triumph.

I would think, however, that L&Lship could best and in a manner most appropriate to it contribute the plurality of views by minding in a comprehensive and systematic manner about the multiplicity that there is and has been in *scriptum est* that actually exists or has existed. Recognizing the obligation of *scriptum est* as the formal foundation and maxim of L&Lship could already be beneficial. On the other hand, investing in the plurality, which the variety of interpretations could produce, might not be so effective, after all. The interpretations in our present, for instance, are perhaps not as original and diverse as we might assume. They rather could reflect the views that are ‘fashionable’ and possibly even ideologically dominant. In this respect, the focusing on *scriptum est* ‘as such’ and maintaining awareness of it and of all the various views presented there could contain a critical potential as regards the prevailing ‘fashions of interpretation’ and ideologies. In any case and above all, it would be the plausible task of L&Lship and have a foundation in what the libraries have been doing for centuries. Especially as far as we are considering libraries maintained professionally and possibly by public authority, some formal—even if also abstract—foundation would be appropriate to avoid choosing in an overly arbitrary manner the directions in which one then would be looking for the further plurality of views. Furthermore, while having some formal foundation, L&Lship can better reach some exhaustivity. Deliberately investing its resources to the sphere that is proper to it could help in the pursuits of L&Lship towards the plurality of views.

The library about *scriptum est* in a strict sense, further, can recognize even the varying interpretations—though only as far as the interpretations are literary in the sense of combining documentation to works or as far as they are parts of *scriptum est*. Commentary-type works, of course, would be the most obvious instances of this. Various intertextual relationships, for instance, could provide us with further examples.

What I am suggesting here would be a kind of a ‘rehabilitation of the facts’, which could also be a ‘medicine’ to the “moral means of coercion in the form of public opinion” (see Section 6.4.4 ) where the “public opinion” (not necessarily the same as the *Hegelian öffentliche Meinung*) would typically be an interpreta-

tion that has attained wide acceptance. Recognizing something said by someone already because someone has said it can give the critical views as well a status that such views would not have otherwise. The form of *scriptum est* of the said makes such recognition on a comprehensive level possible by means proper to the library. In this sense, the library about *scriptum est* can both

- recognize the rights of the authors, thus being and functioning even on behalf of *scriptum est* and the authors behind it, and
- advance the options of critical thought<sup>526</sup>.

Returning to my claim about the library for the state, my argument here would also mean recognizing something that can be critical as regards the state and its policies, for instance. On a superficial level, this could mean that the library would be against the state, rather than for it. Then again, even while maintaining awareness of views that are critical as regards the state, the library could be for the state as well if the state only takes seriously *öffentliche Meinung* as its own existence in the Hegelian sense. With its formal maxim of the obligation of *scriptum est*, the library—as well as literature as a more or less institutionalized practice—could approach, at least, the formal and particularly noteworthy levels of the Hegelian *öffentliche Meinung*, such as the estates.<sup>527</sup>

In view of the people's will becoming deliberate, finally, the educational rationality of L&Lship on behalf of *scriptum est* as well with its foundation in the Gadamerian rehabilitation of authority and tradition—which as such, of course, is quite substantial—would matter. We could consider the practices such as L&Lship and literature(s)—whether they were strongly institutionalized, semi-institutionalized, or just in some sense formal—in view of the dilemma of “the swings of popular emotions” as opposed to the deliberate will of the people. Not only the Senate as opposed to the House of Representatives but also literature and L&L-

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<sup>526</sup> I have no illusions, however, that all the possible views could become parts of *scriptum est*, let alone that they would be there in equal positions. The production of *scriptum est*, of course, is not innocent or free of ideological twistedness. The fact that *scriptum est* as the content of the library becomes from the long history, on the other hand, can better the situation. The library itself also can have policies of ‘positive discrimination’ that pay particular attention to parts of *scriptum est* that otherwise would remain in shadow but such policies should not disturb the fundamental maxim of telling the truth about *scriptum est*. The library should not become a propagandist.

<sup>527</sup> Hegel's on suspicious if not actually negative disposition as regards journalism makes my argument here a little problematic. We could assume, however, that Hegel while talking about journalism is talking about the newspapers as they were and appeared to him in his own time, rather than the institution of press as such.

ship about *scriptum est* with their formality—by side of educational or scholarly practices and as opposed to all the possible less formal and occasional chatting and common sense interpretations—could be advancing the move from the swinging emotions towards deliberate will. Even if the plurality there were decreasing—if compared to all the possible interpretation of all *scriptum est* and perhaps even without any connection to *scriptum est*—we perhaps should say that the plurality remaining could be more significant and noteworthy. Formality does not guarantee the quality of thought and less formal communication as well certainly has a value and even an indispensable role. Without any formal elements, however, communication hardly can reach maturity required by the formation of a deliberate will of the people in a democracy. Some sophisticated formality, on the other hand, could and perhaps should become and be a part of what we can consider as substantial even—particularly, perhaps, in view the ideals of what ultimately could qualify as the rational Hegelian state.

We could have here still another stepping order of the dominant ideas of popular sovereignty with their affinity with what Mäki denotes as the autonomous freedom, on one hand, and some formal principles more typically related to abstract ideas like the negative freedom, on the other. Partly at least, some a little agnostic and even in a banal sense reality-aware reasoning could warrant the latter though ultimately, the relationship would be in quite a substantial sense dialectical.

### **9.2.3 Additional remarks on the ‘margins’ of ‘for the case’ rights of the “individuals qua individuals” and on the rationality of L&Lship**

The fundamental opposition in argumentation by Pippin on the foundation of freedom and rights (see Section 6.4.4[b]) is between the Hegelian idea of “mutual recognition”, on one hand, and “the equality of worth of each, qua individual, on the other”<sup>528</sup>. The latter would prevail within the “liberal version of the state” while the former could be more typical of republicanism. The question is whether we should see the rights as well as equality that we should respect

- (1) as the results of particular intersubjective relationships and even of what an individual does while recognizing the rights of the others, or

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<sup>528</sup> Pippin 2006, 126.

- (2) as the rights of the “individuals qua individuals”, as belonging to anyone already because of being a human individual, i.e. as native and original, in a sense.

The foundation of option (2), quite obviously, is in a sense analogical with my claim that L&Lship should recognize pieces of *scriptum est* merely because of their being there. A kind of ‘rehabilitation of facts’ would be there, in both cases. Such a foundation could be conceptually somewhat problematic and in any case, everything claimed by various linguistic and pragmatic “turns”—as well as by Gadamer—would be there as foundations of methodological reservations. Connected to mutual recognition, on the other hand, we could have problems with the rights that the very small children probably should have—or the possible obligation that we could have to respect some (quasi-)rights of the animals even. In the case of the possible rights of the dead authors, we already encountered a somewhat similar problem. In this sense, could see some sense in option (2) as well of the above differentiation of foundations of rights—as a kind of a ‘just for the sake’ recognition of ‘as if’ rights or quasi-rights, at least, if not for other reasons. To avoid insulting the rights of anyone, we and particularly the state should perhaps ‘over-recognize’ rights even beyond what could be the result of the possible rational foundation of the rights in the form of mutual recognition. The demand of such ‘over recognizing’ even would be a rational maxim as far as we consider the avoidance of insulting the rights of anyone as a rational and primary aim. This, in turn, could be quite a plausible priority within the politico-ethical rationality, a priority that we perhaps should consider as most serious.<sup>529</sup>

Furthermore, as far as the state or we can recognize such a ‘marginal’, we perhaps should consider as absolute and inalienable the rights recognized within this ‘marginal’ as well—quite similarly to the rights recognizes otherwise. Such rights and obligations based on abstract and formal facts would certainly be abstract and formal in themselves as well. In all their formality and abstractness, in any case, they could help us to avoid insulting the rights of anyone.<sup>530</sup>

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<sup>529</sup> Within the domain of Human Rights, of course, we have good examples of such ‘sanctified’ principles, such as the rather universally accepted ban of torture or the categorical condemnation of capital punishment by Amnesty International and the Council of Europe, for instance.

<sup>530</sup> There could be—and probably are—some limits beyond which no state can go with such ‘just for the sake’ recognitions without risking to insult some other rights, for instance. There certainly are also some restrictions related to the paucity of material resources.

If we stuck in a very rigid manner to the republicanist refutation of the neutrality of the state and indispensability of the ‘message’ of the state, such as the Hegelian *Sittlichkeit*, we could end with quite an odd notion of the ‘pluralism of unequals’. In view of sociology, such inequality probably is inevitable and equality would remain a mere illusion. In view of morality and advancing justice, however, the case could be different. While emphasizing the ‘message’ of the state, we could think that what is closer to this ‘message’ would also be somehow more noteworthy. We could make this less restricting by requiring only relevance as regards the message instead of conformity. Noteworthy counter-arguments as well could then have a justification. Even then, however, the result could be a kind of agenda power of the state beyond what might be acceptable or beneficial. Then again, the ‘message’ of the state would be the foundation of the option that the state actually can advance justice in a concrete manner. In this respect, as odd as it might seem, even the ‘pluralism of unequals’ could have some value in view of morality and advancing justice—as a prerequisite of something else that has value.

In this sense, we perhaps should accept both the republicanist fundamentals and an abstract and formal maxim of *prima facie* equality of the views that there are—even if the latter might seem somewhat ‘liberalist’. The obligation of *scriptum est* in the sense of a criterion of truth, certainly, is a foundation of a maxim that is formal, abstract, and even neutral. The educational rationality on behalf of *scriptum est* as a plausible companion of L&Lship about *scriptum est*, on the other hand, would bring into the L&Lship about *scriptum est* some life and substantiality.

To end with the thematic of political theory and philosophy, it is useful to summarize shortly which elements of republicanism proper and which liberal—in some cases perhaps even liberalist—ingredients would belong to my agnostic republicanism.

- (1) Not only as a necessity of the sociology of politics but also in view of genuine morality and advancing justice, and in this sense, in view of genuine politics, there should be the evolving ‘message’ of the state, such as the Hegelian *Sittlichkeit* that the state incorporates.
- (2) Since the state can also be somewhat suspect and untrustworthy in advancing justice, *Sittlichkeit*, etc., however, particular means of maintaining a wide plurality and even an unquestioned *prima facie* equality of various views as well

as laws, institutions, and other structures supporting particular aspects of individual liberty, even if only abstractly and as negative, would also have value. Typically connected to negative freedom, clear commands to and bans of particular acts of the state could be particularly effective in this sense; to such laws, the citizens could actually appeal.

The formal structures suggested in (2) would be only tools possibly advancing—rather than actual automata leading to—justice and good government. Then again, I find it in quite a formal sense appropriate to suggest that the state with its ‘message’ should be tolerant of dissidence and create an even formal, constitutional, and institutional foundation and maxims for this. Ban of censorship could be the formally legal counterpart of such good and tolerant aspirations.

As regards the rationality of L&Lship, finally,

- (1) would be the foundation of the educational rationality on behalf of *scriptum est* while
- (2) would be the foundation of the bibliographic rationality about *scriptum est* where the obligation of *scriptum est* would appear as a criterion of truth even and would be, in a sense, a formal and abstract rule and principle.

In the social division of labor, then, the task of the library would primarily connect to the somewhat formal and even abstract side of minding about the plurality. Ultimately, this could be the foundation of a part of the educational dimension of L&Lship as well. Particularly if we took seriously the Hegelian view of *öffentliche Meinung* as the existence of the state, the library working with *öffentliche Meinung* would be working for the state as well—though not necessarily on behalf of the state in some overly concrete sense.

### **9.3 Maintaining the rationalities that are reachable for the humans: the paradigmatic instance of Bultmannian exegetics**

Returning to Ricoeur, we can see a figure of thought that is somewhat analogical with my above remarks on the significance of the principles, rules, or laws to which the people actually could appeal. The metaphoric reference to the fate of Moses with Ricoeur (see Section 4.4) could be an allegory of the human condition. A result of this would be that the rationality that the humans can reach is perhaps always partial and particular while the merge of understanding and being—or of epistemology and ontology—remains a horizon only. With Ricoeur, as

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we have seen, distances, distanciation, and alienation are permanent companions in our being as humans.<sup>531</sup>

In view of a fundamental experience of the incompleteness of being as a human that we could have, Ricoeur's argumentation here appears rather plausible. Without taking any conclusive stance on such fundamental questions, however, we can assume that partial and particular rationalities as well do matter and ignoring them could be somewhat reckless. The fundamental rationalities or the rationality of history or even more solemnly founded rationalities—if we assumed such—would remain only as “horizons” and not entirely conceivable for us. This could imply that the life and cultures of the humans as such inevitably consist of particular practices only or mostly, at least—even if there always is the horizons of being and its merge with the understanding that the humans actually cannot reach. Be this matter as it is, the general mentality of the Ricoeurian way to think encourages us to pay attention to particularities and ‘regionalities’. We also saw in Section 4.1 how Ricoeur contrasted philosophy and reason while commenting on Hegel's view of philosophy, which “comes always too late”. In my view, this manifests his view that the rationalities that we can concretely reach and maintain are always particular.

In this respect, Ricoeur's comments on Rudolf Bultmann's existentialist exegesis—particularly, on Bultmann's notion of “demythologization”—interestingly enough illustrates the tension between Ricoeur and Gadamer as well. Gadamer as well actually refers to Bultmann but as it seems, without any serious reservations<sup>532</sup> while Ricoeur is more critical.

Demythologization with Bultmann basically means that a mythic text is taken in a ‘deeper’ meaning where there are no more mythological elements, no so-

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<sup>531</sup> As regards the emphasis of the alienation that we cannot avoid with Ricoeur—an openly Christian and more particularly, a Protestant philosopher—we could have a temptation to look for some affinity between his perseverance on this matter and the Christian doctrine of original sin. Original sin, of course, is a particularly significant notion in Lutheran Reformation with its affinity with the Augustinian theology. Certainly, this would be a most complicated matter (see for instance Kearney 2006 and Mann 1998). We perhaps should avoid concluding in an overly straightforward manner from the Augustinian-Lutheran lines of thought. Corneliu C. Simut (2009, 122–123), however, writes that with Ricoeur, “man is a dual being in the sense that it is ontologically confronted with the disproportion between the polarity of finitude and the polarity of infinitude.” Anticipating our discussion on politico-ethical rationalities in Part II or this treatise, another remark by Simut (*op. cit.*, 125) is relevant. “Resorting to psychoanalysis and political philosophy does not mean breaking up with religion and theology—it is actually the other way around. Psychoanalysis and political philosophy continue what religion and theology initiated by symbolically presenting the reality of human alienation”.

<sup>532</sup> See for instance Gadamer 1960/1992, 295.



called ‘supernatural’ or occult events, for instance. Since Bultmann is a Christian exegete, the text would be the Bible. According to Ricoeur, ”demythologization as the work of science” with Bultmann would mean that a person educated by science can pass by, in a sense, what he or she cannot accept on the level of a mythic story with various mythical events and beings. Thereby, he or she can find what the mythic text actually could mean in a deeper, typically religious sense. Similarly, there can be the ”demythologization as the work of philosophy”, where a philosophically educated interpreter can find within a mythic story a philosophically intelligible message after erasing the mythological content. With Bultmann, there are some historically recognizable steps of demythologization of and within the Judeo-Christian kerygma, such as

- the New Testament as a demythologization of the Old Testament and
- Reformation as a demythologization of Catholicism.

The final demythologization, we perhaps could say, would be the personal existential decision or “decision of faith”, which is no more a step that we could recognize in history, however.<sup>533</sup>

In demythologizations “as the work” of science and philosophy, according to Ricoeur, there is not necessarily anything specifically Christian, as opposed to the last one, which would be typically a demythologization of faith, and it connects to the specific tradition of Christianity—a representative of which Bultmann himself is—i.e. the tradition of Apostle Paul, St. Augustine, and Martin Luther. With Bultmann particularly, however, the last phase, as a ”decision of faith”, would perhaps give a sense to all the other phases as well. Ricoeur thus can write that Bultmann speaks in turn as a scientist, as an existential philosopher, and as a man of faith or a ”listener to the Word”—or “*en disciple de Paul et de Luther*”. In the last phase, “he preaches; he makes the Gospel heard” (“... *il preche. Oui, il preche, il fait entendre l’Evangile*”)<sup>534</sup>.

Bultmann’s view in itself is fascinating, and there is some substantial resemblance with some features of the Gadamerian thought. With Bultmann, the life comes into a tradition from our personal relation to it, from our actual being or our ”existential decision”, which could correspond, at least partly, to the Gadamerian notion of application. Something that draws our attention—but first seems somehow strange, unacceptable to reason, and mythic—becomes intelligible,

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<sup>533</sup> Ricoeur 1969/1974, 388 ff. and Ricoeur 1969, 380 ff.

<sup>534</sup> Ricoeur 1969/1974, 393 and Ricoeur 1969, 385.

after all, and can actually speak to us. It seems that we can interpret it as it best convinces us and answers our own questions. It inevitably seems to me that with both Bultmann and Gadamer, there is some arbitrariness and space for a kind of voluntarism—even if we have seen how Gadamer himself quite explicitly tells us that we must not understand meanings “in an arbitrary way” (see Section 4.2.3[b]).

One of the problems with the Bultmannian phases of demythologization, according to Ricoeur, is that the result of the last demythologization with Bultmann seems to cease being a text. Ricoeur first remarks that the result of the process of demythologization should be another language, the language of faith that expresses the religious understanding. A point of Ricoeur that I especially wish to bring out here is, however, that if demythologization and exegesis do not result in something that is a text with significations—as the case would be with Bultmann, according to Ricoeur—one cannot say anything anymore and there actually can be no intelligence of faith. (*“Il faut dire alors que la signification non mythologique du mythe n’est plus du tout de l’ordre de la signification, que, avec la foi, il n’y a plus rien à penser, rien à dire.”*<sup>535</sup>.)

We here perhaps could illustrate still in another way the tension between the Gadamerian and Ricoeurian thoughts, in view of what the notion of language—which as such is pivotal for both of them—would mean. With Gadamer, we perhaps could say that the language merges with the world, history, traditions, and our being and hermeneutical experience. With Ricoeur, in turn, the language would be a particular and concrete part of our (literary) cultural world. The logic with Ricoeur seems to be, furthermore, that on this level only, we actually could say and argue something. In this sense, it perhaps is an indispensable level of particular rationalities, which we should maintain. Here, once again, we could see the dialectics of the events and meanings (see Section 5.1.4) with a fine but decisive line of demarcation.

What Bultmann is suggesting is a kind of a story telling how alienation disappears from religious thought. For rationality among the humans, however, there must be a language. A result of this is that there would be alienation and distance as well. Consequently, where all alienation, distance, and distancing disappear, also a particular kind of rationality, at least, would disappear. We could characterize this rationality as discursive since it would consist of our option to say some-

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<sup>535</sup> Ricoeur 1969, 388.

thing in the form of particular arguments responding to particular criteria of validity, step-by-step.

#### 9.4 Still another instance of agnosticism: a Cartesian epilog to the properly philosophical reasoning

The remarks so far should be enough for the conclusions that I shall summarize as the cultural, social, and political philosophy of L&Lship in Section 10.1. I shall continue a little further, however, partly in order to anticipate and preliminarily respond to some counter-arguments that my argumentation here could raise, partly to make sharper my arguments of the inevitable dialectics of the Ricoeurian kind while scrutinizing the conditions of our being and even the rationality of L&Lship.

In Section 7.2.3, we saw Ricoeur ‘rehabilitating’ even the Cartesian doubt, and we perhaps could see in his thought—in addition to his “*kantisme post-hégélien*” (see Section 4.1)—even a kind of ‘*un Cartésianisme post-hégélien*’. We are not here talking about the ‘surface Cartesianism’ that typically appears while someone makes critical remarks on “Cartesian monologism”, “Cartesian subject-object dichotomy”, or the rigid dualism of *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, etc.<sup>536</sup>—even if such simplified versions of the Cartesian thought are quite typical particularly once Descartes himself has become the “postmodernist’s bogeyman”<sup>537</sup>. With Ted Peters, for instance, we can find quite a typical instance of superficially dualism-critical reading of Descartes.

This false picture of reality, which modern science has inherited, issues primarily from the “turn to the subject” by Descartes and the Enlightenment. Here, reality is broken by a fundamental split between the understanding subject and the objects of the world external to it; there is a subjectivity dwelling within itself (*res cogitans*) independent of an external world of objects out there (*res extensa*).<sup>538</sup>

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<sup>536</sup> See, for instance, Tuominen 2000, Mingers 2001, Capurro 1992.

<sup>537</sup> Guss 1991, 1156. Charles Guignon’s and David R. Hiley’s (2003, 6) remark shows how a ‘standard interpretation’ of Descartes made him scapegoat of all the sins of Modernity. “In retrospect, we can see that Rorty’s eliminative materialism [...] was actually an attempt to undermine the entire modern (Cartesian) philosophical tradition that organized the world in terms of mind and matter.

<sup>538</sup> Peters, 1975, pp. 38–39.

#### 9.4.1 “Positivisme scientifique” ensuing from a particularly Cartesian form of agnosticism?

A noteworthy part of the philosophical significance of Descartes certainly is that he is one of the major classics of modern philosophy of the subject. He also is very much a philosopher of the human subject and his or her imperfectness, however. In this respect, the following remarks on Descartes’ thought could be useful as an introduction.

- (1) Dualism itself with Descartes is a much more fundamental matter than a simple distinction between two substances, *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, or of mind and body, for instance. There is, in addition, the dualism of will and understanding (*volonté* and *l’entendement*<sup>539</sup>, Lat. *voluntas* and *intellectus*), accompanied by the dualism of judgment and ideas, and both of these additional dualisms have to do with the constitution of human knowledge<sup>540</sup>. We should perhaps consider these dualisms as the most fundamental ones. In a sense, they are ‘inside’ *res cogitans*, so to speak, and therefore, reducing the Cartesian thought into the dualism of mind and body starts to seem most problematic and superficial.
- (2) Even if theological or religious concepts could appear strange for the ‘scientific’ minds around the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries, we certainly should not ignore the notion of God with a philosopher like Descartes. The impossibility of reaching adequately the inner logic of his thought would be the result of ignoring God. Here we particularly should notice that God with Descartes is also an epistemological principle, the foundation of our capacity to know. According to Descartes, we can know by means of “the natural light of reason once situated in us” (*lumine quidam in nos insito*) by God<sup>541</sup>. God also is with Descartes the third substance reuniting what the other dualisms

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<sup>539</sup> Descartes, 1647/1978, 39

<sup>540</sup> I should remark here that exceptionally within LID-studies, Olof Sundin and Jenny Johannisson (2005, 26) would approach—even if perhaps not actually reach—realizing this while writing that according to Descartes, knowledge is “something that is attained through ideas, ideas being objects of thought in the individual mind and objects of thought being mental pictures reflecting objects in the outer world”. Neither the dialogue of will and ideas nor *lumen naturalis* as another kind of ideas nor the dialectics arising from this seem to have their due position in understanding of the Cartesian thought by Sundin and Johannisson either.

<sup>541</sup> Descartes, 1701/1965, 383.

distinguish and seemingly in a fatal and ‘irreparable’ manner separate from each other.<sup>542 543</sup>

- (3) What we particularly should notice here is that our knowledge of God and all other knowledge that we could have differ from each other in a fundamental manner with Descartes. According to him, we can know, but not conceive of God. Conceiving of is to “embrace by thought” while for knowing a thing, “touching it by thought” is enough (“*car comprendre, c’est embrasser de la pensée; mais pour sçavoir vne chose, il suffit de la toucher de la pensée*”<sup>544</sup>). This would lead to still another kind of agnosticism, to the Cartesian *l’agnosticisme chrétien*, which as such, of course, is closest to the typical context of the notion of agnosticism among the forms so far discusses.<sup>545</sup>

Still related to remark (3) above, Maurice Blondel—a French philosopher from the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century—writes most insightfully about the results of “Christian agnosticism” (*agnosticisme chrétien*) with Descartes:

The center of gravity of Cartesianism ... is on the axis of symmetry that permits Descartes’ Christianity to balance and even elicit, as if it were its counterpart, the development of his scientific positivism.<sup>546</sup>

The historically significant positivism towards which the agnosticism that we can find with Descartes paves the way would certainly approach what one typically

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<sup>542</sup> Rather than as a dualist, indeed, we can see Descartes as a ‘triadist’, as far as we do not violently erase God from his philosophy—albeit even this would be a most superficial way to characterize his thought. His thought, in any case, consists of (i) the human subject or *res cogitans*, (ii) *res extensa* or, as Laberthonnière formulates, “*l’objet en basse*”, i.e. the ‘earthly’ objects that actually include parts or *res cogitans* even, and (iii) “*l’objet en haute*”, God, or the third substance behind the others and explaining their relationship, in a sense.. (See Laberthonnière 1935, 5–9. More on Descartes’ thought in these respects, cf. Suominen 2008 and 2016, for instance.) We perhaps should notice how Descartes particularly—albeit shortly and as if in passing—writes that the mind is not in the body like the captain in a ship (“...*il ne suffit pas, quelle soit logée dans le cors humain ainsi qu’un pilote en son navire*”). Rather, the mind and body are “more closely” united (“*jointe & unie plus estroitement*,” (Descartes, 1637/1658, 59).

<sup>543</sup> We perhaps should notice how Descartes particularly—albeit shortly and as if in passing—writes that the mind is not in the body like the captain in a ship (“...*il ne suffit pas, quelle soit logée dans le cors humain ainsi qu’un pilote en son navire*”). Rather, the mind and body are “more closely” united (“*jointe & unie plus estroitement*,” (Descartes, 1637/1658, 59)

<sup>544</sup> Descartes, 1930/1969, p. 152.

<sup>545</sup> More on Descartes’ thought in these respects, cf. Suominen 2008 and 2016, for instance.

<sup>546</sup> Blondel 1896, 557. Transl. by VS from the following: “Le centre de gravité du cartésianisme ... se trouve sur l’axe de symétrie qui permet au christianisme de Desartes de compenser et même de provoquer, comme pour en être le contrepois, le développement de son positivisme scientifique”.

denotes as the technical rationality dominating the modern science. Blondel claims about Descartes that “more than anyone, he is a positivist” (*positiviste, il l’est plus que personne*), and the ultimate ethos of Cartesian thought would be as follows, according to Blondel.

It is the initial purpose, because the supreme interest of philosophy is in the successful conduct of life and in the progress of our earthly conditions, apart from immortality that is a truth of faith.<sup>547</sup>

Descartes, on his part, would seem to help such positivism get rid of all theological elements that are characteristic of medieval knowledge of nature<sup>548</sup>.

#### **9.4.2 ‘Positivism’ as a subordinate moment to hermeneutics and belonging to history even?**

In view of hermeneutics, the Cartesian “*positivisme scientifique*” as such hardly could be a part of the rationality proper to the humanities, i.e. the rationality of preserving and fostering, listening-to, and cultivating what the history has handed down to us, with its foundation in our being as being since the past (see Section 3.5.3). Neither would it be very consistent with humanism as an actual life stance and philosophy of life—though we probably should appreciate the genuinely philanthropic ethos with Descartes.

In spite of this, the argument with Blondell about the Cartesian “*agnosticisme chrétien*” accompanied by “*positivisme scientifique*” could enlighten hermeneutics as well, perhaps most typically along the lines that we can see with Ricoeur. Then again, Gadamer as well quite explicitly concluded from the claim of history never becoming transparent that “To exist historically means that knowledge of oneself can never be complete” (see Section 4.2.3[c]). With Gadamer as well, there is a kind of agnosticism as regards history. Descartes claims that we cannot conceive of God who made our capacity to know. Similarly, we could rephrase

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<sup>547</sup> Blondel 1896, 560. Transl. by VS from the following :”il l’est par le but d’abord : car l’intérêt suprême de la philosophie réside dans la sagesse pratique, dans la conduite heureuse de la vie, dans le progrès de notre condition terrestre, abstraction faite de l’immortalité qui est une vérité de foi.”

<sup>548</sup> Laberthonnière depicts the opposition of the medieval and modern science with some eloquence. Before the modern “physics of an engineer” (*une physique d’ingénieur*), there was the medieval “physics of an artist” (*une physique d’artiste*). While considers the nature as “*bonne a posséder*”, the former is going on in terms of the causes and effects while the latter considered the nature as a manifestation of God’s miraculous grace and in this sense, as something that is “*belle à voir*”.( Laberthonnière 1935,288-289.)

Gadamer's claim as a denial of the option that we could 'embrace' or entirely conceive of the history that made us<sup>549</sup>. In both cases, the result would be that we could not entirely understand and conceive of ourselves. Particularly, we could not conceive of entirely our capacity to know, understand, or conceive of anything. On a more general level, we could formulate this as follows. A person should never be very sure about him/herself since he or she could not conceive of entirely the history that made him or her. As regards the Ricoeurian thought, we could assume that the need of hermeneutics of suspicion already implies that a human cannot be so sure about him/herself. He or she has some reasons to be suspicious.

We could claim that there is even with Descartes a history as a foundation of our capacity to know, but it would be the 'once and for all' history of creation. One of the conceptually noteworthy differences between the historicity of our being within hermeneutics and the Cartesian thought relates to Descartes' view that God is eternal and not changing<sup>550</sup>. Within the 'real' history, changes tend to take place, of course. Consequently, as far as we assume that history has 'made' us, we also should assume that different phases of the 'real' history, as well as the histories in various cultural spheres, have 'made' us differently and different, in some respects. Returning to the 'once and for all' history of Descartes, there would be neither the moments of accident characteristic of the 'real' history nor change, which together could even result in some incongruities of the rationalities among the humans and between their cultures, for instance.

With neither Ricoeur nor Gadamer could we assume to find any positivism in the sense of Auguste Comte's *l'esprit positif* replacing earlier stages of religion or philosophy as the dominant rationalities and forms of intelligence<sup>551</sup>. Neither would there be positivism in the sense of the analytical and/or empiricist self-understanding and philosophy of modern science in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. There could

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<sup>549</sup> I have elaborated in another publication (Suominen 2016) this somewhat provocative argument.

<sup>550</sup> See, for instance, Descartes 1647/1978, 84.

<sup>551</sup> See Comte 1844, 1 ff.. Comte depicts the advancing from theological, via metaphysical, to positive, then depicting the last of these as follows. "La pure imagination perd alors irrévocablement son antique puprématie mentale, et se subordonne nécessairement à l'observation, de manière à constituer un état logique plainement normal, sans cesser néanmoins d'exercer, dans les spéculations positives, un office aussi capital qu'inépuisable, pour créer ou perfectionner les moyens de liaison, soit définitive, soit provisoire" (op. cit. 13). Neither would Comte, then, reduce knowledge entirely to observation, though the fundamental *esprit positif* remains even after the concession made by him to "speculation".

be, however, some ‘positivism’ of another kind, legitimized or perhaps rehabilitated because of an agnosticism of a kind or another.

Such ‘positivism’ would be only a moment—and in a substantial sense, only a subordinate moment—manifesting itself as an intermediate phase within the hermeneutical rationality and intelligence. It would be *only* positivism and *only* science, and the observations as their foundation would be *only* observations that could lead to knowledge *only*.<sup>552</sup> The dialectics that there should be between the interests in knowledge and in communication within the history according to Ricoeur (see Section 7.2.3) quite clearly indicates how the ‘positivism’ with him, for instance, should be open to rationality proper of hermeneutics, rather than an in itself sufficient and in this sense, we could say, ‘a stand-alone’ form of scientific rationality.

Ensuing from the quite explicit agnosticism as regards history with Gadamer as well, in any case, the actual history for a human could remain, at least partly, a kind of *observable signs or symptoms only* of the history that made him or her. A person would have signs and symptoms only of what he or she actually is and what is the foundation of all the understandings that he or she might have. Particularly for this reason, however, such signs and symptoms could be most noteworthy. As regards Ricoeur, we could say that he only makes more explicitly what Gadamer’s view as well in this particular respect could imply. Moses who never was able to enter *la terre promise* (see Section 4.1) had no option but to look at, or observe, it from a distance. The one who cannot actually reach or enter the matter itself has to be satisfied with the signs and symptoms that he or she can see or otherwise receive since they could tell something, in any case.

There then could be an interest in facts and states of affairs as such even. We even could think that any particular questions or horizons opened by some partic-

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<sup>552</sup> Among other things, this has to do with my remark above about knowledge as a restricted form of intelligence (Section 3.5.1[b]). We could here make further remarks of somewhat speculative nature on the notion itself of knowledge. Theological vocabulary being opened by the Cartesianism-critical argumentation within various fields of the humanities and cultural and social studies, including LID, and particularly by necessity of some critical remarks on the very notion of Cartesianism behind such criticism, we could formulate as follows, deglorifying further the notion of knowledge. An omnipotent would have no reason to know, at least as far as we consider the instrumental rationalities of knowledge, which would be proper to what Gadamer, for instance, denotes as modern science. An omniscient, furthermore, would have no reasons to make doubtful questions. In this sense, the very notion of knowledge and our need to know would be a kind of symptom of an existential incompleteness, rather than of perfection, in our being as humans. Consequently, the self-understanding of an omnipotent and omniscient perhaps could avoid the Cartesian fallacies, but for us as humans, any attempt in such direction could be somewhat arrogant.



ular books, for instance, could be a kind of a sign and symptom—but only a sign and symptom—of the history that made us and the horizons and questions that we perhaps should appropriate. While aiming at *Bildung* in the Gadamerian sense (cf. Section 3.3.2[b]), we ultimately should be pursuing for such horizons and questions as a part of appropriating what the history has handed down to us and what we are, consequently. The existence of some particular books—or of some particular signs and symptoms—however, would be a most primitive historical fact, and the possible significance and value of those particular signs and symptoms could depend on some other facts behind them and states of affairs “out there” in the past.

Among other things, my reasoning here could lead to some conclusions that would belong to the sphere of morality. If what we are is for in this sense as signs, symptoms, and as probably ultimately imperfect observations only, declaring our own interpretations to be the Reason of History, however, would be most arrogant as well as voluntarist. This could matter even if in the spirit of Gadamer, we probably should assume that there actually exists nothing like the (assumingly) Hegelian—or quasi-Hegelian—transcendent Reason and Truth of the History<sup>553</sup>. We probably should assume that such a reason would actually exist only quite immanently in “ongoing conversations”—as an allusion to the constructionist parlance (see Section 4.2.2).<sup>554</sup>

The reasoning here becomes particularly significant once we move from an individual person to human communities. If one person considers his or her interpretations and understandings as the Reason and Truth of the History, it can be a little sad. If a human community—let alone the state—makes the same without recognizing the logic of the signs and symptoms, we already could have an arrogant culture with a Great Truth that leaves no room for discussions and appealing to other signs and symptoms than those prevailing in the interpretation and understanding that has become the Great Truth.

With Descartes, the warning of arrogance would be most obvious—even if its form may appear as archaic. While thinking in theological or religious manner, it would be quite plausible to think that a human must not be very arrogant in front of God. Within hermeneutics and even particularly with Gadamer, then, we could

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<sup>553</sup> We could have here still another difference between Descartes and, for instance, Gadamer. As far as Descartes’ agnosticism is *chretien*, we perhaps should not assume it to be actually atheistic.

<sup>554</sup> The case of Bultmann and Ricoeur’s critical remarks there could have relevance here. How could there be any ongoing conversation if there were no more anything that we could say or *rien à dire*?

see an option of an analogical, yet perfectly secular reasoning. My agnostic republicanism, in turn, would be a warning of the dangers of the arrogance of the state, rather than of arrogance of humanism directly. Then again, especially while considering notions of state like the one based on Hegelian premises, the danger of the possible arrogance of the state and the danger of arrogant humanism are not so remote from each other. A non-arrogant state should perhaps consider as quite legitimate the fact that its citizens can have some suspicions as regards what the state with its ‘message’ is suggesting—and perhaps contain in its Constitution some even relatively formal paragraphs and principles that could give some support to the right to be suspicious as well. Similarly, a non-arrogant humanist would accept what a person or a community reaches from history and its sense is symptoms and signs only. This would leave space for suspicion and consequently, for arguing by appealing to those signs and symptoms—even if such appealing and argumentation could have a somewhat ‘positivistic’ appearance.

#### ***9.4.3 A remark on the mentality and the “germ de la vie moral” proper to the rationality sui generis of L&Lship***

There is a particular reason for which I advanced rather far—to Descartes and Cartesian thought even—with the thematic of ‘agnosticism’. We can conceive of L&Lship as a practical instance of the humanities. L&Lship, furthermore, quite plausibly combines even with the cultural ideals called humanism. The Cartesian agnosticism as well as the ‘agnosticism’ that we could find with Gadamer as regards the sense of history, however, could quite effectively warn us of dangers of what we could see as an arrogant and overly self-confident form of humanism. My short Cartesian excursion above already serves to illustrate in quite a sharp

manner what the Ricoeurian kind of dialectics could mean<sup>555</sup>. Taken together with the Gadamerian remarks against the assumingly Hegelian (or quasi-Hegelian) position, serious consideration on such dialectics could vaccinate us against a kind of arrogance of assuming that our own interpretations and understandings could reach some assumed Reason and Truth of the History—let alone the Divine Will.

Avoiding arrogance could well qualify as a part of “the germ of moral life” (*le germe de la vie morale*) constituting “the living principle” of a philosophical doctrine, according to Laberthonnière (see the beginning of Chapter 1). Here, the philosophical doctrine would be one reflecting on L&Lship. We could think that arrogant humanism would not be the appropriate mentality of L&Lship.

The practice of L&Lship about *scriptum est* and taking seriously the obligation of *scriptum est* as a criterion or truth as well would be in accordance with what a careful historian is actually doing while thoroughly scrutinizing the sources that could tell about what actually has happened<sup>556</sup>. This could contest the established, canonized, prevailing, and perhaps even ideological interpretations of history. In terms of the Ricoeurian metaphor of ascending and descending paths (see Section 4.1), the librarians could be the wanderers of the descending path, the above imagined historian as their companion, and thus be reminding the rest of the society about the significance that actual historical facts might have. A part of the mentality or the concern neither of the librarian nor of our historian would be

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<sup>555</sup> I should remark here that it would not be accurate to characterise Ricoeur as a Cartesian—or ‘blame’ him for Cartesianism. He makes quite explicitly critical comments on Descartes, such as the claim according to which “Before the subject consciously and willingly posits himself, he has already been placed in being at the instinctual level” (Ricoeur 1969/1974, 243-244). We should notice, however, that even with Descartes himself, there is even before the *cogito* a being, which is not only formal and empty and which conditions even the *cogito*. We actually could conceive of all that the Cartesian *prima philosophia* suggests as a kind of practical truths required because *iudicare necesse est*—in a somehow Kantian manner, as the conditions of the very possibility of knowledge (cf., for instance, Keeling, 1934/1968, 291 n. 4, but also the reservations by Beck 1952/1970, 73). This all remains, however, rather archaic: there is no genuine history but only the once and for all history or creation. Even if Ricoeur did not wish to be a Cartesian, the case could be that Descartes was more ‘Ricoeurian’ than one typically realizes, after all.

<sup>556</sup> I perhaps should remark here that I am not talking about the investigation of history or historians in general but about a particular though probably also typical kind of historians, about those of them who carefully, perhaps even in a Rankean spirit, are collecting data to reconstruct parts of what actually has been and happened in the past and thus contributing to the basic story of history. In spite of all theoretical ambitions that historical investigation can contain as well as all the reservations that one could put forward as regards our options to produce complete representations of the past, such ‘story compiling’ as well probably belongs to the of the historians.

the “obsessive concern with radicality” (see Section 4.1). Once faced with overly theoretical attitudes and ideas, the librarian could say: ‘*well, then again, we perhaps should remind that X, Y, and Z as well wrote something about this matter*’. Such an attitude and disposition, of course, could be a nearly self-evident part of the ethos of scholarly discourses, for instance, but we could also think that L&Lship—here as a part of the scholarly practices and of their infrastructure—would be the instance particularly accentuating such attitude and disposition within those practices. The practice of L&Lship and particularly the knowledge that it requires and produces—its inner *Bildung*—would be in a substantial sense enumeration, indeed.

This particularly, as well as advancing similar disposition even more widely within communities and societies, could be the task of L&Lship in maintaining and advancing erudition and *Bildung*. Rather than being in service of whatever knowledge and interpretations that there could be, the part and the mission most proper to the practice of L&Lship—following from the notion of the library that I have been elaborating here—would be to serve knowledge about the facts of and around *scriptum est*. The practice of L&Lship would be a bibliographically educational practice about as well as on behalf of *scriptum est*. This could be quite a dignified service, I assume.

The remarks made in the previous section and here have to do with my promise of a conception of L&Lship with the rationality *sui generis* already in the additional title of this treatise. We should not subordinate—at least not in a self-evident manner—the rationality of L&Lship to rationality of any other practice about and around documentation, communication, and knowledge. The reader might wonder whether I just above subordinated the rationality of L&Lship to the rationality of the modest historians only interested in what actually has been “out there” in the past. Then again, as far as we subordinate or in a smoother sense, analogize the rationality of L&Lship to or with something else, I actually would consider the analogy between L&Lship and our careful historian more appropriate than subordination to the (resource-)userist rationalities within LID-studies.

Then again, there certainly are differences as well between librarianship and the work of the kind of historians that I used as an analogy. The library would primarily focus on histories like *historia literaria*, documentation history, and the history of *scriptum sense* in the sense that this notion has had in this treatise. Furthermore, the approach of L&Lship would be wide and for this very reason, often relatively superficial as well, even in the most richly content-oriented forms of it.

The history focused on by the bibliography, furthermore, would be a relatively 'silent' thread within, though not separate from, the 'bigger' and perhaps 'louder' history around it.

## 10 Concluding and complementary remarks

My (quasi-)Kantian question was about the conditions of intelligibility in the cultural, social, and political philosophy of the rationality of the notion of L&Lship about *scriptum est*. I shall start my concluding remarks with a summary of this.

While proceeding to the concluding remarks as regards the constitution of the rationality of L&Lship, we should keep in mind the distinction that I made between the notion of the library in a general and the special-purpose libraries. Actual libraries or library services often are what I denote as special-purpose libraries, having their function in the context of some wider but still concrete cultural, social, or political practice. In such cases, it is quite legitimate to take into account such wider rationalities and demands.

Even the rationality of a special-purpose library, as far as we can see it as a library, would contain something of the rationality of the library in general, however. We thus may wish to find the rationality of its own and as such of L&Lship, which we perhaps should not subordinate to some occasional contextual rationality. As far as the rationality of L&Lship in general is the issue, we should consider it in view of widest possible cultural, social, and political perspectives, without narrowing it by subordinating too hastily its rationality entirely to some particular even if perhaps most legitimate and valuable purposes, such as advancing knowledge as a resource.

### 10.1 Summarizing the answers to the (quasi-)Kantian question: existential necessities and (politico-ethically preferable) options

Quite shortly, an answer to my (quasi-)Kantian question could be that the cultural, social, and political philosophy of L&Lship consists of the following elements.

- (1) The Gadamerian hermeneutics would be the primary foundation of the educational rationality of L&Lship on behalf of *scriptum est*
- (2) The footnotes to (1) the foundation of which we could find within Ricoeurian hermeneutics would be the starting point of the bibliographically literary rationality of L&Lship primarily about *scriptum est*, though, in some respect, we perhaps should go beyond Ricoeur even.

- (3) Republicanist—even Hegelian-republicanist—political theory and philosophy would add to the foundations of the educational rationality with its primary foundation in (1)
- (4) My agnostic republicanism with liberal—if not actually liberalist—footnotes or reminders to (3) and with its affinity with (2) would further accentuate the primacy of the rationality of L&Lship about *scriptum est*.

We should still notice that the foundation of the educational rationality in (1) was actually my primary motivation to proceed to (2). The common element in hermeneutics—whether Ricoeurian or Gadamerian—is that history matters.

Concluding from hermeneutics of Ricoeur and Gadamer, two conditions would necessarily be present as something that we can denote as existential necessities in the constitution of the being of the humans. As there is the tension between these two necessities, a third existential condition as well should be there.

- (1) With both Gadamer and Ricoeur, the belonging of a human to the history and his or her cultural traditions and the community that such belonging-to creates appear as an inevitable condition of the being of the humans.
- (2) With Ricoeur, distance as well is a primordial element and thus an inevitable condition of the being of the humans. My Cartesian epilog (Section 9.4) particularly would fortify this.
- (3) Assuming as necessities both (1) and (2), we further must assume that the dialectics between distanciation and belonging-to as well is a necessary condition of being of the humans, as there is a tension, possibly even a conflict, between them and we could not reduce either of them off.

Contrasted to these, we probably cannot consider as existential necessities the premises within political theory and philosophy. Politics, by definition, has to do with what necessarily is not as it is (cf. Aristotle’s preliminary remark on the notion of practice, Section 1.2.3). In this sense, neither republicanism nor my agnostic republicanism would deserve the status of necessities. Then again, we should remind that the latter is a footnote to the former or even a reminder only within the former. We thus could see the necessities and preferabilities here as follows.

- Republicanism as a preferable option because of its foundation in an existential necessity of belonging-to and further, because of its capacity to indicate

how justice could actually become reality, the latter part of the argument being more typically an argument based on preferability alone.

- Agnostic republicanism with the liberal footnotes or reminders would be a preferable option because of its foundation in caring about the rights of the individual citizens particularly. Even here, however, we could see some foundation in what we could see as existential necessities as well, such as the inevitability of the distances and alienation as the conditions of our being as humans, according to Ricoeur.

A remark would here be in place in view of Kauppi's notion of library anthropology and especially the element of philosophical anthropology in it. Our belonging to history and traditions (with both Gadamer and Ricoeur) as well as the inevitability of distances, distancing, and alienation (particularly with Ricoeur) would obviously have relevance in view of philosophical anthropology. We could say the same about the option that we can trust in people's capacity of genuine solidarity—even if to a degree only, perhaps.

A way to see what I am suggesting here is to consider it as a philosophy of the 'in-betweens', a philosophy going on, for instance,

- between the being of a human as individuals and 'as one of us', the latter as a reservation that the individual should not ignore in his or her individuality, and
- between formal though abstract and what we could characterize as substantial or even organic, the former being a prerequisite for realization and maintenance some particular, yet quite noteworthy politico-ethical ends and ideals, for instance, and the latter being related to matters like *Bildung* and concrete promotion of justice.

An important point in these 'betweens' is that we should neither ignore nor make absolute either of the ends. Rather, both of them typically can express something most important and consequently, there would always be a dialectics—a Ricoeurian kind of dialectics or a dialectics without a strong and unproblematically all-reconciling synthesis or *Aufhebung*, I would assume.



## 10.2 Primarily about, then plausibly on behalf of *scriptum est*, or the bibliographically educational rationality *sui generis* of L&Lship

While the constitution of the rationality of IM/KM would have an objective as the center of gravity, the foundation of the rationality of L&Lship, in my view, would be the point of departure or the beginning, in a sense. This point of departure would be the existence of literature and *scriptum est* as parts of our historical, cultural, social, and even political environment and reality and consequently, as a part of the constitution of our concrete historical condition in a literary culture. I would not even try to answer here the question of what the literature itself is for. It is a fact that there is literature with *scriptum est* as its product and at this point, this is enough.

The practice of IM/KM would be a practice for an aim, a practice about ‘what so ever’ that can contribute to knowledge as a resource. The practice of L&Lship as I see it, in turn, would be a practice about a point of departure, about *scriptum est* and for whatever to which *scriptum est* could contribute. The different ways of defining different practices could then reflect the essential differences of the rationalities of the practices themselves. Figure 12 illustrates the constitutions of the rationalities of both of the practices from this point of departure. If we do not exclude the fundamental and constitutive history from our understanding of our cultural, social, and political being, the both ways of defining a particular practice are equally intelligible.

The practice of	
<b>L&amp;Lship</b>	<b>about <i>scriptum est</i></b> → for → nearly → what → so ever
<b>IM/KM</b>	nearly → what → so → ever → for knowledge becoming into and <b>developing as a resource</b>

Fig. 12. The rationalities of L&Lship and of IM/KM contrasted

At this point, finally, I can specify further the relationship between those two thematic expressions that even the main title of this treatise contains, i.e., the notions *about* and *on behalf of scriptum est*.


- The literary and bibliographic rationality of L&Lship about *scriptum est*, with the obligation of *scriptum est* as its maxim in the sense of a criterion of truth, is the fundamental rationality of L&Lship.
- Then, however, I would say that the educational—or *Bildung*-educational, we could say because of the foundation for this particular kind of educational comes from Gadamer—rationality of L&Lship on behalf of *scriptum est* is a plausible complement to the fundamental rationality as defined above.

Figure 13 illustrates this while also indicating the plausibility of the Gadamerian *Bildung*-educational rationality and the option of several other rationalities. We should notice, further, that in the course of my argumentation above the option of the Gadamerian *Bildung*-educational rationality was the one that made intelligible the bibliographic L&Lship about *scriptum est* as well. The bibliographic rationality was no more mere *ars gratia artis* since there would be a noteworthy and even noble cause that it could serve. Then again, we can have even other ways to legitimize L&Lship with the bibliographic rationality.

We could specify further the foundations of plausibility of the educational rationality on behalf of *scriptum est* as an addition to the rationality of L&Lship about *scriptum est*

- The relatively formal fact that the library contains *scriptum est* always having its origin in past—in a closer or more remote past and in this sense, in any case, belonging to what the history has handed down to us—would make it plausible to extend the rationality of L&Lship towards the educational on behalf of *scriptum est*.
- The first argument becomes even stronger if we take into account that our dependency on what the history has handed down to us as suggested by Gadamer approaches something that we can characterize as an existential condition.

What I have summarized here would be the literary and bibliographically educational rationality of L&Lship about and on behalf of *scriptum est*, and even for the communities, societies, and the state.



**Fig. 13. The possible intelligible rationalities of the library in view of the restricted and wider perspectives**

As regards the notion of bibliography, further, we should keep in mind its openness towards *scriptum est* itself. If we considered even collection as telling about *scriptum est* (see Section 2.4), then bibliography would not be only the production of catalogs or knowledge about *scriptum est* in some other form. It would be clarifying to think that bibliography as such is knowledge about *scriptum est* and the responsibility and educational content of its own of L&Lship while *scriptum est* is the Great Teacher in the library and the most substantial educational content within the library would be the content of *scriptum est*. Then again, these two aspects of the educational rationality of L&Lship come quite close to each other and the options to consider the collection as well as an instance of the bibliography would emphasize this.

A particular merit of my scant determination of the rationality of the L&Lship in terms of ‘about’ is that it leaves space open for several ‘fors’. In Figure 13, the option of viewing *scriptum est* as a *res publica literaria* would still come relatively close to the educational rationality of L&Lship on behalf of *scriptum est*. It actually would be the addition that I have been discussing extensively in Part II of this treatise. The option of viewing as a resource the library and what it contains would also be quite legitimate—as far as we are not considering it as the only possibly intelligible option.

Neither should we as (meta)theorists of L&Lship fix the aims and ends of L&Lship in an overly hasty manner within research related to the library. While investigating a library of an ancient monastery or religious school, it could be a mistake to project there the idea of L&Lship for knowledge, particularly if one took the very notion of knowledge from the modern, technological culture and society. In such an ancient religious context, one should assume that what the library contains can be an authority—even in a sense quite different from the authority that Gadamer is rehabilitating. On this level, further, considerations on possible actual preferability of some particular rationality would already be beyond what a library theorist or LID-scholar should try to do. Neither are the library theorists and LID-scholars the persons who could say whether the manner in which those in the monastery viewed some text was rational or not. Even if sociologizing the very problematic of rationality, this reasoning, as a subordinate argument in some particular instance, could have some relevance.<sup>557</sup>

I believe that what I am suggesting here would provide the practice of L&Lship with a sound and firm foundation of a realistic and, at least, somehow reasonable cultural and social task and identity. It would also indicate the fundamental direction of expertise that the profession should cultivate. It should focus on literature in the sense of the instance where works and documentation combine and *scriptum est* as the products of literature. With such a focus, further, it should exercise bibliographic practices and scholarship, aiming at knowledge about *scriptum est*, above all.

Most concretely the obligation of *scriptum est* would be an obligation if we consider *scriptum est* as the responsibility of L&Lship in the social division of

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<sup>557</sup> Within library politics as well, it would be most beneficial to consider the variety of possible ‘fors’ and even rationalities in a wider sense, as it can be a means of avoiding a ‘hidden acceptance’ of some singular option as self-evidently the only one that could be intelligible and a consequent exclusion of the other options.

cultural labor. We could think that what the literature in the wide sense of the notion as a combination of works and documentation is a part of the cultural infrastructure of the society—and perhaps a part of the existence of the Hegelian state even. We should then consider *scriptum est*, not only as merchandise but also as something that should be in ‘public care’, so to speak. The ‘(public) care’ of *scriptum est* could qualify even as a definition for the (publicly maintained) library, which would be consistent with my minimalist-phenomenal definition of the library as the place where the books are or *scriptum est* is.

In this sense, however, the vagueness of the notions of literature, *scriptum est*, and work, particularly, could be a problem since the responsibility for something with very fuzzy borderlines would be problematic. The notions of literature and *scriptum est* can become extensionally sharper, however, if we consider particular fields of literature, or literatures in the plural, with fields of *scriptum est* as their products, instead of using the notion in quite an abstract and comprehensive manner in the singular (see Section 1.1.3). The notion of work within the scholarly literature, for instance, is already much more established than the notion of work in general. On a practical level of scholarship, for instance, one recognizes the works as publications that the academics list as merits in their *curricula vitae*<sup>558</sup>.

Then again, the move from the general notions of literature and *scriptum est* to particular literatures in the plural with their particular kinds of *scriptum est* could modify the problem of the ambiguity of the notion of literature into a problem of arbitrariness of enumeration in the different literatures about which we should and have reason to mind. What particular literatures and fields of *scriptum est* are so important that the (publicly maintained) library should recognize them? Furthermore, we should ask who or what instance would have the authority to define such importance?<sup>559</sup>

In the beginning of this treatise, I made a distinction between the inner historical substance of L&Lship and the outer history of it. At this point, we could see

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<sup>558</sup> Even forms of documentation within such particular fields are relatively established even if also changing. The scientific journal, for instance, has maintained a plenty of its forms while moving to digital forms from printing.

<sup>559</sup> One could claim that the notion of L&Lship that I have been elaborating here would make the library an archive. I actually could admit this. Even then, however, the particularity of the library would be that it would be a literary archive. I have used in several instances the national collection of a national library as the paradigm but my claim is that even of other libraries, the special-purpose libraries, as I have denoted them—would have as moments of their rationality something of the rationality of the national collection.

how the inner historical substance is prominent particularly in the primary rationality of L&Lship *about scriptum est*. The educational rationality on behalf of *scriptum est* as a most plausible complement to the fundamental bibliographically literary rationality as well as the other intelligible ‘fors’, then, would already be a matter of what we could denote as library policy, which, in turn, would belong to the outer history of L&Lship. Drawing from my argumentation until here, we could see how the inner historical substance as a part of our historical, cultural, and political reality would warrant a somewhat cautious attitude within the library politics as well. Because of its substantial historical content, the practice of L&Lship can be for a plenty of different valuable goals. Then again, by pursuing carelessly whatever new ‘fors’ there could be—and have some ‘market value’, perhaps—could destroy the library itself, its inner substance, or the ‘picture’ of the historical reality of *scriptum est*. Such carelessness could destroy the very asset, which the library has and by which L&Lship could advance such a variety of culturally and socially valuable goals.

### **10.3 Complementary remarks on the materialities of the library and literature(s)**


So far, I have not paid very much attention to the concretely social or, we could say, socio-material realities related to L&Lship, neither to their historical evolution. I shall neither here add very much in this respect.

The notion of materiality, of course, is somewhat problematic but in addition to socio-material, there can be what we could denote as the techno-material environments and substances within and around the practice of L&Lship. These specifications of the notion of materiality perhaps help us to overcome some problems and vagueness of the notion itself of materialities.

Especially the techno- and socio-material aspects of L&Lship can also lead us back to the question that we left open at the end of Section 1.1.3, the question of how universally valid and relevant the notion of L&Lship as a practice about *scriptum est* could be even in the future. I shall end this treatise by some comments on the so-called “Gutenberg parenthesis”, on the idea that literature in the form that we for some hundred years are used to see would remain a parenthesis only in the long run of history. The assumption could be even that information and communication technological innovations would lead us back to something that reminds the pre-literary culture. (See Section 10.3.2.)

### 10.3.1 Practical, political, and technical in the library and literature

Figure 14 depicts the practice of L&Lship in terms of three fundamental dimensions the foundation of which is in Habermas' triad of the interests of knowledge and of fundamental social and cultural spheres of (i) technology, (ii) history and language, and (iii) politics. Further, the triad of technical, practical and political as regards the library has as its foundation the literature or *scriptum est* where we, once again, can recognize the same aspects or dimensions.



**Fig. 14. Practical, political, and technical in L&Lship and in literature and *scriptum est***

As regards the library as well as literature, it is plausible to consider that the fundamental functionality of both of them has to do with the reproduction of culture, with the practical interest of culture and traditions reproducing themselves, already in the light of the hermeneutical philosophy in general. Yet, there may be

critical questions as well as regards the traditions and authority. This leads us to the political or power related fundamental dimension of both the library and the literature or *scriptum est*. Authority especially is a political matter as well, related to power and domination even. Then again, there can be a community without much of criticism, but there can be no community without some moment of the commonness of traditions and authority—or, we could say, without at least some ‘common credo’. A community without it would simply be no community at all.

We further can say that linguistic or semiotic in a sense falls between the practical or the reproduction of culture related, on one hand, and technical in the sense of the capacity of producing some particular and assumingly useful effects, on the other. Language as such is an even privileged moment of practical. We could say that the way in which a language ‘lives’ and exists is an example *par excellence* of what Gadamer calls the effective history. Further, as the world that we can understand, the language is the substance of tradition and authority as well. It is not only that one needs language and linguistic skills to learn to know the traditions, but the language in itself is what the history has handed down to us or, we could say, the heritage. A language exists, on the other hand, only once generations one after another appropriate and use it. As a materialized form of tradition, on the other hand, language allows technical manipulation. Language allows processing masses of text by a computer, a search of texts with particular physical features like presence of some string of characters, and calculations based on such physical features, for instance. We can manipulate language and linguistic materials and we can manipulate by the language even. In this sense, the language also relates to the technical sphere of the production of effects.

Between the technical and the political, we can position a further aspect that is inevitably present in the real social life. We can conceive of institutions and organizations as allocations of resources for producing some influences. Obviously, the library as an institution also would be such an allocation, and we thus can talk about institutional or “bureaucratic librarianship”, to use an expression of Birdsall<sup>560</sup>. The libraries typically consist of considerable amounts in a way or other materially existing instances of *scriptum est*. The library typically has rooms and buildings or perhaps computer hardware to store *scriptum est* as well as other equipment needed. Behind all this, further, a library would have some money or a budget. All this has its foundation in relationships that we can call socio-material

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<sup>560</sup> Birdsall 1994, 95 ff.



or quasi-material, especially in ownership or in relationships that remind ownership.

Since the institutional or bureaucratic L&Lship especially contains aspects that I have not so far discussed, a few further remarks are in place here. Having resources at use enables a librarian or library profession to cause effects. Birdsall, while arguing against what he calls the “myth of electronic library”, writes most insightfully:

Like other personal service professionals, librarians gain much of whatever professional status and power they do possess because of, not despite, their attachment to the library as a bureaucracy.<sup>561</sup>

Birdsall here is commenting on professionals “sympathetic to the idea of the deinstitutionalization of librarianship promoted by the electronic library myth-makers” and willing to get rid of the library institution<sup>562</sup>. Thus, he gives the librarians as well an advice:

Neither through the electronic library nor by any other means will librarians increase their professional status by trying to become more like the autonomous medical practitioner; rather, physicians are joining the overwhelming number of professionals found in bureaucracies.<sup>563</sup>

In terms of my concept of the library, the collection or otherwise accessible instances of *scriptum est* would be the most substantial part of the resource allocated to the library. Bibliography incorporating knowledge about *scriptum est* would come right thereafter. This, however, is not so much in terms of the monetary values of collection and bibliography compared to the other kinds of resources. Especially if we consider the collection and bibliographic work on it, on the other hand, we can say that the collection that already exists is even in view of its monetary value the most valuable part of the collection. This is the case especially if we consider the bibliographic and other work incorporated in it, in addition to the money needed to purchasing the material. What one can do with a collection dur-

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<sup>561</sup> Birdsall 1994, 96.

<sup>562</sup> Birdsall 1994, 98. Not without irony, he further describes how the ideas of “deinstitutionalization” take as an ideal the professions like medicine, assumingly free of institutional bounds and autonomous in this sense. Birdsall then remarks that this indeed was the case with medical professionals—in the earlier 19<sup>th</sup> century. In a modern society with its modern hospitals, however, there is a strong tie between those institutions and practicing the medical professions.(Op. cit. 96 ff.)

<sup>563</sup> Birdsall 1994, 98.

ing one year, for instance, is always only a tiny addition to the value of the already existing. Fostering should be a major part of what the library does.

Seemingly, but only seemingly, opposed to what Birdsall writes—as well as opposed to my claim that L&Lship could have a rationality *sui generis*—is the following, in my view quite insightful remark by Marjatta Okko, the first professor of library and information science nominated to the position (in 1977) in Finland.

I understand librarianship as a kind of scholarship. It is a mode of thinking and acting, which, for its particularity, has evolved into a profession.<sup>564</sup>

Okko then proceeds to tell how we can find instances of the same mode of thinking and acting even elsewhere, in administration, in organizations, etc.

What Okko writes could actually enlarge the sphere of my notion of the bibliographic continuum (see Section 5.5) over the borderlines of the profession and institution itself in another manner, in addition to the communication between the professionals and their clients in reference interviews, for instance. This actually would be quite consistent with my own search for the rationality of L&Lship in Gadamerian hermeneutics the result of which would be that the rationality of L&Lship would be the rationality of belonging to the history and culture. Who of us would not belong to the history or traditions—particularly if we take into account what Gadamer is teaching? In this sense, L&Lship has not its particularity through a sharp difference from other people around it. In view of a trade union activist, of course, this can be somewhat problematic. Then again, the most sustainable way of ‘marketing’ a profession could be to ‘market’ it as it actually is. By the side of this, further, we must remind the close connection between the library institution and librarianship, which can sharpen the professional identity in spite of the lack of sharp lines of demarcation between the profession and other people.

In my view, further, the particular mode of thinking and acting characterizing librarianship and constituting its identity would be the bibliographic mode of acting and thinking characteristic of L&Lship about *scriptum est*. This already is certainly something particular. Drawing from my wide notion of bibliography, I

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<sup>564</sup> Okko 1987, 107 (transl. by VS from the following: ”Käsitätän kirjastonhoitajuuden oppineisuuden lajiksi. Se on ajattelu- ja toimintatapa, joka erityisyytensä ansiosta on kehittynyt ammatiksi”). This tiny remark by Okko, since she wrote it, has actually encouraged me to think about L&Lship in terms of a professional practice with scholarly elements and a practice-oriented scholarship, these two then converging with each other (see, for instance, Suominen 1986).

would even say that there is a plenty—and possibly enough—of particularity for one profession.

### **10.3.2 A warning of another kind of alienation based on the illusions of immediacy: a future-oriented epilog**

If we conceive of L&Lship as a practice about *scriptum est* by which I here mean the products of literature, the whole rationality and even existence of the library has its foundation in literature, in its cultural and social significance, in its developments, etc. Related to literature and *scriptum est* that it has produced as well, there are—similarly to the dimensions of L&Lship—technical, practical, and political as well as the intermediate common credo related and critical, linguistic or semiotic, and institutional or bureaucratic moments (see Figure 14). Publishing houses and agents on book market too are allocations of resources<sup>565</sup>. Literature and *scriptum est* contribute to the reproduction of culture and society and may support or challenge prevailing views, and publishing houses do have an influence through the kinds of literature they publish—probably even a stronger influence than the libraries. Finally, the products published, then perhaps sold and bought as merchandise, are linguistic and semiotic: they participate in cultural reproduction and furthermore, they have commercial and technical characteristics.

We could say that the library as I have been elaborating the notion here ‘rests on’ *scriptum est* and literature. A consequence of this is that the sustainability of the concept of the library about *scriptum est*—the ‘eternal’ library as I characterized it at the beginning of this treatise—is dependent on the possible developments of literature itself.

During its enormously long history, the library has been a place where one has collected and preserved instances of *scriptum est* as physically separate objects, as papyrus *volumina*, or as codices, be the codex a manuscript or a printed book, and then later, even in other forms, such as film tapes, microfilms, music recordings in various formats, etc. The era of the Internet has brought some quite substantial further forms and options. Instances of *scriptum est* can be ‘present’ in the library without being physically there in the sense that they earlier had to be. As a conclusion of this, one has suggested, for instance, that the role and task of the library would move towards “organizing knowledge”, i.e. bibliographic work

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<sup>565</sup> Allocation here, however, could have the character of an investments or accumulation of profit.

or the production of ‘metadata’, for instance, since the task of building collections of physically separable objects would lose its significance. Yet, we actually could quite well see a particular task for the library that remains quite close to the classical and traditional task of constructing such collections. In the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, we do not see many signs suggesting that the position of ownership would be weakening. Ownership and the ‘work of owning’, on the other hand, could be rather similar to the earlier task of collecting physically and preserving objects containing *scriptum est* to and in some premises.

In any case, the changes that digitalization in the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is bringing to our documentary environment deserve some further attention—even if argumentation on this matter inevitably remains highly speculative. Lars Ole Sauerberg, a Danish scholar of literature, formulates as follows his thesis of “Gutenberg parenthesis”.

It is becoming increasingly likely that from the perspective of a not too distant future the period from the late Renaissance to the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century will be seen as dominated and even defined by the cultural significance of print—not least in the form of the mass-produced book which is virtually synonymous with Western culture. It accordingly seems appropriate to designate this period, roughly corresponding to the half-millennium from 1500 to 2000, “the Gutenberg Parenthesis”.<sup>566</sup>

The claim is that many of the features that we now have used to connect to the literature would not remain, and the whole position of text, not only of literature, would be in change. Starting from my notion of literature as the place where documentation and works combine, we can make some remarks.

Within Saureberg’s argument, technological development would be the major factor in the change. I would not here take any stance as regards whether technology could be the most important factor, a factor among others only, or even merely a factor in addition to other, more important factors. Yet, it seems to me sound to avoid the extreme called technological determinism.

First, of course, we should ask whether there was any sense in making the notion of literature dependent on the notion of a printed codex. In the spirit of Gadamer, then, we could think that historicity is an inevitable part and even an existential necessity in our cultural and social being. Sauerberg, however, formulates his argument in terms of *disappearance or decrease of the significance of temporality*. He predicts a move from diachrony to synchrony.

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<sup>566</sup> Sauerberg 2009, 2.

Even though digitalized media offer facilities for continuing the diachronic dimension—and to a large extent still do so by imitating the familiar book medium—it is in the nature of IT to apply a synchronic perspective in a pattern of simultaneity.<sup>567</sup>

What Sauerberg claims could actually lead to a view—in my view, to an illusionary view—of a simple continuum of masses of messages here and now within which the individuals are looking at, interpreting, selecting, criticizing, constructing, and participating in the knowledge and understanding that is evolving within the flows of messages. About authority, Sauerberg writes as follows.

Whereas authority during the Gutenberg Parenthesis rested on the mastery of the accumulated canon of wisdom lodged in books (in Bacon’s words, books were “ships of time” bearing precious cargo through the ages), beyond the closing of the parenthesis authority will lie with those mastering the permutations of iconography under the aegis of the permanence of change. Experience—“wisdom”—is no longer in demand, because experience is always already and simultaneously accessible.<sup>568</sup>

There would only be a kind of all-comprehending universal immediacy and actuality of a most fragmentary, multi-dimensional, and even entirely formless multitude of messages—perhaps even of mere trivialities, or, at the best, of pieces of knowledge in a sense or another. Sauerberg and the idea of the post-Gutenberg culture could continue the tradition of encyclopedic ideas that have appeared typically in times of infatuation with unforeseen technological marvels—even if within what Sauerberg is talking about, there perhaps would be no systematic encyclopedic order<sup>569</sup>.

We probably should think, however, that the core of the Sauerberg’s argument is a claim about a proportional, but also substantial change, rather than a claim of a sudden and absolute disappearance of something and appearance of something else. The Gutenbergian book culture would have ever less significance and another culture of undifferentiated flow of communication would become increasingly dominant, as an effect of the new technologies that allow us to reach simultaneously so much. We can see similarly relative changes even earlier. There certainly was literature with the authors producing it already before Gutenberg, It belonged, however, to the life of quite a small minority of people. During the

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<sup>567</sup> Sauerberg 2009, 13.

<sup>568</sup> Sauerberg 2009, 13.

<sup>569</sup> We can find similar ideas with Otlet’s “monographic principle” (see Section 2.7[b])

Gutenberg era, the books and literary erudition became increasingly a part of the life of wider populations. The demand of masses of at least somehow educated workers within the development of industrialized societies fortified, perhaps even caused this development. The emergence of comprehensive schooling systems as well was a part of this.

Then again, in spite of the invention of things like the Internet, the world and society have probably not become simpler than they used to be—particularly in view of all their technological, political, social, etc. structures, differentiation, specification, sophistication, etc. The case probably is quite the opposite, in many respects. Consequently, neither has the demand for education of and sophisticated understanding with those who have actual responsibility of the society disappeared. Then, however, we may ask if such possibly even literary education for wider spheres of the population would be necessary within the post-industrial society anymore. While ‘seriously’ productive work demands fewer people than earlier, perhaps the wide and comprehensive education of the population is not necessary anymore. Could it be enough to have educated technocratic elite, while the rest of people could be only consuming and entertaining themselves with various forms of new media? Here, however, the question would become in quite a serious sense political as well.

We should notice further that neither literature nor the library can have any monopoly of knowledge or *Bildung*—let alone a monopoly of beauty, morality, holy, fun, etc. Ultimately, however, my argumentation here appeals to the measures and scales. The thesis of the “Gutenberg parenthesis” and the “post-Gutenberg era” has a resemblance to Marshall McLuhan’s notions of “Gutenberg galaxy” and “global village”<sup>570</sup>. McLuhan as well probably intends to pinpoint metaphorically some rather relative trends. In a spirit of a thought experiment, if not otherwise, however, we could remark that there could be no village with over seven billion inhabitants. The reality is quite remote from the immediacy on which the metaphor of village could rest.

Sauerberg himself as well actually notices—as we saw in the quotation above—that in this respect, there is continuity. Without making too much violence to Ricoeur, we probably can talk about distances in complexity, in scale, or in number as well. Earth’s population of over seven billion humans as such—or even the modest population of the little more than five million Finns—would

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<sup>570</sup> See, for instance, McLuhan 1962, 31.

constitute a noteworthy distance, in view of an individual person or a small community and the immediacy that is possible for them.

In this sense, immediacy as well, or the illusion of the universal immediacy that we could reach, may be a form of alienation. It would be alienation from the fact that alienating distance as such is inevitably present in our being. The illusion of seeing the whole of the humanity like one can see one's own family and the neighborhood is an alienating illusion since it means that one is alienated from the social reality and its inevitable mediateness. A plenty of what actually matters is at distance only, in a sense or another.<sup>571</sup>

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<sup>571</sup> Here again, we have an option of rather speculative reason the ultimate foundation of which would be in Cartesian thought (see Section 9.4). I would not claim that what I shall suggest here would correspond to how the matter shaped in the mind of Descartes actually. In the Gadamerian spirit of application, however, some purely conceptual speculation as well could have a justification.

The notion of distance in the sense in which it appears with Ricoeur particularly marks the difference between him and Gadamer. There is a logical connection between the notions of distance and extension and we could see in this sense some further connection to Descartes's notion of *res extensa*. Ricoeur talks about quite concrete distances as well, such as distance in space or time, even if the notion with him refers also to other, more abstract kinds of distances. Without extension, however, there could be no distances—particularly no distances in the concrete sense—which Ricoeur emphasizes as a fundamental constituent of our being as humans. While considering more distances that are more abstract, we perhaps should also consider extensions of more abstract kinds. In any case, we perhaps could conceive of Descartes's notion of *res extensa* and particularly the notion of extension there in a rather literary sense. It would not appear so much as an attribute of what we characterize as 'material', but as the very definition of what we can encounter as objects while being a human individual and subject, i.e. essentially a will that is making judgments of the ideas of understanding.

My most substantial and concrete argument against the futurologist speculations discussed here relates to scale of human life and to size of human culture and societies. Whatever we can say about distance, we can say about sizes and scales in this respect as well. Derived from *res extensa* with Descartes, then, extension could thus become the determinant of the very notion of an object, and it would become quite concrete once we take into account the option that within extensions, there can be distances and scales that go beyond our reach. Objectivity, then, would mean simply whatever can go beyond the reach—be it physical, intellectual, or something else—of a subject.

A different matter, yet partly related to my first argument here, could be that something is 'behind us' in the sense that it is an integral part of our constitution as subjects. It could be the Gadamerian traditions or the Cartesian God, for instance. If we could exhaustively conceive of such realities, in terms of explanation, for instance—we should ask whether there remained any space for the subject any more. I could find as quite a plausible point of departure that if we as humans are not omnipotent, we would encounter something that is beyond our reach, be it only temporarily or even forever. If blamed for Cartesianism, however, I perhaps should confess my guilt.

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